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“Aus blosem Verstande kömmt keine 
Philosophie, denn Philosophie ist mehr, 
denn nur die beschränkte Erkenntniß des 
Vorhandnen” (Hölderlin, 1957, 3: 83).  
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The project  
The central argument of this thesis is that, contrary to what is generally believed, Critical 
Theory (CT) – as understood by the Frankfurt School (FS) – does exist and is developed in 
Spain influenced by and parallel to the Frankfurt School’s own research during the second 
half of the twentieth century1. Hence, the aim of this research is to provide evidence of the 
existence in Spain of thought developed in line with Frankfurtian CT. To this end, we shall 
explore the thought developed by three leading Spanish thinkers: José Luis López 
Aranguren, María Zambrano Alarcón, and Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate. This will be 
done from the perspective of two pivotal currents of thought arising from Germany: neo-
Marxism and Heideggerian thought. By doing so, not only will this research draw attention 
to the much overlooked issue of CT in Spain, but it will also help to re-contextualize 
Spanish thought of the second half of the twentieth century in the broader sociological and 
philosophical discussions which were taking place in post-war Europe and the United 
States. To this end, the thesis has been structured in two parts. The aim of the first part is to 
provide an introduction as well as a methodological and historical contextualization which 
will establish the framework for the rest of the thesis. In the second part, I will carry out an 
interdisciplinary comparative study analysing which aspects of the thought of these Spanish 
thinkers converge with the thought of the FS, and which differ from them. Attention will 
also be paid to the socio-political atmosphere they are immersed in, so as to find out how it 
contributes to shape their thought. 
We will start this chapter by framing this research within the field of the history of 
ideas, thus an introduction to what constitutes the history of ideas will ensue. This will be 
followed by an examination of what can be understood by CT in the context of the FS and 
how the FS developed it. A brief history of how the thought of the FS filtered in Spain will 
also be provided. Finally, the methodology and structure of this thesis will be discussed. 
                                                
1 The components of the FS are, originally, the members of the Institut für Sozialforschung or Institute 
for Social Research, who soon emigrate to the United States as a result of the threat of Nazism. There, 
and from a Marxist and Freudian platform, they develop their CT. Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and 
even Pollock form the core of the Institut. Fromm, Benjamin, Neumann, and Kirchheimer are also 
integral members, although their focus and association with the School differs from the members above 
mentioned, and as a result are sometimes described as being on the periphery. Habermas heads the 
second wave of this current of thought (for a brief history and reflection on the term “Frankfurt School” 
see Heller, 2002: 207; see also Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 225-26). 
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Thus, I would like to start this introduction by pointing out to the reader some 
methodological decisions which have largely shaped not only my approach to the topic of 
discussion, but also the conclusions reached. That is why it must be highlighted from the 
outset that this research, although it shares some points of confluence with literary criticism, 
does not fall under this discipline. Instead, it has been undertaken from the perspective of 
the history of ideas. Therefore, this will be reflected in the premises and methodology 
adopted, which are largely informed by Quentin Skinner’s work. 
As Elizabeth Ann Clark explains, “the history of ideas achieved prominence in 
twentieth-century America under the aegis of Arthur O. Lovejoy” (2004: 107). Lovejoy 
argues that systems of thought are structured around key words and concepts which he 
refers to as “unit-ideas”. In order to trace these unit-ideas, he argues that research must be 
interdisciplinary and must take into account an expanded literary cannon which extends to 
different countries and incorporates linguistic research (see Clark, 2004: 107). During the 
1960s, however, this approach has been criticized for stressing excessively formal thought 
and written texts, and adopting an “unhistorical” perspective (see Ritter, 1986: 236). A 
contrasting view argues that “social history is the necessary complement to the history of 
ideas” (Holborn, 1972: 208). It is from this perspective that Hajo Holborn points to Dilthey 
as the father of the history of ideas (1972: 203; see also Ritter, 1986: 237). Skinner, 
however, is critical of both approaches. For him, the term history of ideas refers to “as wide 
as possible a variety of historical inquiries into intellectual problems” (1969: 3). Whereas 
the two main – and conflicting – currents within the history of ideas insist, respectively, on 
the autonomy of the text to yield its own meaning and on interpreting the text according to 
its context, Skinner argues that both approaches are insufficient and that, instead, the history 
of ideas should interpret a text by interpreting the illocutionary intentions of its writer, as 
we shall discuss below (see 1969: 3-4, 45-46). From this perspective, contextual 
information will be used, not to interpret the text directly, but to contribute to elucidate the 
intentionality of its author. This is the methodological framework which this thesis is based 
on. Consequently, it will be explained below in greater detail.  
Kari Palonen starts his reflection on the thought and methodology of Quentin Skinner 
by drawing the reader’s attention to a “spontaneous remark made by Quentin Skinner”, 
which, notwithstanding, pinpoints the core of his approach: “there is an awful lot of books, 
and if our books are not going to say something new, then we certainly ought not to be 
publishing them. Forests tremble as it is at the onset of authors” (Palonen, 2003: 1; Skinner, 
2001: 21 respectively). This comment not only renders an analytical approach to exegesis 
unnecessary, but, crucially, also insufficient. It implies the desirability for interpretation to 
go beyond what is already said, beyond the text. That is why, in “A Reply to my Critics”, 
Skinner argues: 
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my objection is rather to those who assume that the business of understanding a text is simply a 
matter of recovering, by whatever means, the meaning of the text itself. This is the assumption [...] 
that I still wish to reject in the name of the need to recover, at the same time, what the author of the 
text may have meant by it (1988a: 282). 
As Palonen explains, Skinner’s methodology involves “the critique of empiricism 
and the authority of contemporary sources” (2003: 25). Whereas empiricists believe in the 
possibility of perceiving data directly and producing an uncontentious description of it, this 
premise must be questioned (see Skinner, 2002: 1, 8-26). As Skinner underscores, “we are 
already caught up in the process of interpretation as soon as we begin to describe any aspect 
of our evidence in our own words” (Skinner, 2002: 16). This is one of the reasons why in 
this thesis, while factual evidence is provided wherever possible, its evaluation takes place 
in the light of historical contextualization and intentionality, which play a considerable role 
in this research as we shall see in the course of this chapter. 
As Palonen argues, Skinner confronts the role of the academic emphasis placed upon 
truth in contrast with that of novelty, and as a consequence adopts a perspectivist view of 
knowledge (see Palonen, 2003: 1-2)2. It must be emphasized at the outset that this is 
precisely the methodology adopted in this research primarily because, as we shall see, CT 
adopts a similar approach of going beyond that which is. As a result, an analytical approach 
may result in the distortion of its thought. In contrast, adopting an approach which is in line 
with the methodological co-ordinates of CT not only can be considered to be a way of 
analysing it that does less violence to it, but more crucially, it avoids the pitfall of imposing 
an external framework of rationality as the guiding reference for the analysis of the work of 
Critical Theorists. For this reason, this methodology explores the role that biography and 
intentionality play in shaping the language, style, and content of Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre’s writings. Thus, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of these 
authors’s work and it reveals aspects of their thought which may otherwise go unnoticed. 
What is more, I argue that this is precisely what happens in relation to the thought of 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, whose subversive and political content and their 
possible relation to CT have been overlooked until now. 
As a result of this methodological choice, this introduction will not only provide an 
overview of this thesis, a brief introduction to the FS and CT, and a justification for the 
choice of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre as the focus of this research, but it will also 
                                                
2 Although the word perspectivism in reference to Ortega’s thought will be discussed in chapter three, 
in this context, perspectivism refers to the lack of a unique objective criterion to regulate methodology 
regarding research. As Palonen puts it, “it is always possible and desirable to propose a number of 
different perspectives on the study of the ‘same’ phenomena. [...] There are no ‘objective’ criteria for 
assessing research except for the competition of the perspectives themselves. The significance and the 
validity of ‘facts’ can always be assessed differently when judged from another perspective” (2003: 2). 
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discuss in more detail the importance of biography and intentionality, and the role that they 
play in the thesis, thus resulting in an unavoidably lengthy introduction.  
 
1.2 The topic  
The term CT is coined by the members of the Frankfurt School while in exile at Columbia 
University in New York (see Kellner, 1989: 43). At first, as Douglas Kellner points out, this 
term is partly used as a form of code “in order to cover over its commitment to Marxism in 
an environment that is quite hostile to a theory associated with socialist revolution and the 
Soviet Union” (1989: 44). Despite the fact that initially “critical theory” denoted the work 
of the Institut and it is still closely associated with it, the use of this label has expanded to 
describe work of a critical nature, although quite varied in character, intention, and 
substance. It is with its original meaning, in reference to the FS, that this term will be used 
throughout this study, which is why henceforth it will be used in capitals3.  
According to Brian Fay, “‘critical theory’ means a substantive, neo-Marxist theory of 
advanced capitalism, whose parts have been propounded by some or all of the members of 
the Frankfurt School and its followers” (1987: 4). Its aim is to transform society as opposed 
to uncritically reproducing it; its target is the critique of instrumental reason and the 
denunciation of the new forms of alienation developed by neo-capitalist society in 
particular4. It can be characterized as a critical supradisciplinary discourse, expressed in a 
challenging language and style that require the active involvement of the reader (see 
Kellner, 1989: 1, 5-7, 46). As is well-known, instrumental reason refers to the framework of 
rationality according to which each object and each action is conceived and treated as a 
means and not as an end in itself. Although this concept is already developed in 
Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (1947b), the phrase “instrumental reason” first appears in 
Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft (1967), that is, the German translation of 
Horkheimer’s English original (see Carlebach, 1977: 639)5. There, it is argued that reason, 
as has been known and exercised since the Enlightenment, is ruled by exploitation, 
                                                
3 When referring to the School in this context, Horkheimer – its director – and Adorno represent the 
ideological centre of the School. As Agnes Heller puts it, “the cause of the Frankfurt School was the 
cause of Horkheimer” (2002: 220). 
4 As Frederic Jameson explains, “the new social formation in question no longer obeys the laws of 
classical capitalism, namely, the primacy of industrial production and the omnipresence of class 
struggle” (1991: 3). It is this advanced form of capitalism, which is devoid of class conscience and 
class struggle as such, that will be discussed throughout this thesis. 
5 Although the term “instrumental reason” was first used by Horkheimer, it is grounded on Max 
Weber’s concept of the “iron cage” to refer to the dead-end of modern reason, a reason which focuses 
only on the means and loses sight of the ends (see Weber, 1958: 181; see also Rasmussen, 2006: 266). 
As David Rasmussen explains, “Weber coined the term Zweckrationalität, purposive-rational action. 
Reason, devoid of its redemptive and reconciliatory possibilities, could only be purposive, useful and 
calculating” (2006: 266). This forms the basis for Horkheimer’s concept of instrumental reason. 
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productivity, and profitability criteria which have become ends in themselves (see 
Horkheimer, 1973: 21). That is why, far from being the kind of interpersonal, critical, and 
reflexive reason which would encourage the development of the individual6 and of the 
society he inhabits, it constitutes an instrumental form of rationality which in fact proves to 
be irrational insofar as it leads to different destructive – rather than constructive or creative 
– paths7. This rationality, guided by self-interested criteria, has equated utility with 
rationality, ultimately resulting in the subjugation of nature and the individual. More 
specifically, instrumental reason describes the use of reason, in the form of economy, 
communication, and cultural life with the purpose of social control (see Rasmussen, 2006: 
266). These are the dynamics of thought and action which CT uncovers and denounces, 
opening up new directions of research and, particularly, different methodologies in 
philosophical, sociological, and socio-political investigation. 
Understanding the role played by (neo-)Marxism and Heideggerian thought is of 
central importance because not only are they at the core of this debate, but their influence 
does not stop in Spain. Marxism in its different forms and Heideggerian thought have 
contributed to shaping to a large extent post-war European thought8. Marxism has played a 
key role in the development of socio-political and economic policies and behaviours in 
Western society throughout the twentieth century. Insofar as it promises an alternative 
socio-economic structure to capitalism, it has been perceived as a powerful and inspiring 
ideology by some, while also being regarded as a dangerous threat which we need to protect 
                                                
6 The terms “subject” or “individual” will be employed throughout the thesis as synonymous, despite 
the discussion their distinction has generated (see Bordwell, 1996: 15, 32). The reason for this choice 
lies, first, in the defence of the existence of the subject/individual in contrast with its disappearance, 
because without such a concept meaning and responsibility become impossible or, rather, non-
applicable (see Bruns, 2005: 364-65; see also Bordwell, 1996: 15 respectively); second, because it is 
argued that, in the context of CT, the terminology “subject” and “individual” are the reflection of the 
assumptions, behaviours, and roles as described and prescribed by instrumental rationality. These terms 
are, therefore, opposed to “person” which is considered to reflect, not the duality between subject and 
object or the separation between the individual and the others, but an integral role as an agent in society 
and culture. “Person” emphasizes the incomplete, social nature, and humanistic aspect of the agent, 
thus, overcoming the limitations of the terms “subject” and “individual”.  
7 As Stephen Bronner explains, for the FS, “technology generated under capitalism and its peculiar 
form of instrumental or scientific thinking increasingly undermines the reflective exercise of 
subjectivity. Moral judgment is understood as becoming increasingly subordinate to instrumental 
thinking, and, as a consequence, individuals appear threatened with the loss of their capacity for 
normative judgment” (2002: 223). It is because of this threat to the normative judgement of the 
individual and its consequences that instrumental reason is judged to be essentially irrational. In other 
words, it is an assessment made on moral grounds. It should also be noted that, for the FS and Adorno 
in particular, these consequences have materialized more clearly in the moral atrocities of Auschwitz 
(see Adorno, 2003: 19-36; see also Tiedemann, 2003: xi-xxvii; see also Horkheimer, 1947b: 161).  
8 Unless specifically stated otherwise, all references to Marxism throughout the thesis refer to classical 
Marxism, understood as the body of work published by Marx and Engels, in contrast with other forms 
of Marxism which arise from the different interpretations or reactions to such work, such as Soviet 
Marxism or neo-Marxism (see Storey, 2001: 47-49; see also Heywood, 2000: 64). 
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and defend ourselves from by others9. Thus, Marxism is of interest to this research not only 
because of the scope and relevance of its impact, but also because CT, although 
interdisciplinary in nature, must be understood within the framework of the renovation of 
the principles of the already then dated Marxism. On the other hand, phenomenology and 
Heideggerian thought must also be counted amongst the early influences on the thought of 
the FS. As Dermot Moran points out, “the Frankfurt School of Social Criticism […] 
developed largely in reaction to Heidegger, often juxtaposing the young Marx’s view of 
human alienation and domination by ideology against Heidegger’s account of man and the 
domination of technicity” (2000: 245). In fact, phenomenology and Heideggerian 
philosophy make an indelible impression on post-war European thought, also partly 
inspiring and influencing the development of French existentialism, and being at the very 
heart of postmodernism (for a more detailed account of Heidegger’s influence see Moran, 
2000: 245-47; see also Taylor, 1993: 317). 
There is ample evidence of the existence of links and of the critical engagement of 
Spanish thinkers with German thought and culture. As Juan López Morillas explains, “con 
su viaje de estudios a Alemania, en 1843-1844, Sanz del Río abre un período de 
incalculable trascendencia en la crónica del pensamiento y exploración de los valores de la 
cultura alemana en su triple dimensión filosófica, literaria y científica” (1956: 85; see also 
Ferrater Mora, 1982: 1879). In fact, Spanish thinkers have been particularly influenced by 
German thought since the introduction of Krausism by Julián Sanz del Río in the mid-
nineteenth century (see Velasco, 2003: 17)10. Krausism has been a movement of special 
                                                
9 Grounded on the Marxist tradition, for the members of the FS, “ideology, in short, is a ‘totalitarian’ 
system which has managed and processed all social conflict out of existence” (see Eagleton, 1991: 
127). This position is, of course, not without problems, for it unavoidably raises questions regarding 
how a critique of ideology would be thinkable and possible under such circumstances (see Eagleton, 
1991: 127). Terry Eagleton, aware of this difficulty, understands ideology instead as “the ways in 
which specific ideas help to legitimate unjust and unnecessary forms of political domination” (1991: 
167). Although it is important to highlight this negative meaning of the word “ideology”, for it will be 
relevant when discussing Marxist and neo-Marxist views, following Josh Beach, a broader definition of 
this term will be used (see Beach, 2005: 10, 14). It is necessary to acknowledge that every criticism and 
position comes from a certain ideology (see Beach, 2005: 13). In this sense, ideology is synonymous 
with world view, and, as such, is inescapable (Beach, 2005: 13). That is why Beach argues that “the 
study of ideology should not simply be a critical tool to identify and judge malignant institutions of 
power and the perversions of ideology, which promote or mystify injustice and inequality. It should 
also be about evaluating benevolent and empowering systems of thought as well as postulating new 
ideological worldviews” (2005: 14). 
10 Following Elías Díaz, two stages can be identified in the development of Krausist philosophy in 
Spain (1973: 48-49). The first period expands from the introduction of the ideas of Karl Christian 
Friedrich Kraus by Julián Sanz del Río from 1854 until the latter’s death in 1869 or until the restoration 
of Bourbon Monarchy in 1875 (1973: 48-49). It is focused on Kraus’s thought. Its central ideas are 
based on the concept of panentheism, as a result of which it is assumed that life and thought are ruled 
by a racionalismo armónico or harmonic rationalism, according to which reason is able to harmonize 
or find a synthesis between concepts perceived as oppositions, such as nature and spirit, body and soul, 
and individual and State (Abellán, 1984: 428, 440). Krausism also beliefs in the moral progress of 
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relevance because, as José Ferrater Mora explains, “el krausismo dejó pronto de ser un 
movimiento filosófico atenido a las ideas de Krause para convertirse en un movimiento de 
renovación espiritual y en particular educativa” (1982: 1879-80). As José Luis Abellán 
explains, Krausism is basically a metaphysical philosophy which, as it was assimilated by 
its followers, acquired a religious, moral, and practical dimension (1984: 413). In fact, the 
Krausist doctrine contributes to renovating cultural life, while also destabilizing previous 
patterns of thought to the point that it has a reinvigorating impact on the development of 
socio-political events in Spain (see 1984: 424). It is particularly crucial in understanding the 
influence of the second period of Krausism, which is led by Francisco Giner de los Ríos and 
revolves around the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, thus creating what has become known 
as krausinstitutionalism. According to Fernando Velasco, krausinstitutionalism, rather than 
an inflexible set of doctrines, becomes an “estado del alma”, a certain disposition shared by 
those who are seeking an extensive intellectual and moral renovation (1993: 336-37). It is 
largely on these romantic ideals of nation, nature, God, and the individual imported from 
German idealism that the Republic is built, for, as Sebastian Faber explains, “the 
ideological basis of the Second Republic is not Gramscian Marxism but the nineteenth-
century liberal tradition of Krausism” (2002: 64). This empathy towards the German 
cultural heritage is not an isolated position, but, in fact, a perceptible tendency during that 
period and the following years, which can also be observed in the influence that Nietzsche 
and also Schopenhauer had on the areas of philosophy and literature, particularly, on the 
authors of 98 (see Bretz, 2001: 126; see also Abellán, 1998: 13)11.  
                                                                                                                                       
humanity (Abellán, 1984: 428). Ethics play a pivotal role in the structure of Krausist thought, which 
can be observed in the importance placed in values such as sincerity and honesty (Abellán, 1984: 428-
29); this accounts for the prescriptive, and therefore, practical implications of this doctrine. The second 
period starts in 1876 when Francisco Giner de los Ríos – Julián Sanz del Río’s most salient follower – 
founds the Institución Libre de Enseñanza which, as a matter of fact, becomes an alternative University 
led by Krausists principles, resulting in what Velasco refers to as “krausinstitucionalismo” (see Díaz, 
1973: 49; see also Velasco, 1993: 336; 2003: 22; Faber, 2002: 76). Krausinstitucionalismo, framed 
within the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and still as a development of the ideas of Kraus, refers to the 
attempt to moralize social life and reinvigorate Spanish thought (Velasco, 1993: 11). Its position rests 
upon three pivotal points: freedom as the pre-requisite of moral life and of science, consciousness as a 
guiding principle, and reason as the path towards truth (Velasco, 1993: 27; see also Abellán, 1988: 156-
57). Díaz estimates that this second period ends around 1915 or 1917, the years of the respective deaths 
of Giner de los Ríos and Gumersindo de Azcárate, another promoter of Krausism (1973: 49). 
11 The expression “authors of 98” is preferred here to “generation of 98” given its problematic nature, 
for as Ricardo Gullón explains, the latter is a baseless invention made by Azorín, and the authors it 
encompasses are better understood instead in the context of modernism (1969: 7-9; see also Blasco, 
2000: 121-31). As Abellán explains, modernism in Spain constitutes a rupture with the past: “España 
no les gustaba y había que cambiarla […]; para unos la solución tenía que ser la rebeldía estética, para 
otros la revolución social, para los de más allá la exaltación nacionalista y para casi todos la 
‘europeización’ del país” (1988: 63-64). Modernism in Spain is, therefore, a reaction to a crisis; in 
consequence, modernism must not be made synonymous with modernity because modernism 
constitutes the search for, the attempt to reach modernity (Abellán, 1989a: 17-18). In contrast, 
“‘moderno’ es todo lo referente a la Edad Moderna y que, por tanto, puede connotarse con los 
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A key member of that group is Unamuno. Understanding his influence on Zambrano 
and, to a lesser degree, also Aranguren and, even, Aguirre is of central importance. 
Unamuno’s work constitutes to a large extent a reaction to a widespread feeling of crisis. 
 As Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez explains, the decadence of the Spanish Empire starts after 
the period of maximum territorial expansion that Spain enjoyed under the Habsburgs (1962: 
43). This process of disintegration of the Empire translates into a national crisis which can 
be observed after the Peninsular War against Napoleon (1808-14), described by Abellán as 
the beginning of Contemporary Spain (1984: 15). Social and political turmoil follows in 
different forms: the conflict between the liberals and the traditionalists (1822-23), the 
Catalan peasant insurrection (1827), and the First and Second Carlist Wars (1833-40 and 
1873-76 respectively) (see Payne, 2006: 2; see also Carr, 2000: 205-25). In addition to this, 
the nineteenth century in Spain is marked by numerous pronunciamientos, civilian-military 
coups, which contribute to the lack of stability so characteristic of this period of Spanish 
history (see Carr, 2000: 205-25). In 1873, Amadeo of Saboy, the constitutional king, 
abdicates as a result of the pressures exercised by the army; the short-lived First Republic is 
born. However, the First Republic soon fails as a result of its ambitious goals and its 
utopian character, which is reflected in the lack of specific structures of government and of 
sufficient support (see Abellán, 1984: 665-67). The monarchy is restored with the entrance 
of King Alfonso XII in Madrid in January 1875 (see Abellán, 1988: 15). During the 
Restoration a compromise between the traditional, conservative forces and the progressive 
ones is sought in the form of the Canovist system of political alternation (see Abellán, 1988: 
17, 23). Despite this attempt, former divisions within the country remain (see Abellán, 
1988: 49): the political equilibrium granted by the Canovist system is only apparent because 
votes are coerced (Abellán, 1988: 23); there is a further, third, Carlist War (1876) (Abellán, 
1988: 26). Catholicism becomes the official religion of the State. As a result it becomes an 
instrument of ideological and political legitimation, while forced to share its hegemony with 
the liberal bourgeoisie, creating resentment amongst families of lower income (see Abellán, 
1988: 26; see also González Ruiz, 1977: 166). In this context, the Cuban-American war 
(1895-98) simply represents the culmination of an on-going, unresolved crisis (see Abellán, 
1988: 30). As Abellán explains, “por un lado, nos hallamos ante el fin del llamado ciclo 
imperial, por otro, estamos ante una crisis del ‘sistema canovista’ con importantes 
implicaciones económicas, sociales y militares” (1988: 29). With the loss of the remaining 
Spanish colonies overseas, Spain is no longer an Imperialist power and as a result, its sense 
of identity and direction are profoundly questioned, at the same time that the disintegration 
                                                                                                                                       
caracteres derivados de la misma, mientras ‘modernidad’ es aquella cualidad que se tipifica 
precisamente por haber alcanzado los caracteres más definitorios y específicos de lo moderno” 
(Abellán, 1989a: 17). 
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of the colonial structure has a serious impact on Spanish economy, to the extent that the 
core of the crisis of 1898 can be found in the end of this economic system (see Abellán, 
1988: 29-30).  
The twentieth century carries forward this crisis. As Sebastian Balfour explains, “the 
crisis of national identity which came to a head after the disaster made the search for an 
alternative and more authentic model of society to that of the Restoration all the more 
urgent” (1995: 415). This sense of crisis originates a profound debate regarding Spanish 
identity and its future whose participants are not only politicians, journalists, intellectuals, 
but also average people (see Balfour, 1995: 412). This debate is often referred to as el 
problema de España. As José Álvarez Junco explains, 
the events of 1898 gave rise to a vast literature on ‘the Spanish problem’, generally in the form of a 
maudlin, self-denigrating nationalism. There were grandiose proposals for the transformation of the 
Spanish national character, a determination to europeizar, ‘to make European’, that is, to encourage 
pragmatism, industry and science, to leave behind El Cid, Don Quixote and Columbus (2002: 86). 
An attempt to address this crisis is made by regeneracionismo. As Balfour indicates, 
“regenerationism was an old intellectual tradition stretching back to the seventeenth-century 
vogue for instant remedies for the nation’s early decline. In the aftermath of the disaster it 
took an overwhelming urgency” (1995: 411). Regenerationism, led by Joaquín Costa, 
strives to modernize, even europeanize, Spain (see Álvarez Junco, 1999: 74-75; see also 
Balfour, 1995: 412). Despite the divergence of its exponents, regenerationism insists that 
Spain must undergo a process of reform regarding economy, legislation, agriculture, and, 
particularly, education (see Harrison, 2000: 56-59; see also Balfour, 1995: 412). To this 
end, proposals for a programme of public works in the areas of irrigation, housing, and 
transport are put forward, although most of these ambitious projects do not come to fruition 
(Balfour, 1995: 412, 414-16).  
This crisis manifests itself in numerous ways. As Carlos Barriuso explains, “en 1900 
se produce una larga crisis de legitimidad del estado-nación que el recién constituido grupo 
intelectual aprovechará para formular una crítica al poder político reivindicando un papel 
rector en la conciencia social” (2004: 82). Influenced by German idealism, and by means of 
a philological and political (socialist) project of research and revival of Spain’s popular and 
mystical past, Unamuno “pretende […] traducir a la realidad española el modelo germano 
del Volksgeist” (Barriuso, 2004: 84; see also 85-87, 93). In addition, there are two 
conflicting elements which will also be present in later thinkers. On the one hand, there is a 
marked dichotomy; Unamuno searches for and defends national identity, even, or, rather, 
particularly those idealized traits which are now only part of a medieval past, while he still 
aspires to Europeanization (see Bretz, 2001: 141). On the other hand, he also rejects French 
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rationalism, as does d’Ors, and the question of faith takes centre stage in his work (see 
Bretz, 2001: 126). As Ródenas de Moya explains, 
y entre un querer creer en Dios que es un anhelo ontológico y un resignarse a la incertidumbre van 
discurriendo, de un modo errabundo y brioso, uno tras otro, los ensayos que configuran esta 
formidable declaración de inseguridad del hombre arrojado al mundo (2006: 46). 
His is the tragedy of a tortured mind whose rationality will not allow room for religion or 
faith. This not only shows Unamuno’s vital struggle, but also represents the dilemma that 
Spanish thinkers have traditionally faced (see Unamuno, 1983: 58-63, 68-69, 72-73; Baker, 
1990: 37-56; Pérez, 2001: 5; Abellán, 1989a: 47).  
Ortega is another key bridge between Spanish and German culture (see Marí, 1983: 
126). The weight of the influence of Krausism and, more precisely, the mark of the 
Institución Libre de Enseñanza is palpable in Ortega, whose influence can be traced in 
Zambrano and Aranguren in particular, and in Aguirre to a lesser degree. After Aguirre’s 
stay in Germany (1905-1907), he remains deeply impressed by German philosophy and the 
European ways of German life and culture, being particularly influenced by German 
Idealism, Husserl’s phenomenology, and by Heidegger’s work (see Cacho Viu, 1998: 13; 
Menéndez Alzamora, 2004: 454).  
As discussed above, Spanish identity becomes a problem of almost metaphysical 
proportions, as has been illustrated by the authors of 98 (see Álvarez Junco, 1999: 75). 
Ortega continues questioning the situation and identity of Spain in relation to both its own 
tradition and the rest of Europe. He exacerbates a dual attitude; in the first instance, there is 
admiration for the modern European way of life and a progressive rapprochement towards it 
is perceived as progress; these conflict with a strong sense of Spanish identity which lead 
him to view the problem of Spain as a historical, rather than as a political one (see Dobson, 
1989: 83, 86-88, 98; see also Favretto, 2005: 113; Argullol, 2005: 21; Graham, 2001: 
241)12. This dichotomy has an enormous influence on all three authors of this study, for 
they all are, in one way or another, as explained in the subsequent chapters, Ortegians. This 
said, the impact that other thinkers, although maybe less charismatic ones, have had on later 
Spanish intellectuals should not be underestimated. D’Ors, Marañón, and Zubiri have made 
vital contributions by, on the one hand, crossing the national borders through their 
germanophily – their interest in German culture – and, on the other hand, confronting 
tradition and progress, rationality and religion, in an attempt to shape Spanish identity (see 
Gracia, 1996: 22). As Bretz concludes, “the Spanish modernist reconceptualization of 
                                                
12 The authors of 98 already show concern about the problem of Spain, el problema de España, which 
they tackle mainly from an aesthetic angle, and which more generally materializes in “críticas al 
sistema parlamentario, susceptibilidad ante los militares, crecimiento del anticlericalismo, 
preocupación política por la regeneración del país…” (Abellán, 1988: 67; see also 1989a: 168). 
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history and nation, of the past and its connection to collective identity contributes 
significantly to introduce new ways of imagining and experiencing that are fundamental to 
a modern and post-modern understanding of the world” (2001: 149). This is precisely the 
journey taken by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre who, driven by their historical and 
vital circumstances, develop a socio-cultural critique that goes beyond previously 
established parameters.  
 
1.3 What is Critical Theory? 
The aim of this section is to provide a brief introduction to CT in terms of its nature, topics, 
aims, methodology, and style, so that it can be used throughout the thesis as a point of 
reference and comparison in relation to Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in order to 
determine if their thought can also be considered to embody CT.  
Before a discussion of what CT is can take place, the first feature of CT which needs 
to be highlighted is its diversity. As Fred Rush explains: “while it is characterized by certain 
shared core philosophical concerns, Critical Theory exhibits a diversity among its 
proponents that both contributes to its richness and poses substantial barriers to 
understanding its significance” (2004: 6; see also Held, 2004: 12; Thiebaut, 2003: 441). 
Thus, the idiosyncratic and, sometimes, substantial differences between the work of the 
individual members of the Institut should be understood as different manifestations of CT. 
Despite this diversity, as Rush indicates, there are some core concepts which are shared by 
all Critical Theorists. These include theoretical aims, but also central aspects of their 
content and style, for one of the characteristics of CT is the interrelation of its elements – 
the intrinsic link between content and style, theory and praxis. Bearing this in mind, we 
shall now focus on the central core elements which they share. 
CT is first and foremost a critique of advanced capitalist society; its distinctiveness 
lies in that while traditional theory uncritically reproduces existing society, CT, by contrast, 
strives to transform it (see Kellner, 1989: 46). As Rush puts it, 
Critical Theory is not merely descriptive, it is a way to instigate social change by providing 
knowledge of the forces of social inequality that can, in turn, inform political action aimed at 
emancipation (or at least at diminishing domination and inequality) (2004: 9). 
The study of ideology, for the FS, is linked to a project of liberation, in contrast with 
empirical sociology which professes a liberal and capitalistic ideology (Ricoeur, 1986: 6). 
Thus, it attempts to provide criticism and alternatives to traditional or mainstream social 
theory, as well as a critique of a full range of ideologies (see Kellner, 1989: 1, 44). Instead 
of targeting specific socio-economic and political problems only, its critique is directed 
against the specific rationality upon which Western society is based: instrumental reason. 
Such a critique is most clearly developed in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (1947b) and 
 20 
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964). The structure of their critique is supported by 
three key elements which are at the core of their thought. First, the criticism of instrumental 
reason as a socially deficient rationality is the result of the ethical core implied in Critical 
Theory (see Honneth, 2004: 338). Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno, and Habermas share the 
conviction that the actualization of individual freedom requires adopting a common praxis 
that is more than the result of the mere coordination of individual interests (see Honneth, 
2004: 343). Thus, their aim is the “cooperative self-actualization [which] includes [...] the 
notion that subjects are not able to achieve a successful social life as long as they have not 
recognized the common core of value judgements that lies behind their respective 
individual interests” (Honneth, 2004: 343). However, it is important to highlight that, 
despite this ethical motivation, the possibility of a universal moral theory is rejected by 
Critical Theorists (see Honneth, 2004: 342). Second, capitalism is identified as the cause of 
an instrumental and ultimately deficient rationality (see Honneth, 2004: 338). And third, 
their critique establishes an intrinsic connection to praxis, which is necessary when the goal 
is to overcome the social suffering caused by this deficient rationality (see Honneth, 2004: 
338). This attack against instrumental reason is comparable to the critique of reason 
developed by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre; even if they do not refer to this kind of 
rationality in terms of “instrumental reason”, the essence of their critique shares some 
remarkable similarities13. As a result of the premises and critique discussed above, CT must 
adopt a different rationality itself in order to avoid being prey to its own criticism. Thus, CT 
claims to be essentially different in its theoretical content but, more radically, also in its 
methodology, effectively constituting a different rationality of its own right. This is also 
precisely what the three authors who are the object of this study aim to do with their 
critique, and even more comprehensively in the cases of Aguirre and Zambrano, through 
their use of language.  
The work of the Institut is heavily influenced by Marx, Hegel, and Freud, and to a 
lesser degree by Lukács, Korsch and Gramsci, who stress the importance of subjectivity and 
culture (see Brunkhorst, 2004: 251; Whitebook, 2004: 74). Hence, their theoretical platform 
goes beyond Marxism, which they consider obsolete and inadequate to confront the new 
challenges brought about by advanced capitalism. As Marcuse states: “Marx’s image of the 
realm of necessity does not correspond to today’s highly developed industrial nations” 
(1968: xvii). Old Marxist economic models are also found to be in need of revision; 
influenced by Georg Lukács and the economists Grossmann and Pollock, the School adopts 
                                                
13 A glimpse of this – which will be developed at length in the coming chapters – can be observed in 
Zambrano’s elegant critique of Western reason, which she describes as soberbia, arrogance: “los 
breves pasos en que hemos acompañado a la razón en su caminar por nuestro angosto mundo de 
Occidente, son suficientes, creo yo, para poder advertir que la razón se ensoberbeció” (1939: 18).  
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more action-oriented theories (see Kellner, 1989: 11, 52). Economic movements and 
interests are no longer thought to fully represent or reflect society. As Kellner highlights, 
Although Marcuse and his colleagues would accept the Marxian position that the economy is the 
crucial determining factor for all social life, they reject all forms of economic reductionism and 
attempt to describe the complex set of mediations connecting the economy, social and political 
institutions, culture, everyday life, and individual consciousness as parts of a reciprocally interacting 
social system (Kellner, 2001b: 11). 
Whereas the concept of the proletariat becomes inapplicable, the social force which 
needs to be analysed is the mass (see Thiebaut, 2003: 444). The relevance of psychological 
and cultural forces is identified. Fromm and Marcuse develop their social analysis critically 
incorporating Freudian psychoanalysis14. At the same time, Adorno applies his musical 
insights to the same aim (see Rush, 2004: 30). In doing so, CT goes beyond 
interdisciplinarity and becomes supradisciplinary, for not only does it cross over several 
disciplines, but it questions the very idea of having boundaries between competing 
disciplines as a counter-productive and arbitrary division (see Kellner, 1989: 7-8, 36). It 
stresses the interconnections between philosophy, economics, politics, culture, and society, 
integrating these different dimensions of social reality in a social theory. The result, in the 
case of the FS, is a highly critical complex theory which targets instrumental reason, 
consumerism, mass society, and the culture industry. Similarly, although in a comment 
regarding Zambrano, Aranguren articulates his keenness on what he describes as a 
transdisciplinary discourse, which, as he explains, goes beyond philosophical reflection:  
una cosa es lo que hemos seguido llamando filosofía (dentro de lo cual sin duda de ninguna clase 
cabe el primer Heidegger, no estoy seguro de que quepa el segundo) y esto otro que puede ser mejor 
que la filosofía; algo que en definitiva se va buscando hoy cada vez más, este espíritu transdiciplinar 
(1983: 137). 
As we shall see in the course of the thesis, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre also develop 
a supra- or trans- disciplinary discourse, which in their case, includes another pivotal 
element, a reflection on spirituality. 
 
1.3.1 The particularity of Critical Theory 
According to Kellner, what distinguishes CT from other social theories is:  
(1) their independent version of critical Marxism; (2) their supradisciplinary research which 
combined philosophy and the social sciences; and (3) their exile in the United States and ability to 
experience both the rise of fascism and the transition to a new stage of capitalism in the United States 
at first hand (1989: 76-77).  
                                                
14 The work of the Frankfurt School is to a large extent a response to the rise of fascism in Europe; 
given the irrationality of the latter, the School considers psychoanalysis to be necessary for the analysis 
of fascist society itself, but also of the society which creates the conditions for fascist ideology to 
emerge and thrive (see Whitebook, 2004: 74, 97). 
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The first two aspects have already been discussed above. In addition to these, the 
importance of exile must be underlined: “Critical Theory was born in the trauma of the 
Weimar Republic, grew to maturity in expatriation, and achieved cultural currency on its 
return from exile” (Rush, 2004: 6). CT is, to a large extent, a theory of exile (see Kellner, 
1989: 80-81). Even its name, as pointed out above, is the result of the group’s stay in the 
United States. But most importantly, the content of their thought was shaped in no small 
measure by their experience of exile (see Kellner, 1989: 81; see also 66; Lonitz, 1999: 57, 
200). Their condition as exiles provides them with an outsider’s perspective. It provides 
them with the critical distance which puts them in a privileged position to develop a fierce 
critique of the socio-economic and political dynamics which they encounter, as well as of 
the rationality which supports it. 
Thus, the concept of reason becomes crucial to their critique: “all the authors 
mentioned above [the inner circle and the periphery of the Institute for Social Research] 
assume that the cause of the negative state of society is to be found in a deficit in social 
rationality” (Honneth, 2004: 339). Axel Honneth draws the reader’s attention to the fact that 
despite the different vocabulary used by the various members of the Instutitut –“irrational 
organization” (Horkheimer); “administered world” (Adorno); “one-dimensional society” 
(Marcuse), “repressive tolerance”; and “colonization of the social life-world” (Habermas)– 
they all refer to a deformed rationality in contrast to a presupposed “intact” rationality 
which would provide individuals the opportunity for self-actualization (see Honneth, 2004: 
338-39). As Alan How explains, “for them Reason proper was an altogether bigger and 
more significant concept than mere reason. Part of their aim was to challenge what 
currently passed for reason, and extend it into something more comprehensive” (2003: 6). 
The specific nature and characteristics of this “intact” rationality, is either not very 
elaborate, or changes substantially from author to author, sharing only the core premise that 
it should allow for the self-actualization of the individual, whatever that may actually mean 
in practical terms (see Honneth, 2004: 341). Influenced by Hegel, the only characteristic of 
this self-actualization shared by the members of the Institut is that it involves “the 
conviction that the self-actualization of the individual is only successful when it is 
interwoven in its aims – by means of generally accepted principles or ends – with the self-
actualization of all the other members of society” (see Honneth, 2004: 342). This premise is 
consistent not only with their concern with social justice, but, more primarily, with the 
undefined ethical premises guiding their thought. 
As pointed out above, while in exile in the United States, Critical Theorists analyse 
not only the concept of reason, but also the basic features of contemporary capitalist 
societies, in particular the relationships between economy, state, society, culture, and the 
individual (Kellner, 1989: 51). They claim that there are important connections between 
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liberal capitalism and fascism. Thus, the origin, nature, and effects of fascism are also a 
major topic of research and discussion (Kellner 1989: 66-7). In fact, the Institut’s 
conception of mass culture, particularly in relation to communication and manipulation, is 
first shaped by how these are used by Hitler, but their analysis also extends to their use in 
democratic societies (see Kellner, 1989: 133-34; see also Brunkhorst, 1999: 49). Their 
analysis includes the development of consumer society, the culture industry, and the role of 
science and technology in the relationships of production, all of which are viewed as forms 
of control and domination over the weakened individual (Kellner, 1989: 5-6). 
The analysis of art also plays a central role in CT, although the interpretation of this 
role differs substantially amongst different thinkers. As Hauke Brunkhorst puts it,  
where Benjamin saw a great chance for a revolutionary transformation of art by the new technical 
mass media, Adorno and Horkheimer were much more sceptical. They both emphasized the obvious 
power or the new media in fascist dictatorships, their manipulative potential to impose the will on 
[sic] the leaders to passive and authoritarian masses of people (1999: 48-49).  
Adorno and Horkheimer, particularly the former, aspire to sublimate instrumental reason 
through art:  
Aunque no de manera explícita, parece que ya en Dialéctica de la Ilustración se sugiere que la 
mímesis del arte puede contener una función crítica y, mediante una negación determinada de lo 
existente y de lo inmediato (injusticia social), contribuir a superar la autodestrucción de la Ilustración 
(Gomá Lanzón, 2004: 312). 
For Adorno, art can restore genuine experience by providing an encounter with the new and 
the other (see Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii). For him, the aim is for aesthetics to overcome 
instrumental reason by developing a non-repressive rationality and social integration (see 
Wellmer, 1991: 151). But, in contrast with Benjamin, he is very selective regarding what 
kind of art may achieve this. Only art which negates itself through its lack of functionality, 
its disinterest, its refusal to become reified as an object of trade in the market has this 
subversive potential. As Gomá Lanzón explains, 
El arte que se niega a sí mismo, el antiarte de Schönberg, Kafka, Beckett, Joyce o Klee es, para 
Adorno, el arte en sentido enfático o arte radical, porque destruye la ilusión de una belleza totalizada, 
orgánica, sistemática, ideal, y acepta lo feo y lo disonante de la realidad (2004: 314).  
This resistance to function within the parameters established by instrumental reason, 
which is crucial to understanding Zambrano’s use of language, is one of the central aspects 
of the aims and methodology of CT as we shall discuss below. 
 
1.3.2 Aims 
Despite its diversity, it must be noted that CT can be described as holistic, in the sense that 
its methodology is not only dictated by its aims and its ideological standpoint, but it is also 
intrinsically connected to them. As Simone Chambers states, the aims of Critical Theory 
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are: “to show the internal relationship between knowledge and experience [...], and to use 
the interconnectedness of knowledge and experience to break out of the given and project 
normative goals and ends” (2004: 221). This interconnectedness becomes apparent in any 
attempt to analyse any of these aspects separately, for such separation can only take place 
artificially with the purpose of carrying out their analysis, which is why a certain amount of 
repetition is necessarily involved. 
The first point of cohesion for Critical Theorists is their agenda. “Critical Theory has 
a normative agenda. Its stated interest is the emancipation of humanity from injustice” 
(Chambers, 2004: 221)15. As Honneth observes, for Critical Theorists, the normative goal of 
society should be making the self-actualisation of each member reciprocally possible (see 
2004: 344). The fact that it is not, is what turns its rational goals and practices into 
unreason16. 
There are also other cohesive elements of CT. As Honneth observes:  
Critical Theory [...] insists on a mediation of theory and history in a concept of socially effective 
rationality. That is, the historical past should be understood from a practical point of view, as a 
process of development whose pathological deformation by capitalism may be overcome only by 
initiating a process of enlightenment among those involved. It is this working model of the 
intertwining of theory and history that grounds the unity of Critical Theory despite its variety of 
voices (2004: 337). 
The influence of Marxism can be observed in the Frankfurt School’s interpretation of 
history, according to which there is a causal relationship between the existing socio-
economic conditions and development of history. They differ from Marxism, however, in 
that they do not expect the proletariat to gain class-consciousness and overthrow the 
capitalist government, for they consider the proletariat and the class struggle as obsolete 
concepts (see Thiebaut, 2003: 449-50). Instead, they focus on the critique of the existing 
rationality and the socio-economic conditions it generates. It is hoped this critique will lead 
to a process of enlightenment which will eventually achieve the liberation of the individual 
consciousness from the ideology it is subjected to, thus eventually liberating society as a 
whole. Although the members of the School believe this liberation to be theoretically 
possible, they are all too aware of its difficulties and the limitations they face. For this 
reason, their focus, as the term CT indicates, is precisely the aspect of critique.  
                                                
15 Normative, in this context, refers to how things ought to be. It is to be understood in contrast with 
descriptive and positive. On the one hand, as Rush explains, “Critical Theory is not merely descriptive, 
it is a way to instigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social inequality that can, 
in turn, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least at diminishing domination and 
inequality)” (2004: 9). On the other hand, whereas positive statements are falsifiable, normative 
statements are not (Driver, 2005: 31-62). 
16 This link which Critical Theory makes between individual suffering the defective rationality which 
pinpoints as is cause is, as Honneth explains, the result of the incorporation of Freudian psychoanalysis 
into their thought (2004: 351, 354). 
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We have discussed above the theoretical dimension of this critique, but it is equally 
important to stress that, although the School does not focus on pursuing positive and 
specific paths for the liberation of the individual, their work still has significant practical 
implications. These implications can be observed in Marcuse’s defence of the Great 
Refusal: 
Marcuse [...] constantly advocated the “Great Refusal” as the proper political response to any form of 
irrational repression, and indeed this seems to be at least the starting point for political activism in the 
contemporary era: refusal of all forms of oppression and domination, relentless criticism of all of all 
[sic] policies that impact negatively on working people and progressive social programs, and militant 
opposition to any and all acts of aggression against Third World countries. Indeed, in an era of 
“positive thinking,” [...] Marcuse’s emphasis on negative thinking, refusal, and opposition provides at 
least a starting point and part of a renewal of radical politics in the contemporary era (Kellner, n.d.: 
n.p.17).  
It must be highlighted that it is not prescriptive. As Rush explains, “Marcuse does not think 
that Critical Theory can prescribe what precise changes should take place. Its role is limited 
to displaying the relevant possibilities.” (2004: 29-30). This also applies to the rest of the 
members of the Institut, who provide a critique of different aspects of society and 
rationality without developing and putting forward a positive plan of action. This is a 
deliberate position, which they also have in common with Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre, whose implications we shall explore below. 
 
1.3.3 Politics 
As Chambers says, it is often thought that CT has no politics (2004: 219). She succinctly 
explains that there are several senses in which this statement is used: 
Critical Theorists of this time explicitly refused to engage in party politics, voice opinions about 
current events, propose reform agendas, or indeed talk about political institutions in any specific way. 
The second sense in which early Critical Theory has no politics is that its critique focused more and 
more on a realm of culture and aesthetics detached from politics. […] Finally, and most significantly, 
early Critical Theory has no politics because its diagnosis of the times is so pessimistic as to make 
any political action, or indeed any attempt to break out of the logic of instrumental reason, futile 
(2004: 219).  
However, the relationship of CT to politics is not as straightforward. Despite their lack of 
affiliation to party politics and their focus on cultural and aesthetic issues, this is no 
evidence of their lack of political commitment. Their non-engagement with party politics is 
more the result of their attempt to redefine the nature and dynamics of political practice 
than evidence of their apolitical attitude (see Chamber, 2004: 220). In contrast, “Critical 
Theory is envisioned as political in the sense of embracing the unavoidably political nature 
                                                
17 Neither date nor page number are available for this quotation which has been extracted from a 
website which Kellner has devoted to Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School. The details of this 
website have been provided in the bibliography. 
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of all theory in attempting to direct it towards rationally chosen ends” (Chambers, 2004: 
221).  
For Adorno and Horkheimer, “to enter the world of action is to enter a world 
saturated by commodification and fully reified; it is to have one’s actions hijacked by 
overwhelming powers of management. The fully administered society ‘embraces those at 
war with it by coordinating their consciousness with its own’” (Chambers, 2004: 222; 
Chambers quotes Adorno, 1978: 206). The realization of the impossibility of escaping the 
existing co-ordinates of rationality, however, does not mean that their work is not political. 
As Chambers goes on to explain, “despite their pessimism, Horkheimer and Adorno 
continued to theorize. One of the ways of understanding their continued commitment to 
theory is to suggest that they replaced the question ‘what is to be done?’ with the much 
older one ‘how should one live one’s life?’” (2004: 222). This is not to be understood as an 
inner withdrawal. Instead, “like Socrates in the Gorgias, we see an embrace of truth over the 
demos and again, like Socrates, this is understood as ultimately political”18 (Chambers, 
2004: 223). Their answer to the question posed above is “teaching the good life” (Adorno, 
1978: 15). That is to say that they ultimately understood politcs as paideia (see Chambers, 
2004: 223). It is also in this sense that the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is 
political in nature as we shall see in the following chapters. 
Thus, the aim of CT is liberating the individual from the all-encompassing ideology 
which constrains thought and possibility. Thought, however, cannot be freed from ideology, 
because of the totalising power of the totally administered society, but more crucially, 
because even that statement is made from an ideological standpoint (see footnote nine). 
This is obviously a problematic and paradoxical position, stating such a critique results in 
its own negation. Is this an error in judgement on Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s part or 
simply an aspect of their dialectical discourse and negative thought? Even though, as critics 
agree, making such a totalising statement about ideology from a Marxist background is self-
disqualifying, if we become just for a moment less concerned with the logical coherence of 
the argument and go beyond what there is as expressed in the essays establishing the aims 
and methods of CT, it is then possible to argue that its very occurrence suggests its 
possibility (see Eagleton, 1991: 127). Adorno and Horkheimer, however, did not pursue this 
line of reasoning and their critique remains essentially negative. Even Marcuse, who does 
not state the impossibility to free consciousness from the limitations imposed by 
                                                
18 As Chambers explains, “Socrates claims that he is ‘one of the few Athenians (not to say the only 
one) who has attempted the true art of politics,’ [Gorgias, 521d] despite the fact that he avoided public 
office and democratic politics whenever he could. Care for the community or the true art of politics 
seeks truth and the improvement of souls through Socratic interrogation” (Chambers, 2004: 223; see 
also Plato, 1994: 481a-522b; 481b-482a). 
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instrumental reason, remains in the sphere of critique and admits not knowing who the 
agents of change may be (1970b: 69).  
It is crucial to the understanding of the development of the comparison drawn in this 
thesis between CT and Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre that, as a result of not having 
been able to identify directly political paths towards liberation, the FS turns their focus 
towards psychological and moral aspects of the individual. It must be emphasized, however, 
that this move takes place not because they give up the possibility of having a political 
impact, but because they identify such possibility in the potential of the individual. As 
James Bohman explains, 
in its initial phases, critical theory developed a clear and radical orientation to democratic theory 
through the ideal of a self-organized, free society that is an expressive totality. The normative contrast 
operative here is between the real consensus of democracy and the reifying effects of capitalist 
rationalization. But since the Frankfurt School theorists saw the spread of instrumental reason as 
turning modern society into a ‘false’ totality, democracy played less and less a role in their normative 
thinking; they sought potentials [sic] for non-dominating social relations deeper in the psychological 
capacities of human beings for solidarity, compassion, and the mimetic identification with others 
(1996: 210). 
As we shall see in the course of the thesis, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre also link 
closely the personal to the political, and focus on the nature of the individual, not only from 
a psychological or moral perspective, but crucially, also from a spiritual one. These three 
thinkers solve the difficulty encountered by the FS in the realm of political action with a 
process of spiral change, a process of progressive and integrated layers of change that, by 
building on past steps, achieves a further and more comprehensive evolution. Moreover, 
this concept not only applies to the political project of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, 
but it also reflects the evolution of the thought of these three thinkers, which itself follows a 
spiral trajectory in as much as the development and unravelling of their ideas can be 
considered to be concentric, cumulative, and, yet, non-repetitive. This will be developed 
and explored in detail in the following chapters. Suffice it to say now that this spiral form, 
pointed out by scholars such as Chantal Maillard and Carmen Revilla Guzmán in relation to 
Zambrano’s work, is a concept which, although none of these three authors articulate it 
explicitly in their work, is nonetheless present as part of the underlying structure which 
grants coherence to their thought (see respectively 1990: 31; 2005: 51, 103). The spiral 
evolution of Aranguren and Aguirre’s thought, however, has not been discussed by previous 
scholars. In all likelihood, two main reasons account for this. In the case of Aranguren, 
much more attention has been paid to the content of specific and well-differentiated aspects 
of his work, such as his religious phase, his work on ethics, on communication, and his 
work as a critic than to all of his intellectual production as a whole. That is why, in contrast 
with this, the approach undertaken in this research offers a re-evaluation of his thought by 
looking at his entire intellectual production in conjunction with biographical data. In the 
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case of Aguirre, this spiral structure has been overlooked simply because no scholarly work 
has been produced in relation to Aguirre to date.  
 Based on their understanding of the dynamics of ideology, society, and the human 
being, for change and liberation to be possible, these authors must not be understood in 
absolute terms; liberation may only take place in a succession of stages. As a result, any 
possibility of change and liberation is spiral in as much as it is embedded and framed in 
democratic institutions. Change requires a first wave of people’s will and action to bring it 
into effect, but even then it would only be insufficient and ephemeral unless this 
institutionalisation of change is followed by the internalization and consistent praxis of such 
change by individuals. Once this stage of liberation is achieved, another such wave of 
action is hoped to come about and start a similar process which will lead to another stage of 
liberation, which will in turn, continue the process. 
  
1.3.4 Understanding CT as methodology, praxis, and style. 
The methodology and goals of the CT are first put forward by Horkheimer in his essay 
“Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937) and Marcuse’s “Philosophy and Critical Theory” 
(1937) (Hohendahl, 2001: 6). Although Horkheimer’s essay constitutes a statement of the 
structure and aims of CT, “focusing on it alone provides a simplified and overly neat 
answer to the question of what is supposed to make Critical Theory critical” (Rush, 2004: 
11). Similarly, the methodology and goals put forward by Marcuse are also subject to 
change and evolution, as Marcuse himself explains in relation to the aforementioned essay: 
“That most of this was written before Auschwitz deeply separates it from the present” 
(1968: xv). He also highlights that, 
at that time [1934-1838], it was not yet clear that the powers that had defeated fascism by virtue of 
their technical and economic superiority would strengthen and streamline the social structure which 
had produced fascism. [...] Capitalist society had not yet revealed all its strength and all its rationality, 
and the fate of the labor movement was still “uncertain” (1968: xi).  
Thus, it becomes evident that CT is not only diverse in its manifestations, but also flexible, 
for it aims to address the problems associated with the ideology and rationality prevalent at 
the time that is being exercised. 
Bearing this in mind, it must be stressed that the methodology of the members of the 
FS is intimately linked to its aims. In his essay “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (1937), 
Marcuse establishes the difference between philosophy and CT in that while the former, 
being concerned with pure reason alone, can never conclude anything that was not already 
present in essence, the latter is anchored in different aspects of the material conditions for 
thought and perception, allegedly providing a genuine platform for social transformations 
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(Hohendahl, 2001: 5-6). In Marcuse’s words, “truth that is more than the truth of what is 
can be attained and intended only in opposition to established social relationships” (1968: 
149). Seeking such truth is one of the core aims of CT. A similar search can also be found 
in the three Spanish authors who are the subject of this research. Zambrano in particular is 
explicitly critical of any “pensamiento ‘apriorístico’ que sólo se descubre a sí mismo, su 
propia estructura” (1989a: 32). As Elena Laurenzi explains, Zambrano is critical of 
analytical forms of thought specifically because they are unable to go beyond that which is 
already there (2004: 24). The perception of the insufficiency of instrumental reason to 
develop and overcome its own limitations, the realization of its inadequacy, lies at the heart 
of the cultivation of an alternative rationality which allows the thinker to express, but more 
primarily, to conceive ideas beyond what already is. This is what the members of the 
Frankfurt School and also Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre set out to do as we shall see 
in the course of this thesis. As a result, CT highlights the insufficiencies and dangerous 
consequences of instrumental reason. This does not mean that the FS advocates renouncing 
reason altogether; “in One-Dimensional Man (1964), Marcuse differentiated more clearly 
between reason as ‘Vernunft’[reason as common sense] and ‘instrumental reason’, yet he 
continued to link reason and liberation – thereby also insisting on the revolutionary 
potential of reason” (Hohendahl, 2001: 7). Hence, the logic of the critique of instrumental 
reason itself already suggests the need to develop a more comprehensive alternative reason, 
which any truly transformative research should be based on. That is why, in an effort to 
break free from the framework of rationality of instrumental reason and develop and 
encourage a richer, more humane reason, the distinguishing features of CT include a 
supradisciplinary approach in terms of content and methodology, and the close connection 
between content and style, conferring special importance to the subversive use of language 
(see Kellner, 1989: 7, 77). 
 
1.3.4.1 The methodology of Critical Theory 
As indicated above, CT is a supradisciplinary effort to construct a comprehensive social 
theory which can confront the key social and political problems that result from advanced 
capitalism. By adopting a supradisciplinary approach, CT endeavours to integrate 
experience and reality into its theoretical analysis (see Kellner, 1989: 7-8, 36). Despite this 
approach, CT is suspicious of totalizing solutions. Instead, it rejects systematic thinking and 
reclaims the value of fragmentary, contradictory, even experiential accounts of reality, for 
only by embracing these aspects can the complexities of reality be grasped. 
In stark contrast with the Anglophone empiric, analytic, and positivist traditions, for 
CT, an essential element of reason and, consequently, of its methodology is speculation (see 
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How, 2003: 2-3)19. As indicated above, CT is concerned with the interpretations of what 
there is in such a way that reason may reach conclusions which go beyond its initial 
premises. As Rush puts it in relation to Adorno: 
Adorno [...] does not think that Critical Theory is a theory of interpretation in the ordinary sense. 
Critical Theory does not study its objects with the aim of revealing meanings that are already there, 
independent of the interpretive process [...]. The objects of interpretation, as well as any particular 
interpretation of them, are always subject to further interpretation (2004: 34). 
Thus, an awareness of the interconnections of the different aspects of society and the fabric 
of reality itself is necessary, along with room for speculation. Such an awareness is pursued 
by Horkheimer and Adorno with their negative dialectics and through Adorno’s aphoristic 
style. The value of speculation is argued particularly by Marcuse, because, as How 
indicates, “for Marcuse the positivist/empiricist [...] emphasis on the givenness of facts 
entails a distinctly conservative acceptance of things as they are” (2003: 3). In contrast with 
this acceptance, Marcuse argues that “the real field of knowledge is not the given facts 
about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond 
their given form” (1955: 145). As indicated above, this is achieved by incorporating or 
stressing the role of elements traditionally excluded from the realm of reason. For this 
reason, the value of experience, subjectivity, and, ultimately, praxis, must also be 
highlighted.  
 
1.3.4.2 The role of praxis, subjectivity, and experience  
From CT’s perspective, there is an intrinsic link between theory and praxis, which becomes 
effective once the existing distorted rationality has been overcome (see Honneth, 2004: 
353). Because their aim is precisely overcoming this distorted rationality, their work 
requires the resurgence and incorporation of this link.  
In the specific case of the members of the FS, the element of praxis can be observed 
from two different perspectives. On the one hand, the ultimate goal of their critique is the 
liberation and the self-actualization of the individual. This is clearly a practical aspiration. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, because of this guiding goal, their thought has political 
implications, which, as such, belong to the realm of praxis. On the other hand, an aspect of 
their praxis can also be found in their biographical choices, although less so in the case of 
Horkheimer (see Bronner, 2002: 223-24). This is most visible in the case of Marcuse, who 
not only is a source of influence, but also of support, for the New Left in the United States 
                                                
19 It should be noted that, as see How explains, “in everyday English usage, the word ‘speculation’ 
suggests something vague and probably unjustified [...]. But because Critical Theory always sought to 
bring the social sciences into conjunction with philosophy I discovered the role of speculation could be 
seen in a quite different light. [...] Marcuse [...] in particular explicitly drew out Hegel’s ideas on the 
intrinsically speculative nature of reason to form the basis of Critical Theory’s critique of empiricism” 
(2003: 2-3). 
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during the 1960s (see Bronner, 2002: 223). Erich Fromm is a consistent supporter of social 
justice, and campaigned for international human rights and the abolition of nuclear weapons 
(see Bronner, 2002: 223). And Adorno provides dozens of radio interviews in an effort to 
reach the public and make his views clear (see Bronner, 2002: 224). In so far as praxis is 
human praxis, it involves an element of experience and of subjectivity, which are also 
integrated into CT without falling prey to relativism (see Bronner, 2002: 220)20.  
Another reason for the important role awarded to these elements is that, in contrast to 
the trends of recent continental philosophy, which seriously questions the concept and even 
existence of the subject, “[Critical Theorists] have produced a more socialized and 
integrated notion of subjectivity sensitive to ethical and political demands” (Rasmussen, 
2004: xxxvi). Thus, the subject and the concepts of experience and subjectivity play a very 
relevant role in CT (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 216-17). 
The concept of experience – which is intimately linked to subjectivity – is central to 
Critical Theory, as can be observed in Adorno’s work (see Rush, 2004: 10). For Adorno, 
the concept of experience is embedded in the socio-historical matrix in which it takes place 
(see Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii). Thus, as a result of the defective rationality his socio-
historical experience is based upon, experience is shaped by the process of production and 
commerce of material goods (see Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii; see also Jay, 2001: 32). That is 
why he claims that genuine experience has disappeared (see Jay, 2001: 32). For this reason, 
one of the purposes of CT is recovering the value and the possibility of genuine experience, 
which is essential for a coherent rationality as well as for the self-actualization of the 
individual. In contrast, “for Adorno, [genuine] experience rather derives from an encounter 
with the otherness in which the self no longer remains the same –an experience of the other 
in a nondominating, nonsubsumptive and nonhomogenizing manner” (Rasmussen, 2004: 
xxxviii). Adorno’s aim is to recover this experience that has been lost, which he finds in the 
work of art (see Bronner, 2002: 149). In his view, genuine art provides an irreducible 
experience, an experience of the other. In doing so, the work of art overcomes the 
framework of instrumental rationality and encapsulates several paradoxes: in the work of art 
reflection becomes interwoven with experience and the work of art becomes a prolonged 
process as well as a moment in time, an instant (see Bronner, 2002: 149). As discussed 
above, the role of art in the process of liberation and self-actualization of the individual is 
shared by Critical Theorists. Similarly, although the extent or, even, the nature of the role 
that experience plays for each Critical Theorist varies, experience plays a central role in the 
possibility of a healthy rationality. 
                                                
20 In order to dismiss any suspicions of relativism, it must be reiterated that “for the reinvestigation of 
human subjectivity Freud’s works were regarded as of paramount importance” (Held, 2004: 19). 
Moreover, as in the case of Marx, Freud’s thought undergoes a process of re-evaluation and revision. 
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Theoretical and methodological importance has been awarded to experience and 
subjectivity in the biographical text because, in this context, it constitutes a subversive 
genre. The reason why it is subversive is because, by its very nature, it questions and 
destabilizes the structure of instrumental rationality, while welcoming other – experiential – 
forms of discourse. As Edward Said puts it, 
a biographical text like Minima Moralia is an assault on biographical, narrative, or anecdotal 
continuity; its form exactly replicates its subtitle – Reflections from Damaged Life – a cascading 
serious of discontinuous fragments [...] whose grand synthesis has derisive contempt for the 
individual (2002: 202). 
Thus, the interrelationship between aim, methodology, and style becomes apparent. This 
interrelationship is also a crucial feature of the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre 
for it is precisely because of the intertwining of these aspects that their work, like the work 
of the FS, presents a challenge to the established framework of rationality as we shall see in 
the coming chapters.  
  
1.3.4.3 The role of style 
The different elements which form CT are part of a holistic effort to subtract Critical 
Theorists themselves and readers from the dominant ideology of advanced capitalist society 
enough to make and process this criticism, but also to open up the possibility of the 
liberation of the individual from such ideology. For this reason, the style which Critical 
Theorists use to communicate is a deliberate consequence of their aims and their own 
ideology, and can be considered the materialization of their methodology. This style, 
although idiosyncratic to each one of them, shares the same aims, namely, the expression 
and communication of complex and interrelated trains of thought, but also the 
destabilisation of instrumental reason. Furthermore, this style of expression demands the 
engagement of the reader with the text; the reader no longer is a passive subject who 
absorbs information, but an active agent who strives to make sense of the text and of the 
society and ideology it discusses. That is why some critics, such as How, express their 
surprise at the description of CT as popular and, even, populist. He explains in relation to 
reading Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man in particular that 
the style of language was the plainest obstacle. Marcuse mostly did not write in short, easily 
absorbable sentences, but in long, roving, muscular phrases where a sentence could last a whole 
paragraph and where the subject and object of the sentence seemed only distant cousins. [...] In 
dialectical fashion each clause reciprocally (re)defined the one that went before while simultaneously 
adding meaning to the one that came after. [...] It forced the reader to hold a variety of inter-related 
ideas together and allowed them to co-mingle and influence each other (How, 2003: 2). 
This challenging language is by no means exclusive to Marcuse, for other members of the 
School also defy the linguistic limitations of lineal expression and demand the engagement 
of the reader with the text. 
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 As Edward Said explains, “Adorno is exceptionally difficult to read, whether in his 
original German or in any number of translations. Jameson [in Late Marxism: Adorno, or, 
the Persistence of Dialectic (1990)] speaks very well about the sheer intelligence of his 
sentences, their incomparable refinement, their programmatically complex internal 
movement” (2002: 201). It must be stressed that the choice of this style is deliberate and 
obeys methodological reasons. As a result, many of Adorno’s works “are self-conscious 
exercises in embodying the movement of ideas in negative dialectic in a style of 
philosophical writing” (Rush, 2004: 35). This becomes even more palpable in his later work 
which is characterized by his aphoristic and poetic expression, in the hope that it “might 
resist instrumental demands by stubborn insistence upon nonpurposive activity” (Honneth, 
2004: 342). As Holger Brier indicates: 
 Adorno was no poet. [...] But his texts are informed by a poetic, itself informed, and not only 
historically, by a certain kind of music and poetry. Invariably, this does have implications for his 
style. [...] message and medium have to collapse into each other (2001: 113). 
By integrating this poetic expression into his thought, Adorno is hoping to access and 
convey concepts which would otherwise be beyond the reach of the traditional 
philosophical, sociological or aesthetic discourse. The integration of a poetic style into the 
reason developed by Critical Theorists has important implications, opening the door for the 
consideration of the highly poetic thought of Zambrano which shall be discussed at length 
in Chapter Four. 
 
1.3.5 Reception of Critical Theory in Spain 
The FS is first introduced in Spain in 1962 by Manuel Sacristán, by means of his 
translations of two of Adorno’s works: Notas de literatura and Prismas; La crítica de la 
cultura y la sociedad, both published by Ariel21. Despite this, it is Aguirre who is often 
credited with having introduced the works of the FS into Spain by editing and translating 
them, thus making them accessible to a Spanish readership (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 544; 
1994, 5: 376; see also García Hortelano, 1985: 12). Gracia provides a more balanced 
account of the process of translation and edition in Spain of the members of the FS: 
Taurus, de la mano de Jesús Aguirre, acometería una considerable renovación de su catálogo en los 
sesenta y setenta con la edición selectiva del pensamiento alemán contemporáneo, en particular la 
Escuela de Frankfurt, con T.H. Adorno o Walter Benjamin (aunque Adorno ya había sido traducido y 
editado por Manuel Sacristán desde Ariel), pero también Nietzsche. En el mismo sentido, Seix Barral 
editaba a Marcuse (1996: 34)22. 
                                                
21 Please see appendix one, where a list all of the books by Adorno, Benjamin, Horkheimer, and 
Marcuse published in Spain from 1962 until 1981 has been provided. 
22 Although Seix Barral does translate and edit two of Marcuse’s books during the period this author is 
being introduced to a Spanish readership, it cannot be said that Seix Barral had a leading role in this 
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Hence, although there is good reason to praise Aguirre’s efforts in relation to the 
introduction of the FS in Spain, the extent of his role, however, must be carefully nuanced. 
We shall explore this issue in greater detail in Chapter Five, but suffice it to say that, in his 
role as translator and later editor for Taurus, Aguirre is chiefly responsible for the 
publication in Spain of at least seventeen books by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and 
Benjamin. Furthermore, this constitutes the most consistent and prolific effort to introduce 
the work of the School into Spain. 
 Regarding the influence, it is widely assumed that CT as developed by the FS has had 
little impact on the direction of Spanish intellectual development. This view can be 
illustrated by the opinion of Romero de Solís: 
tanto una como otra corriente filosófica [estructuralismo y Escuela de Frankfurt], que ambicionaban 
renovar el pensamiento marxista europeo, fueron flor de un día. La desorientada y radicalizada 
izquierda española pretendía sustituir las toscas y oxidadas herramientas filosóficas del marxismo-
leninismo por instrumentos más sutiles y en concordancia con las tareas con que se enfrentaba en el 
ocaso de la dictadura de Franco. [...] también opino que aquellos cultos y brillantes epígonos de 
Marx, como Adorno o Benjamin, traducidos a instancias de Jesús Aguirre, tampoco contribuyeron a 
la renovación del panorama filosófico y político de una España que se aprestaba a vivir la Transición 
(2002: 295-96).  
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that Spanish thinkers have not produced any material 
which can be considered to fall under the category of CT, as can be observed in the fact that 
there is no mention of a possible Spanish CT which follows the tradition of the FS in the 
entry on CT in Barry Jordan’s Spanish Culture and Society; The Essential Glossary: 
neither Republican exiles nor oppositional intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s in Spain managed to 
develop a serious and coherent body of Critical Theory (2002: 57).  
However, in the course of the thesis, I will provide evidence to the contrary, showing that 
CT did contribute to the renovation of the socio-political panorama and, most importantly, 
that, although it has been largely overlooked, the thought of some Spanish authors – 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in particular – shows some defining characteristics 
which make it possible to refer to it as CT. 
 
1.3.6 The presence of Critical Theory in Spanish thought 
Although the focus of the previous section has been CT as first developed by the FS, it is 
important to stress that, even though the work of the FS will be used as a frame of 
reference, CT is not limited to them. As Kellner puts it, “a critical theory of society is 
always a project underway, it is always partial, historical, and subject to revision. Thus, one 
                                                                                                                                       
task, for Ariel, and Alianza also translated and published two of his books (see appendix one; see also 
5.3.1). Hence, there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that the role it plays in relation to Marcuse is 
comparable to that of Taurus in relation to Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin. 
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is always moving toward a critical theory, open to new historical experiences, phenomena, 
and discourses” (2001b: 32). It is based on this understanding of CT that I argue that it is 
possible to conceive that, in response to the specific socio-political circumstances of 
twentieth-century Spain, a form of CT has been developed by some Spanish thinkers. Thus, 
the purpose of this thesis is to provide evidence to argue that Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre, although idiosyncratically, all develop their thought in ways consistent with CT. 
Further research may show that other Spanish thinkers may also be considered Critical 
Theorists. 
I will argue throughout the thesis that, as a result of the approach of Aranguren, 
Zambrano, and Aguirre towards content, style, and methodology they can be considered 
Critical Theorists. I do not, however, suggest that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre 
develop a co-ordinated line of research or form a cohesive school of thought. In fact, their 
interests, the specific focus of their thought, their form, and style are diverse, as we shall 
see. Nevertheless, it can be said that Aranguren and, although differently, also Aguirre 
develop a neo-Marxist critique of neo-capitalist society and its effect on the individual, 
whereas Zambrano, considerably influenced by Heidegger, focuses on the problem of being 
and its relationship with others and the world. What the three of them have in common, 
however, is the elaboration of a critique of instrumental reason which, as we have seen, lies 
at the very core of CT as developed by the FS. What is more, this critique forms the basis 
from which Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre develop the rest of their thought.  
It is, of course, not my intention to argue that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre 
deliberately follow the patterns of thought described above in order to accommodate their 
work within the parameters of CT. Nonetheless, it remains true that a parallel development 
to that of the FS can be observed. After the unreason involved in any war, especially in a 
civil war, after the incongruities and the injustices of totalitarian ideology, a new form of 
reason had to be sought. As Díaz explains, “opposition culture during the dictatorship was 
importantly engaged in what one could term the reconstruction of ‘reason’ (i.e. rational 
discourse/thought)” (1995: 285). This is precisely one of the key characteristics of the 
decade of the 1960s in Spain. In this sense, the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre is a 
reaction against the ideology of the regime. More importantly, it is the rejection of the 
rationality exercised by the regime as well as an attempt to develop a questioning, yet 
coherent, reason. They are, of course, not alone in this quest. What is specific about them, 
in contrast with Díaz’s statement, is that they consider the reconstruction of reason a 
counter-productive exercise, for it was reason – instrumental reason – that allowed for such 
irrational development of events and ideology in the first place. Zambrano, although in 
exile, takes the same stand, defending the role of delirium in contrast with the abuses of 
reason (1996b: 169). Hence, what they advocate is a much more radical project, not the 
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reconstruction of instrumental reason, but its rejection in favour of a more humane and 
holistic alternative: experiential reason, a concept which will be developed in Chapter Four. 
Despite their lack of awareness or will to develop a co-ordinated or systematized 
intellectual production, they do, however, share the defining characteristics of CT: besides 
offering a poignant critique of modern society and the rationality on which it is founded, 
their theoretical work is shaped by an interactive critique which is expected to exercise an 
emancipating effect. In turn, this is hoped to spark a qualitative process of transformation of 
society, as we shall see in the course of this thesis. 
Their work, however, does not constitute a mere replication or reiteration of CT as 
developed by the School. In contrast with the mostly pessimistic conclusions drawn by the 
FS, these Spanish thinkers offer a more hopeful vision23. Partly informed by their highly 
developed sense of spirituality, they place their hopes for emancipation in a cyclical process 
of multilevelled change which can only start with the individual. For this reason, it is 
important to emphasize that all three of them share an interest in spirituality which they 
incorporate into their critique, and which becomes their distinctive contribution. 
Religion is an inescapable fact of life for most Spaniards who are born during the 
first half of the 20th century; the strongly Catholic upbringing (both within the family circle 
and at school), the ubiquitous presence of the Church and the way in which religion has 
been absorbed culturally all translate into demands of public displays of piety, if not faith. 
This interest in spirituality results in a tradition that has incorporated spirituality and 
religion in general, and faith specifically, into its discourse as a conflicting aspect which, 
although it cannot be resolved, has to be addressed. What is more, Sebastian Faber 
considers that spirituality, as opposed to materialism, is the key feature of Hispanism, which 
suggests that the role of religion in these authors’s thought is, in fact, part of a long 
established defining trend of Hispanism (2002: 167, 175, 178-80, 183). As previously 
discussed, the long period of crisis and decline in which Spain is submerged results in the 
longing for a reinvention of Spanishness which gives way to a series of public debates and 
efforts aimed at the modernization and Europeanization of Spain. At the same time, there is 
a sense of pride or nostalgia regarding Spanish heritage and traditions (see Balfour, 1995: 
415; see also 1.2). To add to the turmoil, these co-existing tendencies, the deep-rooted 
religiosity, and the keenness for progress and modernity are often considered incompatible, 
or, at the very least, conflicting. As a result of this confrontation, many pages have been 
devoted to this issue, some of them offering a conciliation of rationality and spirituality. 
                                                
23 The main reason why the thought of FS is often described as pessimistic is because they do not 
clearly identify who the agent to bring about social change and personal emancipation will be (see 
García de la Serrana, 2004: 205). Moreover, without such an agent, the possibility of bringing this 
emancipation to fruition comes into question and the possibilities which they sketch in their writings 
remain confined to the realm of utopia. 
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Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre are no exception. Taking their cue from such influential 
Spanish thinkers as Unamuno and Ortega, they offer a resolution, individual and 
indeterminate, to the problem of the relationship between spirituality and rationality. They 
strive to overcome the concept and practice of established Catholicism by opting for faith 
rather than religion as part of a personal and social project of collective growth. 
 
1.4 Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in the spotlight 
The criteria for choosing these three thinkers as the central figures of this research are based 
not only on their attempt to overcome the co-ordinates set by instrumental reason, but also 
on their intellectual and circumstantial affinities and disparities. 
The choice of Aguirre is due to the crucial role he plays in Spanish intellectual and 
public life under many different guises, such as those of priest, translator, editor, and 
aristocrat. But, more importantly, as mentioned above, he is often credited with having first 
introduced the works of the components of the FS to a Spanish readership (see Aranguren, 
1994, 4: 544; 1994, 5: 376). He translates and publishes a considerable number of their 
works into Spanish, encouraging the dissemination of their thought, as well as being 
considerably influenced by it himself. His influence – both under and after Franco – is 
considerable, not only because of his prominent social position, or his pre-eminent 
connections, but also because of his contact with the general public through his translations 
and contributions to El País (see Gullón, 1989; 13)24.  
Aranguren, who befriends both Aguirre and Zambrano, and in that sense serves as a 
link between the two, has been included in this thesis because he shows a clear interest in 
the School and deals with and develops many of the key questions posed by the members of 
the Institut. What is more, his personal experience in the United States and his sparse but 
direct contact with Marcuse put him in a privileged and singular position to discuss, 
evaluate, and, even, develop neo-Marxist thought. In addition, Aranguren contributes, as 
does Aguirre, to newspapers with a diversity of regular articles which introduce Spanish 
readers to different currents of thought and encourage a critical outlook towards domestic 
affairs. All in all, Aranguren also exercises a considerable influence on the Spanish 
readership who – not without controversy (see Javier Marías, 1999) – holds him in high 
esteem as the number of awards received and the events held in his honour bear witness to 
(for more details of these awards see Blázquez, 1994a, 1: 12-13; see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 
                                                
24 Evidence of this is that Aguirre frequents the Palacio de la Zarzuela, the residence of the Spanish 
royal family, and he hosts the social event which introduced Felipe González, the future Spanish 
socialist president, to public life as the head of his party (see Gullón, 1989: 12-13; Aguirre, 1985: 46). 
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17-20; see Blázquez, 1994, 6: 6-7)25. The polemic aroused by Javier Marías’s posthumous 
accusations against Aranguren bear testimony to the Manichean perspective often adopted 
towards people’s relationship with the regime. Whereas it is undeniable that thinkers such 
as Torrente, Ridruejo, Rosales, Laín, Rovar, Maravall, and Aranguren were supporters, 
some even ideologues, of the regime, it is equally true that from the late 1940s and 1950s 
they become disillusioned with the regime, exercising an increasing amount of criticism 
towards it (see Gracia, 2004: 218-19, 242, 260, 267, 275; see also Díaz, 1983: 75). As Jordi 
Gracia puts it, “dejaron de sentirse integrados en un sistema mejorable, para volverse 
disidentes” (2004: 370). It is the intention of this thesis to elucidate the complexities 
involved in the evolution of those within and, later, against the regime, with particular 
reference to Aranguren and Aguirre.  
Finally, Zambrano offers a very different perspective on essentially the same topic: a 
critique of instrumental reason and the search for possible alternatives to it. Her personal 
experience as a woman in exile also contributes to shaping the direction, content, and style 
of her thought. This results in a coherent body of work with a deeply personal and symbolic 
outlook, offering what could be considered as a profoundly original, although less explicit, 
CT.  
Although it is true that all three thinkers have been well-known public figures in one 
way or another and are, therefore, quite well-known, their thought tends to be understood 
and interpreted within the co-ordinates of the historical moment they shared and, to a 
certain extent, shaped, that is, their reaction towards the Franco regime, their position 
during the Spanish Transition, and, in the case of Zambrano, her contribution as an exile. 
What I would like to suggest, however, is that there is an important subversive element in 
their work which, although concerned with their historical circumstances, aims to transcend 
those in order to address the issue of rationality itself. Their work will thus provide 
evidence of the existence of attempts to liberate reason from its instrumentalization as part 
of a wider European current, opening the door to finding other such attempts in other 
authors whose work, although beyond the scope of this thesis, may be analysed in 
subsequent research. The study of these three thinkers from this perspective is, therefore, of 
interest because it constitutes a recuperation of a crucial aspect of their thought which has 
                                                
25 In 1982 he receives the award in social sciences “Giner de los Ríos”, in 1984 a public homage, in 
1989 the Premio Nacional de Ensayo, and in 1991 a book-homage is published: Ética, día tras día. 
Homenaje al profesor Aranguren en su ochenta cumpleaños. Also in 1991, he receives the medal 
Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid, in 1993 the award León Felipe; later that year he becomes doctor 
honoris causa by the Universidad Carlos III, Madrid; he also receives a tribute by Círculo de Lectores 
and the Golden Medal of the city of Zaragoza; in November, he becomes emeritus professor at the 
Universidad Complutense, Madrid. In 1995, he receives the award Príncipe de Asturias for 
Communications and Humanities; in May of that same year, he becomes doctor honoris causa by the 
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 17-20). 
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passed largely unnoticed, and, of course, because it unveils evidence of the existence of a 




The aim of this thesis is not to assess the philosophical, political, or intellectual value of 
CT. As Skinner puts it, “it is I think nothing less than fatal to good historical practice to 
introduce the question of truth into social explanation” (Skinner, 2002: 31). As Skinner 
explains, it is not the role of the historian, even in the area of the history of ideas, to engage 
in an analysis of the truth content of the past, but rather in its interpretation (see Skinner, 
2002: 27-31). Consequently, my aim is to provide evidence to show that the work of 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre largely falls under the co-ordinates of CT and can, 
therefore, be considered, even re-evaluated, as such. This is not to say that an analysis of the 
truth-value and even usefulness of their thought and work should not be undertaken from a 
different disciplinary perspective, but it simply falls beyond the scope of this research. In 
other words, this research is more concerned with establishing the inner coherence – or lack 
thereof – of these authors’s work and their belief system and how they relate, or not, to CT 
than to assess the rationality of their positions from an external and anachronistic 
framework of rationality (see Skinner, 2002: 27-56). 
I would like to stress that although the purpose of this thesis is to reveal the existence 
of a link between Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre and CT, I do not intend to carry out a 
comparison between these three authors, nor do I suggest that such a comparison is possible 
or desirable. Although their thought converges in various points in so far as they all develop 
a fierce critique of neo-capitalist society and its rationality, the nature of their work, their 
style, and their praxis as well as their contributions remain distinct and original in each one 
of them. Regarding their points of convergence, these are the characteristics which, as we 
shall see throughout the thesis, account for their thought to be considered CT. I argue that 
through the analysis of the elements present in the content, methodology, and style of their 
work, and, in connection with the available biographical information, it is possible to 
observe how their thought conforms to the parameters established by CT as discussed 
above.  
                                                
26 Evidence of this is can be found in Eamonn Rodger’s Encyclopedia of Contemporary Spanish 
Culture, whose entry on CT focuses exclusively on CT in the context of the literary criticism produced 
by academic authors or the mass media, but makes no mention of CT in Spain in the Frankfurtian sense 
(see 1999: 129-30). Similarly, as indicated above, Jordan dismisses the idea of the cultivation of CT in 
Spain (2002: 57). 
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Despite these common aspects of their work, each of these authors adopts a 
distinctive approach and style, which result in different intellectual contributions in the case 
of each individual author. This is true of their critique of instrumental reason, but 
particularly of the alternatives to it offered by each of them. As we shall see, in the case of 
Aranguren, these materialize in the study of human communication, particularly in relation 
to participative democracy, where, with the help of a more comprehensive, humanitarian, 
and political education, and a critical attitude, his hopes lie. Aguirre, like Aranguren, 
wagers on the power of critical thought; but rather than explicitly encouraging the reader to 
develop it, he aims to help the reader develop these critical skills by means of the effort and 
engagement required in the reading of his texts. In contrast, Zambrano, possibly the most 
original of the three of them, offers an altogether alternative rationality, namely, poetic 
reason. Such poetic reason will be discussed at length in Chapter Four. 
Thus, whereas aiming to preserve the individuality and idiosyncrasies of the authors 
here studied, a number of common aspects inform the methodology of this research. As 
indicated above, the FS and Zambrano consider the empiric and analytical methodology 
barren in relation to sociological analysis. Taking into account that not only their work, but 
also the work of Aguirre and, to a lesser extent Aranguren, constitute an effort to 
communicate more than what it is said, it then becomes clear that an analysis of their work 
that aims at acknowledging and engaging with the more subtle and less explicit aspects of 
their thought requires more than simply attempting the exegesis of the available texts. In 
fact, because of the methodological features of their work, an analysis which limits itself to 
the text may have counterproductive results. An example of this can be found in the 
common interpretation of some of Zambrano’s texts as mystical (see Bundgård, 2004: 15; 
see also Pujalá, 1992: 80; Ortega Muñoz, 1980: 79). As I shall discuss in Chapter Four, 
these emerge from a close reading of the text which does not consider the aim of the author 
or function of the text. As a result of the importance of the elements of praxis and 
intentionality to the development of CT, this research relies substantially on the analysis 
and interpretation of biographical data. Hence, in the first place, an overview of the life and 
work of each author, an account of the interaction and evolution of these two elements, and 
the contextualization of the socio-historical period in which their work is produced and 
received will be provided in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. Second, a comparative 
analysis of their work with the relevant current of thought (either neo-Marxism or 
Heideggerian thought) will be carried out in those chapters. Then, there will be an overview 
of their socio-political content and other relevant aspects related to it, which may include a 
variety of topics, such as overtly political ones, their views on religion, the self, and art, as 
appropriate for each author discussed. In the light of all of this information, as part of the 
heuristic efforts of this thesis, a reconstruction of the premises which support their thought 
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will be attempted, so that their arguments come to light more clearly, but also so that it is 
possible to observe how the different aspects of their thought relate to each other and are 
part of a core project. Finally, their framework for the critique of instrumental reason will 
be evaluated in the last chapter, so as to determine whether or not their thought can actually 
be considered to be CT. 
Because this research has an important component of re-construction, it will rely 
heavily on primary sources. However, as reiterated throughout this introduction, this 
heuristic analysis will not focus exclusively on the explicit content of the text. In addition to 
this, it will pay close attention to the implications of what it is said and of how it is 
expressed. Skinner has supported this approach by referring to the performative value of 
speech acts:  
from the perspective of speech acts, ‘performatives’ illustrate the possibility that the point of interest 
is that ‘the same thing’ may be said in a number of ways and for a number of purposes. Hence, the 
strict meaning of words, what is said, is not the only and not even the main question that interests, but 
also how and why (by which intention) it is said (Palonen, 2003: 32).  
As a consequence, it is important to consider the context in which a text is written and to 
interpret what the author intends to convey by writing such a text. In order to accomplish 
this, what this research attempts to elucidate is what the implicit premises and beliefs held 
by the authors are (see Skinner, 2002: 5). That is why quotations will often be provided 
whose main value to this research lies not in the main point which the text makes, but in the 
seemingly marginal information which they provide and which often reveals the premises 
and beliefs mentioned above; hence, the element of re-construction.  
Several key themes, such as spirituality, utopia, and the notion of spiral development 
will be found to be present in all three authors. Although, based on this thematic cohesion, 
it may seem appropriate to structure each chapter around these themes, this structuring 
principle is not suitable for this research for several reasons.  
First, having an identical structure in each chapter, would give their contents a false 
sense of homogeneity, which is not present in CT or amongst Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre.  
Second, spirituality is not one of the defining manifestations of CT and, although its 
role is crucial to understanding the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, its 
relationship to the work of each author is significantly different. In the case of Aranguren 
and Aguirre, this spirituality is understood, particularly initially, in relation to its 
institutionalised form: religion and Catholicism in particular. Because of the socio-historical 
circumstances of Spain at that time, their faith and its impact on their thought can only be 
understood in relation to the socio-political and economic conditions they live in, which is 
why the chapters have been structured in such a way that these connections and their 
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implications are underlined and explored. In the case of Zambrano, her spirituality is deeply 
intertwined with her thought, which is why the chapter has been structured so as to 
highlight and analyse this connection. Nevertheless, for the purpose of cohesion, a section 
on the role of spirituality is included in the final chapter. 
It must also be highlighted that, as in the case of the FS, and as a result of their 
premise of the interconnection of the social fabric and of existence itself, a certain element 
of apparent repetition is unavoidable. It occurs because, often, different aspects of the 
thought of these authors lead to different aspects of the same conclusion or, even, the same 
conclusion. Thus, this repetition is partial and crucial to the development of the argument, 
for it reinforces its coherence and intrinsic interconnectedness. It is also because of this 
interconnectedness that I consider counter-productive any attempt to structure the analysis 
of their thought in well-differentiated and fully comprehensive sections, for in the case of 
these authors such a structure would only result in the distortion of their thought. 
Third, concepts such as utopia and the notion of spiral development are not 
structuring elements of their thought, but rather the consequences of its development; that is 
why they are best illustrated as the consequences of the premises of their thought.  
With the aim of providing the reader with the critical frame of reference that this 
research is posited on, particular attention will now be paid to the levels of semantics, 
intentionality, and biography, for these intertwining aspects play a key role in the structure 
of this research and the development of the arguments made. 
The semantic difficulties implicit in analysing a text from a perspective of the history 
of ideas must be acknowledged. Extracting, questioning, and paraphrasing specific concepts 
such as talante, mood – which will be further developed in Chapter Three – is particularly 
problematic, as can be seen in the sharp philosophic divergence in the history of ideas of 
whether such a practice is valid. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon and French structuralist 
traditions defend the existence of “text” as a separate and independent object from the 
psychological state of the agent who creates it, the hermeneutic tradition which draws on 
the writings of Dilthey and Heidegger is opposed to such separation between text and 
author (see Rosen, 1982: 2). Meaning, according to the latter, “is neither reducible to nor 
separable from its literal embodiment in a text” (Rosen, 1982: 2). In line with this, the 
methodology of this research has been very much oriented by Quentin Skinner’s postulate 
that one can neither solely rely on the socio-political, economic, and religious context of a 
text in order to extract its meaning, nor entirely dismiss these factors and consider the text 
as autonomous (see 1988b: 29). That is why intentionality plays a crucial role in the 
exercise of exegesis. In fact, Skinner suggests as a general hermeneutic rule that “the 
recovery of a writer’s (illocutionary) intentions must be treated as a necessary condition of 
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being able to interpret the meanings of his work” (1988c: 77; see also 1988b: 55-56). For 
this purpose, he makes two further points:  
in order to be able to interpret the meaning of a text, it is necessary to consider factors other than the 
text itself. [...] I thus have been concerned to shift the emphasis of the discussion off the idea of the 
text as an autonomous object, and on to the idea of the text as an object linked to its creator, and thus 
on to the discussion of what its creator may have been doing in creating it (Skinner, 1988c: 78).  
Thus, work and author become inextricably linked. Such is the key assumption this research 
rests upon, which − as with CT itself − accounts for its biographical approach. As a result of 
their methodological relevance, biography and intentionality shall be further developed 
below. 
Regarding the issue of paraphrasing, this thesis also follows Skinner’s views. As a 
result, the use of a different vocabulary and different style of expression to those used by 
the authors studied is not only considered merely acceptable, but even often necessary in 
order to be able to develop arguments in the best possible manner and provide suitable 
explanations. As Skinner puts it, 
It would be a quixotic form of self-denying ordinance to insist that our language of explanation must 
at this juncture match whatever language the people in question applied or could have applied to 
themselves. If we wish to furnish what we take to be the most powerful explanations available to us, 
we are bound to employ what we believe to be the best available explanatory theories and the 
concepts embodied in them (2002: 50). 
It is also of paramount importance to acknowledge the political implications of the 
methodology which guides and structures this research. Palonen argues that Skinner adopts 
a “pro-political orientation [which] serves as a heuristic instrument” (2003: 4). Such a pro-
political orientation is also present in this research. As indicated above, for Skinner, 
utterances have a performative value, that is why when it comes to the social realm and 
politics in particular saying something is doing something (see Palonen, 2003: 31-35). By 
means of his perspective of linguistic action, Skinner  
gives us a model of how to study political thought by giving a priority to politics over thought. [...] 
Skinner alters the perspective from the vita contemplativa to the vita activa. He gives us a model of 
how to study politics by studying theories, concepts and their role in the shifting horizons of the 
possible, using the well-known facts and more disputed narratives of the events precisely as auxiliary 
contextual instruments (Palonen, 2003: 94). 
 By thinking politically there is a shift in perspective. For this reason, it is necessary to 
understand that thinking politically goes far beyond thinking about politics. As John Pocock 
indicates, 
political thought may be regarded as an aspect of social behaviour, of the ways in which men behave 
towards each other and towards the institutions of their society; or it may be regarded as an aspect of 
intellectuality, of men’s attempt to gain understanding of their experience and environment (1962: 
185). 
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This has important consequences. As Palonen explains in relation to Skinner’s thought, 
“thinking politically is an aspect of the activity of politics itself” (see Palonen, 2003: 3; see 
also 29). Thus, the sphere of what politics is, and more importantly, of who makes politics, 
widens considerably to include not only the researcher, but also the author who is 
researched, whose political voice is, thus, revealed. As Palonen puts it, “to take ‘political 
life itself’ as the point of departure rehabilitates the political agents. They are not devalued 
or functionalized into bearers or representatives of some principle” (2003: 3). Thus, this 
rehabilitation of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre as political agents becomes 
simultaneously one of the aims of this research and one of the consequences of its 
methodology. 
 
1.5.1 The role of biography 
The fact that intentionality is a key methodological tool in the interpretation of these 
authors, as discussed above, is unquestionably problematic. The first and perhaps most 
serious problem arising from the concept of “intentionality” is its subjective, unmeasurable, 
and unverifiable nature, which may put the researcher in an uncomfortable situation; 
uncomfortable, indeed, if this hypothetical researcher’s methodology, in line with scientific 
practices, demands direct evidence of these claims of intentionality. Instead, indirect 
evidence, that is, biographical and contextual information will be used in this research in 
order to attempt to elucidate the authors’s intentionality. Its conclusions are, of course, not 
entirely verifiable. Nevertheless, the inferences made will be supported by existing material 
testimonies and are, therefore, falsifiable, thus avoiding the trap of relativism. Furthermore, 
as with intentionality itself, such a rejection of verifiability, of the aspiration of certainty, is 
very much in line with the stand taken by CT, as we shall see in the course of the thesis 
where further arguments supporting this position will be provided. 
There are other reasons for incorporating biography as an important aspect of this 
research. First, the work of all three authors has been noticeably influenced and shaped by 
their psychological profile, or actitudes vitales in Ortegan terminology, and by key 
biographical events, at least as much as by their socio-historical background. Second, the 
fact that the analysis of Zambrano’s and Aguirre’s work, and, to a lesser extent, also 
Aranguren’s, constitutes an exercise of reconstruction makes considering their 
psychological profile and the key events of their biography crucial in not only 
contextualizing, but also understanding the content and scope of their work. Finally, as 
pointed out above, there is unwillingness on the part of these authors to separate author 
from work, life from theory, because of its impact on the content of their work, but more 
importantly on the framework of the rationality they adopt. What is more, as Carmen 
Revilla argues in relation to Zambrano, the unity and coherence of Zambrano’s works can 
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only be fully appreciated when they are approached and analysed in the light of her 
biography, more specifically, in the light of her “decisión de desvelar, de manifestar las 
posibilidades del ser humano” (2004 :7). Similarly, it is the biographical choices and the 
intentionality behind their work that reveals the unity and coherence within the diversity in 
the works of Aranguren and Aguirre. Due to their search for an overarching and 
conciliatory rationality, the division between biography and œuvre is perceived as artificial. 
The desirability and feasibility to establish different and distinct fields of research and 
experience is questioned. Consequently, a conscious effort is made to integrate the two, thus 
blurring their boundaries and differences. That is why a good number of the 
autobiographical testimonies found in their texts have been left there as a trail, the purpose 
of which is to complete the text providing it with a wider context, more profound content, 
and greater significance. This is particularly evident because, although there are important 
formal and stylistic differences between the three, their work shares a substantial emphasis 
on a traditionally autobiographic topic: selfhood, which is almost ever-present. Hence, one 
of the key characteristics of their contributions is the existence of this deliberate 
autobiographical element whose implications and significance have to be acknowledged 
and explored.  
Undoubtedly, including (auto-)biography as part of an academic argument presents a 
number of difficulties. Even stating that their work includes a strong autobiographical 
component is itself problematic, for if the author is always implicated in his own work, then 
everything written could be considered autobiography (Anderson, 2001: 1). Paradoxically, 
this reductio ad absurdum, instead of proving the impossibility of this genre, states the 
importance of it and the implicit dangers of refusing to acknowledge the reach of the ever-
present author. Despite efforts to relegate the personal to some clearly signposted and 
separated sections of the text, there are traces of the author throughout the text in the form 
of specific words or rhetorical constructions that modify several aspects of the discourse, 
thus conferring the personal a certain visibility (see Anderson, 2001: 122). The 
autobiographical is an inherent aspect in any text, although in varying degrees. 
Acknowledging it, both as a critic and as a writer is, therefore, not so much a practice which 
should be at odds with the standards of an acceptable argument, as the act of positioning 
oneself on a particular side of the discussion.  
Having discussed the reasons for this approach, it should be noted that the emphasis 
of this analysis is placed not so much on the truth content of this markedly autobiographic 
material as on the implications and repercussions that arise from it (see Anderson, 2001: 
91).  
This autobiographical content performs a testimonial function. The personal account 
of the writer bears witness to a certain part of history, a part of history which in all 
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likelihood has been shared by others. The existing connection between biography and 
history effectively extends a bridge over the distance that separates the writer from the 
reader, the self from the other. Regardless of whether the reader is part of the historical 
event or historical context or not, the autobiographical text creates a set of two co-ordinates, 
personal experience and subjectivity on the one hand, and a socio-historical context, 
historicity, on the other, which the reader may find it easier to relate to. It contains an 
element of reality, even if this element just means that it has been experienced as real, 
which may resonate with the reader’s own experiences and circumstances. Autobiography 
not only contributes to closing the gap between the self and the other, but insofar as a silent 
other may find representation in that biography he also finds empowerment; the individual 
is released from his isolation, finds a voice, and gains a degree of visibility (see Anderson, 
2001: 104).  
However, this connection between autobiography and history is not without 
problems. First of all, it has been argued that testimonies can never provide a full picture, a 
totalizable account of events (Anderson, 2001: 127-28). Although this is, of course, true, it 
does not automatically dismiss the value of an autobiographical account as testimony; it 
only reminds us that, as human beings, we often experience a need or, at least, a desire for 
totalizing, explanatory, and definite accounts. There are a number of epistemological 
difficulties which make any claims for such knowledge highly suspicious as already 
suggested above (these views will be expanded in several discussions on perspectivism and 
epistemology in the course of the following chapters). 
Autobiography as testimony also raises the issue of the role of subjectivity, because 
“our story cannot be ‘self-present’ to us, cannot be under the conscious control of the 
subject” (Anderson, 2001: 126). The question of control is a very relevant one; to what 
extent can anything actually be under the conscious control of the subject? Is control, on the 
contrary, an illusion, a working concept that allows the individual to gain a sense of safety 
and direction so as to go about his daily life? It seems reasonable to suggest that the actions 
of any individual will be influenced by intentionality on the one hand, and by the 
unconscious mind on the other. Other influences include the surrounding atmosphere, the 
socio-historical situation, the actions of others, as well as our perception of them and a long 
list of endogenic and exogenic factors27. Determining the extent of this influence, and how 
this may affect the issue of control is a complex matter which deserves close attention, and 
although it cannot be resolved here, its complexity should not be underestimated. However, 
whether the individual is the agent of his own life story or whether he just bears witness to 
it does not affect his capability to perceive and the potential for expression. Autobiography 
                                                
27 The terms “endogenic” and “exogenic” have been chosen here, although “inner” and “external” 
could have been used, with the intention of highlighting the psychological component of these factors. 
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is then an exercise which results in the representation and expression of the self and its 
circumstances, although, granted, it is a biased and partial one.  
The presence of this autobiographical material also performs other functions, such as 
that of self-reflection, catharsis, and, more importantly, a methodological function as 
pointed out initially. That is why after having carefully considered the methodological risks 
this biographical approach entails, it has still been considered necessary to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of these authors. These functions and their implications will be 
studied at greater length in the subsequent chapters in reference to the authors. 
Despite the key role of the biographical component in re-constructing and analysing 
the work of these intellectuals, it is just as important to acknowledge the limitations of this 
approach. The biographical data can only ever provide ad hoc explanations, because the 
reverse would result in an undefendable determinist view of personal choice and history. 
Therefore, the biography of a given author is only considered as a contributing factor, not a 
determining one, in accounting for his production and choices. It is this element of choice, 
not to mention the uniqueness of every individual biographical circumstance, which makes 
pointless the extrapolation of any conclusions of this nature as an a priori premise. 
 
1.5.2 The implications of intentionality and style 
Much of the analysis undertaken throughout this thesis rests upon what has been known as 
the “linguistic turn” introduced by Skinner. He describes this change of perspective and 
approach as follows: 
 I mark a strong distinction between what I take to be two distinguishable dimensions of language. 
One has conventionally been described as the dimension of meaning, the study of the sense and 
reference allegedly attaching to words and sentences. The other is best described as the dimension of 
linguistic action, the study of the range of things that speakers are capable of doing in (and by) their 
use of words and sentences. Traditional hermeneutics has generally, and often exclusively, 
concentrated on the first of these dimensions; I concentrate very much on the second (Skinner, 1996: 
7-8). 
Intentionality is, therefore, doubly relevant in this research because not only is it a defining 
aspect of the work of the authors here studied, but it is also a key element of the present 
hermeneutic approach. The FS and the three authors here studied envisage intentionality as 
playing a crucial role in their own works partly as a result of Heidegger’s influence, and 
partly as a necessary requirement for the cohesion of their own rationality and their project 
as a whole. Clarifying the nature in this cohesion in the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, 
and Aguirre is of paramount importance for the argument and methodology of this thesis, 
because of the analysis, reconstruction, and interpretation of these authors’s thought will 
rest on such cohesion. That is why it must be emphasized that this cohesion is not an 
external construct or structure imposed a posteriori by the exegete on the groups of texts 
analysed with the objective of conferring to these texts or even creating a sense of 
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coherence that was not there in the first place. This is what Skinner refers to as the 
“mythology of coherence” (see Skinner, 1988b: 38-43; see also Skinner, 2002: 67-72). This, 
however, does not apply to the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre because they 
contain an inherent coherence that is the result of the intentionality which has shaped and 
guided their thought. Consequently, in their case, cohesion is the result of the awareness 
and, more importantly, intention of these authors to set out a project of criticism and 
rationality, which – although in different forms and different shapes – expands throughout 
their work and even their own lives. It is because of the pivotal role that intentionality plays 
in the thought of these authors that the link between biography and work is crucial in their 
analysis. The most immediate consequence of this position which insists on the link 
between text and author is the interconnectedness of the various levels of their work, such 
as biography, content, and meaning, to mention just a few, as indicated above. Some of the 
implications and materializations of such interconnectedness shall now be explored. 
None of these three authors can be considered a systematic thinker. Despite their 
asystematic nature, their work is still part of a project of personal and social development. 
The key features of their writings must, therefore, be understood as aspects of such projects. 
In this context, and bearing in mind the relevance of intentionality, the form and style of 
their work are just as important as the content, for they are clearly concerned with the effect 
they would have on their readers, as their writings are produced in the hope of encouraging 
a certain reaction or motivation in the reader.  
Intentionality is at the very core of their writings, which at a very basic but powerful 
level is aimed at two things: first, to communicate – as opposed to lecturing or 
indoctrinating – and, second, to motivate – to motivate the reader into action, into 
questioning or simply to engage with the text. An example of the centrality of 
communication can be found in the topicality and interest of the content – for their 
contemporary readers –, their frequent use of the newspaper article and the essay to 
establish a more direct and intimate connection with the reader, as well as a wide number of 
stylistic features, which will be discussed more at length in the course of the following 
chapters. The newspaper contribution plays a double role, that of reflecting the writer’s 
concerns and echoing those of many of the readers, as well as opening their thought to new 
possibilities and pointing to new horizons (see Gracia, 1996: 20). As for the connotations of 
essay writing, Bretz’s conclusion regarding the use of the footnote (or lack thereof), which 
also applies to our key three authors, forcefully grasps these authors’s perspective on 
communication:  
they [Maragall, Unamuno, Ortega and other members of these generations] tend to avoid or 
minimally use footnotes, even in longer treatises such as Unamuno’s Del sentimiento trágico de la 
vida. Footnotes and source identification invest the writer with specialized authority that allows him 
to impart information rather than enter into exchange with the reader or antecedent texts (2001: 201).  
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It emerges from this how they avoid standing in a position of intellectual authority, 
deliberately stripping the text of those features which may provide such authority and create 
a further distance between reader and text. Although it can be argued that the mere fact of 
being published and being read may already, and perhaps unavoidably, put the author and 
the text in a position of authority, what remains true is that these authors are clearly 
concerned with the reception of their work; that they share the desire, the intention, to create 
a closer relationship between reader, the text, and the writer; and that they develop certain 
strategies in the attempt to do so. 
This is also the case with Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre. Aranguren himself 
corroborates this in relation to the near-absence of footnotes in Zambrano’s work:  
pareciéndose en esto al propio Ortega, nunca abusa de las citas, porque María Zambrano despoja 
totalmente su texto de citas y nos lo presenta desnudo, exento a nuestros ojos. De modo que la 
intertextualidad en María Zambrano está viva, pero más bien latente, y en cambio está bastante 
patente lo que hay de comunicación, no en universo cerrado, sino en universo abierto, como un juego 
abierto hacia la realidad (1983: 117; see also Laurenzi, 2004: 15). 
Thus, they share the same aim of gaining closeness with the reader, at the same time as they 
emphasize the humanistic rather than scientific nature of their writings. Content, form, and 
style deliberately work together in a holistic manner, and only reluctantly are they separated 
here for the purpose of analysis. As we have seen, these features are not coincidental or fruit 
of an observation a posteriori, but a central premise of their work which consequently 
shape it. Having provided some evidence of their interconnectedness, which will be 
explored at length in Chapter Four, the key characteristics of their writings will be 
discussed below. 
 
1.6 The writings 
1.6.1 Style, content, and availability 
This section will explore the style, content, and availability of Aranguren’s, Zambrano’s, 
and Aguirre’s work, which need to be considered in order to better understand the project of 
personal and socio-political development put forward by these authors, as well as the reach 
and significance of their ideas. 
Aranguren is a fertile writer who writes on a variety of topics, especially religion, 
ethics, and socio-political issues. Aranguren starts his trajectory with a largely descriptive 
style, which Gracia, in relation to his analysis of d’Ors work, describes as “prosa científica 
de las humanidades” (1996: 27). As he matures intellectually and politically, his expression 
changes accordingly into a more inquisitive, digressive, personal, and dialogical style. 
Books, journals, and newspaper articles are his preferred means of expression. A number of 
lectures in both the academic and the public domain bear witness to his vocation as teacher, 
and to his proximity with his public or readers. All in all, his style is clear, coherent, and 
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communicative in an effort to reach the greatest number of readers possible, and to awaken 
their interest and critical attitude.  
His regular newspaper articles coupled with his personal circumstances and his 
relation with the regime have contributed to making him a well-known intellectual with a 
considerable readership. Moreover, since 1994 the availability of his intellectual production 
has increased with Feliciano Blázquez’s publication of his complete works. There are also 
various secondary texts which introduce, discuss, and analyse Aranguren’s work, or aspects 
of it, especially his views on religion and ethics (see Gracia, 1996: 161; see also Chapter 
Three). Despite Aranguren’s prolific and wide-ranging career, he is probably best known 
for the series of articles published after his death as a result of the controversy between 
Javier Marías and Aranguren’s family and friends regarding Aranguren’s role and 
sympathies during the Francoist regime (Javier Marías, 1999). Although his role and impact 
on the process of Transition is widely recognised, the extent of the research on Aranguren’s 
interest in politics has been extremely limited. To my knowledge, only Victoria Camps and 
Carlos Soldevilla focus on this aspect of Aranguren’s work (see 1997: 181-189; 2004: 123-
143 respectively). This thesis aims to reveal and elucidate the political dimension of 
Aranguren’s work and its relationship to CT.  
Zambrano is probably the most prolific of the three, although her works are 
fragmentary, disperse, and elusive, reflecting the element of instability present almost 
throughout her life. Her style boasts an attractive simplicity, not simpleness, full of poetic 
and spiritual resonances because the focus of her reflection is not so much theoretical as it is 
existential and experiential, as we shall see (see Gómez Blesa, 2006: 36). She relies heavily 
on the use of symbols because she aims to communicate at different and progressively 
simultaneous levels, inviting the reader to consciously submerge himself in a fruitful and 
personal process of creation of meaning28. In recent years, particularly with the celebration 
of the hundredth anniversary of her birth in 2004, Zambrano has sparked popular interest 
which has resulted in an extensive number of publications on her works29. These include 
several doctoral theses, which, more or less successfully, have offered readings of different 
aspects of her thought30. Incidentally, Aranguren himself has supervised one such thesis 
entitled “La huida de Perséfone. María Zambrano y el conflicto de la temporalidad” 
                                                
28 In this sense, the Fundación María Zambrano (Vélez-Málaga) has fulfilled and continues to fulfil the 
task of promoting and preserving her legacy, as well as progressively publishing her remaining 
unpublished work. 
29 In addition to this, in 2004 a film which portrays her later life is released, bearing witness to the 
popularity of this author. The film in question is entitled María querida and it is directed by José Luis 
García Sánchez.  
30 See TESEO, a database of theses created by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia. 
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(Eguizábal Subero, 1994). Two of the theses, “El pensamiento político y social de María 
Zambrano” and “Maria Zambrano: Política e Historia”, are dedicated to the political aspect 
of her thought, although they focus on her early writings (Salguero Robles, 1994; Paniagua, 
1997 respectively). Some articles analyse her political contribution from different 
perspectives, most notably “Una lectura marxista de la obra de María Zambrano” and 
“María Zambrano y la guerra civil”, although, again, their focus is her early work (Dorang, 
1991; Robles Carcedo, 1991, respectively; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 8-9). The purpose 
of the present thesis, nevertheless, is to analyse her political thought, not limited to the early 
and overtly political years, but to the entirety of her work, and interpret her views and 
evolution in the light of Heideggerian philosophy and in relation to CT. 
Aguirre’s publications are, on the other hand, less extensive (see Herralde, 2006: 16). 
Except for a very limited number of smaller contributions to the debate on religion during 
the time he exercised his role as a priest, no literary work of his own is produced until after 
the end of the regime, and, even then, the quantity remains modest. This probably accounts 
for the fact that despite his importance as an influential intellectual and as a socialite, there 
are hardly any materials analysing his intellectual contributions; but his influential task as a 
translator, and editor-in-chief during the early 1970s at Taurus, a publishing house located 
in Madrid, should not be overlooked. His choice of authors, and the nature of the texts 
translated and published are highly significant, as well as his prologues, which − when 
available − give the reader a revealing insight into his motives and personal perspectives. 
He also tries his hand at journalism, proving his desire to maintain a direct contact with the 
public in an attempt to shape their attitudes as he had already started doing from the pulpit 
years earlier (see Gullón, 1989: 13). Despite his cultivation of the journalistic genre, and in 
contrast with Aranguren and Zambrano, his language is often obscure; its goal is to demand 
effort from the willing reader who, through this exercise, would awaken and practice 
independent thinking and a critical ability, which it is hoped could be extrapolated to other 
contexts. Although Chapter Five has been to a large extent a work of reconstruction, I 
believe that there exists sufficient material to carry out an analysis and evaluation of his 
contribution. What is more, given the influence he exerted on Spanish society, particularly 
during the Transition, the elucidation of the role he played is imperative in order to add one 
more piece to the incomplete puzzle of recent Spanish history, particularly considering that 
very little attention has been devoted to Aguirre’s role as an intellectual in his own right.  
Thus, despite their multiple differences, what links together the work of Aranguren, 
Zambrano, and Aguirre is their intention not only to engage with the reader, but to 
encourage the readers’s engagement with their texts, which they hope would trigger a 




Despite the problems involved in structuring their production according to clear generic 
labels given the heterogeneity of their content, form, and style, it is still useful for the 
purpose of analysis to consider whether or not their writings tend to have the traits of any of 
the major traditional genres. Anderson explains that “the markers of genre can thus be used 
to insist on the resemblance to what is already known, and to organize and regulate the 
meanings of a text for the reader” (2001: 10). Therefore, in order to be able to determine if a 
text belongs to a specific genre we must first establish if such a text exhibits the markers or 
patterns which are consistently found in a given genre. The usefulness of this method of 
classification and analysis is the motivation for the elucidation of how these authors’s work 
conforms to these patterns. Equally, the existence of such patterns, and their impact on the 
reception and elaboration of meaning makes traditional genre allocation incompatible with 
the subversive and creative project of CT as elaborated in these authors’s work, as I shall 
argue below and throughout the rest of this thesis. Bearing this in mind and the fact that the 
boundaries between the private and public tone and content of their writings are often 
blurred, their publications can be classified as epistles and partial semi-autobiographic 
accounts. They are also characterized by a more public format which tends to materialize in 
speeches (including sermons in the case of Aguirre), newspaper and journal articles, essays, 
and, very significantly for Aguirre, translations.  
Nonetheless, the most prolifically cultivated genre by all three authors is the essay. 
As Gracia’s insightful account of the nature of the essay as a genre reveals, essays can be 
understood as a “reflexión no sistemática, sin talante exhaustivo ni científico, expresada en 
términos marcadamente personales, proclive a la digresión más o menos colateral y sensible 
a la huella de un estilo de autor” (1996: 9). The essays written by Aranguren, Aguirre, and 
Zambrano fulfil this description; all three share a deliberate, open-ended, non-systematic, 
often digressive, and openly personal style. Hence, format and style seem to validate the 
claim that the genre mainly used by these authors is the essay; however, it is only with 
difficulty and reluctance that these works can be described as essays. A closer look at their 
writings reveals that, even formally, they resist classification since the traditional genres 
used blend into each other; this is so because they often borrow traits from other genres, so 
it is not unusual to encounter an essay − or part of it − in the tone of a public speech, or of 
an autobiographical confession. Essay writing in the case of Zambrano often adopts an 
epistolary aura, which can also be said of Aranguren’s and Aguirre’s newspaper articles. In 
addition, there is also a recurrent element of loiterature, in reference to the digression and 
openness of their writings; openness in the sense of indeterminate, unfinished, but also in its 
openness to the other, in what it contains and does not contain of alterity (see Chambers, 
1999: 37).  
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The borderlines between genres, as between disciplines, become blurred, conferring 
their expression a sense of fluidity on the one hand, and a sense of confusion and 
disorientation on the other. It is precisely because of this difficulty in confining Zambrano’s 
work to a particular genre that Aranguren describes her work as transgressive:  
estoy diciendo que todos estos creadores del lenguaje y particularmente los creadores del lenguaje 
poético, y de este lenguaje poético en la frontera de la poesía y otra cosa, como es el caso de María 
Zambrano, tienen que estar transgrediendo, por tanto, todo lo que constituye un género, puesto que 
ellos cultivan un género que en realidad son dos géneros distintos y por tanto una verdadera 
innovación en aquello que hacen. Tienen que ser por tanto transgresores, pero a la vez atenidos a la 
palabra y a las reglas de la palabra (1983: 114-115). 
This transgressive characteristic is common to all three authors. In the case of Aguirre, this 
is also because of his use of language, which is markedly idiosyncratic and deliberately 
obscure, as we shall discuss in Chapter Five. Aranguren does not communicate in a poetic 
language; however, it is the nature of his critique that accounts for his transgressive style as 
shall be argued in Chapter Three. 
This is just one of the many challenges which surround their work. Contemporary 
theorists tend to describe genres in terms of “family resemblances” among texts rather than 
look for rigid paradigms of classification which would define the nature of a text (see 
Swales, 1990: 49). Genre, however, is more than the mere reproduction or repetition of 
established patterns of expression. Because of this element of repetition, a certain level of 
expectation is created on the reader. As Paul Cobley puts it, “genre is not a set of textual 
features that can be enumerated; rather, it is an expectation” (2006: 41). Identifying a given 
text with a specific genre involves an implicit statement of similarities between the two 
which results in the creation of numerous expectations regarding the length of the text, the 
scope of its contents, the style in which it is written, the identity of its readership, and, even, 
its impact, to mention just a few. For this reason, the classification of a text into a genre is 
not a neutral one. Furthermore, from a Marxist perspective, genre can be considered as an 
instrument of social control because it contributes to reproducing the dominant ideology 
(see Feuer, 1992: 145). In as much as genre is an expectation, the text to be classified is 
linked to the existing patterns of a suitably similar genre. This has an impact on the 
reception of the text, especially, in the process of the elaboration of meaning on the part of 
the reader, which is particularly problematic for CT as we shall see below. 
Genre is more than the combination of content, format, and style. The aspirations and 
intentions of the author, insofar as they can be discerned from the text, must also be 
considered, as well as the nature and status of the resulting product31. From the 
                                                
31 As Gerard Genette argues, the intentions and aspirations of the text can be traced in the paratext, 
which contributes to providing a contextualizing frame for the reader: “the paratext consists, as [the] 
ambiguous prefix suggests, of all those things which we are never certain belong to the text of a work 
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aforementioned traits of essay writing, Gracia rightly concludes that “todo ello significa, 
por añadidura, que es un texto de opinión y, por debajo de un frecuente aspecto resolutivo o 
definitorio, su más íntima naturaleza lo aleja de lo conclusivo” (1996: 9). In contrast with 
this, even though neither Aranguren, Zambrano, nor Aguirre aim for conclusive and 
definitive results, and although their style is markedly personal, when examined under their 
own parameters, the content of their work cannot be considered as mere opinion either, for 
in line with CT, they aim to establish different epistemological grounds; they reject the 
dichotomy between science and doxa, between science and everything else. Yet, they still 
lack the definitiveness and conclusiveness or closure to become a political or philosophical 
system. Instead, their work may be described as a critique, but also as an invitation to the 
reader to share and to take part in the alternative framework of rationality in which they 
exercise their writings. Although personal, they cannot be considered individual, for they 
contain routes of personalized action in the direction of the realization of an alternative 
rationality which would become public and shared. That is why their writings transcend 
opinion and become a project in themselves; they go beyond hypothesis or theory to 
become possibility and action.  
As indicated above, intentionality is crucial in the case of the FS, because it is 
precisely the shared aim of their project what provides their work with cohesion for the 
different manifestations of CT. Given the homogenizing and reactionary effects indicated 
above of classifying a text within a given genre, the allocation of a text elaborated by the 
members of the FS or by any of the three authors studied seems incompatible with the 
subversive and creative intentions of their project. Because their work constitutes an attack 
on the established patterns of rationality as well as an attempt to overcome them, it would 
then be misleading to classify their writings within established genres, such as essay or 
biography. However, it is unclear whether it is desirable or necessary to do away with genre 
altogether. As Derrida puts it, “a text cannot belong to no genre” (1981: 61). Semiotically, 
genre provides a useful framework of reference and understanding within which texts are 
not only interpreted, but also, even, produced (see Fowler 1989, p.216). That is why, in as 
much as the work of Critical Theorists shares the same aims and requires a specific 
methodology of their own, that is, the coherence between intentionality, content, and style, 
their work also constitutes a genre of their own, namely, CT. As Jane Feuer observes, “a 
                                                                                                                                       
but which contribute to present – or ‘presentify’ – the text by making it into a book. It not only marks a 
zone of transition between text and non-text (‘hors-texte’), but also a transaction” (Genette, 1988: 63; 
see also Allen, 2000: 103-04). For Jacques Derrida such information can be found in a 
deconstructionist effort outside the text, in the “exergue”: “Exergue derives from the Greek and means 
‘outside of work’; the term was used to describe the space on a coin or medal reserved for inscriptions” 
(Smith, 2005: 140). In addition to these elements, as indicated above, this thesis will examine the 
content of texts in the light of the whole œuvre of the author and will also resort to biographical data in 
order to elucidate the intentionality of the author. 
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genre is ultimately an abstract conception rather than something that exists empirically in 
the world” (1992: 144). It is this relative flexibility of the nature of genre as an abstract 
conception which ultimately allows CT to become a genre of its own, for its common traits 
are sufficiently distinctive and cohesive to do so. 
These traits, as well as their consequences, attest to the praxis of an ideological 
statement: in their effort to destabilize and, ultimately, overcome instrumental reason, they 




This thesis, which is structured in a total of six chapters, has been divided in two parts 
which are quite distinct in focus and style. The first part, more theoretical and historical in 
nature, comprises two chapters. Its role is to provide an introduction and contextualization 
to the thesis that will not only establish the theoretical bases for the arguments that will be 
developed throughout the thesis, but it will also serve as a point of orientation and reference 
for the reader. Thus, after having introduced the aim and methodology of this research in 
Chapter One, Chapter Two provides a short introduction to twentieth-century Spain with an 
emphasis on the relevant socio-historical background for Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre, as well as introducing their socio-political positions, for they are crucial to 
understanding the background against which the subsequent discussion takes place. The 
second part of the thesis comprises a total of four chapters: a chapter for each individual 
author and the conclusion. This second part, which is more critical, focuses on the evolution 
of each one of these thinkers: their thought and the development of their critical stance 
towards the different expressions of instrumental reason.  
Chapter Three focuses on Aranguren. He is the first author to be discussed at length 
because, unlike Zambrano and Aguirre, his language is direct and his critique is fairly 
explicit, particularly during the later stages of his work; in fact, Amelia Varcárcel points to 
Aranguren’s clarity as one of the distinguishing features of his writings (1997: 43). This is 
why the analysis of his thought provides a useful platform for the rest of the thesis. This 
chapter explores Aranguren’s relationship to neo-Marxism and, more specifically, to 
Marcuse. Moreover, it sheds light on the fact that Aranguren explicitly develops some of 
the key topics first identified by the Frankfurt School, which are central to the critique of 
instrumental reason, making them his own subject matter. These topics include Aranguren’s 
criticism of consumerism and his denunciation of the manipulation citizens are subjected to 
from the mass media and the State, and he deals with them in an intentionally open and 
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easily accessible manner. The implications of this critique and Aranguren’s defence of the 
role of faith and of democratic values are also discussed at length.  
Chapter Four turns to Zambrano’s thought. Unlike Aranguren, her thought is far from 
explicit. Instead, she often uses symbolic language to deal with disparate and abstract 
topics. This has lead to a tendency to qualify her as a mystical thinker, often overlooking 
other more concrete dimensions of her work. Hence, this chapter will attempt the task of the 
reconstruction of her thought so as to bring out the latent unity and coherence of her project. 
More specific aspects of her work will also be explored, particularly her socio-political 
dimension, with a special emphasis on her views on democracy, and the relationship 
between the spiritual and political dimensions. Her status as an exile is of relevance in order 
to analyse how this experience shapes her positions, as well as to explore the differences 
and coincidences with the position of those who remain within Spain, as well as their 
possible (in)communication.  
Chapter Five focuses on Aguirre, who, despite being a very well-known public 
figure, has not been the object of any previous scholarly work. This chapter evaluates the 
role and influence of the different positions this charismatic intellectual held throughout his 
life, and especially clarifying his relationship to CT. It argues that, as a result of the 
influence of the School, Aguirre’s methodology and style are consistent with those of 
Critical Theory and his work should, therefore, be considered as such. Although Aguirre is 
often regarded as the introducer of the FS into Spain, he will be studied last for a number of 
reasons: there are fewer sources available because his own production is more limited than 
that of the previous authors; there are hardly any secondary texts available specifically on 
his work; and, more importantly, his style is obscure and fragmentary. Hence, this chapter 
has been, to a large extent, as in the case of Zambrano, a reconstruction of his thought. In a 
sense, Aguirre’s work can almost be viewed as the synthesis of Aranguren’s and 
Zambrano’s thought, for he covers the topics of the former in a style which is reminiscent 
of the latter in as much as his style shares many of her assumptions. That is why Aguirre 
will be discussed last, supported by the background and arguments used for his two 
contemporaries.  
The sixth and final chapter focuses on pivotal aspects of Critical Theory, as argued 
throughout the thesis – the role of biography, fragmentation, exile, art, the subject, 
psychoanalysis, and spirituality – and it argues that all these elements are present in some 
form in the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre. Thus, it concludes, that, while 
maintaining the originality of their approach, considering the similarity and affinity of the 
aims, scope, choice of subject matter, methods, and style of these three thinkers to those of 
the FS, their thought can also be considered Critical Theory. Furthermore, by introducing 
the elements of spirituality, faith, and the role of choice, transcendentality becomes a key 
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aspect of their alternative to instrumental reason. In consequence, as we shall see, not only 
do they establish the singularity of their approach, but they also by-pass the limitations 
associated with the Frankfurt School. 
Finally, it must be said that this thesis does not attempt to do provide a complete or 
totalizing account of these authors’s work. Because of the necessary limitations imposed by 
the format of a thesis, but, more importantly, because of the nature of these authors’s 
thought, such an attempt would be impossible and, more to the point, undesirable, since the 
value of their work lies, to a great extent, in their open-ended nature as we shall see in the 
course of the thesis.  
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2 Background and contextualization 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextualization for Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre because, as Skinner explains, “we need to make it one of our principal tasks to 
situate the texts we study within such intellectual [historical] contexts as enable us to make 
sense of what their authors were doing in writing them” (2002: 3). That is why this chapter 
will focus on providing and discussing the historiographic, socio-political, and economic 
context in which Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre develop their work and how their key 
biographical events relate to such a context. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
issue of cultural hegemony, which will be explored so that the nature and reach of their 
work can be appreciated in reference to their historical moment. That is why particular 
attention will be paid to the situation of education, censorship, and culture during the 
Franco regime.  
While the impact that this context may have had on their thought should not be 
overlooked, it is important not to be constrained by it either. As Quentin Skinner maintains, 
the “context” mistakenly gets treated as the determinant of what is said. It needs rather to be treated 
as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings, in a 
society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to 
communicate. (In this way, [...] the context itself can be used as a sort of court of appeal for assessing 
the relative plausibility of incompatible ascriptions of intentionality) (1988b: 64). 
For this reason, the present chapter will aim to provide a contextualizing framework which 
may be used as a point of reference throughout the thesis; intentionality, however, will 
carry more weight in the process of exegesis for the reasons indicated above. The 
unavoidably subjective nature of this category makes it a necessarily problematic 
methodological aspect. Nonetheless, its centrality renders it an indispensable element of this 
research. Therefore, beside context and background, biographical information will also be 
provided with the purpose of better understanding the authors’s motives and aims, in the 
hope that the reader will be in a better position to discern their intentionality (see 1.4.1). 
 
2.1 The historiographic context 
In order to provide a comprehensive background for this research, the question of the 
existence of a bourgeois revolution in Spain needs to be addressed. The answer to this 
question will provide a valuable insight into the Spanish socio-economic structure, not only 
during this period, but in subsequent years, shedding some light onto the events that would 
later unfold.  
Jesús Cruz convincingly challenges some key premises of traditional historiography 
on this topic: the existence of a new social revolutionary class before 1850, the bourgeoisie, 
and the causal link in history between economic, political, and social processes (1996: 6, 
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12). He argues that although there are a number of new economic opportunities during the 
period 1750-1850, the social and economic dynamics of interaction remain unchanged, 
which accounts for the continuation of a traditional economy (1996: 41-42). This is possible 
because of the following dual, layered, and conflictive – although entirely coherent – 
attitude: 
they [the political elite, generated by the self-perpetuating economic agents] embraced liberalism 
because that ideology is the agent of political stability and economic prosperity in northern Europe 
and America, because its economic principles are very much in line with their economic interests, 
and because they are attracted to its political message of freedom and progress against obscurantism 
and tradition. However, at the same time they had to maintain their domination in a society whose 
structure and organization is strongly opposed to the principles of the new ideology (Cruz, 1996: 206-
07).  
While their intellectual commitment, that is, their public discourse, displays a progressive 
attitude, their private discourse is still infused with the old values and ways (see Cruz, 1996: 
173). Hence, Cruz concludes that a bourgeois revolution cannot account for the changes 
that take place in Spain between 1808 and 1853, for while there is economic and social 
continuity, the nature of this continuity is political, and that is why he refers to it as 
“Spain’s liberal revolution” (1996: 276). As Ringrose explains, “there is no ‘bourgeois 
revolution’, if by that phrase we mean a demand for political power by a new middle class 
born of the rise of capitalism” (1996: 392). Indeed, power does not change hands because 
the same mechanism of clientelism and patronage continues in place throughout the 
nineteenth century (see Cruz, 1996: 173, 176; see also Ringrose, 1996: 295). The change, as 
stated above, is rather of a political nature, embracing liberal rhetoric and values so as to 
move forward in the same direction as the developments in the rest in Europe and to secure 
legitimization. 
In the light of the above, it is necessary to rethink the traditional conceptualization of 
Spanish modernity based on the liberal or Marxist models which stem from a linear 
evolutionist approach to historical processes and, indeed, progress (see Cruz, 1996: 4-5, 
260). This is of great consequence to the present research, for it highlights the need to 
consider the role of other factors and dynamics in the process of change. Cruz points to 
three key elements which play a vital role during the revolutionary changes that take place 
in the first half of the nineteenth century: the power of hierarchical relationships; cultural 
hegemony, in particular the role of, in Bourdieu’s terminology, habitus, that is, internal 
structures at the heart of social norms and customs that are more resistant to change than 
economic structures; and, finally, the role of the unconscious (see Cruz, 1996: 9, 13, 10-11; 
Holguín, 2002: 8-9; Bourdieu, 1990: 53 respectively). 
These factors also prove to be a great explanatory tool for the events which take place 
in twentieth-century Spain. From Cruz’s study we learn that the reach and depth of change 
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must not be taken at face value, and that its levels – economic, political, social, moral, and 
religious – must be analysed individually, although not separately. Understanding the 
irregularity and unevenness of the process of change may serve as an explanatory factor for 
the emergence of the two Spains and the subsequent conflict, while the power of habitus 
may also contribute to understanding the possibility of the peaceful Transition which takes 
place after the death of the dictator32. As for the role and impact of cultural hegemony and 
the unconscious, they will be examined at greater length below. 
More importantly, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre seem to have an intuitive 
understanding of the complexity and variety of factors involved in social change, and for 
that reason they emphasize that social progress can only be achieved when changes in 
behaviour are the reflection of a change in attitudes and beliefs which must start in the 
individual. The importance of this realization will unfold in the course of the thesis. 
 
2.2 Socio-historical contextualization 
The socio-historical context of the authors studied will now be discussed, for it will provide 
us with an insight into their background, shedding some light on their circumstances: the 
challenges they face, their motivations, the influences they receive, and the influence they 
exert. It is, therefore, crucial in understanding their significance, for their contributions are 
closely linked to both their personal circumstances and the socio-political events that 
surround them and shape the world they live in.  
All of them are born at the dawn of the twentieth century. The Spain into which 
Zambrano is born in 1904, rural Andalusia (Vélez-Málaga), is quite different from the more 
developed Spain that Aranguren (Ávila, 1909) and Aguirre (Madrid, 1934), the youngest of 
the three, are born into. Whereas both Aranguren and Aguirre come from well-off families 
who have a rather moderate political position, Zambrano’s father – D. Blas José Zambrano 
García de Carabante – is seriously committed to politics, becoming president of the 
Agrupación Socialista Obrera, the Socialist Party (1913), which effectively means that she 
is brought up in a left-wing atmosphere (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 28 and 2001: 14-15). It 
is, thus, hardly surprising that when the Second Republic is proclaimed in 1931, Zambrano 
embraces it full of hope. Although Aranguren and Aguirre do not suffer the Civil War itself 
and its consequences quite so dramatically as Zambrano does, these are still events which 
have had an unquestionable effect on them as people and as intellectuals (see Zambrano, 
                                                
32 The true Spain is understood as the Republican one by the exiled Republican refugees (see Faber 
2002: 4); similar claims are made by Nationalists (see Lannon, 2002: 8; see Favretto, 2005: 114). The 
Civil War, far from settling the conflict of the two Spains, imposed a stronger and more definite 
separation between the two, although attempts for reconciliation, or at least communication, with the 
exiled Spain, are made at different points (see Gracia, 1996: 11, 16-18; see also 2.3.1). 
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1977: 368-69; Bundgård, 2005b: 8, 11-13; see also García Ruíz, 2000: 195-218). This is 
particularly so in the case of Zambrano, who, in reference to the Civil War and in an 
allusion to the sacrificial component of her generation, refers to it as the generation of the 
bull (see Moreno Sanz, 1996: 44; see also Robles, 2002: 381)33. Following the outbreak of 
the Civil War on 18 July 1936, Zambrano actively campaigns in favour of the Republic, 
even coming back from Chile, where she is staying with her husband, to offer her support to 
the Republican cause and becomes Consejero de Propaganda and Consejero Nacional de 
la Infancia Evacuada (Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29, 32). In the meantime, Aranguren, initially 
stationed with the Falangists for a short while in Aragón, soon goes back home supposedly 
afflicted with tuberculosis (1994, 1: 21). As a result, he does not shed any blood. His lack of 
political interest and involvement is patent at this stage, as is his rejection of violence. 
Aguirre, some thirty years younger than Zambrano and Aranguren, is only two years old 
when the war breaks out, and is, as a result, imbued with post-war values during his 
education. Although there is little information available on his family and early economic 
background, his surname – Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate – suggests the comfortable position of 
his family (Savater, 2006). This is confirmed by an anecdote which Aguirre used to tell 
regarding his early alimentary habits. This is how Savater remembers it: 
                                                
33 Although Comte and Stuart Mill suggest that the concept of generation may have some historical 
significance because it may be involved in the process of social change, Ortega and Mannheim are the 
ones who develop this idea in greater detail and establish a link of causality (see Schwartz, 1999: 4). 
For Mannheim, Ortega, and their followers, “generation” makes reference to “groups of people who 
share a distinctive culture or a self-conscious identity by virtue of their having experienced the same 
historical events” (Alwin, 2003: 43). Ortega explores the concept of generation in El tema de nuestro 
tiempo (1923), a concept which is later often revisited. His disciple Julián Marías also engages with the 
concept of generation in El método histórico de las generaciones (1949) (see also Gracia, 1996: 103; 
Julían Marías, 1996: 104-108). The Ortegan concept of generation must be distinguished from that of 
“cohort” (see Alwin, 2003: 43). Cohort, which the Oxford English Dictionary may be defined as “a 
group of persons having a common statistical characteristic”, is more solidly anchored in the time and 
place of birth, namely, those who share the same band of time and place of birth qualify as members of 
a particular cohort, whereas generation is more flexible in terms of natural time and, more decisively, it 
requires having lived through one or several defining socio-historical events that would supposedly 
shape the attitude, outlook, and expression of its integrants. According to this view, a generation would 
exert some pressure for change upon the previous generation, until they become the policymakers and 
are being pressured themselves by the new generation who would start a new cycle (see Schwartz, 
1999: 4). The existence of such cycles is, of course, arguable, as is the concept of generation as the key 
motivating factor for regular social change. Having said this, it should be noted that the term “cohorte” 
in Spanish only means group in a general or military sense. Taking into consideration the above, the 
concept of generation will be used throughout this thesis, not as an agent of social change, but as a 
contextualizing tool because as Raymond Williams explains, the term “generation” allows “the 
emergence of a sense in which the distinctiveness of a particular time or set of people is emphasized” 
(1983: 141). Given the weight placed upon the biographical factor in this research, it is helpful to revert 
to the generational classification developed within the Spanish tradition to better understand the key 
socio-historical co-ordinates which contextualize and shape each author (see Gullón, 1969: 162). This 
is particularly relevant, considering that all three authors, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, do refer 
to the concept of generation, not as a classificatory tool, but as a contextualizing one, thus, highlighting 
the importance they place on belonging to a specific historic time. Hence, the term “generation”, like 
the classification systems used throughout this research, will only be used for the purpose of 
reconstruction, interpretation, and analysis, and not as a definition or definitive category.  
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él era la única persona en el mundo que yo he conocido que no le gustaba el jamón. Es una cosa 
rarísima. “Pero ¿cómo que no te gusta el jamón? No hay nadie en el mundo que no le guste un 
jamón”. Y él [Aguirre] dice: “sí, porque cuando yo era pequeño no quería comer, no me gustaba 
comer, y entonces mi madre me alimentaba sólo de jamón serrano y de agua de solares, y ya no he 
podido volver a comer en mi vida ni el jamón ni el agua de solares” (2006).  
Considering that at the time jamón, ham, is well out of reach for the majority of the 
population, it is only logical to assume that Aguirre’s family must have been comfortably 
off, which indicates a traditional, conservative, even Nationalist, background.  
What is certain is that the Civil War and its outcome determine to a large extent the 
future of these three thinkers. With the defeat of the Republicans (1939), Zambrano finds it 
necessary to flee the country through the Pyrenees into France, to emigrate later to the 
American continent where her travels continue until 1953 when she returns to Europe, and, 
finally, in 1984, to Spain. This long exile and its consequences have a decisive influence on 
her, as will be argued in Chapter Four. After the end of the Civil War, the establishment of 
the Franco regime decisively influences the development of Aranguren and Aguirre’s 
thought. Nevertheless, although in different ways, as time goes by, they grow critical of 
National Catholicism, and as they distance themselves from Catholicism, their work and 
intellectual activity increasingly become the expression of their dissidence from the regime 
as we shall see throughout the thesis. 
During the 1940s, most of the essays and articles published are regime-legitimating 
ones, as Gracia explains: “el intelectual vencido que permaneció en el interior calló a la 
fuerza o se resignó al Nuevo orden seleccionando sus asuntos desde la inocuidad aparente o 
real” (1996: 10). The gap between this discourse and what many of its initial supporters 
expect from the regime on the one hand, and the reality the regime actually delivers on the 
other, is steadily growing (see Gracia, 1996: 10-12). The worst enemy of the regime is 
reality itself: 
In the 1950s a new opposition culture – its democratic colours somewhat muted – emerged from 
within the ranks of the privileged, as the sons and daughters of prominent Nationalist families turned 
their backs on a would-be totalitarian regime which they found politically appalling and culturally 
false, in the sense that it represented a negation of ethical, humanist civic values (Díaz, 1995: 284; 
see also Gracia, 1996: 12).  
Disillusioned by the regime, this is the journey taken during the late 1950s and 1960s 
by some prominent intellectuals, ideologues, propagandists, and supporters of the regime 
such Pedro Laín Entralgo, Enrique Tierno Galván, Antonio Tovar, Luis Rosales, José 
Antonio Maravall, Gonzalo Torrente, José María Castellet, and Dionisio Ridruejo, but also 
Aranguren, and Aguirre34. It is for this reason that, although it may seem contradictory to 
see the names Aranguren and Aguirre often associated with National Catholicism and the 
                                                
34 See Gracia, 1996: 26; see also Gracia, 2004: 218; Díaz, 2004: 498, 507-08, 510-12; for a study of 
political dissidence among writers in the post-war era, see Jordan, 1990. 
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regime’s hegemonic efforts, upon closer examination it becomes clear that theirs is a 
personal trajectory that goes from their somewhat sheltered early years, resulting in a naïve 
outlook, to the discovery of the distance between the regime’s discourse and its practice, 
which leads to their subsequent active dissidence (see Gracia, 2004: 219, 237, 242). The 
disillusionment involved in this process and the caution learnt may have been key factors in 
pushing their thought towards highly critical directions, searching for radically different 
alternatives. As Díaz goes on to explain, “Francoism, precisely because of its stultifying 
cultural and political dogmatism, sharpened the critical edge of new, emergent currents of 
thought and generated significant cultural and political forms of resistance among writers, 
poets, philosophers, and scientists” (1995: 285). Aranguren’s dissidence becomes most 
visible in the 1965 peaceful demonstration outside the vice-chancellor’s office, as a result 
of which he is removed from his Chair of Ethics and Sociology at the Universidad 
Complutense. Enrique Tierno Galván and Agustín García Calvo, who also demonstrate, 
suffer similar consequences (see Gracia, 2004: 266-67; see also Díaz, 2004: 514). Aguirre, 
being younger and having spent the latter part of the 1950s in Germany does not show 
(public) disconformity until the early 1960s, a time when dissidence and many of the 
existing concerns are voiced, alternatives explored, and change demanded (see Gracia, 
1996: 13). Aguirre gives up his position as a priest (1969), not because of lack of faith, but 
because of the unsustainable socio-political and religious incongruities within the Spanish 
Catholic Church and National Catholicism in particular, which, as Gracia puts it “se nutre 
de elementos, por decirlo así, intraducibles al lenguaje racional” (2004: 42)35. As we shall 
see in Chapters Three and Five, these are turning points for both authors from which they 
sharpen their critique towards neo-capitalism and instrumental rationality in general. In fact, 
one of the most remarkable features of Spanish thought during the last few years of 
Francoism is the reintroduction of utopian thought, whose aim is to criticize the existing 
hegemonic reason and the dogmatism of state and bureaucratic practices (see Díaz, 1983: 
166-67; see also París, 1977: 49; Castellet, 1977: 13; Gracia, 2004: 349). This is, in fact, 
one of the central links with the FS as shall be discussed in the following chapters. 
It is necessary at this point to make a digression regarding the position of the Spanish 
Catholic Church during the Spanish Civil War and also during the dictatorship due to the 
historic relevance of the role it played, and, even more importantly, because understanding 
the position of the Church and its weight in socio-political and intellectual life during 
Francoism provides an essential insight into Aranguren’s and particularly Aguirre’s 
biographical and intellectual choices, which makes it crucial to the overall argument of this 
                                                
35 Although this year is not explicitly mentioned on any sources as the year when Aguirre leaves the 
clergy, the rest of dates and contextual information about his life point – by a process of deduction – to 
1969 as the year when Aguirre gives up his priestly vows and becomes editor in chief at Taurus. 
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thesis. This digression will provide evidence of what I have described above as its 
incongruities, which, as we shall see below and throughout this thesis, are present at the 
level of its political involvement, but also affect its internal institutional cohesion, the 
integrity of its spiritual values, and the religious commitment of its followers.  
From the military coup against the Republic (18 July 1936), the Spanish Church sides 
with the insurgents (González Ruiz, 1977: 178). Evidence of this is the clearly supportive 
behaviour of many of its bishops. This is the case of the bishop of Salamanca, Pla i Deniel, 
who offers the episcopal palace as General Headquarters for Franco (González Ruiz, 1977: 
178). In the face of Republican anti-clericalism, for the insurgents, the Civil War becomes a 
war “por Dios y por la patria” (Viñas, 1986: 163). In fact, in 1937, a collective Pastoral 
Letter issued by Spanish episcopacy legitimising the military rising and the Spanish Civil 
War, effectively giving the Nationalists its blessing and elevating the war to the status of a 
crusade (Giner, 1993: 53-54; see also González Ruiz, 1977: 178). Even then, however, it 
was possible to observe conflict within the Church. Three bishops decline signing the 
Pastoral letter: Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, of Tarragona, Múgica of Vitoria, and Irastorza 
Loinaz of Orihuela (Lannon, 1987: 204). What is more, Vidal i Barraquer criticizes the 
active engagement of the Church with the Francoist war efforts, and contacts – with little 
success – Pope Pius XII with the aim of bringing this issue to his attention, hoping for a 
papal condemnation of this position of the Spanish Catholic Church (González Ruiz, 1977: 
178-81; Lannon, 1987: 205-06). Instead, later that year, the Vatican officially recognizes 
the rebel government, offering it its doctrinal support (Giner, 1993: 53; Lannon, 1987: 204-
08). 
At the end of the war, in 1939, the Church continues to be closely linked to 
Francoism, to the point that it provides one of the key pillars of legitimation for the regime 
(see Linz, 1993: 18). As a result, during the Francoist regime, the Spanish Catholic Church 
is plagued by incongruities, which can be observed in its political position, in its internal 
division, and in the relationship between religious observance and faith.  
By providing the Francoist regime with legitimation, the measures implemented by 
the Republic which were considered anti-clerical are reversed (Lannon, 1987: 215). As a 
result, state funding for the clergy is restored (Lannon, 1987: 215). The Spanish Church 
regains its former spheres of power and influence, such as education, and marriage, and 
gains others, such as censorship (Lannon, 1987: 215; see also Giner, 1993: 57; Callahan, 
2000: 463-69). Although neither education nor censorship are explicitly political activities, 
they have, however, serious political implications.  
“El período de 1945 a 1957 es el punto álgido del triunfalismo católico de la 
identificación pública de la Iglesia” (Linz, 1993: 20). With the exception of Bishop Pildain 
and few others, not many dare to express dissenting views during this period (Callahan, 
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2000: 407). The supportive role of the Church towards the regime is not without problems, 
as Cardinal Gomá soon learns when his pastoral letter entitled Lecciones de la Guerra y 
deberes de la Paz is banned by the government in August 1939 (Lannon, 1987: 215-16). 
Despite this friction, the Church does not announce its separation and independence from 
the State until 1973, in a statement produced in the Episcopal Conference celebrated and 
published that same year (Lannon, 1987: 252-53; Taracón, 1980: 70-77).  
Until this separation takes place, the number of its members who feel or express 
dissatisfaction with the relationship between the Church and the regime grows with the 
passing of time. One of the reasons for this is the loss of some of the Church privileges and 
power, such as the loss of autonomy of the Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica 
(HOAC), a quasi union for Catholic workers (González Ruiz, 1977: 182). As Callahan puts 
it, 
although bishops and lay activists from Catholic Action remained loyal to Franco during the 1940s 
and 1950s, they struggled to break through the exclusions imposed by the regime. As circumstances 
changed during the 1960s, some bishops, priests, and religious began to question not only this 
attempt to confine the Church to a narrow role in a time of economic change and social upheaval, but 
also its identification with an authoritarian State (2000: 385). 
Another cause for dissent within the Church, and of distance between the Church and 
the regime is the regime’s immobility regarding issues of social justice (Callahan, 2000: 
502-03). An example of this can be found in the pastoral letter attacking social injustice 
issued by Bishop Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, which is met with accusations in the official 
press of being communist (Callahan, 2000: 407; see also Chapters Three and Five for a 
discussion of curas rojos, Marxist priests). As Callahan explains, 
the divide between bishops and many, though by no means all, priests rested on more than 
differences of opinion over civil-ecclesiastical relations. [...] The causes of this avalanche of protest 
and demonstrations varied. Some protests were inspired by concern over abuses of civil rights, others 
by issues of social justice, and some, in the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, by regionalist 
sympathies, while still others were moved by demands for a more open ecclesiastical organization. 
Taken as a whole, the protest wave revealed widespread discontent with both the dictatorship and the 
hierarchy's ambiguous response to demands for fundamental reform in the way Spain was governed 
and in the Church's role within a society undergoing rapid social and economic change. […] This 
historic and deeply conservative prophetism was now turned on its head in the form of vigorous 
clerical denunciations of the regime and even the hierarchy for tolerating social, economic, and 
political abuses regarded as incompatible with Christian values (2000: 516; see also Giner, 1993: 58-
59). 
Evidence of the growing distance between the regime and the Church can be found in 
the fines, even jail, in some cases, that the Francoist police imposes on priests for the 
dangerous contents of their religious homilies; 109 priests face such fines (see González 
Ruiz, 1977: 183-84; see also Linz, 1993: 23; Lannon, 1987: 253). 
As a result of these tensions, paradoxically, the Church, or rather not the Church as 
an institution, but numerous priests and churches support those opposing the regime. In 
fact, some churches become a meeting – and sometimes a hiding – place for activists 
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(Atkin, 2003: 276). This can be observed in the development of militant Catholic workers 
associations and in the clergy’s support for regionalist movements in Catalonia and in the 
Basque country around the 1960s (see Callahan, 2000: 382; Lannon, 1987: 235, 250). 
These, in addition to socio-political impact of the Vatican Council, contribute to 
undermining the close ties, as well as the appearance of consensus between Church and 
State (see Lannon, 1987: 235, 250).  
It is important to understand the complexity of the internal division within the 
Spanish Catholic Church. Care must be taken not to reduce these internal divisions to the 
tensions that exist between the hierarchy of the Church and some dissident priests. There is 
an important division even within the hierarchy itself. Lannon highlights what happens to 
some associations related to the Church to illustrate this point: “what is certain is that JOC 
[Juventud Obrera Católica] and HOAC were actually undermined, not by Communist 
rivalry nor by state oppression, but by episcopal hostility” (1987: 235; see also McAdam, 
2001: 181). As González Ruiz explains, there is “rivalidad entre los dos ‘primados de 
España’” (1977: 181). 
The impact of the Second Vatican Council, which was held in Spain, must also be 
considered (see Brassloff, 1998: 6-41). Largely as a result of the spirit of this 
aggionarmento – lead, first, by Pope John XXIII and, later, Paul IV –, that is, the efforts of 
Catholicism to embrace modernity, “in the last decade of the military dictatorship the 
Spanish Church became as much its critic and opponent as its faithful supporter” (Lannon, 
1987: 224, 249; see also Callahan, 2000: 515-26). 
On balance, the Church’s position on social justice was stronger in 1965 than it had been a decade 
earlier, but it was not without any ambiguity. Impelled by the social documents of Pope John XXIII 
and the Vatican Council, the hierarchy developed a more realistic perception of social problems and, 
in some cases, became bolder in its criticism of official policy. This produced inevitable tension with 
the regime, although the bishops sought to contain the pressure from Catholic activists and clergy for 
a more aggressive approach (Callahan, 2000: 507). 
Distance and tensions between the Spanish Church and the Vatican grow, as can be 
observed in the requests made by Pope Paul IV to Franco to relinquish the right of 
presentation to Spanish sees in 1968 (Lannon, 1987: 251). As Linz explains, “las relaciones 
entre Iglesia y Estado después del Concilio Vaticano experimentaron un cambio 
fundamental: de una cooperación íntima a distanciamiento, tensión e incluso conflicto”, the 
cause of which Linz identifies in a religious examination of consciousness (1993: 29). 
The paradoxical relationship between religious observance and faith also deserves 
attention; high levels of church attendance, which diminishes from the 1960s onwards, is 
not necessarily evidence of the faith of the church goers (see McAdam, 2001: 181). Another 
reason for their religious observance can be found in socio-political pressures. As Callahan 
explains, “civil marriage was possible during the Franco period, but baptized Catholics 
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wishing to evade a church marriage had to take the audacious and potentially damaging step 
in personal and career terms of formally abjuring the Catholic faith” (2000: 473). Thus, 
participating in religious rituals was often a requisite for the successful integration in the 
work-place and in the community.  
As a result of all of the above, this is how González Ruiz describes Catholicism in 
Spain during the Franco regime: 
un puro convencionalismo, huero y vacío, de profundos intereses políticos, de ingenuidades cínicas o 
de cinismos ingenuos, que han ido jalonando rutinariamente la vida de la Iglesia española durante 
más de treinta años en una aparente “buena salud”, que, según frase popular, no era más que la 
llamada “mejoría de la muerte” (1977: 181). 
As indicated above, it is vital to take into account the situation of the Church in Spain 
during this period, as well as its relationship to individual faith and to the State, in order to 
not only contextualize, but also understand the positions and development of the authors 
studied here, particularly Aranguren and Aguirre, as will become evident in the course of 
the thesis. 
It is also important for this historical contextualization to underscore that the events 
which take place outside Spanish borders also have a considerable effect on these thinkers, 
not least because all three have and maintain significant links abroad. During her exile, 
Zambrano stays in Mexico, Puerto Rico, and other Latin American countries before 
returning to Europe, spending time in France, Italy, and Switzerland, until finally returning 
to Spain in 1984. Aranguren spends a number of years working in the United States, and 
Aguirre, who also travels extensively, spends a crucial formative period in Germany. 
Hence, none of them are oblivious to the Second World War or its consequences, which, 
despite Spain’s policy of non-intervention, also have repercussions for Spain36. They also 
display a keen interest in post-war European thought, particularly Aranguren, who makes 
numerous references to phenomenology, irrationalism, existentialism, structuralism, and 
other currents of thought (see Soldevilla, 2004: 129)37. In the case of Aguirre, his frequent 
                                                
36 As Julián Marías explains, as a consequence of the outbreak of the Second World War, Spain does 
not receive the international help it needs to attempt its reconstruction (2005: 371). Furthermore, its 
international situation was not improved by Spain’s initial public support of the Axis (Julián Marías, 
2005: 371). Later, as Wayne Bowen indicates, “World War II and the immediate consequences of its 
outcome strengthened General Franco’s commitment to autarky and restricted opportunities for 
alternative approaches” (2006: 94). Not only are Spanish exports and imports of food, raw materials, 
and energy seriously reduced as a consequence of the war, but Spain is also initially deprived from any 
aid from the Marshall Plan and has to face the partial economic embargo imposed by France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (see Bowen, 2006: 94). 
37 For instances where evidence of this interest materializes in Aranguren’s writings see 1994, 2: 46, 
88, 150-57, 161, 195, 197-98, 200, 207, 209, 214, 220-22, 224, 228-30, 245-47, 249, 258-59, 286, 288, 
314-15, 340, 367-68, 370, 384, 401-02, 410, 435, 458, 462, 465, 494-95, 511, 519, 524, 555, 603, 615, 
625, 639, 682, 693, 697, 701, 727, 731, 733; see also 1994, 3: 12, 70, 77, 81-82, 96, 110, 116-23, 129, 
139, 149, 185, 198, 203, 205-06, 208-09, 213-18, 222, 295, 314, 316, 408, 414, 448, 461, 471, 559, 
 68 
references Heidegger, but also Sartre, and Kierkegard, are evidence of his interest in 
existentialism (see Aguirre, 1969c: 15-16; 1985: 79-80, 83-86, 238; 1989: 103-105, 140). 
Nevertheless, the impact of world politics goes beyond their personal interests and 
interconnections (Díaz, 2004: 505). The Second World War and the two-sided atmosphere 
of tension of the Cold War, of which the regime soon becomes a pawn, precipitates Spain’s 
admittance to the UN (1958), the International Monetary Fund and a number of other 
international organizations (Portero, 2002: 214, 221; Viñas, 2002: 245; see also 3.2.2.1). 
International recognition of the Franco regime delivers the final blow to the claims of 
legitimacy of the already internally divided Republican government in exile (see Faber, 
2002: 57-58; see also Balfour, 2000: 278). 
Several events would have a considerable impact in the final years of the regime. In 
relation to the economy, despite constant anti-Marxist propaganda, the question “is Spain a 
society of mass consumption?” is already being asked in 1966, since the socio-economic 
features of Spanish society of that time do not match the rhetoric of the dictatorial regime it 
is subjected to (see Equipo Reseña, 1997: 154)38. People are rapidly immersing themselves 
in the Welfare State and into a “cultura postiza y portátil” (Mainer, 1988: 15)39. As regards 
religion, in 1969, Pope Paul VI appoints the liberal Enrique Tarancón as Cardinal Primate. 
As a result, as indicated above, the Church undergoes a profound transformation, becoming 
a shelter for the opposition to the regime. So much so that in 1971, an assembly of bishops 
and priests issues a letter preaching reconciliation and begging for the forgiveness of the 
Spanish people for its role during the Civil War, paving the way for the bishops’s vote in 
1973 in favour of formal separation from the state, as well as the abandonment of their 
political role (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 154). Politically, the fall of the Portuguese and Greek 
dictatorships in 1974 mark Spain as the last authoritarian regime in Western Europe 
                                                                                                                                       
697, 706, 712; see also 1994, 4: 196, 225-30, 235, 485, 487, 496-98, 514, 523-24, 542, 559, 568, 584, 
593; see also 1994, 5: 34, 82, 217, 249, 254-55, 332, 336, 339-40, 358, 360, 505. 
 
38 As Bosse observes, “the term ‘consumption’ emerged in the Middle Ages and it meant ‘devouring’ 
or ‘eating up.’ Specifically, in that time period, the word referred to diseases such as syphilis and 
tuberculosis” (see Bosse, 2007: 38; see also 9-10). In this same vein, the word also refers to the process 
of ingesting and metabolising food (see Bosse, 2007: 38). In reference to material culture, this latter 
meaning expands to be applied to a particular behaviour in the market place. There has been an 
evolution of the meaning of the words ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer’, which, in a socio-historical and 
economic context, have become linked the dynamics of late capitalism and market economy. As result 
of the changing manufacturing practices in the early twentieth century, which no longer supply just for 
the needs of their market, but expand to determine production according to the speculated wants, the 
words “customer” or “user” become inadequate; the term “consumer” provides a more suitable 
description of the relationship of this agent with the market place and its products (see Williams, 1983: 
78-79). That is why Williams remarks that “it is appropriate in terms of the history of the word that 
criticism of a wasteful and ‘throw-away’ society was expressed, somewhat later, by the description 
consumer society” (see 1983: 79). 
39 See also Viñas, 1984 for a more detailed analysis of Spanish economy in relation to politics and to 
the non-participation of Spain in the Second World War in particular. 
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(Powell, 1990: 254). Furthermore, they demonstrate the fragility of regimes previously 
considered to be impregnable (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 157). With Franco’s death in 1975, 
the peaceful process of Transition into a democratic society is set in motion40. This process 
crucially involves a general political amnesty (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 162) and a silent 
agreement for political amnesia widely known as Pacto del Olvido (see Vilarós, 1998: 9-
12). As Vilarós explains, “la política de reforma de aquellos años, ratificada en diciembre 
de 1976 en un referéndum político que recogió el 94,2% de los votos emitidos, fue 
claramente una política de borradura, de no cuestionamiento del pasado” (1998: 9). The 
culmination of this process can be observed in the advent of democracy (1976) and the 
Constitution of 1978 (Jordan, 2002: 53).  
However, this seemingly smooth Transition does not shelter most members of society 
from the disorienting changes that took place after Franco’s death in 1975. An example of 
these can be found in the composition of the government; there are rapid political changes, 
but also some – perhaps disorienting – continuity, as is the case with a number Ministers 
and the king himself who, despite having served under Franco, soon adapt and become 
democratic politicians. In addition to these political changes, the advent of democracy and 
the new freedom it offers also mean rapid moral changes, both within and outside the realm 
of religion. There is a moral crisis on two levels. In order to understand the extent of this 
moral crisis, it is necessary, first, to acknowledge its historical roots. As indicated above, a 
deep sense of crisis is present in Spain since the nineteenth century and it is carried forward 
into the following century. There is a historic moral crisis that becomes evident when the 
loss of the remaining Spanish overseas colonies in 1898 proves that Spain can no longer be 
considered an empire (see 1.2). Furthermore, the two Spains can be considered as the 
expression of two attempts to provide a satisfactory solution to this crisis. As the victor of 
the Spanish Civil War, the Franco regime does its best to impose its own view on this issue: 
a united and homogenic Spain legitimised by the Francoist victory and by National 
Catholicism (Nash, 2000: 289). The asphyxiating limitations on individual and public 
freedom imposed by this dictatorial regime, as well as the artificiality of this marriage of 
convenience between Church and State make this regime model morally unsustainable and 
it results in the growing discontent and dissidence which become more visible towards the 
later stages of the regime. Consequently, the Transition and the young democracy tactfully 
look for conciliatory solutions. But it is not until very recently, with the recognition of the 
role that memory plays in the process of reconstructing history, but also in shaping the 
present, that this issue of national and moral identity is starting to be adequately 
                                                
40 It must be noted that the characteristics and, even, the duration of the Transition are the subject of 
much debate (for a contemporary analysis see Collier, 1999: 97-119; Ferrán, 2000: 191-94). 
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addressed41. It must be stressed that another reason why the regime had limited success in 
instilling their moral values is that, as Balfour observes, “social and economic change both 
stimulated and was accompanied by a revolution in values” (2000: 277; see also 283). This 
revolution is not without disorientation or confusion, for the rapid changes that take place 
during the apertura years of the regime bring about a moral crisis, perhaps individual in 
nature, although of social proportions, since these newly acquired values conflict with those 
defended by the regime (Carr, 1980: 30; Lannon, 1987: 50, 53). A similar phenomenon 
takes place during the Transition, when the political and moral freedom which citizens can 
now exercise conflicts with the learnt values and behaviours of their recent past. 
There is disorientation and there is also disillusionment. The boom of the counter-
culture during the last phase of the Franco regime strongly contrasts with the subsequent 
disenchantment that comes about with the advent of democracy (see Mainer, 1988: 15, 23). 
According to Vilarós, “desencanto, como bien sabemos, es el término aplicado al peculiar 
efecto político-cultural causado en España más que por la transición a un régimen 
democrático-liberal, por el mismo hecho del fin de la dictadura franquista. Fue la película 
de Jaime Chávarri, El desencanto (1976), la que le dio al término carta de naturaleza” 
(1998: 23; see also Díaz, 1995: 289 who claims that this desencanto is often 
misrepresented). Undoubtedly, this disenchantment and disorientation are produced when 
the long-established attitude of “being against” ceases to be a meaningful practice, but they 
are also the result of the difficult materialization, or disappearance altogether, of many of 
the hopes and expectations so dearly embraced by those who opposed the regime and 
longed for democracy. Aranguren is well-aware of this process and of its moral 
repercussions which is one of the reasons why he takes upon himself the task of the 
moralist, he embodies in the figure of the intellectual, as we shall see in Chapter Three. 
Aranguren and Aguirre both take an active interest in this process and maintain 
regular participation in public opinion through the publication of newspaper articles. In the 
case of Zambrano, although she also publishes a number of articles, the most remarkable 
effect democracy has on her − although not an immediate one − is her return to Spain 
(1984) and her recognition as the illustrious intellectual she is.  
 
2.3 Reception and Cultural Hegemony 
From the start, Zambrano and, progressively, also Aranguren and Aguirre all share a defiant 
political stance which seems to arise from their spiritual beliefs. These positions are 
                                                
41 The dictatorship exercises control over the dissemination of information, and even over the portrayal 
of history. In addition, the voluntary political amnesia which takes place during Transition and the 
reinstitution of democracy for the sake of peace and stability also obscures or misrepresents many 
aspects of Spain’s recent past, which are being questioned only recently (see Espinosa, 2006: 136, 159-
69, 171-92, 196-204). 
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strongly reflected in their writings, but what is their impact and reach? As Faber explains, 
“even though the regime is obsessed with dominating all forms of cultural expression, it is 
clear that, with the exception of the years immediately following the Civil War, Francoism 
never really succeeded in wielding full cultural hegemony” (Faber, 2002: 37; for an 
analysis of hegemony see Gramsci, 1999: 277; also Faber, 2002: 31-33). Nonetheless, it 
does try to impose its hegemony indirectly through illiteracy and directly through 
censorship, the control of cultural expressions and public discourse (see Chulia, 2001: 25 on 
the suppression of the freedom of expression with the rise of Franco to power)42.  
The struggle for cultural hegemony is inevitably linked to cultural policy, which at 
the same time is dictated by political interests43. In order to illustrate this relationship, and 
in order to understand better the regime’s cultural policy, we shall go back to the time of the 
Second Republic so that the roots and development of the regime’s positions in these 
matters can be observed.  
 
2.3.1 Education 
The illiteracy rate in 1930 is estimated to have been somewhere between 30 and 40 percent 
(Jordan, 2002: 131; Shubert, 1990: 37; Greaves, 1938: 25). In response to this situation, 
there are various initiatives amongst the Republicans to spread culture throughout Spain, 
although not without controversy; bread and tools to work seemed more urgent (see Faber, 
2002: 78). This can be observed in the misiones pedagógicas, which are created in 1931 as 
a project which, although criticized for its paternalist and utopian attitude, still brings 
libraries, lectures, films, and plays to the remotest rural areas (see Faber, 2002: 77). The 
Republican government sets out to combat the high illiteracy levels by creating new 
schools44: 
siete mil nuevas escuelas [fueron creadas] durante el primer bienio [de la República] y, a pesar del 
proceso de involución, dos mil más durante el bienio de las derechas. De 1931 a 1936 se crearon 
13.850 plazas y 3.400 más entre 1934 y 1935 (Claret Miranda, 2006: 9). 
                                                
42 In addition to the above, their use of a deficient language and an equally deficient rationality must 
also be considered part of the effort of the regime to gain hegemony, but also legitimacy (see Gracia, 
2004: 387). 
43 Understanding the complexity of the word “culture” is crucial, although discussing it is beyond the 
scope of this research (for such a discussion see Eagleton, 2000: 1-31; see also Faber, 2002: 35, 37, 40, 
65, 73, 82-86; Balibrea, 2005: 2). Suffice to say that when used in the present context it is in relation to 
high culture – books, journals, and art –, but also mass culture – radio, television, cinema –, as well as 
cultural practices in general. 
44 In contrast, “en el período republicano, las fuerzas del Antiguo Régimen, base social del Alzamiento 
Militar, habían mostrado, tanto desde el poder como desde la oposición, clara animadversión al 
desarrollo científico y cultural y muy particularmente a los proyectos de reforma educativa” (Mones i 
Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 221-22). Their policy is to oppose any attempts to secularize education. It is in 
this sense that Claret Miranda mentions below a period of involution. 
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This marked interest and heavy investment in education, as well as the awareness of the 
impact that education may have on politics, leads to this effort being branded as “guerra 
escolar”. As Jaume Claret Miranda explains, this belligerent attitude towards education has 
serious consequences: 
La ‘guerra escolar’ facilitó la articulación durante la Segunda República de un discurso de creciente 
violencia verbal contra profesores e intelectuales que, a partir del 18 de julio de 1936, con el fracaso 
del golpe de estado y el inicio de la guerra civil, se transformó en violencia explícita. Se acusaba a la 
intelectualidad española de haber introducido ideologías extranjeras desde cátedras y ateneos en 
detrimento de las esencias patrias, para acabar llevando al país a la decadencia a través de la 
instauración del régimen republicano (2006: 23). 
Nevertheless, the accusation that educators have Republican loyalties seems to be based 
more on the efforts of the Republican government in fostering education, particularly 
primary education, and on the threat that falangists perceive – and voice – from it than in an 
accurate reflection of the educators’s affiliations (Claret Miranda, 2006: 10, 25). As Claret 
Miranda explains in reference to their political sympathies, “en realidad, el colectivo 
docente reproducía la diversidad también existente en la sociedad española” (2006: 25). 
The educational effort of the Republicans intensifies during the first years of the Civil 
War. As Rafael Abella explains, “la incautación de todos los grandes colegios regentados 
por las órdenes religiosas significó el acceso de una infancia postergada a instalaciones que 
hasta julio de 1936 habían sido coto de unas clases privilegiadas” (1975: 285). Moreover, 
many unoccupied houses are transformed into schools. Regarding higher education, during 
the year 1937-1938 alone over four thousand grants are awarded (Abella, 1975: 294). The 
Republic is also concerned with adult illiteracy, and in January 1937, in an effort to combat 
it, creates the Milicias de la Cultura, which teaches basic reading and writing skills to 
voluntary military recruits and combatants (Abella, 1975: 286-87). The faith and hope 
deposited in culture are such that, in spite of the difficult and dangerous circumstances of 
war, the Congreso Internacional de Escritores para la Defensa de la Cultura is celebrated 
in Valencia in 1937 (Abella, 1975: 316). However, this eagerness also means that the 
boundaries between culture and propaganda are often blurred. 
During the Civil War, “‘culture’, or more precisely ‘the defence of culture’, becomes 
the common cause in the name of which antifascist intellectuals of all different political 
backgrounds are able to unite” (see Faber, 2002: 73). Pío Moa affirms that “entre los 
intelectuales españoles hubo equilibrio, y no responde a la realidad el tópico de que casi 
todos los escritores y artistas defendieron la ‘república’” (2001: 347). However, most 
historians agree that, at least initially, the Republic received the support of the majority of 
Spanish intellectuals and artists. As de Meneses explains:  
successive intellectuals’ manifestos made this support clear, even if some of the early signatories 
preferred to leave Spain quietly and quickly. The murder of the poet and playwright Federico García 
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Lorca in the very first days of the war by Nationalist forces galvanized Spanish intellectuals, who 
identified the Nationalists as enemies of culture (2001: 144). 
Gracia also voices this view: “al principio, por tanto, los nombres mayores de la vida 
intelectual se mantuvieron leales a la República. [...] El entorno reaccionario, en cambio, 
estaba muy huérfano de patrones intelectuales de primera fila” (Gracia, 2004: 50). Picasso, 
Antonio Machado, Casals, Alberti, León Felipe, Buñuel, Miguel Hernández, Max Aub, 
Bergamín, Corpus Barga, Sender, Barea, and, of course, Zambrano, are amongst the 
Spanish intellectuals who support the Republic (see Moa, 2001: 347; see also de Meneses, 
2001: 144-45). Numerous renowned intellectuals from abroad also offer their support to the 
Republic. As de Meneses puts it, “the supreme example of these intellectual concerns was 
the Second International Writers’s Congress for the Defence of Culture, held in Spain in 
1937. [...] The message of solidarity for Spanish intellectuals and the Republican war effort 
in general was potent” (2001: 145). Some of the best-known intellectuals who express their 
support for the Republic include Ernest Hemingway, André Malraux, Arthur Koestler, Joris 
Ivens, César Vallejo, Egon Kisch, Pablo Neruda, and George Orwell, whose support 
contributes to a certain romantic image of the Spanish Civil War (see Faber, 2002: 15, 79; 
see also de Meneses, 2001: 145). Such romanticism can also be observed in Marcuse, who 
says that “the last time that freedom, solidarity, and humanity were the goals of a 
revolutionary struggle was on the battlefields of the Spanish civil war” (1968: xv). In 
contrast, Gracia questions the intellectual support received by Nationalists. He says that “el 
único respaldo profundo y auténtico era intelectualmente menor: procedía de las camadas 
de fascistas joseantonianos de los años treinta, y del grueso del tradicionalismo reaccionario 
de Acción Española (Maeztu, Luca de Tena...)” (Gracia, 2004: 51). The names of Baroja, 
Azorín, Marañón, and Pérez de Ayala should also be added to this list, because, as Gracia 
explains, after leaving Spain in 1937, they are engaged with war propaganda on the 
Nationalist side (see Gracia, 2004: 51-53). There are also some renowned supporters from 
abroad, such as Paul Claudel and Igor Stravinski (see Gracia, 2004: 50-51). 
Both Republicans and Nationalists strongly believe in cultural nationalism45. 
However, despite Nationalists’s believe in cultural nationalism and their defence of culture 
understood as identity, culture as knowledge and thought is perceived as a threat. The 
reasons for this are that, on the one hand, the concept of culture is soon equated with left-
wing thought and, on the other, because the empowerment that knowledge may confer 
makes it dangerous for them. As a result, Nationalists seek cultural hegemony. Very much 
aware of the political power of education, in September 1938, the first Francoist 
                                                
45 Cultural nationalism is an idea originating in German Romanticism which claims that a nation’s 
essence emanates from the idiosyncrasies of its geographical location and its cultural-historical heritage 
(see Faber, 2002: 40). 
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government approves a law for the reform of secondary education (Claret Miranda, 2006: 
29). As Claret Miranda points out, the reason behind their concern lies in their belief that it 
is in secondary education where the ruling classes are formed; therefore, shaping them 
according to Francoist principles was a priority (2006: 30). 
Despite the efforts of the Republic, at the end of the Civil War, Spain still is a 
country with low levels of schooling, high levels of illiteracy, and insufficient educational 
infrastructure (Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 221). Jordi Mones i Pujol-Busquets argues 
that 
en esencia, las fuerzas sociales que recobraban el poder en 1939, concebían la enseñanza como un 
mecanismo que coadyuvara a mantener la población del Estado español en un estadio de semi-
hipnosis cultural. Esta política sería tanto más sensible cuanto más abandonada estuviera la enseñanza 
pública. […] Parten de la base [sic] que la ignorancia del pueblo es una condición esencial para 
prevenir todo intento de cambio en la estructura económico-social (1977: 222). 
This statement, however, needs to be clarified. It is true that illiteracy contributes to the 
regime’s endeavour to impose its cultural hegemony, for as Jordan explains, “the regime 
had no desire to promote reading since readers tend to have inquiring minds and may well 
criticize or oppose official views” (Jordan, 2002: 188). Nevertheless, and although active 
efforts to promote and expand access to education are not made by the regime until the 
1960s, whatever education there is, is used for the political purposes of the regime46. That is 
why Mones i Pujol-Busquets later states that “a la escuela tradicional políticamente 
burocrática, socialmente clasista, ideológicamente conservadora, y metodológicamente 
uniformista, se le sumaba una politización llevada a extremos insospechados, basada en las 
nuevas doctrinas de los países del Eje” (1977: 223). 
In 1945, the Ley de Enseñanza Primaria confirms that primary education should 
conform to the ideological and political principles of the regime and grants educational 
privileges to the Church (Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 225): “A cambio de su apoyo, la 
Iglesia se aseguró rápidamente el dominio ideológico y, sobre todo, el control de la política 
educativa” (Claret Miranda, 2006: 28). This law, however, does not mean substantive 
changes in the direction of education, which was already conforming largely to these 
principles since the end of the Civil War. It is not until the 1960s that some movements of 
educational reformation, such as the Basque ikastolas, are allowed to develop (Mones i 
Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 233). 
Using education as a political instrument leads to the clear separation between 
education and culture. This can be observed in the distrust of the regime towards educators, 
                                                
46 It is not until 1960 that the illiteracy rate drops to some 15 percent, still a high rate. From 1963, 
literacy campaigns are progressively launched, so that by 1993 – well after the introduction of 
democracy – illiteracy is reduced to 3.5 percent, being largely confined to those over 45 years of age 
(for further details on illiteracy see Rodgers, 1999: 304; Jordan, 2002: 131; Aldcroft, 1996: 3). 
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whose loyalty to the regime has to be confirmed before they are allowed to teach (Claret 
Miranda, 2006: 27). Educators, researches, as well as research and teaching material are all 
under scrutiny and consequently purged by the regime, particularly at the beginning (see 
Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 223). 
The Church is heavily involved in teaching and in cultural life, an example of which 
can be found in the considerable presence of the Opus Dei in Spanish universities (see 
Equipo Reseña, 1997:145-147; Iglesias, 2000; Jordan, 2002: 159; Lannon, 1987: 221-22). 
The result is a return of a scholastic style and the focus of education on the production of 
technicians who are needed by the global structure of capitalism (see Equipo Reseña, 1997: 
145-47). As Lannon explains, “the Church found itself given a position of ideological 
hegemony, untroubled by its erstwhile enemies […]. These enemies had been killed, 
imprisoned, forced into exile, or effectively silenced” (1995: 276).  
 
2.3.2 Censorship 
As pointed out above, the high levels of illiteracy prevent a large portion of the population 
from accessing reading materials. Getting hold of these materials also presents a problem: 
also, under Francoism, in a censorship context, the market for reading matter of all kinds is initially 
purged of ‘anti-Spain’ elements, distorted by official controls and is highly restrictive in the choice 
and availability of material (Jordan, 2002: 188). 
This means that an important number of titles deemed pernicious or not suitable, 
particularly foreign books, are destroyed or locked away47. Libraries and learning are often 
considered as left-wing propaganda (Jordan, 2002: 129). Public libraries do not enjoy the 
support of the regime, at the same time as the production of new material and the delivery 
of education are also closely controlled, making for largely stifled University classrooms 
which are reminiscent of the scholastic style, as indicated above (see Jordan, 2002: 129; see 
also Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 224). The voices of intellectuals in exile are virtually 
shut out until the early 1950s when there is a “hesitant beginning of a dialogue between 
dissident intellectuals in Spain and their colleagues in exile” (Faber, 2002: 37). Aranguren’s 
article “La evolución espiritual de los intelectuales españoles en la emigración” (1953) 
plays a vital role in starting this dialogue (see Díaz, 1983: 71-72, 75; see also 2004: 504; 
Gracia, 1996: 17; 2004: 158, 258)48. As Díaz explains, 
                                                
47 Paradoxically, some of the books confiscated have ended up in the National Library, thus ensuring 
their survival (Jordan, 2002: 129).  
48 Aranguren himself explains how, as a result of this article, he befriends or becomes closer to several 
Spanish intellectuals in exile, including Zambrano: “a partir de aquel artículo, anudé o estreché una 
relación de muy afectuosa amistad con José Ferrater Mora, Juan Marichal, Antonio Sánchez Barbudo, 
Francisco Ayala, Max Aub, María Zambrano, Guillermo de Torre, [sic] Claudio Guillén” (1994, 6: 
196). 
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Aranguren habla objetiva y elogiosamente en su trabajo (era uno de los primeros que lo hacía), [...] 
informando a los lectores españoles de la obra de nuestros exiliados en América. Insistirá de modo 
muy especial en el profundo y sincero amor de esos hombres hacia España, faceta ésta que, 
desgraciadamente, en modo alguno resultaba obvio recordar y poner de manifiesto ante los españoles 
del interior en aquellos momentos (1983: 71).  
Although this communication continues uninterrupted from this point onwards, it still 
remains true that the reach and, indeed, effect of such communication is limited, as is made 
evident by the fact that many exiled intellectuals and their contributions remain largely 
unknown until a much later date (Díaz, 1983: 72). 
Meanwhile, writers in Spain, forced to work within the constraints of the regime, 
often develop alternative ways of expression while readers cultivate the art of reading 
between the lines (Jordan, 1990: ix). Censorship, however, is inconsistent; although 
established by the draconian Press Law of 1938, there are no clear guidelines to define 
which contents are allowed and which are not, reliance being placed to a great extent on the 
subjective opinions of the censors (see Jordan, 2002: 44). On the one hand, this subjective 
factor offers some leeway. On the other, this lack of clarity also contributes to enhancing 
insecurity, instability, and, ultimately, fear. Although this inconsistent censorship seems to 
be due more to lack of organization and the different interests of the people and institutions 
involved in the censoring process rather than being the result of a carefully developed 
strategy, the results, nonetheless, still echo Bentham’s Panopticon − a prison built in such a 
way that prisoners could be observed at any time without the prisoners being able to 
determine at any one point whether they are being observed or not (Bentham, 1995: 29-95). 
Thus, although authority and repression are not continuously imposed in an active way, 
their power rests rather on its possibility; if clear rules exist one can attempt to work outside 
their scope, but when instead of rules, control is exercised by the constant possibility of 
punishment for indeterminate reasons, then rules and boundaries are self-imposed, so that 
censorship results in self-censorship, which becomes even more relevant with the 1966 
Press Law, as we shall see below. 
Bearing this in mind, it must be highlighted that censorship also depends upon factors 
of an economic and political nature; on the one hand, the regime is trying to gain 
acceptance, both at home and abroad, particularly between the years 1945 (marking the 
beginning of a period of international isolation) and 1952 with the entrance of Spain into 
UNESCO (see Díaz, 2004: 499-503; see also Rodgers, 1999: 98); on the other hand, some 
of the restrictions of the dictatorship become partially lifted from the 1950s onwards, due to 
the pact with the US, one of whose side-effects is that American culture becomes 
fashionable (see Jordan, 2002: 243). A piercing satire of Spain’s unequal relationship with 
the USA is provided by Luis García Berlanga and Juan Antonio Bardem in Bienvenido 
Mister Marshall (1952). Both of these factors lead to the 1966 Press Law introduced by 
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Fraga; “prior censorship is abolished, but the authorities could still suppress or confiscate 
material after publication. This measure, though presented at the time as an important step 
towards liberalization, does little more than replace censorship by bureaucrats with self-
censorship” (Rodgers, 1999: 98; see also Romero Salvadó, 1999: 155). Castellet’s 
reflection must also be taken into account: 
Si con los años se suavizaron, en el terreno cultural, algunas de esas actitudes, no fue por inteligencia 
o permisividad del Régimen, sino por la debilidad o el vacío ideológico de sus planteamientos 
culturales, frente a un cuerpo social que se iba recomponiendo lentamente y que, en consecuencia, 
recuperaba una parte –pero sólo una parte– del terreno perdido (1977: 14). 
In any case, censorship is typically harsher on those forms of expression which reach the 
wider public, press and cinema in particular (Rodgers, 1999: 98). In the case of Aranguren, 
this means that because the readership of his early books and journals is mainly limited to 
the academic arena, he is not initially under the attentive eye of the censors quite so much 
as those who produce films or newspapers. However, he is subjected to attacks from within 
the Church, such as the one by Torrens (1956), insofar as he exercises a moderate self-
criticism of Catholicism (see Aranguren, 1994: 1, 540; see also Blázquez, 1994a: 1, 15-16). 
Eventually, Aranguren becomes a regular contributor to Spanish newspapers: La 
Vanguardia (1970) and El País (1976). However, by the time that Aranguren’s mass 
divulgence of his thought may have been considered to have become potentially dangerous 
for the regime’s efforts to gain cultural hegemony, the dynamics of censorship had already 
changed. The 1966 Press Law and the eagerness of the regime for international acceptance 
would lead to the dictablanda, allowing for wider scope of expression49. This proves to be a 
successful strategy for the regime; by allowing some degree of dissidence to be voiced, the 
regime hopes to gain a wider degree of international acceptance and to promote a 
misleading national sense of relative freedom and Europeanization. Thus, this dissidence is 
assimilated by the regime, effectively rendering it innocuous.  
Aranguren’s presence in the newspapers is of great significance, because, as Alexis 
Grohmann explains, the Spanish press plays a momentous political role during the 
Transition; in the absence of political parties, the newspapers, by initiating a political 
debate, create a point of reference at the same time as they inform the public (2006: 15). 
Aranguren himself is aware of the political role of newspapers, which confirms the 
intentionality of his contributions (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 496).  
The end of the regime results in a proliferation of articles, books, and films, which 
lead to the cultural explosion of the 1980s. For Aranguren, it means that, not only can he 
                                                
49 Although the term is used mostly in the context of Primo de Rivera’s regime, it is also applicable to 
the later years of Francoism, when – in an effort to gain international approval – repression arguably 
softens and becomes more inconsistent (see Alexander, 2002: 107; Collier, 1999: 106). 
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write in a bolder manner about socio-political issues – by then the main focus of his work – 
but also that these works enjoy a considerable readership, fuelled by Aranguren’s 
significant popularity. Having said that, it must be borne in mind that during the 1980s and 
even until the present day, the levels of readership in Spain are low by European standards 
(Jordan, 2002: 130, 177, 188; Stanton, 2002: 92)50. 
Regarding Zambrano, it is important to bear in mind that, as Gracia puts it, “María 
Zambrano no dejó de ensayar en 1938” (1996: 65)51. However, due to the circumstances, 
many of her manuscripts are not published until the latter stages of her life and others are 
published posthumously. 
Despite the publication of Les Philosophes espagnols d’hier et d’aujourd’hui by 
Alain Guy (1956), in which he highlights the importance of Zambrano, her work was 
largely overlooked. It is not until 1981, when she is awarded the Premio Príncipe de 
Asturias, that public attention is drawn to Zambrano’s work and worth (see Ortega Muñoz, 
1992: 8, 35-36). Since then, she has been the object of an array of publications, particularly 
so recently, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of her birth. In spite of this recent 
popularity, little has been done to unravel and explore the political content of her thought 
beyond her early work. Aranguren has speculated on the different reasons why Zambrano’s 
thought may have been initially ignored or overlooked; he concludes that her being a 
heterodox disciple of Ortega, her exile, and her not having held a chair in a University are 
all factors which may have contributed to this (1983: 128-29). Her gender, however, should 
also be considered as one of the key factors which has contributed to her thought having 
been overlooked for so long, as well as for the later keen rediscovery of her work and 
persona. 
Hence, although after her exile the mechanisms of censorship of the Franco regime 
do not affect her writing, other more subtle mechanisms of cultural hegemony, and her own 
personal circumstances, limit not so much her production as her publication (see Faber, 
2002: ix). As a result of her status as an exile, access to her work and to that of the exiles in 
general is extremely difficult for those who stay within Spain. As discussed above, dialogue 
with the exiles is not initiated until 1953, but even then, gaining access to their work is 
difficult and limited (see above for further details on Aranguren’s role in this process). In an 
effort to preserve and promote her thought and legacy, in 1987 the Fundación María 
                                                
50 “In the mid-1980s the government published a survey showing that more than half of all Spaniards 
had not read a single newspaper in their lives. The same was true of books” (Stanton, 2002: 92). 
51 It is worth noting that Gracia’s use of the verb “ensayar” in this context makes reference to 
Zambrano’s persistence in writing, specifically in the genre of the essay, ensayo. At the same time, 
“ensayar” also translates into “rehearsing”, which is also a very appropriate connotation for 
Zambrano’s work, for it hints at its open-ended, unfinished character which will be discussed at length 
in chapter four. 
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Zambrano is established. As a result of the Fundación’s work, her manuscripts and letters 
are being preserved and made available to researchers, and some previously unpublished 
material has now been edited and published. Because of this, some considerable gaps may 
be found between the publication date of some of Zambrano’s work, and the time when 
they were actually written. This distance bears testimony to the complexities of her life and 
work and it should be taken into account when approaching her publications, for it 
constitutes yet one more challenge in the task of establishing and understanding the 
structure and progression of her work.  
Aguirre presents a very different picture. His status as a priest provides him with 
certain privileges, whose boundaries he pushes on numerous occasions and in various 
inventive ways, as can be observed in this anecdote recounted by Savater:  
en el año 68, en una de las grandes algaradas [...] se organizó un lío tremendo y entraron [los 
alborotadores] en la iglesia. [...] Uno, en un momento determinado, salió por la ventana con el 
crucifijo que había cogido de la pared y se lo tiró a los guardias. [De] Todo esto, la prensa franquista 
[decía] “¡oh, pecado! ¡tiran el crucifijo...!”. Y entonces salió Jesús [diciendo]: un crucifijo, es un 
objeto sagrado, que en un caso de apuro, pues puede ser simplemente un objeto más (2006).  
Despite the limited amount of publications of his own during the Franco regime, his 
rebellious position towards the regime is visible in his sermons (collected in Sermones de 
España, 1971b), which include a number of progressive topics and positions. Such 
progressiveness is also present in his choice of titles for the translations published in Taurus 
when he is religious editor (1969), and even more so later when he becomes editor-in-chief. 
It is not until the end of the regime that he becomes a writer in his own right52. He is not 
alone in doing so. In fact, the freedom of expression granted by the new-born democracy 
propitiates a proliferation of publications, particularly autobiographical and semi-
autobiographical works such as José María Pemán’s Mis encuentros con Franco (1976), 
Pedro Laín Entralgo’s Descargo de conciencia (1930-1960) (1976), and Carmen Martín 
Gaite’s El cuarto de atrás (1978) (see also Sobejano, 2003: 172). The significance of this 
phenomenon lies in the fact that these writings not only constitute an exercise of a new-
found freedom, but they also provide a new epistemological stand which challenges the 
authoritarian and unilateral epistemology encouraged and imposed by the regime. As 
Fredric Jameson explains in relation to postmodernist narrative fiction, questioning of 
absolute truths about the past allows the past to be detotalized and the illusion of objectivity 
and truth present in the “grand narratives” crumbles (1984: xii). Similarly, the deliberate 
introduction of subjectivity in the biographical discourse invites the reader to engage with 
the writer encouraging a bond between the two. At the same time, the text becomes infused 
                                                
52 Although there are no direct sources which mention this date explicitly, by a process of deduction, all 
the available information regarding Aguirre’s biography points to 1969 as the date he becomes 
religious editor for Taurus. 
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with human-like characteristics. Truth becomes fragmentary; the perception of reality is 
necessarily limited and partial. These (semi-)autobiografical accounts adopt a shift of 
perspective which allows a re-evaluation of the past. In contrast, Aguirre’s autobiographical 
style is not used to shape his confessions or memoirs of his actions during the regime; his 
post-1975 writings focus on post-1975 events. As in the case of Aranguren, it is of great 
significance that many of these writings are first published as newspaper articles. In fact, 
Aguirre has a very strong presence in the press, as this article in El País points out: 
“vinculado a EL PAIS [sic] desde la aparición del periódico, perteneció al comité asesor de 
cultura del mismo hasta su nombramiento de director general [de música] y ha sido 
colaborador habitual en nuestras páginas” (n.a. 1978: n.p.)53. Ricardo Gullón confirms 
Aguirre’s involvement in this newspaper: “aparece el País, con signo liberal, Jesús Aguirre 
muda de oficio: el periodismo le atrae, escribe y hace escribir; sugiere temas, apunta 
posibilidades” (1989: 13).  
Beside the political implications of his involvement with the press highlighted above, 
this presence in the press means that Aguirre establishes a close relationship with the 
public; his name, his contributions, and opinions become familiar, expected. He becomes a 
mediator; Aguirre engages in the socio-cultural and political debate, maintaining contact 
and discussions with cultural figures and politicians, contributing to shape the socio-cultural 
and political landscape of his time; Aguirre also maintains contact through the newspapers 
with the wider public, thus also contributing to shape their opinions and preferences. 
 
2.3.3 Culture 
Regarding the totalitarian nature of Francoism, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán concludes that 
persigue un control sistemático de la organización de la convivencia y de la conciencia social sobre 
esa organización. No se limita pues a ejercer una represión física (terror, control judicial, estructural) 
sino que trata de falsificar la identidad de los individuos y de las clases sociales para impedirles el 
punto de partida de la conciencia de sí mismo y la delimitación de la otredad (Vázquez Montalbán, 
1977: 68). 
As a result, culture is used as an instrument of legitimation and perpetuation of power, an 
instrument of domination (see Equipo Reseña, 1997: 145-46). Media and education are 
controlled by the regime’s ideologues. Popular culture exercises certain control on the 
masses by means of its potential for escapism (Jordan, 2002: 243; Aguilar Fernández, 2002: 
50; see also 3.2.2.1). On the other hand, the media is instrumentalized to serve political 
                                                
53 This article, published originally by El País on the occasion of Aguirre’s wedding to the Duquesa de 
Alba, is currently available on the internet, however, El País does not provide information regarding 
the author or the original page where this article was published in the printed version (for more details 
see bibliography). Please note that when this occurs in other instances in the thesis, it will simply be 
indicated by n.p. and more information will be available in the bibliography. 
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purposes. As Enrique Bustamante explains, “the dictatorship had imposed a primarily 
political function on the press, radio, and television” (1995: 356). In fact, the 
instrumentalization of the media is first exploited by Nazism and is common to 
authoritarian and fascist regimes, although, as we shall discuss in Chapter Three, is not 
necessarily limited to them (see also 1.3)54. As Vázquez Montalbán observes, “para 
conseguir estos efectos uniformadores, el fascismo recurre a sofisticados instrumentos 
represivos, los más sofisticados hasta entonces conocidos, valiéndose ante todo del 
apabullante control de los aparatos ideológicos” (1977: 69). He adds that, as a result, the 
only redoubt of freedom is initially individual thought, but even that is coerced and attacked 
by bugged phone lines, controlled correspondence, and torture (Vázquez Montalbán, 1977: 
69). 
As discussed above, the Francoist regime makes numerous efforts to obtain cultural 
hegemony which expand across a wide range of cultural practices and institutional 
intervention, from the purging of teachers and of textbooks at schools to political 
indoctrination by means of children’s toys, from censorship to torture to mention just a few 
(see Iglesias, 2000; Balfour, 2000: 267). Despite its many efforts, Francoism fails to impose 
an official culture (Castellet, 1977: 13). As Castellet explains, “los intentos de llenar de 
contenido teórico la actividad ‘cultural’ del Nuevo orden, se estrellaron sucesivamente por 
la inviabilidad de sus propuestas” (1977: 13). Thus, one of the central reasons it fails is the 
weakness of the theoretical construct these attempts stand on, which Vázquez Montalbán 
describes as “desfachatez teórica del poder” (1977: 73; see also Castellet, 1977: 13). Carlos 
                                                
54 Most historians do not accept the existence of fascism in Spain (see Payne, 1997; Knight, 2003: 
114). That is why this is a term which requires some discussion. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos is considered 
the ideological founder of Spanish fascism (Payne, 1995: 258; 1999: 54-65). He starts developing his 
ideas in relation to his extreme nationalism in the early 1930s, drawing his inspiration from Italian 
fascism, and although he concludes that it would be counterproductive for Spain simply to imitate the 
Italian model, he does reproduce in Spain many of the key characteristics of Italian fascism (Payne, 
1995: 258; 1999: 54-65). As a result, Spanish Falangism, “though to some extent derivative from the 
Italian form, it became a kind of Catholic and culturally more traditionalist fascism that was more 
marginal” (Payne, 1995: 466). Stanley Payne provides a working definition of fascism, according to 
which it is “a form of revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth that is based on a primarily 
vitalist philosophy, is structured on extreme elitism, mass mobilization, and the Führerprinzip, 
positively values violence as end as well as means and tends to normalize war or the military virtues” 
(1995: 14). The Franco regime can be considered fascist only to the extent that it fits this definition and 
it must be borne in mind that it does not share many of the features present in Italian or German 
fascism, namely, their secular character, their expansionist and imperialist program, and the racist 
agenda, in the case of Germany (see Payne, 1995: 8, 11, 262-66). As Gracia explains, “Franco usó 
desde la misma guerra la toxina del terror que es el miedo, y dos herramientas políticas que supo 
combinar con eficiencia, Falange y el integrismo católico. Dotó al nuevo Estado de un fascismo 
distinto y particular [...]. Falange encarnó desde 1933 la versión española de esos movimientos 
europeos [el fascismo alemán, portugués e italiano], aunque es un partido tardío” (2004: 41; see also 
Abellán, 1989b: 385-392). Bearing in mind the idiosyncrasies of the Franco regime, the word fascism 
will be used in relation to it only in as much as “generic fascism is an abstraction which never existed 
in pure empirical form but constitutes a conceptual device which serves to clarify the analysis of 
individual political phenomena” (Payne, 1995: 4). 
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París describes the thought it generated as “un pensamiento dirigido, organizado y 
programado desde sus áreas propias de poder […] concebido de espaldas a la historia, en 
absoluta extrañeza con la sensibilidad propia de los tiempos” (1977: 49; see also Castellet, 
1977: 13). The apparent paradox of the failure of a Francoist cultural hegemony in the face 
of its continuous hold on power until the natural death of the dictator is explained by 
Castellet: “la única fuerza del mismo [del franquismo], desde sus orígenes hasta el final, no 
estuvo en la evolución de las ideas, sino en la capacidad de represión” (Castellet, 1977: 14). 
All in all, this chapter has aimed to provide a background of the social, economic, 
political, and cultural atmosphere lived throughout the period here studied, so that it can be 
used as a referential platform from which to undertake a more analytical approach 
throughout the rest of the thesis. This chapter, through the analysis of Cruz’s research, has 
highlighted the importance of taking into account the role that cultural hegemony, discussed 
in the present chapter, but also habitus, play in allowing changes to the structures of power 
and thought and to take place. For this reason, Chapter Three explores in detail the concept 
of habitus and its relationship to false consciousness. Both habitus and false consciousness 
will be recurrent concepts in the analysis of the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre, as we shall see in the following chapters.  
In addition, the following key aspects of the development of the argument of this 
thesis emerge from this contextualization: religion and spirituality, Marxism, education and 
culture, and censorship. First, the problematic situation of the Church in relation to the 
State, to its own followers, and, ultimately, to faith during the Francoist dictatorship, has 
been underscored and discussed. This situation has an important bearing not only on 
shaping the experience of religion, morality, and thought of Spanish citizens during the 
regime and well into the Transition, but also on Aranguren and Aguirre in particular. As 
shall be discussed in Chapters Three and Five respectively, initially religion and then 
spirituality play a pivotal role in the evolution and thought of these two authors, to the 
extent that their motivations seem to be rooted in no small part in their religious beliefs 
first, and, later, in their spiritual commitment. Spirituality is also ever-present aspect of 
Zambrano’s thought, which can be observed in her premises as well as in her conclusions, 
increasingly gaining visibility towards the later stages of her thought, as we shall see in 
Chapter Four. Second, Marxism plays a prominent role politically, both in reference to 
international relationships during this time and to interest and controversy that Marxist 
theory arouses. The latter will be explored in detail in reference to Aranguren and Aguirre 
in Chapters Three and Five respectively. On the one hand, they engage themselves in this 
controversy with the purpose of promoting a debate between Christians and Marxists in 
Spain. On the other hand, it is of paramount importance to understand the position of 
Marxism in Spain during this time and the relationship of Aranguren and Aguirre to it, in 
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order to analyse their response towards neo-Marxist positions, that is, those of the FS. 
Although their positions in this matter will be discussed in Chapters Three and Five as 
indicated above, an evaluation of such positions and how their thought and Zambrano’s 
thought relates to CT will take place in Chapter Six. Third, the present chapter has 
discussed education and culture in order to elucidate the cultural background against which 
these authors develop their thought. In addition, these are also relevant in order to 
understand the context which contributes to shaping these author’s motivations to award 
education and culture such importance in their thought and in their proposals, as shall 
become apparent in the course of the following chapters. This is particularly clear in the 
case of Aguirre, who devotes most of his lives to the endeavour of cultural dissemination, 
be it by means of his translations and editions of other authors’s works or be it by means of 
his direct involvement in the promotion of the arts, as was the case in the later stages of his 
career, as we shall see in Chapter Five. Fourth, censorship plays an important role in the 
analysis of the work of any author who wrote under the constrains of the Franco regime. 
This is the case with Aranguren, since there are indications to conclude that in the early 
stages of his career, his choice of subject matter was influenced by his awareness of the 
restrictions placed upon public expression by the regime, as will be argued in Chapter 
Three. Similarly, the expansion of his focus of interest and of his medium of publication – 
from books to newspapers and even television appearances – as well as the increasingly 
critical tone of his work is linked, on the one hand, to his extended stays in the United 
States where he was not subjected to this type of censorship, and, on the other hand, to the 
changes in the Press Law in the sixties and to the abolition of censorship which followed 
the end of the dictatorship. The impact of censorship on the work of Aguirre is even more 
apparent. Aguirre practically limits his publications during the regime to translations and 
editions and these are mostly of a religious nature until the mid-sixties. As will be argued in 
Chapter Five, it is not until the Transition – when state censorship has been abolished – that 
he starts publishing manuscripts of his own. 
Thus, as indicated in the introduction, the following chapters in the second part of 
this thesis will consist of an analysis of the work and thought of the three authors object of 
this research, so that their contributions, particularly their relation to spirituality, political 



















3 The presence of Marcuse and neo-Marxism in 
Aranguren’s thought 
3.1 Introduction  
As indicated in the introduction, several reasons account for the choice of Aranguren as the 
first author to be studied in relation to neo-Marxism. First, he actively encourages and 
participates in the dialogue with Marxism. Second, not only does he discuss and comment 
on the work of the FS, but, more importantly, there are numerous neo-Marxist elements 
readily observable in his work, unlike the cases of Aguirre or Zambrano, whose work 
requires a greater degree of reconstruction and heuristic effort. Having said this, it is 
important to point out that, as it will become clear in the course of this chapter, Aranguren 
does not develop CT as comprehensively as Aguirre and Zambrano do, for his style is more 
direct and transparent than theirs. His relevance lies in that, influenced by the neo-Marxist 
critique of advanced capitalism offered by the FS, his later thought incorporates these 
critical elements, which he often applies to the specific socio-political situation in Spain, 
becoming an influential voice during the process of Transition (see Argullol, 2005: 21). 
Like the FS, Aranguren criticizes mass culture and the forms of cultural control and 
manipulation, and he establishes links between economic stability, capitalism, 
consumerism, political participation, and the possibility of freedom and true choice. Third, 
Aranguren’s initial position will allow his analysis to function as a preliminary link between 
Aguirre, his close friend, and Zambrano, whom he also meets and whose thought he 
expresses interest in and which becomes an object of reflection in his work on several 
occasions (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 589; 1994, 6: 128-129, 134, 196, 330). Moreover, 
Aranguren is the only one of these three authors who shows awareness of the work of the 
other two in his own work. In this sense, he is the one element where an explicit connection 
between them can be traced, for he often reports and comments on the work and 
significance of both Aguirre and Zambrano. Fourth, Aranguren’s position in relation to 
exile also makes him a suitable starting point, for he strives to establish communication 
between those intellectuals who stay in Spain and those of the España peregrina. 
Furthermore, although he does not belong to the Republican exile, his later emigration to 
the United States, although it must be carefully nuanced, does offer him a valuable 
experience of exile, while it widens his horizon of reflection, as will be discussed later in 
the chapter55. Fifth, and finally, despite the debate that takes place shortly after his death 
                                                
55 Although the use of the word “horizon” in the figurative sense as the extent of concepts or ideas 
thinkable or imaginable by one person or group may sound like journalese today, it will, nonetheless, 
be used throughout this thesis with the meaning indicated above because this is the vocabulary used 
originally by Critical Theorists, particularly Marcuse, to designate this concept and it still remains an 
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questioning some of his motives and loyalties, as well as his quality as a thinker, the 
relevance of his thought for this research rests on the worth of his contribution, which is 
patent in his work, as well as on its impact (see 1.4). The public nature, length, number, and 
variety of people involved in the debate is evidence of the weight that Aranguren’s figure, if 
not thought, bears on his coeval Spanish society; his impact, although impossible to be 
accurately measured, makes the study of his person and thought necessary to shed some 
light onto the puzzle that is post-war Spain.  
Thus, with the purpose of clarifying Aranguren’s political positions and his 
relationship to Marxism and neo-Marxism, the present chapter will explore his links and 
attitude towards the FS. Moreover, in an effort to elucidate Aranguren’s intentionality and 
to show the specificity of his approach, this chapter will also look into his background, 
biography, and the role that religion and spirituality play in his thought. 
 
3.1.1 Influences 
One of the key characteristics of Aranguren’s thought is his awareness and interest in a 
wide range of currents and authors, which reflect his supradisciplinarity, a central feature of 
CT (see Chapter One). In fact, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre share a polymathic range 
of interests which represents not the fragmentation of the post-modernist individual, but the 
acceptance of his multiplicity, which reveals a sense of unity driven by the perceived 
interconnectedness of reality, concepts which shall be explored in Chapter Four, devoted to 
Zambrano56.  
Aranguren’s frequent reviews, comments, and allusions to a vast array of authors are 
a testimony to the task of dissemination he takes upon himself by contextualizing, echoing, 
and evaluating their work. Amidst this variety of influences, those of Unamuno, Ortega, 
d’Ors, Heidegger, and the FS particularly stand out, as we shall see below (see 3.2.1.1) 
Although Aranguren’s relationship to Unamuno’s thought regarding religion shall be 
explored below, suffice it to say at this point that there are some important coincidences 
between the two authors as Amando de Miguel points out: “con el de Salamanca, 
Aranguren mantiene muchos puntos de contacto, como el gusto por la paradoja, el placer de 
la etimología o la angustia religiosa” (1997: 25). It must be said, however, that although 
                                                                                                                                       
efficient and useful metaphor to express it (see Marcuse, 1964: 131, 157, 159, 165; 1968: 59, 149, 151, 
154; 1972: 18, 36, 106). 
56 It must be noted that, according to Bretz, a multiplicity of forces is already perceived within the unity 
of the subject by modernist authors: “throughout the period [of modernism], explorations of 
subjectivity unfold in relation to both the individual and collectivity, with a growing recognition that 
any entity conceived as a unit carries within itself multiple forces that interact in dynamic tension” 
(2001: 442). 
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both cultivate these, their positions on these issues are different as we shall see in the course 
of this chapter (see also Soldevilla, 2004: 126). 
As Aranguren explains, “se ha dicho que María Zambrano pertenece a la llamada 
generación del 36, yo mismo pertenezco también a esa generación, aunque un poco 
posterior a ella, y he tenido los mismos maestros que ella” (1983: 126; see also Pastor 
García, 2000: 670; Díaz, 1983: 93; 2004: 510; Gracia, 1996: 24). Thus, Aranguren is also a 
late member of the intellectual circle created around Ortega and his teachings known as the 
Escuela de Madrid (see Abellán, 1989b: 230-31)57. What is more, Abellán sees in 
Aranguren’s work an attempt to complete Ortegan philosophy by linking it to Catholicism 
(1989: 256). Ortega’s influence is visible in Aranguren’s interest in German philosophy. It 
is also apparent in the perspectivist reminiscences present in Aranguren’s concept of 
talante, which emphasize the inextricable link between philosophy and biography (see 
1994, 1: 218, 224-27; 1994, 2: 563, 606; 1994, 4: 149). Thus, he keeps coming back to the 
question of personal identity, which may be described as an almost subsidiary topic for him 
(see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 25; 1994, 2: 563, 606; see also Pastor García, 2000: 665; Gracia, 
1996: 161). As with Zambrano, Aranguren, following Ortega, views life as the unfolding 
and realization of a personal project. This is particularly visible in his treatment of the 
concept of vocation, for “la verdadera vocación nos remite, no a un proyecto cualquiera, 
sino al proyecto fundamental de nuestra existencia” (Bonete, 2003: 436). This unfolding, 
one’s ethos, is formed in the process of confrontation with reality and the appropriation of 
some of the possibilities displayed before us (see Bonete, 2003: 437).  
Eugenio d’Ors also has a considerable influence on the direction of Aranguren’s 
thought. As Gracia explains, what La filosofía de Eugenio d’Ors (1945) – Aranguren’s first 
published book – confirms is “esa conciencia de prolongación de un mismo mundo cultural 
y de imposibilidad de reanudar el camino ex novo” (1996: 16). This is crucial for 
developing Aranguren’s supradisciplinarity and his interest in German culture in particular. 
As Bretz explains, “Eugenio d’Ors labours to reconcile admiration for German cultural 
contributions with opposition to German militarism and at the same time, to establish a link 
between Latin and Germanic cultures” (Bretz, 2001: 126). This early interest in German 
                                                
57 Strictly speaking, the Madrid School ceases to exist in 1936 as a consequence of the Civil War 
(Abellán, 1989: 15-16). Despite José Gaos’s leadership in Mexico, the main difficulty it faces in exile 
is the subsequent diaspora that takes place in Latin America (Abellán, 1989: 254). The Madrid School 
in the mainland, headed by Julián Marías, along with Laín Entralgo, Joaquín Ruiz-Jiménez, and 
Aranguren himself, also suffers considerable difficulties, mainly the weight of the dictatorship upon 
intellectual and University life (Abellán, 1989: 255). As a result of the emerging personal and 
theoretical divergences, Abellán ultimately concludes that after 1936 it would be more appropriate to 
refer to the philosophical tradition that originated with Ortega, instead of using the term Madrid School 
(1989: 257). In any case, the term the Madrid School will be used throughout this thesis more as a 
starting intellectual and meeting point than as a geographical one. Incidentally, a similarity can be 
found with the FS, whose emigration to the United States does not affect its name. 
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culture can be observed in Aranguren’s effort to understand and build a bridge between 
Catholic and Protestant religions, and the impact of these beliefs on their attitudes and 
behaviours, and, ultimately, on their wider cultural frameworks, as can be observed in 
Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952) and in El protestantismo y 
la moral (1954) – originally his doctoral thesis. In an effort to move on from the French 
rationalist tradition, d’Ors considers German culture as a model for the Spanish one (see 
Bretz, 2001: 126). Unlike Ortega, who deposits many of his hopes on the possibilities of 
rationality and science, d’Ors highlights the impossibility of solely rationalist explanations 
to successfully and satisfactorily account for the complexities of life and the human 
experience: “defining life as movement and flux, d’Ors argues that no figure, formula, or 
rational conceptualization fully comprehends its complexity and dynamism” (Bretz, 2001: 
127). D’Ors rejects all-encompassing rationalist explanations in favour of an open-ended 
dialectic approach. Relying on Nietzschean philosophy, he defends the significance of 
dynamic oppositions, at the same time as he envisages irony as the bridge between 
Germanic and Mediterranean cultures (see Bretz, 2001: 128). It is from this rejection of 
rationalism that Aranguren develops his own CT – as do Zambrano and Aguirre – by 
unmasking the reductionist and destructive content of formulaic solutions and highlighting 
the value of contradiction. Instead of irony, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre wager for 
faith not only to bridge the cultural gap, but, more importantly, as the cohesive ingredient 
for their utopian socio-personal project. 
Influenced by d’Ors and Ortega, Aranguren engages – as does Zambrano also – with 
Heideggerian thought (see Díaz, 2004: 505). In his prologue to the collection of essays 
entitled Heidegger: La voz de tiempos sombríos (1991), Aranguren shows his awareness 
and interest in the debate around Heideggerian thought, as well as his interest in Hölderlin 
and Lévinas (1991: 9). It is no coincidence that Aranguren chooses to question Heidegger’s 
Dasein: “¿sigue siendo esto ética o es, más bien, poesía? ¿Sigue siendo esto ética o es, más 
bien, religión?” (1991: 9). These questions explicitly raise the issue of ethics – central to 
Aranguren’s work – and relate it to poetry and to religion, also suggesting links between the 
two58. By establishing this connection, Aranguren reveals the subject of his own interests at 
the same time as he hints at the direction his answers take. Moreover, he shows that the 
main interests in his own thought are also directly related to Heidegger’s, indicating a close 
relationship between them.  
The focus of the rest of this chapter, however, will be the FS’s influence on 
Aranguren’s thought. 
                                                
58 It must be noted that when Aranguren writes about religion, he means mostly Christianity: the 
analysis of different forms of Christianity and the contrast between Christianity and other non-religious 
attitudes towards life, such as Marxism (see Aranguren, 1952, 1954, 1968, 1982b).  
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3.1.1.1 Aranguren and the Frankfurt School 
According to Aranguren, “hoy mismo seguimos moviéndonos en torno a los grandes 
problemas planteados por la Escuela” (1994, 4: 543). What is more, the issues first 
identified by the FS become Aranguren’s subject matter, as we will see in the course of this 
chapter. Hence, this section will address the question of what Aranguren’s relationship to 
the FS is and what its intellectual consequences are. 
Aranguren is not only aware of the works of the FS and of the relevance of their 
critique, but he also expresses interest in its reception and impact in Spain. In La cultura 
española y la cultura establecida (1975), Aranguren argues against the perception that there 
was a late reception of CT in Spain (1994, 4: 427). In fact, he concludes that access to the 
FS in Spain cannot be considered as having been restricted to his generation, because the 
Institut does not immediately acquire a real social existence (Aranguren, 1994, 4, 542). The 
first books published in Spain by one of the members of the FS, Adorno’s Notas de 
literatura and Prismas; La crítica de la cultura y la sociedad, both date from 1962. 
Considering that the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung first appears in 1932, their introduction 
in Spain in the early sixties may, indeed, seem late. Nonetheless, the changes in focus, 
location, and even members of the School account for what Aranguren considers a delayed 
social existence. It is from this perspective that Aranguren argues against the perception of 
the late introduction of the FS in Spain late. Far from a late reception, Fernando Savater 
indicates that translations of the works of the FS are available in Spain earlier than in other 
European countries such as France (2006). In any case, according to his own recollection, 
Aranguren is one of the first people to discuss the thought of a member of the School in a 
Spanish university; he discussed Adorno’s Minima Moralia in the context of a seminar on 
ethics in the early 1960’s (1994, 5: 544). Despite these efforts, the adoption of such utopian 
theories – those of the FS − does not properly take place until 1969-1975, a period during 
which, according to Díaz, they had very direct repercussions in the realm of political action 
(1983: 166)59.  
                                                
59 It must be highlighted, however, that as Marsal notes, “la relación entre las ideas, las superestructuras 
ideológicas –de las que son ‘funcionarios’ los intelectuales– y la estructura económico-social no es 
inmediata y directamente causal como la de otros grupos sociales, sino mediata y compleja. De ahí 
también la mayor elusividad del intelectual ante la presión del poder que no puede medir bien las 
consecuencias difusas de lo que el intelectual dice o escribe” (1979: 37). Nevertheless, as Díaz 
observes above, there are indications to suggest that the introduction of the thought of the FS in Spain 
has a socio-political impact not only because it is introduced on the verge of a time when crucial 
decisions of this nature are being taken, namely, the Transition, but also because of the important 
political connections maintained by the person chiefly responsible for introducing it, Aguirre, as we 
shall discuss in chapter five. In both cases, the nature of this impact lies in that these ideas contribute to 
expanding the horizon of possibilities of those individuals who embrace them, at a time when many 
feel that change is at hand. However, in the light of the difficulty in establishing a relationship of 
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Aranguren’s views on the FS are first published in a newspaper article entitled 
“Marxismo e imaginación” included in La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975) 
(1994, 4: 541-44). He later returns to this topic in order to explain the nature of the title: “el 
marxismo con imaginación −‘imaginación dialéctica’, buen lema de lo que la Escuela ha 
querido ser con su gran sensibilidad para el arte y la literatura− por nadie ha estado mejor 
representado que por ellos durante años” (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 589). Thus, he expresses his 
admiration for these aspects of the work of the School. 
However, it would be contradictory for Aranguren, and it would also go against the 
very spirit of the FS, not to exercise his critical attitude; the Institut is no exception. 
Although, on the one hand, Aranguren recognises the importance and impact of their 
thought, on the other hand, he points to their source of income and questions its possible 
impact on their work, and finally concedes that “en cualquier caso, la Escuela de Francfort 
es una prueba más de la imposibilidad de la pureza absoluta. Siempre ‘usamos’ o ‘somos 
usados’ y, con frecuencia, ambas cosas a la vez” (1994, 4: 543). Nevertheless, there is 
conclusive evidence to support Aranguren’s interest in and gratitude towards the FS.  
He praises their achievement for having created what he describes as the first 
independent, heterodox Marxist circle (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 543). He also highlights their 
merit in having identified and analysed the problems associated with neo-capitalist 
societies: 
la conciencia de nuevas alienaciones, la de la cultura de masas –en principio, para la Escuela, la 
cultura popular que sus miembros vivieron en América–, así como la del consumismo (y tanto, o más, 
contra el ascetismo puritano), se la debemos a este grupo. Y tantas cosas más, entre las cuales es 
imprescindible citar, frente a la razón tecnológica o reducción de la razón a “razón instrumental”, su 
voluntad de distinguir entre la técnica y la praxis (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 544). 
The new forms of alienation, mass culture, consumerism – all by-products of the 
reduction of reason to instrumental reason – become, in fact, some of the very topics to 
which Aranguren devotes his attention during the most socio-politically oriented phase of 
his career. Aranguren also applauds the attitude of the members of the Institut who, in his 
view, live out their theory as a form of praxis (see 1994, 4: 544). By doing so, Aranguren 
acknowledges not only the relevance of their thought, but, more crucially, the element of 
praxis implicit in the rationality they propound, which reveals the value that Aranguren 
himself ascribes to it (see Rush, 2004: 16, 27). We will now turn our attention to 
Aranguren’s connection to the individual members of the FS, which shall be explored 
below. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
causality between intellectual ideas and their impact on the realm of social and political action, it must 
be stressed that more research needs to be done in this area, which falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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3.1.1.2 Benjamin  
Benjamin’s heterodox position in reference to the School and the difficulties and harshness 
experienced throughout his life, as well as his death at the Spanish-French border, awakens 
Aranguren’s and Aguirre’s interest. In fact, Aranguren points to Aguirre as the person 
responsible for making Benjamin accessible to a Spanish readership (1994, 4: 474, 477; 
1994, 5: 291, 319; see also 5.3.1 and appendix one).  
Aranguren devotes three articles to Benjamin, “Actualidad de Walter Benjamin”, 
“Viajero sin equipaje”, and “Un alto en la lectura”. Here he discusses his position as the 
harbinger of the New Left, as well as his independent approach towards Marxism and his 
attitude and views so often ahead of his time on issues such as the green movement, his 
position on art, culture, and violence (see 1994, 4: 474-83; 1994, 5: 291). Benjamin 
becomes a point of reference for Aranguren’s views on art, particularly regarding the 
reception of mass art (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 76, 106). Aranguren admires Benjamin as a 
non-orthodox member of the FS who does not leave behind a system but instead a number 
of anticipations, of gestated thoughts which he does not fully develop (1994, 4: 482). In 
fact, Aranguren describes him as excomulgado and excomunicado. With these terms, 
Aranguren emphasizes his condition of outcast, that is, his heterodoxy within the FS and his 
subsequent isolation from it (1994, 4: 481-82, 595). Both words highlight the isolation and 
rejection suffered as a consequence of his dissent. Furthermore, excomulgado – a 
deliberately religious term – reminds the reader of the then ever present power and 
influence on Spain of the Church, thus establishing an analogy between Benjamin and the 
situation of the more independent Spanish thinkers. What is more, this situation closely 
relates to the concept of inner exile, which once again stresses isolation in its different 
forms: from the self, from other possible interlocutors, from the standard accepted culture 
and society, and, eventually, from the nation-state (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 426, 482, 596; 
1994, 5: 127; see also Salabert, 1988; Caudet, 2005: 55). This inner exile provides an inner 
retreat which, in the case of Benjamin, the rest of the FS, and many Spanish thinkers of this 
period, eventually including Aranguren himself, is also extended to the outer world. 
Physical exile in one form or the other is an experience which marks the life and work of 
these authors, highlighting once again the close connection between them, as we shall see 
throughout the thesis. 
 
3.1.1.3 Adorno and Horkheimer 
Aranguren refers to Adorno, along with Marcuse, Gramsci, Korsch, Habermas, Ernst Bloch, 
Schaff, and Garaudy, as one of the Marxist thinkers of greatest interest of his time for 
tackling the moral issues of Marxism (1994, 3: 185, 203). There are multiple references to 
Adorno and Horkheimer scattered throughout Aranguren’s work making his awareness and 
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interest in their work clear60. Aranguren acknowledges Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s 
pioneering role in denouncing the culture industry and the manipulation of consciousness, 
issues which Aranguren dwells on himself (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 220). He reviews The 
Authoritarian Personality (1950) by Adorno and concisely summarizes its conclusion: “una 
correlación biunívoca entre liberalismo e inteligencia, fanatismo y pobreza intelectual” 
(1994, 4: 439). Thus, through Adorno’s work, Aranguren makes an indirect reference to the 
impoverishment of Spanish thought as a consequence of dictatorship. Its relevance lies in 
that this realization is one of the key factors that account for the evolution of Aranguren’s 
position in reference to the regime.  
 
3.1.1.4 Aranguren and Marcuse 
As indicated above, there is sufficient evidence to assert Aranguren’s interest in the FS and 
their work. The case of Marcuse is of particular interest because there are numerous 
parallels at a biographical and theoretical level. Biography and subjectivity play key roles in 
Aranguren’s thought. He makes an explicit link between intellectual production and 
biography, to such an extent that biography and identity become an almost subsidiary theme 
in his work. According to Aranguren, one’s own works are partly a biography insofar as 
they constitute a testimony to the self at the time of production, and for this reason they are 
necessarily incomplete (see 1994, 1: 25; see also 1994, 2: 563). Based on this, our 
relationship with our past self is described as dialectic, because it is made up of the 
combination of distance and rapprochement, oblivion and memory, past and present, all at 
the same time (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 25). The link is such that it works both ways, for, as 
Aranguren explains, biography also becomes a text: “ahora bien, la vida es también un 
‘texto’, texto legible, y la bibliografía inseparablemente unida en muchos de nosotros [...] a 
la (auto)-biografía” (1994, 4: 529; see also 570-71; 3.2.3 on talante; the key role of 
biography will continue to be discussed in relation to Zambrano, Aguirre, and the FS in the 
following chapters). Thus, a comparison between the two figures will be carried out below.  
While providing an overview of their thought, the purpose of this comparison is to 
illustrate how Marcuse’s work strongly influences Aranguren’s and to uncover how their 
circumstances influence the direction of their work. In fact, there is a convergence in the 
interests, approach, and conclusions of both authors before they meet in the 1960s, and even 
more so after this date, when Aranguren deals with and develops many of the same issues to 
which Marcuse devotes his attention: a critique of consumerist society and the new forms of 
alienation it brings about (see Soldevilla, 2004: 135). Moreover, having established that one 
                                                
60 For Aranguren’s references to Adorno see 1994, 2: 549, 606, 679; 1994, 3: 150; 1994, 4: 184, 439, 
474, 544; 1994, 5: 221, 325, 360; 1994, 6: 209, 463, 600; to Horkheimer, see 1994, 3: 220; 1994, 4: 
542. 
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of the paradigmatic features of neo-Marxism is the correspondence between theory and 
praxis, it is essential to pay close attention to the relationship between Aranguren’s 
biography and his work – as well as Zambrano’s and Aguirre’s – so that it can be 
determined whether they are the expression of a holistic project, as is the case with Critical 
Theorists, particularly Marcuse (see Rush, 2004: 16, 27; see also Brunkhorst, 2004: 263). 
 
3.1.1.4.1 Early life 
Aranguren is born in 1909 in an increasingly tense socio-political climate which culminates 
in the Semana Trágica that same year61. His family, who enjoys a comfortable financial 
situation, is of conservative tendencies. Consequently, Aranguren receives a traditional 
religious education. At the age of nine, he is sent to a Jesuit boarding school in Madrid and 
continues studying with the Jesuits until he leaves for University. Although this young 
Aranguren bears few traits of the critical political writer he would later become, the seeds 
for his strong religious convictions which would shape his entire existence have already 
been firmly planted as we shall see below (for further details of Aranguren’s biography see 
Pastor García, 2000: 665-76). Some eleven years earlier, in 1898, Marcuse is born in Berlin 
to a well-off Jewish family and raised during a period of economic prosperity. Marcuse, 
unlike Aranguren who often meditates on the role of his received religion, Catholicism, 
does not possess a special interest in further exploring and asserting his Jewish background 
(see Kellner, 1989: 80).  
After finishing secondary school, Aranguren’s health deteriorates and University has 
to wait for one year, which he spends learning French in Angulème. When he finally 
attends University, he chooses to do his first degree in Law, which he finishes in 1931. In 
1932, he decides to register at University again to study philosophy. During this time, 
during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930) and the Spanish Second Republic which 
follows, Aranguren is not particularly interested in the socio-political situation of the 
country, assuming a moderate position. Thus, it is hardly surprising that when in 1936 the 
Spanish Civil War breaks out, Aranguren does not manifest any special inclination for 
either side. However, when offered the chance to escape the conflict by going to France, he 
declines the offer (see Pastor García, 2000: 668). Although, a man of peace, initially more 
interested in books than politics, Aranguren is compelled by the circumstances to go to the 
front in Aragón, where he joins a regiment of artillery of the Nationals, serving as the driver 
of the vehicle of his battery (see Pastor García, 2000: 668)62. Once there, he soon claims to 
                                                
61 In July 1909, workers’s protests in Barcelona escalate into anti-clerical riots which are suppressed by 
force, consequently being named the Tragic Week (see Payne, 1993: 12). 
62 Later, in 1969, when looking retrospectively over his life in Memorias y esperanzas españolas, 
Aranguren explains that his decision to pass up the opportunity of becoming an alférez, second 
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suffer from tuberculosis, thus gaining military permission to go back home. Similarly, when 
the Great War breaks out in 1914, two weeks after Marcuse’s sixteenth birthday, Marcuse’s 
rather sheltered upbringing also contributes to the fact that he adopts a rather neutral 
attitude towards it. By the end of 1914, the Germans already suffer the material 
consequences of the war. In 1916, when there are little prospects of a military victory, 
Marcuse is summoned into the Imperial German Reichswehr and is consequently forced to 
conclude his Gymnasium studies. At this point – as with Aranguren – Marcuse also 
manifests health problems; due to his weak eyesight, he is assigned to a relatively safe 
position in Berlin, where he is even allowed to attend Berlin University on an irregular 
basis.  
 
3.1.1.4.2 War as the catalyst for a socio-political awakening 
The Great War, which lasts a total of four years, provokes a great deal of discontent. As 
Barry Katz explains, “it is in these circumstances that Herbert Marcuse, stationed in the 
political centre of the country, began to develop political consciousness” (1982: 26). 
Another decisive factor in awakening his political consciousness is the violence involved in 
war which evokes in him feelings of revulsion. This rejection of violence can also be 
observed in his early political behaviour. Marcuse joins the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
in 1917, a time of crisis and fragmentation for German socialism. As Katz points out: 
he remained a Social Democrat until the end of the war, and although he never became a party 
activist, he recalled that it is at this time that he began to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the 
socialist opposition in the writings of Marx (1982: 28).  
In 1918, in the face of the murders of the socialist Karl Liebknecht and Rosa 
Luxemburg, he withdraws from the SDP, showing his disgust towards such actions – a 
reaction similar to the one which prompts Blas Zambrano’s withdrawal from the socialist 
party (see Marcuse, 2005: 71; see also 4.2.1). It is then when Marcuse starts to study Marx, 
although retaining his political independence (see McCarthy, 1991: 86). Aranguren’s 
interest in Marxism, however, develops considerably later. As a result of his conservative 
background, the demonization of Marxism, and the restrictive intellectual climate instigated 
by Franco’s regime, Aranguren does not substantially engage with Marxism until the late 
1960s. Indeed, his first publication on the subject is El marxismo como moral (1968). 
Although arguably late, he enters into a dialogue with Marxism which is crucial for 
                                                                                                                                       
lieutenant, is based on the fact that his status as a university graduate would have required participating 
more aggressively in the war effort. As he puts it, “esta situación militar [la de conductor] me daba la 
seguridad que en otro puesto, y menos en el de alférez, no habría podido tener, de no participar en la 
matanza general, de no haber dado muerte a ningún compatriota mío” (1994, 6: 187).  
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understanding his socio-economic positions and his later engagement with neo-Marxism, as 
we shall see below. 
The experience of war also has a transforming effect on Aranguren, although initially 
not of a political nature. In 1938, Aranguren marries María del Pilar in San Sebastián, 
where both families, his and hers, are residing during the conflict. From this date, and until 
1941, Aranguren leads a life of reclusion and study which shapes his intellectual 
personality. Although the war ends in 1939, the post-war climate, along with his own self-
reflective tendencies, contributes to a phase of social isolation but of intellectual fruition.  
After the war, in 1919, Marcuse studies Germanistik at the Humboldt University in 
Berlin. During this period, when he considers himself an existentialist, he becomes friends 
with some then promising young intellectuals, such as Walter Benjamin and Georg 
Lukàcs. He transfers to Freiburg, where he studies Philosophy and Political Economy. As in 
the case of Aranguren, Marcuse only becomes interested in philosophy after having already 
spent some time at University studying other subjects, thus providing the basis for the 
supradisciplinary perspective that is so fundamental to Critical Theorists and which also 
forms part of Aranguren’s approach. Marcuse obtains his PhD in 1922 and returns to Berlin 
at the end of this year. In 1924, he marries a former Mathematics student, Sophie. The next 
important influence on his life would be the publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(1927), as a result of which he returns to Freiburg in 1928 to study philosophy with 
Heidegger himself (1928-1932) (see Marcuse, 1991: 29; see also Kellner, 2001b: 2-3).  
In 1933, in Frankfurt, he joins the Institut für Sozialforschung, but in 1934, Hitler 
becomes both chancellor and president of Germany and declares the Nazi Party the only 
legal political party. In the face of these events, Marcuse feels forced to flee from Nazism. 
He and his family emigrate first to Zurich, then to Geneva, finally arriving in New York in 
1934, where he settles and adopts American nationality. The encounter of the members of 
the Institut with National Socialism, however, marks the route of their research which 
largely focuses on cultural production (see Graham, 1995: 3). A similar interest is 
awakened in Aranguren, who, like other members of the opposition intellectuals, become 
highly critical towards any form of cultural manipulation (see Graham, 1995: 3).  
Marcuse is initially interested in the integration of Marxism and existentialism, so as 
to revise the position of Marxism towards the problem of the individual from an 
existentialist perspective. Communication with Heidegger, however, breaks down as a 
result of the latter’s tolerance of – if not outright support for – Nazism and Marcuse 
distances himself from existentialism (see Wolin, 1991: 20). In fact, in 1947, Marcuse sends 
Heidegger a letter by which he hopes to extract from him a public apology or explanation 
regarding his relationship with the Nazi regime and ideology (see Marcuse, 1991: 28-29). In 
this letter, Marcuse explains how Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man cannot 
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be separated, for this would contradict Heidegger’s own philosophy (see Marcuse, 1991: 
29; see also Wolin, 1991: 20). No such public statement is ever issued by Heidegger. With 
this gesture, not only does the lack of correspondence between Heidegger’s thought and 
praxis become visible, but the relevance that such correspondence has for Marcuse is 
underscored (see Aranguren, 1991: 7-8). Varcárcel bears testimony to the value that 
Aranguren also awards to such correspondence and his critique of the distance which exists 
between Heidegger’s life and thought. She recalls that as a result of her teasing Aranguren 
in relation to Heidegger’s thought, he answers: “todo eso es la teoría, pero lo importante es 
la vida” (Varcárcel, 1997: 45). 
As a result, Marcuse’s relationship with Heidegger is broken off, which results in a 
change of direction for Marcuse. Consequently, Aranguren considers that Marcuse only 
truly forms part of the Institut once he distances himself from Heidegger (see 1994, 4: 542-
43). The Institut’s work continues in the United States, although not without financial 
difficulties (see Wiggershaus, 1994: 261-65). As Katz explains, “the small salaries of 
Marcuse and Neumann could only be maintained in 1941-42 by virtue of an outside grant 
from the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars” (1982: 106). At the 
same time, the allocation of such funds confers upon the Institut a certain privileged 
situation in relation to other refugee scholars of the same period (see Katz, 1982: 106). 
Aranguren explains how the Institut functions in New York and Los Angeles, maintaining a 
critical distance from American culture thanks to its economic independence (1994, 4: 542). 
Aranguren, thus, concludes that they owe the United States the great reputation and 
recognition the School acquires (1994, 4: 542). As Kellner explains, one of the key features 
that distinguishes CT from other social theories is “their exile in the United States and 
ability to experience both the rise of fascism and the transition to a new stage of capitalism 
in the United States at first hand” (1989: 76-77; see also 82). This contrast, comparable to 
the one experienced by Aranguren between the different economic and political 
circumstances of Spain and the United States as we shall see below, plays a decisive role in 
his thought. They maintain their identity, instead of being absorbed by the new culture in 
which they are embedded. More importantly, they become keen observers and critics of 
both socio-economic and political systems, as we shall see below.  
According to Aranguren’s own recollection, it is a consequence of his experience of 
the Civil War that his personal attitude and his view of politics change considerably (see 
1994, 6: 184). Thus, a clear evolution in Aranguren’s position on politics can be observed. 
The nature of his interests clearly widens; whereas he is initially interested in religion, 
apparently not concerning himself with politics, his critical attitude eventually makes him 
consider politics to be at the very core of his interests.  
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In Memorias y esperanzas españolas (1969b), Aranguren recalls that “la primera 
autoliberación que hube de llevar a cabo lo fue del medio familiar y colegial, de la 
educación conformista y conservadora, estrecha de miras, de todo o casi todo lo que me 
había rodeado” (1994, 6: 183). This, he continues, takes place before going into secondary 
school under the guidance of his first maestro, Don Luis, whom he considers a 
nonconformist (see 1994, 6: 183). At this stage, he still describes himself as apolitical, 
mainly due to his own conformist nature and as a result of the profound respect he feels for 
his father. As a result of the impact that the Spanish Civil War has on Aranguren, and 
despite feeling very close to his father, he decides to allow himself to go beyond imitation 
or repetition of learnt behaviour. Aranguren describes this change in attitude as a segundo 
alumbramiento or rebirth, which results in a commitment to being himself, to independence 
(1994, 6: 184). As a result of these experiences and decisions, he turns to religion and his 
awareness of his political responsibilities begins to awaken.  
Politics, however, constitutes a path that he will not pursue for two decades. In 
Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952) he says: 
me ocupé de religión, no porque no se permitía hablar con la más mínima libertad de política, sino 
porque, al revés, la política nunca me ha importado, de verdad, sino desde el punto de vista ético, y 
que los temas últimamente capitales para mí son los sociales y morales, los culturales en general, los 
religiosos en particular, y muy poco los estrictamente –estrechamente− políticos. A cada uno lo suyo, 
y lo mío, ciertamente, felizmente también, no es la política (1994, 1: 213; see also 1994, 6: 108; 
Gracia, 1996: 24). 
This initial position, however, is in clear contrast with his views as published in Ética y 
política (1963): 
el hombre es constitutivamente político y lo único que consigue con la abstención es continuar 
siéndolo, sólo que deficientemente. En realidad el hombre apolítico, a su pesar, opera políticamente: 
bien “dejando hacer”, bien desde fuera, en un grupo de presión, sin asumir responsabilidad política 
(Aranguren, 1994, 3: 72).  
He continues to make his point by emphasizing that “lo político, como lo moral, 
constituyen una estructura, que es previa a que el hombre, cada hombre, se decida a 
comportarse moral o políticamente” (1994, 3: 124). Upon this realization, politics 
necessarily become a continuous focus in his subsequent work. In fact, he considers the 
separation between the private and political spheres as unsustainable (see 1994, 3: 67). 
Depoliticization, rather than the refusal to immerse oneself in politics, is viewed as 
conformist acceptance of the established regime (1994, 5: 113). Thus, Aranguren criticizes 
political apathy because it undermines the very dynamics of democracy: participation and a 
certain political tension (1994, 3: 122). That is why politics occupy centre stage in 
Aranguren’s work, as we shall see in the course of this chapter. 
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Aranguren himself is aware of this progression in the focus of his work; that is why 
he retrospectively explains this apparent shift in Memorias y esperanzas españolas (1969b). 
There, in reference to the 1940s, he says that  
en el contexto de la época, la presión de una censura agobiante, hacía imposible asumir una ‘política’ 
también en sentido amplio, pues nunca he tenido, ni tengo, vocación político-profesional, ni tampoco 
mucha fe en la militancia –más o menos clandestina– en los partidos de la oposición, y mi crítica del 
sistema es intelectual, moral y sociológica (1994, 6: 197).  
Although it is true that, partly due to a lack of personal inclination and partly due to 
the pressures of the regime, Aranguren does not actively engage in politics during his early 
career, moved by his understanding of the close relationship that exists between religion, 
morality, ethics, and politics – this relationship will be developed in 3.2.1.1 –, which are all 
linked by a common motivation for justice, Aranguren says:  
La verdad es que yo... no he hecho sino ocuparme de política, aun cuando, por supuesto, sin entrar en 
su “juego”, porque no me va ese juego de la competición para ganar la apuesta que en él se disputa, el 
poder. Yo creo que los intelectuales tenemos poco que hacer en tal contienda (1979c: n.p.; see also 
Camps, 1997: 189). 
In any case, it is from the publication of Ética y política (1963) onwards that he 
demonstrates an awareness of the impossibility of effectively extracting oneself from 
politics and, as a result, he engages henceforth with politics from an intellectual platform, 
for he never becomes involved with party politics. He stresses this distinction in Memorias 
y esperanzas españolas (1969b):  
[me interesa mucho la política] como engagement de convivencia, fundado en una moral social, 
ninguna otra cosa de tejas abajo me importa más que la política […]. Y no me interesa nada la 
política como afán de participación en el apartado de poder a través de sus dispositivos. Dispositivos 
que, sin embargo, me entretiene analizar, como viejos, toscos artefactos totalmente inadecuados a 
nuestro tiempo… y que, extrañamente, siguen funcionando aunque, a mi juicio, no para bien” (1994, 
6: 229).  
This is, in fact, an understanding of politics shared also by Aguirre and Zambrano, who – 
consistently with their style – do not explicitly formulate it as Aranguren does. In La 
democracia establecida (1979b), Aranguren succinctly summarizes his position: “creo en el 
compromiso político total y eso, y no otra cosa, es lo que entiendo por democracia como 
moral, democracia como modo de ser” (1994, 5: 530; see also Camps, 1997: 183-85). 
 
3.1.1.4.3 Marcuse’s and Aranguren’s career and thought 
In spite of all efforts to the contrary, in December 1942, the financial difficulties and the 
general climate, due to the United States entering the Second World War, lead to the 
suspension of the Institut’s activities. At this point, Marcuse leaves Santa Monica, 
California, where he had been residing for a short while to move to Washington and join the 
Bureau of Intelligence in order to apply his particular regional knowledge, linguistic 
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competence, and other valuable skills to the analysis of intelligence data. Although in 1948 
he is made Chief of the Central European Branch, he becomes intellectually and politically 
isolated. Due to his wife’s poor health, however, he remains in the job until her death in 
1951.  
In 1945, and coinciding with the end of the Second World War, Aranguren comes out 
of his isolation and starts attending tertulias, thus coming into contact with various 
promising and prominent intellectuals. As indicated above, between the years 1945 and 
1955, Aranguren’s efforts are directed mainly towards Catholicism (see Blázquez, 1994a, 1: 
12; see Pastor García, 2000: 678). In fact, Aranguren’s work is marked by his writings on 
religion, which constitutes one of the threads running through all his work, providing it with 
a certain cohesion. In 1951, Aranguren obtains his doctoral degree and, in 1956, he 
becomes professor of Ética y Sociología at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. The 
regime’s search for legitimation leads to the appointment as lecturers and the – possibly 
premature – pre-eminence of some very young intellectuals, such as Pedro Laín Entralgo, 
Antonio Tovar, and Aranguren himself, in the hope that, coming from a conservative 
background and having studied in post-war Francoist Spain, they would contribute to such a 
legitimation (Gracia, 1996: 19)63. This conservative background, as well as the pressures of 
the regime, can be observed in Aranguren’s earlier work, which − despite the evolution of 
his thought − has often led to him being considered a conservative thinker (Jordan, 2002: 
118). The most representative book of this period is, thus, Catolicismo, día tras día, which, 
although published in 1955, gathers a number of articles written between 1949 and 1953. 
His tone, however, progressively becomes more inquisitorial, critical, and, even, polemic 
(see Gracia, 1996: 14). The publication of Ética (1958), introduces the second stage in 
Aranguren’s work; it signals “la primera aportación de peso a la filosofía moral, no 
subordinada a la preceptiva católica” (Gracia, 1996: 24). His attitude regarding the 
relationship between religion and ethics is to a large extent Unamunian, for as Bonete 
explains, “la religión no es la base de toda moral, sino al revés, la moral […] (el hacer el 
bien y el proceso de llegar a ser bueno) es la base de la religión” (2003: 390). Good, not 
happiness, forms the basis for Aranguren’s moral philosophy and, although religion is not at 
its foundation, it is still an integral component. In La ética de Ortega (1958), his focus 
widens to include three very closely interrelated fields of study: ethics, politics, and 
morality. 
During the 1960s, universities experience a period of unrest with an increasing 
number of student protests (see Jordan, 2002: 243; see also Gracia, 2004: 276-79, 330; 
Balfour, 2000: 285). Aranguren expresses the need to open up the intellectual sphere of the 
                                                
63 Although Aranguren graduates from law and philosophy before the Civil War breaks out, he does not 
obtain his doctoral degree until 1951 (see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 17). 
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university system in El futuro de la Universidad (1963). During this time, his classes and 
persona become quite popular amongst students due to the climate of intellectual freedom 
he maintains, in spite of the control, restrictions, and, indeed, censorship imposed by the 
regime64. This popularity is one of the characteristics shared with Marcuse for largely the 
same reasons, the praxis of intellectual freedom. Students are interested in Aranguren’s 
“intento de comprensión del marxismo, su búsqueda de una alianza implícita entre las 
formas más progresistas del catolicismo hispano […] y hasta la seducción física 
experimentada ante los sucesivos movimientos alternativos de nuestros días (feminismo, 
contracultura, objeción de conciencia, insumisión, ecologismo)” (Gracia, 1996: 25). This 
stage culminates with Ética y política (1963), which marks a stronger preoccupation with 
political and social issues and establishes Marxism as his main interlocutor (see Díaz, 1983: 
100; see also 1983: 51, 62-63, 65 where the political aspect of his work is emphasized). In 
fact, in the period from 1963 to 1965, Aranguren already engages with several typically 
neo-Marxist topics, such as consumerism and manipulation (see 1994, 2: 559; see also 
1994, 3: 107, 109, 158-59, 165; 1994, 5: 69, 90-91, 167-68). Hence, his distance from the 
regime grows as he becomes more critical of it and more interested in socio-political issues. 
This becomes visible in his participation in the peaceful demonstration of 1965, alongside 
other professors and over 15,000 students (see Pastor García, 2000: 672). As a result of this 
participation, Aranguren is formally sanctioned and, six months later, deprived of his chair, 
as is also the case with Agustín García Calvo and Enrique Tierno Galván. At this point, 
Aranguren, like Marcuse, chooses exile65. He leaves Spain and becomes a visiting professor 
in different countries: Scandinavia, France, Italy, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and, finally, the 
United States, where he is eventually given a tenured position at the University of 
California, until he retires as emeritus professor in 1977 (see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 19; see 
also Pastor García, 2000: 673-74).  
As regards Marcuse, he leaves the Bureau of Intelligence and returns to academic 
life, lecturing at Columbia (1952-1953) and Harvard (1954-1955), having received a 
Rockefeller Foundation grant to study Soviet Marxism, although during this period he also 
focuses his interests and work on Freud. In 1958, Marcuse receives a tenured position at 
Brandeis University where he stays until 1965, when his contract is allowed to lapse due to 
                                                
64 De Miguel explains, in relation to Aranguren’s abilities as a lecturer throughout his career, that “era 
un mago de la mayéutica. Llevaba el auditorio donde él quería” (1997: 26). 
65 Although, strictly speaking, it may seem more appropriate to use the word “emigration” in order to 
refer to Aranguren’s choice, because he still visits Spain with certain frequency. The word “exile” has 
been used to emphasize that, although it may be argued that Aranguren’s decision to leave Spain is 
motivated by his professional situation, it is also politically motivated; not only is he deprived of his 
chair, but, more crucially, he is no longer prepared to work under the regime or its constrains. 
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political considerations (see Katz, 1982: 169). Thus, not only is Marcuse initially threatened 
by the persecution of the Nazi regime which made exile vital, but he also suffers the 
consequences of his overt political and philosophical positions in a country which boasts a 
climate of political and intellectual openness and freedom, the country which is offering 
him asylum. In 1965, Marcuse accepts a position at the University of California at San 
Diego. It is during the 1960s when Marcuse becomes, if not the leader, the inspiration of the 
New Left, travelling extensively and giving lectures and advice to activist students (see 
Marcuse, 2005). As Kellner explains in Illuminations: “Marcuse achieved world renown as 
‘the guru of the New Left’” (2001a: 45). Incidentally, in May 1968, Marcuse is invited to 
Paris to take part in a symposium on Marx and is consequently present during the May 
events, participating in numerous debates and lectures. As result of his radical stand and 
political involvement, he is charged with accusations, such as politicizing university 
students and corrupting the minds of the young (see Katz, 1982: 171, 174). It is at 
California University where Marcuse and Aranguren meet for the first time and 
sporadically thereafter, professing a mutual admiration for each other (see Felipe y Eduardo 
López-Aranguren, 1997: 49; see also Rodríguez Ibañez, 1997: 15; Pastor García, 2000: 
673). Both Marcuse and Aranguren prove to be independent-minded and highly critical; as 
a result they enjoy great popularity with the students, but pay dearly personally and 
professionally. Nonetheless, Marcuse maintains his revolutionary attitude until his death in 
July 1979, as does Aranguren.  
During this time, California is at the heart of counter-culture, whose most visible 
expressions are the protests against the Vietnam War, the hippie movement, and the New 
Left. These trends and events have a decisive impact on Aranguren, who reflects on these 
events and becomes a fierce critic of American society, as can be observed in the following 
quotation: 
Y por si todo esto [los problemas que conlleva la sociedad de consumo] no fuera bastante para dar 
pábulo a la crítica radical, [también están] el escándalo moral de la injusta y atroz guerra del 
Vietnam, el de la violencia establecida y ejercitada cotidianamente desde el poder, el del 
mantenimiento por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de toda clase de dictaduras y oligarquías, el del 
despilfarro para la destrucción, el del creciente militarismo e imperialismo (1994, 5: 168; see also 
Camps, 1997: 188). 
As a result of this impact, Aranguren focuses his attention on sociological issues, such as 
communication and political behaviour (see Pastor García, 2000: 674). In the United States, 
Aranguren has a first-hand experience of “la revuelta, o revolución según algunos, de la 
juventud universitaria norteamericana, que se había originado precisamente en California 
para extenderse luego por el resto de la nación e irradiar desde allí a Europa, es decir, 
Alemania, Italia y Francia […]” (1994, 1: 85). It is from this Californian experience 
onwards that Aranguren keeps Spanish readers up to date on the FS, the New Left, and 
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Marcuse’s moves in the series of articles for La Vanguardia (spring 1970 to January 1973), 
which, in 1974, are collected and published in a book entitled Entre España y América 
(1994, 3: 649-710; see also 1994, 3: 185, 203, 213; 1994, 5: 155, 186, 221; 1994, 5: 332, 
360)66.  
Marcuse and Aranguren support mobilisations and resistance as means of pressure on 
the government of those who choose to step away from the silent majority (see Marcuse, 
1969b: 81, 109; Aranguren, 1994, 2: 667-68). They both agree on the need for popular 
participation and involvement in politics. Thus, they defend the need for an essentially 
different kind of education, one that allows the individual to achieve more satisfactory 
levels of communication and political engagement. One of the goals of this wider form of 
education is to encourage a critical attitude and independent thinking in all individuals, in 
such a way that, free from manipulation and false needs, and realizing the close relationship 
between personal and social ethics, the individual’s best interest will coincide with 
society’s. As Aranguren explains in El buen talante, if we were more rationally selfish, we 
would all strive for the maximum good for everyone, that is, peace (1994, 2: 669). This is 
very closely linked to the notion of false consciousness discussed later on in this chapter. 
The FS, Marcuse in particular, is often criticized for attacking numerous aspects of 
society while being rather vague about how society should be organized or liberated, as 
discussed in the first chapter (see García de la Serrana, 2004: 205; see also Chambers, 2004: 
219, 224). Aranguren is equally vague at times regarding who the agents of social change 
should be; he concludes that the key elements of that change should be a social morality, 
social action, and the recuperation of the value of resistance (Aranguren 1994, 2: 598, 667; 
1994, 5: 226-27). It is the emphasis placed on the elements mentioned above that suggests 
that, for Aranguren, it is ultimately the individual who is responsible for striving for this 
qualitative change. The vagueness of both Marcuse and Aranguren lies in that no specific 
group is appointed as the agent of change, because this agent is society itself; the power of 
liberation is within each individual member of society (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 459; see 
also Marcuse, 2005: 78; Marcuse, 1970b: 69, 71; García de la Serrana, 2004: 196-199, 205-
206, 209; 1.2.3). 
Aranguren describes Marcuse as an example of an intellectual leader, as an example 
of a young spirit in an old body (1994, 3: 697; 1994, 5: 566). He sees Marcuse’s position as 
half way between political and cultural radicalism, but, above all, as essentially utopian 
(1994, 5: 199). Aranguren himself is also interested in the possibilities of utopian thought 
                                                
66 It is important to highlight that, as de Miguel puts it, “sospecho que nunca llegó a asimilar el modo 
de vida californiano” (1997: 28). The relevance of this lies in that, precisely because of not having 
adapted completely to the Californian way of life, because of not having been assimilated by North 
American Culture, Aranguren can observe this culture from the outside and adopt a more critical 
stance, as discussed in chapter six (see 6.1.3). 
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and consequently dedicates a total of four articles to this topic; “Política y utopía” (1994, 5: 
399-401), “Comentarios a un libro utópico” (1994, 5: 435-37), “Los reversos y la calderilla 
de la utopía” (1994, 5: 438-40), and “La función de un utópico Ministerio de la Cultura” 
(1994, 5: 478-80). In fact, Aranguren considers it essential for the intellectual to have a 
critical and a utopian attitude, which should go hand in hand (1994, 5: 399-400, 454; see 
also 1994, 4: 381; Camps, 1997: 185). He summarizes his views on this matter by saying 
that “La utopía es el ‘espíritu’ de toda política que no se conforma con ser mera política. La 
utopía española de 1976 es la democracia [...]” (1994, 5: 401; see also 1994, 2: 714-15). 
This critical and utopian attitude constitutes a combination of qualities which is described 
by Aranguren as vital for the moral thinker and the politician. Aranguren understands this 
combination in Marxist terms: 
y aunar estas dos características, tan aparentemente inconciliables, es sumamente difícil. Yo sólo sé 
de uno que, sin renunciar a la utopía, supo ejercer la crítica sobre ella −la crítica del ‘socialismo 
utópico’, poner la utopía en su sitio (¿u-tópico, por desgracia?) y, al dotar de conciencia de su 
explotación al proletariado y movilizarlo para la acción, desencadenando y encauzando así potentes 
fuerzas político-sociales, aunar la teoría y la praxis, ser político a más de intelectual. Fue, ya se sabe, 
Karl Marx (1994, 5: 401).  
Hence, Aranguren underscores the link that classical Marxism establishes between politics 
and utopia – later reinforced by Marcuse. Moreover, by bringing up Spain’s journey into 
democracy, Aranguren highlights that some formerly utopian possibilities, such as a 
democratic Spain, are no longer so (Aranguren, 1994, 3: 429; on the feasibility of formerly 
utopian ideas see also Marcuse, 1955: 157; 1970a: 139). What is more, Aranguren values 
the possibilities of utopia not only at a political level, but also at an individual one insofar 
as utopian vision is the first element that allows the individual to become a better version of 
himself (1984: 35). Projection, imagination, and utopia are all at the root of any process of 
evolution. What Aranguren does, in line with CT, is to empower the agent by linking his 
individual processes to those of the collective suggesting the relevance of his input. 
Aranguren never loses contact with Spain during his stay in California. Not only is he 
an integral part of the Spanish residents there, but he also makes frequent trips to Spain (see 
Rodríguez Ibáñez, 1997: 14). Entre España y América (1974) signals another stage in 
Aranguren’s career, one that is marked by carrying out what he has always defended to be 
the role of the intellectual, that is, being a critic (see Díaz, 1983: 122, 160, 196; see also 
Pastor García, 2000: 679). Abellán, who also emphasizes the need to recover the role of the 
intellectual as the critic of society, praises Aranguren’s work in this area, describing him as 
“el crítico por excelencia de la etapa de transición” (1979a: 93-94; see also Castellet, 1976: 
15; see also Camps, 1997: 185-87). At the same time, Aranguren highlights the influence 
that the work of the FS has had on him and other thinkers in establishing the importance of 
the role of critique (1994, 4: 544).  
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Aranguren, unlike Marcuse who chooses to remain in the United States and visits 
Germany only occasionally, settles back in Spain after Franco’s death. In 1976, his chair at 
the Universidad Complutense is reinstated by the Suárez government as a result of the 
decree of general amnesty67. There, he teaches during the following three years until his 
retirement in 1979. After this point, he still publishes and often participates in conferences, 
interviews, debates, and makes television appearances always defending the virtues of 
democracy and becoming a public figure in the process (see Camps, 1997: 183). It is 
significant that Aranguren’s very last lecture at the Universidad Complutense in 1980 is on 
Marcuse, serving as a testimony to the relevance he awards to his thought (Blázquez, 
1994b, 1: 19).  
In conclusion, it can be said that the element which provides cohesion to Aranguren’s 
work is religion. As Aranguren explains, religion should be a major concern for anyone 
wanting to understand any given social structure because religion conditions our way of 
thinking (1994, 1: 242). Marcuse, on the other hand, has consistently and insistently 
focused on socio-political issues, and, unlike Aranguren, Marcuse does not discuss religion 
at any length; indeed, religion does not form part of the core of his main thesis. Despite this 
disparity, they share the same motivation: social justice. They seek a socio-political 
organization which, as Marcuse puts it, “would open the possibility of an essentially new 
human reality – namely, existence in free time on the basis of fulfilled vital needs” (1979: 
227). 
Marcuse firmly believes that we now possess the material bases, that is, the 
technological advances, to implement a socio-economic structure which may bring quality 
of life for everyone (see 1955: 157; see also 1970a: 139; 1979: 40). He describes a society 
of free men and women who live in peace – although not necessarily without conflict. The 
relationship between work and leisure would be inverted: the majority of the work would be 
carried out by machines, so that most of people’s time can be dedicated to their self-
development and only a small fraction to work (Marcuse, 1970a: 129; 1958: 84; 1969a: 91). 
Marcuse, however, realizes that technological progress is not enough to bring about this 
qualitative change (1955: 50); people need to be freed, liberated. This liberation comes with 
negation, with a break with the existing structure, rather than with modifications which may 
result in its continuity (1970b: 65). From his point of view, individuals tend to reproduce 
the existing repressive structure, although human needs are historically determined and, 
thus, changeable (1970b: 65). He advocates a leap which can only be possible from a 
                                                
67 Despite this amnesty, repression and violence do not stop during the Transition. As Falcón argues, 
the actions of terrorist groups as well as the violence of the State against marginalized groups of society 
– left-wing leaders, and, at a later point, alleged members of ETA – intensifies (2002: 16-18).  
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“fundamentally different experience of being” (1955: 24). According to Marcuse, 
awareness of our current situation as manipulated agents is the first step towards this idyllic 
society where there would be a qualitative difference in the social conditions, giving each 
one of us has the real opportunity to fulfil our potential (1969a: 33, 37; 1972: 83-86).  
Aranguren, on the other hand, seems to be less vague and utopian by placing his 
hopes on democracy. A closer look at Aranguren’s views of genuine democracy, however, 
brings him much closer to Marcuse. Aranguren proves to be very critical towards the 
existing democratic models, which he considers merely formal (see 3.2.2.4); he strives for a 
fairer socio-economic structure which is essentially very similar to that propounded by 
Marcuse. Aranguren’s link to Marcuse, however, is stronger than the mere coincidence on 
abstract goals. As a result of their motivation, they share the same preoccupation about the 
new challenges brought about by neo-capitalism, such as the new forms of alienation, 
manipulation, consumerism, mass society, and its totalitarian manifestations, as we shall see 
at the end of this chapter. Thus, they both coincide on the inadequacy of the capitalist 
system as well as on the need for a revision of Marxism, as we shall see below. Hence, we 
shall first explore Aranguren’s views on religion, so that we can later see how they inform 
his thought on democracy, and, consequently, on politics. 
  
3.2 Aranguren’s evolution  
The second part of this chapter will discuss the structure and evolution of Aranguren’s 
thought, thus providing the basis from which to understand Aranguren’s approach to CT, 
which will be the focus of the third and final part of this chapter.  
As indicated above, the following stages can be perceived in Aranguren’s work: the 
religious, ethical, socio-political stages, plus the performance of el oficio de intelectual, the 
role of the intellectual, which find a correspondence with Aranguren’s biographical 
evolution (see Pastor García, 2000: 678)68. This division, however, is only approximate and 
flexible due to Aranguren’s transgressive style. Incidentally, as discussed in Chapter One 
transgressive is how Aranguren describes Zambrano’s writing (1983: 114-15). This is, 
however, an adjective which also applies to him for largely the same reasons. It is 
transgressive because it emphasizes the continuous element of crossing or blurring standard 
separations, divisions, or borders of temporal and intellectual nature, hence his 
                                                
68 It must be noted that, as pointed out in chapter one, the evolution of Aranguren’s thought follows a 
spiral trajectory, which is why the chronological order in which he develops his ideas in not lineal. In 
the light of this, a direct reference to the work and year when he first presented an idea or concept is 
only provided when is considered relevant to the argument. Otherwise, a reference to his Complete 
Works is provided. In the interest of clarity, an appendix with the contents of each of the volumes and 
the corresponding original dates of publication for each of the books which they include has been 
compiled with the information provided by Blázquez (see appendix two). 
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supradisciplinarity69. This is perceived as necessary, given that the issues he deals with are, 
in many ways, closely intertwined. This transgression also alludes to the provocative nature 
of Aranguren’s work. His provocation lies in crossing such boundaries, in voicing what 
others dare not think, and, above all, in his thought-provoking, tireless defence of the 
function of the intellectual, which he so keenly performs. The intellectual should, according 
to Aranguren, “criticar el sistema y luchar contra él desde relativamente dentro de él, con un 
pie dentro y otro fuera de él, desde la base, apoyándose sobre ella” (1994, 5: 419; see also 
454). Aranguren adopts this role, thus emphasizing the correspondence between his 
theoretical and biographical stands. The overall result of this transgressive style is the 
supradisciplinarity of his work in the Frankfurtian sense, based on similar motivations to 
those of the Institut. This also means that the time-span and the main subject of discussion 
of each phase, as suggested above, are not rigorously clear-cut. As a whole, Aranguren 
valued the teachings of the past, and integrated them into a critical view of the present, 
developing an intellectual path that could be described as spiral thought, which, although it 
always advances, often gives the impression of going back to a former phase70; it always 
does so at a higher level, building on the distance already covered to make continuous and 
solid progress as we shall now see. 
 
3.2.1 Aranguren’s ethos  
3.2.1.1 Religion 
The ever-recurring theme and connection in Aranguren’s works is undoubtedly religion, 
more precisely, his talante religioso (see Pastor García, 2000: 680); but what exactly does 
he mean by that? What are the motives and intellectual consequences of his focus on 
religion?  
Despite the permanent, even guiding presence of a religious element, an evolution of 
his thought and faith can be observed (Pastor García, 2000: 680-89). Rather than directly 
answering the question of what religion is, Aranguren prefers to emphasize what religion is 
not. In an allusion to Marx, Aranguren states that religion is not a phenomenon that derives 
from “una superestructura de alienación, sino la muestra más alta de esa intencionalidad 
ante-predicativa” (1994, 5: 54). That is to say that in Aranguren’s view, religion is an 
                                                
69 Although using a very different terminology, in his article “Aranguren no es un avión ni un pájaro”, 
de Miguel also argues that the difficulty in assigning Aranguren’s work to one discipline lies in the 
richness of his thought for it integrates philosophy, theology, morality, literary criticism, and so on, 
without being restricted by any of them (1997: 25-28). 
 
70 This dynamic spiral structure of Aranguren’s thought may be the result of d’Ors influence, who, as 
Bretz explains, “advocates a complex definition of culture that links opposites and evolves dynamically 
towards ever new combinations” (2001: 126-27). 
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inherent pre-ontologic response to a human need. As Aranguren explains in El 
protestantismo y la moral (1954), religion is not the mere search for justice either, but a 
much more complex phenomenon, responding to the most inner needs of humankind (1994, 
2: 45). His main concern is not its truth value, but what religion can do for us. He argues 
that each person has to face the very thorny task of searching for his perfection; the quest 
for virtue, as well as finding purpose or meaning to life, is the reason why one needs 
revelation, religion (see 1994, 2: 295, 326, 392, 586).  
According to Aranguren, “el hombre está inserto en un orden que ni siquiera le es 
dado ver” (1994, 2: 295). By means of this assertion, Aranguren is making an elusive 
reference to the supra-rational or supra-moral elements which he considers to be part of 
human existence, such as destiny and fortune, but also to the very nature of such an 
existence, that is, our own finitude and our necessary moral freedom (see 1994, 2: 294-96). 
All of these circumstances and characteristics define the inherent co-ordinates according to 
which our existence develops. We are not, however, in a position to make sense of these co-
ordinates. This results in an existential disorientation which, according to Aranguren, 
accounts for the need for religion to tell us about virtue and happiness (1994, 2: 295-96). 
Thus, Aranguren does not deal with specific issues regarding religion, dogma, and the 
Church as an Institution; these only become important as far as they fulfil their guiding role 
towards the individual (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 299). Thus, this conception of religion, 
instead of exploring spirituality or seeking a foundation in faith, approaches religion almost 
as a utilitarian commodity which is required to provide a moral code and to satisfy people’s 
existential needs by providing an answer to the unanswerable. Defending religion on the 
grounds of its utility is a deeply problematic approach as we shall see below, but, first, the 
relationship between religion and morality shall be explored.  
Subordinating morality to religion involves several serious difficulties. A religious 
morality is a heteronomous morality; its laws are placed outside the individual, thus, the 
individual is expected to follow a given moral code. This is to be done without questioning 
the suitability of such a code – which is unmodifiable –, thus limiting the individual’s moral 
choice to right or wrong, to go with or against the code. Aware of these shortcomings, as 
Aranguren’s thought develops, so do his views on morality and on ethics (see Cerezo, 
1991b: 80). Thus, in Ética (1958), he opts for an autonomous morality where the individual 
has the freedom and responsibility of critically assessing the situation and making a moral 
choice based on his judgement. Although this may point to a Kantian morality, Aranguren’s 
opposition to individualistic ethical positions, particularly his concept of co-responsibility 
by which we are all co-responsible for each other’s decisions, suggests closer links to 
Heidegger than it does to Kant (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 298; 1994, 5: 394; Bonete, 2003: 
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399-403)71. In fact, a rejection of the strong individualism developed during the 
Enlightenment is visible throughout his ethics, which as Bonete explains, is based on: “la 
abertura del ethos personal al ethos social, [que] supone rechazar la separación drástica 
entre la dimensión personal y social de nuestros actos” (2003: 399-400). That is why 
Aranguren understands existence in terms of co-habitation, suggesting a link to Heidegger’s 
Mitsein, and religion in terms of its social dimension (see 1994, 5: 439; see also Bonete, 
2003: 400). 
Aranguren gradually evolves from a naive form of Catholicism, in which his main 
concerns are religion, the Church, and the Christian world, to the engaged and 
comprehensive view of Christianity already expressed in Catolicismo día tras día (1955) 
(see 1994, 1: 453; see also Díaz, 1983: 65). His naivety consists in the initially moderate 
critical acceptance of the Catholic dogma – including its heteronomous morality – and the 
ways of the Church as observed in Catolicismo y protestantismo (1952) and Protestantismo 
y la moral (1954). However, the involvement of the Catholic Church in politics clearly 
constitutes a disappointment for Aranguren – and for Aguirre, as we shall see in Chapter 
Five – (Aranguren, 1994, 5: 317; 1994, 3: 221). As discussed in Chapter Two, the Catholic 
Church does not sufficiently respond to the challenges posed by a society ruled by a 
totalitarian regime which, seeking empowerment and legitimation, aligns the Church to its 
political programme (see 2.2). Even the reforms undergone as a result of the Vatican 
Council (1962-1965) prove insufficient (see Callahan, 2000: 382); it is not until 1973 that 
the Spanish bishops vote to publish a document entitled “La Iglesia y la comunidad 
política” where they commit themselves to political neutrality (see Lannon, 1995: 279). 
From Aranguren’s perspective, if Catholics truly lived their faith they would then have to 
concern themselves with social justice (1994, 1: 676; 1994, 3: 220). In the face of this 
inconsistency, Aranguren, unwilling to let go of his faith, opts for a politically independent 
and morally autonomous form of faith (1994, 4: 434). His disillusionment has two effects; a 
personal one: he no longer feels part of the Catholic structure, so he prefers to define 
himself as Christian instead (see 1994, 1: 537; see also Pastor García, 2000: 688); and an 
intellectual one: the re-orientation of his thought towards socio-political discussions, so that 
he can contribute towards the creation of an essentially fairer society, which would be more 
in line with his own faith. As he puts it,  
                                                
71 Having said this, Aranguren is a Kantian thinker in a different sense. As Camps explains, “si 
tomamos como punto de referencia la distinción kantiana entre ‘la moral política’ y ‘la política moral’, 
junto a la valoración que Kant hace de ambas posibilidades, no hay duda de que Aranguren opta por la 
propuesta kantiana. Una moral política sería una aberración, mientras una política moral es, 
precisamente, el fin que debemos desear para la política” (1997: 181; this relationship between 
morality and politics will be discussed with greater detail later on in the chapter). Nevetheless, Camps 
also points out that Aranguren does not use the Kantian text, Zum ewigen Frieden, first published in 
1795 (Camps, 1997: 181). 
 109 
Era menester que el cristianismo en cuanto tal, y concretamente el catolicismo, aceptasen el 
engagement mundano, fundado en una teología de las realidades terrenas, como se decía hace unos 
años, para que los cristianos, liberados de subrepticios compromisos, cobrasen conciencia de su 
responsabilidad social (1994, 3: 220). 
Consequently, social justice becomes one of his priorities precisely because of his religious 
commitment; in pursuing the practical implications of his faith, the links to ethics and 
politics are perceived as necessary (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 676; 1994, 2: 157, 295, 299, 
439, 458; 1994, 3: 220-21; 1994, 5: 201).  
Thus, the evolution of Aranguren’s views on religion has an impact on his views on 
morality. He grows out of his scepticism regarding the reliability of autonomous morality, 
not only pointing out its feasibility, but also promoting tolerance and dialogue between 
heteronomous and autonomous forms of morality, such as religious, Marxist, and neo-
Marxist morality (see 1994, 3: 185; see also 1994, 3: 180, 220, 606; 1994, 3: 56-57 
respectively). He is able to do so because he understands “moral como autonarración e 
interpretación del ‘texto vivo’ en que consistimos” (1994, 2: 165). As Aranguren sees it – 
echoing Ortega’s ratiovitalism, a vitalist rationality which retains the role of reason, and 
Zubiri’s perspective on freedom and morality – each person is put in the situation of 
deciding what “his” good is, of realizing it in the world, and personally making it his own, 
apropiándoselo:  
mi realidad natural es mi propia realidad, en tanto que recibida; mi realidad moral es mi propia 
realidad, en tanto que apropiada. Porque al realizar cada uno de mis actos voy realizando en mí 
mismo mi ethos, carácter o personalidad moral” (1994, 2: 217; see also Ortega, 1946, 3: 177-178; 
Zubiri, 1986).  
Thus, in realizing one act or another, the individual is appropriating one possibility of 
being. It is by means of these acts, by appropriation, that his deep moral reality is created. 
Aranguren’s attempt to confer meaning to our individual existence with the appropriation of 
each ethical act reveals the influence of Ortega – who views the human being as a project – 
and particularly Zubiri, from whom Aranguren borrows the concept of appropriation (see 
Aranguren, 1994, 2: 299, 307; see also Bonete, 2003: 392, 420; Soldevilla, 2004: 136-37).  
In spite of Aranguren’s recognition and acceptance of heteronymous morality, there 
is unwillingness to relinquish the central role of religion. Even at a late point in his career, 
there is evidence of a certain resistance – in the psychoanalytic sense of the word – to 
accepting his growing non-religious outlook on life. This can be observed in Bajo el signo 
de la juventud (1982), where he describes superstition, esoterism, and rituals as 
manifestations of the religious experiences of young people, thus uncovering their talante 
religioso in some expressions of their otherwise secular life. This is how he puts it: 
superstición, esoterismo, movimientos fundamentalistas y carismáticos, sectas, heterodoxias, 
recuperaciones rituales, entrega a lo ‘sagrado-salvaje’ y reencantamientos de la naturaleza, a los que 
 110 
acabamos de hacer referencia, son muestras muy varias a través de las cuales se manifiesta, de forma 
innegable, la vivencia religiosa de la juventud de los años ochenta recién estrenados (1994, 5: 610).  
Although Aranguren does not explicitly deny the possibility of non-religious individuals, in 
fact, he acknowledges them in the Christian-Marxist dialogue, there is a not so much 
intellectual as personal reticence to fully accepting this fact, since, in Aranguren’s view, 
faith is, above all, the answer to the intrinsic uncertainties of human nature (see 1994, 2: 
45). Thus, unable to accept the possibility of genuine atheism, Aranguren – like Zambrano 
and Aguirre – seeks symptoms of unconfessed spiritual yearning in people’s attitudes and 
behaviour. In addition to the forms of spirituality mentioned above, in La crisis del 
catolicismo (1969a), Aranguren offers quite a different example of secular spirituality. He 
argues that the use of certain drugs lead to an altered state of consciousness which can be 
equated to or, at least, compared to a mystical experience: “mediante la provocación, a 
través del LSD, de la marihuana, del Love-in, de un estado de alma absolutamente 
inhabitual, extático, se lograría una experiencia religioso-mística de unión con lo que en el 
lenguaje tradicional se denominaba ‘Dios’” (1994, 1: 740). A ubiquitous sense of 
spirituality and religion prevails in his thought. 
This widespread spirituality is defended in two ways. First, there is the assumption 
that religion, rather than a creed is an inherent feeling or need, present in everyone –
although with different intensity. As with the contents of the subconscious in 
psychoanalysis, these can be traced through several manifestations as seen above. The 
existence of a religious attitude and its expressions may be denied by the individual. Hence, 
the interpretation of this phenomenon will be independent of the will or intentionality of the 
individual or group analysed, as is the case, once again, in the practice of psychoanalysis 
(see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 527; see also 1994, 5: 199-200, 610). What this effectively means 
is that Aranguren and those with such spiritual convictions – including Zambrano and 
Aguirre – put themselves in the privileged position of unveiling information about the 
subject which is not even accessible to the subject himself. Nevertheless, there are many 
who claim to have no religious or spiritual convictions and no need or longing for them72. 
This is why the legitimacy of insisting on the unawareness of their spiritual yearning or on 
interpreting secular acts as expressions or symptoms of the latter is questionable. On the 
other hand, although this admittedly is a problematic position to adopt, its premises are not 
                                                
72 Phil Zuckerman, after a comprehensive world-wide study on the numbers of atheists published in 
2007, has concluded that “between 500 million and 750 million humans currently do not believe in 
God” (2007: 61). It should be noted that the reason for the large margin of error is because the 
methodological and practical difficulties in obtaining this data has been factored in the result. 
Zuckerman’s argument is that the sheer vastness of these numbers alone is enough to question the 
validity of those arguments which claim the “innateness” of religious belief (2007: 60-61). 
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essentially different from those of psychoanalysis, namely, the existence of a psychological 
reality which is ordinarily inaccessible to the individual73.  
Second, this ubiquitous spirituality is also maintained by assuming that religion is not 
only inherent, but also inescapable (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 610). Religion can be 
considered inescapable in the sense that, although at different levels and in different forms, 
it is ever-present in our personal experience and in society at large. Even more importantly, 
religion is also inescapable from the point of view of rationality because, for Aranguren, it 
can be the best – most fulfilling and least risky – rational choice available. This is to be 
understood in reference to Pascal’s theological wager (see Pascal, 1984: 154-56, 162-63). 
Pascal reasons that there is no rational way to positively find out whether God exists or not. 
Thus, we are left with two options: first, we may choose to believe that God does not exist, 
in which case, if we are right and there is no God, death will effectively be the end of 
everything, or if we are wrong and after having lived a godless life we discover that there is, 
indeed, a God, it will be our loss; second, we may choose to believe there is a God, in 
which case, if in death we are proved wrong, at least we would have enjoyed the comfort of 
faith during life, or, if, on the other hand, we are right, we can only benefit from having 
lived a life guided by this God. Thus, we can only win by wagering on God’s existence, 
because wagering against it does not result in any gain, even if we happen to win our wager. 
Pascal uses the term “wager” in place of “choice”, thus effectively emphasising the 
uncertain nature of such choices. With this reasoning, Pascal avoids supporting his belief in 
God on arbitrary foundations. Instead, faith is the result of a rational choice. There are 
strong resonances of Pascal’s practicality in Aranguren’s faith, and, in fact, numerous 
references to Pascal throughout Aranguren’s work74. The influence of Pascal in Aranguren 
is such that Blázquez says in reference to Aranguren’s prologue to Pascal’s works that 
“[Aranguren,] de manera rigurosa, certera y precisa, se instala en el orbe de la filosofía del 
autor de Pensamientos sobre los problemas últimos” (1994, 6: 12).  
Aranguren himself explains the nature of Pascal’s wager, and wonders whether 
                                                
73 As Frosh explains, psychoanalysis faces a serious critique regarding the dubious empirical 
foundation of its methodology, particularly in relation to the unconscious (1997: 43). The main 
difficulty of psychoanalysis is not so much providing evidence of the existence of the unconscious, as 
the privileged access of psychoanalysis to the unconscious, because “there can be no self – and other – 
knowledge of this kind which is direct and theory independent” (see 1997: 43). In other words, it is the 
reliance on the theoretical premises of psychoanalysis that allows access to its primary object of study. 
Similarly, it is Aranguren’s own conviction of the existence of a universally inherent spirituality that 
accounts for his interpretation of various instances of behaviour as religious manifestations.  
 
74 See Aranguren, 1994, 1: 57, 112, 114, 137, 159, 211-13, 218, 264, 283-84, 305, 337-39, 346, 348, 
350-64, 374-76, 381, 389, 401, 507, 521, 572, 600, 651, 748; 1994, 2: 235, 288, 391, 474, 622, 632, 
690, 703; 1994, 3: 222, 404, 406, 473, 496; 1994, 4: 350, 386, 487, 613. 
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¿hay una falacia en el tránsito del apostar al creer, o se trata más bien de que el interlocutor se da 
cuenta de que esta ‘apuesta’ o compromiso total de la existencia no puede reposar sino sobre una 
creencia, y envuelve, por tanto, un acto de fe? (1994, 6: 611; see also 599). 
He concludes that “las dos interpretaciones son posibles” (1994, 6: 612). However, given 
Aranguren’s religious nature, as seen throughout this chapter, his inclination is to interpret 
the wager as an act of faith in itself, thus aligning himself with Pascal.  
This has far-reaching epistemological consequences. In the face of the impossibility 
of proving or disproving God’s existence, the belief in it is as much an act of faith as 
atheism is. Taking it a step further, even atheism can be labelled as a religion. As Eliade 
explains, there is a multitude of definitions that try to encompass the nature of religion; the 
main reason for this is the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon itself as well as the 
influence of the background of those attempting to provide such definition (1987: 282). 
Bearing in mind the intricate nature of this term, one of the possible ways to understand 
religion is in relation to its social, economic, historical, and cultural context, which may 
provide a motivation for religious practices which may not necessarily be linked to 
spirituality (see Eliade, 1987: 284). This approach suggests that the analysis of the 
manifestations of the religious structures, such as beliefs, customs, and rituals, accounts for 
religion itself. If religion is “profesión y observancia de la doctrina religiosa”, as one of the 
definitions found in the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española (DRAE) suggests, the 
spiritual element is, then, not mandatory. In fact, from this perspective, Marxism itself, it 
has been claimed, has a religious quality, with its own rites and ideology (see Cristi, 2001: 
145). Hence, on the grounds of this understanding of religion, it can be claimed that those 
who do not believe in God or in the transcendental nature of existence choosing to take a 
purely positivist approach not only towards science, but towards life itself, are doing so as 
followers of a particular religion: a religion whose doctrine is scepticism and whose dogma 
is the scientific method. As Bourdieu argues, “scientific thought has no foundation other 
than the collective belief in its foundations that the very functioning of the scientific 
field produces and presupposes” (1991: 8; see also 1975: 34). The key to understanding 
the religious nature of this position is the word “belief”, which reinforces the idea that there 
is no possibility of certainty and that science becomes irrelevant in this area. In the end, 
both perspectives require a leap of faith. This is precisely the key to Aranguren’s 
epistemological underpinning which shall also be further explored in the coming chapters in 
relation to Zambrano and Aguirre.  
Although from a personal point of view Aranguren is far from denying the existence 
of a supreme being and the spiritual experience itself, rather than focusing on the individual 
personal dimension of religion, he analyses religion as a social phenomenon. Viewing 
religion as a social phenomenon explains why Aranguren interprets people’s religious 
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attitudes as a reaction to their personal needs – Unamuno’s attitude (see below) – rather 
than as any kind of transcendental communion (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 532). This also 
applies to those who choose to believe in the non-existence of God, since they do so in an 
effort to maintain cognitive consistency, that is, the psychological effort to make their 
perceptions match up with their beliefs (see Báez Ramos, 2001: 29-36). Thus, Aranguren 
concludes that, in his opinion, Marx places the same wager as Pascal, only he does it in the 
opposite direction; given the unavailability of conclusive evidence and the inadequacy of 
reason to solve the question of the existence of God, Marx chooses to wager on its non-
existence (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 222; for a more detailed discussion of Marx’s attitude 
towards religion see 3.3).  
This position − although rational − is not without problems, for there are numerous 
plausible arguments against God’s existence75 (see also footnote eighteen). However, it 
must be noted that it is not the case that evidence of God’s (in)existence is readily available 
and Aranguren chooses to disregard it. What Aranguren argues is that this is a question 
which is beyond human capacity. Aranguren finds himself in the same quandary as 
Unamuno. Unamuno realizes that reason alone cannot provide proof of God’s existence, but 
neither can it deny it; thus, he concludes that reason must be transcended and justifies 
God’s existence on the grounds of his own need for it (see also Abellán, 1964: 85, 130). 
Unlike Unamuno, Aranguren does not resolve to transcend reason. Instead, given his need 
for God – which he thinks is shared by humankind – Aranguren, like Pascal, concludes that 
believing in God is the best rational choice.  
                                                
75 There is, of course, no shortage of arguments against the existence of God. Richard Gale provides a 
series of counter-arguments to the main classical theistic arguments (2007: 86-101). He explains how 
the main flaw of the ontological argument, which sets to prove God’s existence on the basis of the 
analysis of the concept of God, is the nature of its premises, which are supposed to be self-evident and 
not based on sensorial evidence (see 2007: 86). The mystical argument shares the same problem, 
because the mystical experience cannot be perceived or verified by an external observer (see Gale, 
2007: 98). Gale also deflates the cosmological argument, which is based on the principle that every fact 
can be explained only “in terms of the causal efficacy of a necessarily existent God-like being”, in 
other words, identifying God as the ultimate cause (see Gale, 2007: 90). The difficulty with this 
argument is that accepting it “would be arguing that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition 
p because it is pragmatically rational to believe some proposition q, from which p follows or which is 
needed for the deduction of p” (Gale, 2007: 90). In other words, believing in something because it 
provides a convenient explanation is not evidence of is truthfulness. It should be noted that, whereas 
this is precisely Pascal’s and Aranguren’s argument for believing in God, at no point do they use this 
reasoning to argue the truth of God’s existence. Gale continues explaining that the teleological 
argument intends to apply inductive reasoning to conclude that facts of nature, such as the biological 
composition and organization of a living organism, are there as a result of divine design (see 2007: 97). 
This argument has to face the problem of evil: if worldly existence is created according to God’s 
design, who is supposed to be a benevolent and omnipotent being, how can evil be explained? 
According to Gale, the teleological argument has been ultimately invalidated by Darwin’s theory of 
evolution (see 2007: 97). Having pointed this out, it must be stressed that, in contrast with these 
arguments, what makes Aranguren’s approach valuable is that it does not constitute an attempt to prove 
God’s existence. As he puts it, “la creencia en la existencia de Dios es razonable: esto es lo más que 
hoy se puede decir” (1994, 1: 768). Instead, he focuses on the impact that faith – or lack thereof – may 
have on the subject and makes a vital choice based on this evaluation. 
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In conclusion, in Aranguren’s view, religion has a crucial social dimension and it is, 
therefore, inherently linked to morals, politics, and ethics (1994, 2: 295-99). As Gracia 
argues, “Aranguren había ido rebelándose desde el filo de los cincuenta contra el 
cristianismo saturado de embustes de sus jefes espirituales. Porque en muchos el 
cristianismo fue una convicción no sólo irrenunciable sino exigente razón antifranquista” 
(2004: 258-59, see also Gracia, 2004: 361). This socio-political dimension of religion is of 
crucial importance in understanding Aranguren’s background and his key underlying 
motivation: social justice. This becomes even more apparent with the advent of democracy 
in 1978 and the subsequent rapid transformation of values in Spanish society; these events 
are viewed by Aranguren as an opportunity to give a practical dimension to his work and, 
echoing Zubiri, Aranguren appropriates the oficio del intelectual. Moreover, this is a task 
which he will perform, not because he has left his religious stage behind, but rather, 
because of and from his talante religioso (1994, 2: 217). 
 
3.2.1.2 Talante 
Several references have been made to Aranguren’s talante religioso; it is now time to 
explore this concept. Aranguren first developed his concept of talante in El buen talante, as 
a foretaste to Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952), although it is 
not published as an article in its own right until 1985 (1994, 2: 619).  
Aranguren describes talante as a spontaneous and pre-rational disposition, closely 
related to our estado de ánimo or mood, terms that, in fact, he often uses interchangeably 
(see 1994, 1: 225; 1994, 2: 621-22, 630). The importance of this concept here is that it is 
vital for unravelling Aranguren’s understanding of the human being and of his process of 
evolution. For Aranguren, personal as well as intellectual evolution only takes place in a 
spiral trajectory; this becomes particularly clear upon analysing his approach to the concept 
of talante, as we shall discuss below. Talante is what determines our character. Our 
personality springs from our individual talante; each person possesses a fundamental 
talante from which all different moods emerge (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 226; 1994, 2: 396). 
Moreover, our perception changes with it, thus “la realidad se nos aparece, así, como un 
reflejo del talante” (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 621). Each talante conditions the individual to 
perceive a different aspect of any given reality. Similarly, each act requires the right talante 
(Aranguren, 1994, 1: 218). For Aranguren, each person searches for the religion or, even, 
political ideas that best matches his talante (1994, 1: 224, 227). This view of talante closely 
echoes Ortega’s perspectivism, which questions our ability to perceive reality as a whole 
and concludes that individuals can only ever perceive reality from a specific perspective. 
Therefore, the process of discovering truth is necessarily the process of reconstructing the 
number of fragments, − perspectives − available to us (Ortega, 1946, 2: 18-19; 1946, 3: 
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199-201). Thus, influenced by Ortega, Aranguren encapsulates his conceptualization of 
talante as follows:  
pero acaso la fórmula que más libremente de presupuestos éticos resuma lo que aquí queremos decir 
sea aquella del poeta, según la cual ‘todo es según el color del cristal con que se mira’. El cristal es 
nuestra alma, y su cambiante color, el estado en que ella se encuentra, su talante (1994, 2: 624).  
This point of view leads to two potentially dangerous directions: the relativistic and 
deterministic cul-de-sacs. Aranguren tackles both of them. 
Aranguren is well aware of the immediate relativistic implications of suggesting that 
different perceptions of the same reality may be acceptable. In order to avoid the relativistic 
trap, Aranguren specifies that although there is no one talante that can be deemed best to 
gain knowledge, there is still a hierarchy relating the different anaemic dispositions. Hope, 
trust, faith, and peace are situated at the top of the ladder, conforming what he describes as 
buen talante (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 634). It is from this understanding of buen talante 
that Aranguren develops what Soldevilla describes as a  
teoría de la acción […] preocupada por dilucidar las condiciones de posibilidad éticas, sociales y 
políticas, de un actor que, en momentos de crisis, cuando los sentidos y valores socioculturales son 
severamente cuestionados, sólo cuenta con criterios propios para fundamentar su acción (see 2004: 
130-41). 
Thus, we shall discuss below how, for Aranguren, talante affects the realm of ethics and 
consequently, also the realm of action. 
The concept of talante may seem to imply the deterministic suggestion that we are 
bound by it to access only a certain aspect of reality. A closer look, however, will prove that 
this is not necessarily the case. As Aranguren himself clarifies, a certain talante can be 
induced or fomented by a number of means, thus leaving room for free will and personal 
choices (see 1994, 2: 70-71, 626). Amongst the factors which can have an impact on 
talante, Aranguren points to physical factors or more subtle methods, such as poetry, music, 
rhetoric, philosophy, and, of course, religion (see 1994, 2: 625-26). He even suggests that 
religion influences talante more than culture does, and urges the reader to remember that 
religion is culture, although not only culture (1994, 2: 629). Equally, some strong emotions, 
such as hatred, envy, or fear, can taint our talante when their intensity is such that they take 
control of our being (1994, 2: 621-22). Talante, therefore, is not a permanent disposition, 
but can be influenced and modified by circumstances and decisions. It is in this sense that 
its evolution is spiral: our inclinations and decisions will be influenced by our talante, but 
in turn, our talante will also be influenced by the result of such decisions, which ultimately 
will affect our following decisions in a progressive spiral movement that will last for as 
long as we live. Hence, the concepts of freedom and choice are at the very core of 
Aranguren’s thought. According to him, freedom cannot be granted by any political regime, 
because, first, it must be a personal attitude, a virtue (1994, 2: 459). Freedom cannot be 
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given; it can only be exercised by the appropriation of choices. In line with CT, this 
realization and the relationship between personal and political freedom become, in fact, the 
focus of the later part of his career, as we shall see later in the chapter. 
Talante is then a pre-moral disposition, and it is only by conscious decision-taking 
and the voluntary acquisition of habits that a moral ethos is developed (see Bonete, 2003: 
419). Nevertheless, the intellectual consequences of this seemingly tangential development 
of the theory of talante are deep. What this means is that Aranguren grants subjectivity a 
privileged position on his work, since according to him, subjectivity or, to adopt his 
terminology, talante, is at the very foundation of every discourse. Accepting the subjective 
implications of talante has consequences for Aranguren’s ethics. Vitalist postulates, such as 
Aranguren’s, which are deeply rooted in Ortega’s thought, must necessarily reject general 
or abstract mandates for, as Ortega puts it, “¿no es sospechosa una ética que al dictar sus 
normas se olvida de cómo es en su íntegra condición el objeto cuya perfección pretende 
definir e imperar?” (Ortega, 1946, 3: 101; see Bonete, 2003: 392-93). It is in this sense that, 
as argued above, Aranguren is not a Kantian, for the categorical imperative is too general 
and, therefore, insufficient for Aranguren’s ethics76. This is also one of the reasons which 
moves Aranguren to discard his heteronomous morality in favour of an autonomous one, 
while at the same accepting people’s choice in either direction as discussed in the section 
above. The reach of the implications of talante, however, does not stop at ethics, but also 
hints at an epistemology, which, instead of being based upon an alleged objectivity, is 
flexible enough to reflect the nature and limitations of the researcher, including his 
subjectivity. Thus, Aranguren rejects any reductionist approach which rests on logic alone, 
such as scholastic and dialectic thought (1994, 1: 224; 1994, 2: 628). Hence, Aranguren 
shares with CT its concern with an excessive reliance on objectivity and their reclamation 
of other forms of knowledge (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 217). That is why, as Rabaté 
explains, “its [Critical Theory’s] main thrust is directed against positivism considered as a 
bourgeois distortion of a science whose current crisis has not been acknowledged because it 
has turned into a religion” (2002: 52; see also García de la Serrana, 2004: 190, 195; 
Adorno, 1976). The implications of the inclusion of subjectivity in the realm of 
epistemology will be furthered developed in connection to Zambrano and Aguirre in the 
following chapters.  
 
                                                
76 Kant’s categorical imperative states: “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law” (1995: 30). 
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3.2.2 The Marxist journey 
3.2.2.1 Marxism in Spain 
After having firmly established Aranguren’s religious background and its connection to 
social justice, understanding his relationship to the FS and to CT requires examining the 
other parameters around which his thought revolves, namely, his growing socio-political 
engagement and his interest in Marxism. Although Aranguren and Aguirre engage with 
Marxism and their position towards it is crucial to the later development of their thought, 
they cannot be considered Marxists. It is, nonetheless, necessary to be aware of the 
existence and evolution of Marxist ideas in Spain, so that the implications of the Marxist 
debate and its reception − particularly during the 1960s − can be understood, and 
Aranguren’s and Aguirre’s role can be contextualized. The aim, nature, and consequences 
of Aranguren’s engagement with Marxism shall be discussed below, so as to better 
understand the evolution of his thought into neo-Marxist positions. 
Marxism is first introduced into Spain at the end of 1871 by Marx’s son-in-law, Paul 
Lafargue (see Jordan, 2002: 136). The Partido Comunista de España (PCE) is founded in 
1921 as a splinter group of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), as a result of the 
PSOE’s rejection of the Third International (see Abellán, 1998: 227). Thus, the PCE’s birth 
reflects the serious fragmentation of the Spanish left which later contributes to its defeat in 
the Civil War (see Gómez, 2005: 281-290). Many landless peasants − mostly in the south of 
Spain − welcome Revolutionary ideas, particularly those of a Marxist or Anarchist nature. 
As is well-known, the rise of Communism and of the anti-communist and fascist responses 
which were put forward during the 1920s 1930s was one of factors which lead to the 
Spanish Civil War. This tension, however, acquires an international relevance. Europe is 
engaged in a campaign against Communism, while also being cautions towards the 
advances of fascism. Thus, as Enrique Moradiellos concludes, “it was no coincidence that 
for almost three years Spain became the bloody setting of a miniature and small-scale 
European civil war, a forewarning of the war that would break out in September 1939” 
(2002: 96; see also 98-101). 
Although the Communist Manistesto is translated into Spanish in 1872 and the first 
volumen of Das Kapital is translated in 1935, as a result of the Civil War and the fascist 
victory, subsequent translations of this nature will only take place in exile during the 
following years (see Ribas, 1981: 29-30; see also Abellán, 1998: 239). In fact, the rest of 
the volumes of Das Kapital are translated in Mexico during the years 1945-46 (see Abellán, 
1998: 239).  
With the end of the Civil War, many Republicans choose exile. This is the case of 
Luis Araquistán, a revolutionary Socialist, and of various thinkers of Marxist inclinations 
such as Julián Beistero, Vicente Uribe, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Fernando Claudín, David 
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García Bacca, Sánchez Barbudo, and Juan Rejano (see Abellán, 1998: 235-38; see also 
Díaz, 2004: 517-18; Faber, 2002: 86; Gracia, 2004: 159). Those who remain in Spain, 
however, witness the heavy-handed repression of the regime. Communism is demonized. 
Consequently, as Díaz explains,  
durante muchos años no se publica, por lo que yo conozco, ningún libro español sobre filosofía 
marxista [...] en aquellos tiempos lo que se escribe sobre este tema posee, por lo general, un carácter 
fundamentalmente propagandístico, inspirado más por el deseo de la refutación (religiosa o política) 
que por el de una comprensión científica o filosófica (1983: 101).  
There are, however, several intellectual and political circumstances which lead to the 
renewed interest in Marxism, particularly during the 1960s.  
In spite of the lack of publications on Marxism from the end of the Spanish Civil War 
until the 1960’s, Marxism is far from being forgotten. In fact, Marxism and Marxists 
become almost the embodiment of all evil, the enemy, in the eyes of the regime. Rejecting 
Freemasonry and Communism becomes part of the regime’s ideological creed. This attitude 
is further encouraged by the events that would come about with the end of the Second 
World War. The Cold War reduces to a great extent the political debate to the dichotomy of 
capitalism as opposed to Communism, hence actively contributing to the already existing 
demonization of Marxism in Spain. Furthermore, an agreement is reached (1953) by which 
the United States is allowed to establish military bases in Spanish territory in exchange for 
some economic support; Spain is used as a pawn, by Western democracies and the United 
States in particular, in their strategic planning against Communism (see Balfour, 2000: 278; 
see also Liedtke, 2002: 233-38; Portero, 2002: 210-20; Chapter Two). In the meantime, the 
country enjoys the effects of the Economic Stabilization Plan (1959) which – designed to 
encourage foreign investment, industrialization, and economic growth – marked the death 
of autarky and the creation of a market economy with the introduction of Spain into the 
international economy (see Shubert, 1990: 207). As Shubert indicates, “industrialization 
brought a rising standard of living and with it new levels of consumption. Average income 
jumped from $290 (US) in 1955 to $497 in 1965 and $2,486 in 1975” (1990: 258). Spain 
rapidly adopts a capitalist economy. Indications of the growing spending power of the 
Spanish population and their adoption of a consumerist behaviour can be observed in the 
purchase of non-essential commodities. Whereas televisions were unaffordable for most of 
the population when they were first introduced in 1956, “by the 1970s the ownership of a 
television set had become the norm for Spanish households, even in the countryside. In 
1975, 79 per cent of all homes and 63 per cent of the homes of farmers and agricultural 
labourers had a television” (Shubert, 1990: 258; see also de Riquer i Permanyer, 1995: 265; 
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Balfour, 2000: 283)77. The acquisition of cars followed a similar pattern, so that by 1974 
“one in nine inhabitants owned one” (Balfour, 2000: 283). Meanwhile, Spain becomes 
heavily influenced by American culture, which becomes fashionable amongst young 
people; the interest in television grows and American films are promoted by the regime to 
propitiate escapism (see Jordan, 2002: 243; see also Aguilar Fernández, 2002: 50; Shubert, 
1990: 260-61)78. Other forms of entertainment, such as football and, to a lesser extent, 
bullfighting are also fuelled by Franco, who used them as social tranquillizers (see Jordan, 
2002: 243; see also Shubert, 1990: 260-61). The economic boom, however, had some 
hidden costs: 
the rapid economic growth of 1962-9 is undeniable, but so too is the less palatable reality that 
underlay the bonanza: the structural weakness of the Spanish economy; the high social cost of the 
boom, disproportionately paid for by the poorest; and the lack of freedom (except for capital), which 
seriously impaired the quality of life (Díaz, 1995: 286). 
These circumstances give raise to anti-American and anti-capitalist sentiments, and attract 
some degree of sympathy towards Communism79.  
During the 1960s, and largely as a consequence of the economic boom of this decade, 
there is a substantial increase in the numbers of students in higher education, which also 
increased dissent (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 152). As de Riquer i Permanyer explains, “this 
increasingly critical attitude was based on two fundamental principles: better information 
about world affairs and the decline of traditional religious values” (1995: 266). As a result, 
this post-war generation, which did not suffer repression in the same way as their parents 
may have done, hungry for political participation and freedom, becomes an important 
source of opposition against the regime and many of them find Marxism attractive. 
In addition, Marxist works by some Spanish exiles are slowly being filtered into 
Spain. A number of journals of Marxist tendencies − in varying degrees − are published in 
exile during the early 1960s and find some – limited – distribution in Spain. This is the case 
of Realidad (Rome 1963, associated to the PCE), Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, and 
Mañana. Tribuna Democrática Española (París, 1963) (see Díaz, 2004: 515). Well-known 
Spanish intellectuals, such as Jorge Semprún, Manuel Sacristán, and Fernando Claudín, can 
                                                
77 This is particularly relevant because, as Candice Bosse puts it, “it served as an asset that was an 
aperture to popular knowledge about the world and increased visibility of other socially lived realities” 
(2007: 47). 
78 As Shubert explains, during this period, “there are two common denominators to the changes in 
leisure: it has become much more commercialized and it has been integrated into an increasingly 
homogeneous international – and American-dominated – leisure world” (1990: 261). 
79 Boris Liedtke argues that, regarding the Madrid Agreements (1953) by which Spain accepts to 
become a part of the Western defence structure, “large sections of the Spanish political establishment 
and the left-wing opposition have argued that Franco had bought them [USA’s economic support] at 
the cost of national sovereignty” (2002: 229). 
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be found amongst the editors and contributors (see Díaz, 2004: 515)80. A similar interest in 
Marxism is also awakened amongst the Spanish exiles living in Latin America, as can be 
observed in the work of Wenceslao Roces, José Gaos, and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez (see 
Abellán, 1989: 238-40, 243-45). What is even more relevant is that their views, far from 
being dogmatic or orthodox, reflect a need for renewal (see Abellán, 1989: 238-40, 243-45). 
In Spain, in 1954 Enrique Tierno Galván founds the Boletín del seminario de derecho 
político de Salamanca, which boasts an array of Marxists and Socialist contributors, such as 
Raúl Morodo, Elías Díaz, Fernando Morán, Ignacio Sotelo, and Iris Zavala (see Gracia, 
1996: 26; see also Díaz, 2004: 505-06, 512). Thus, interest in Marxism within Spain grows 
and gradually steps outside clandestinity. As Gracia explains: 
los primeros análisis marxistas de alguna solvencia se harían con la conciencia de extirpar el disfraz 
retórico y apuntar a diagnósticos precisos, de aires –todavía– vagamente regeneracionistas. Y me 
refiero a los que pueden aparecer en el Boletín de Tierno, en la misma Praxis de Aumente o a los que 
figuran en las páginas más interesantes de Índice en torno a 1960 (Gracia, 1996: 31).  
Praxis, although short-lived, also contributes to the Marxist debate in Spain (Díaz, 
2004: 513). However, it is not until 1961 that the first serious book on Marxism since the 
end of the Spanish Civil War is published: Introducción al pensamiento marxista (see Díaz, 
1983: 101). It is a collective work which publishes the outcome of a series of public lectures 
held at the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (from 17 October to 6 December 1958) 
and imparted by Carlos París, Carlos Alonso del Real, Pedro Lucas Verdú, José Lois 
Estévez, Carlos Eduardo Bastos de Soveral, Luis Legas y Lacambra, and José Guerra 
Campos. This publication opens an intense debate, by voicing a subject which could no 
longer be ignored. This revival of the Marxist debate is qualified by Díaz as the newest and 
most characteristic occurrence of this decade (1983: 143). In this same year, 1961, 
Aranguren directs an international seminar in Madrid on Nationalism and Marxism, also 
becoming one of the first Spanish authors to publicly discuss the influences of Marxist 
thought (see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 18; see also Díaz, 1983: 99). Valuable Marxist analyses 
are also provided within Spain by Manuel Ballestero, Gustavo Bueno, and Carlos Castilla 
del Pino (Díaz, 2004: 517; see also Chandler, 1991: 381-83)81. Marxist ideas are also visible 
                                                
80 It should be noted that, as indicated in chapter one, Manuel Sacristán plays an important role in the 
introduction of the FS in Spain for he was the translator of the first books by any of the members of the 
FS to ever be published in Spain, namely, Adorno’s Notas de literatura and Prismas, la crítica de la 
cultura y la sociedad (1962) (see 5.3.1; see also appendix one). In total, Sacristán translates three books 
by Adorno – the two mentioned above and Crítica cultural y sociedad (1969a) – and two books by 
Marcuse – El final de la utopía (1968b) and Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad (1970b). All 
of them are published by Ariel, with the sole exception of the last one, which is published by Martínez 
Roca. 
81 Manuel Ballestero is interested in Marxism and, particularly, in its relation to existentialism, as can 
be observed in Marx o la crítica como fundamento (1967). He also focuses on the concept of freedom 
in relation to three key authors, namely, Nicolas de Cusa, Martin Luther, and Karl Marx, in La 
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in the arts; this is the case of the poets Gabriel Celaya and Blas de Otero, and the film 
director Juan Antonio Bardem (see Gracia, 2004: 158). There are also several Marxist 
activists, such as Simón Sánchez Montero, Julián Ariza, Marcelino Camacho, and Nicolás 
Sartorius, who during the 1960s engage in the political debate in Cuadernos para el 
Diálogo (see Gracia, 1996: 38). They also champion workers rights during Francoism and 
continue to represent their interests during the Transition. 
Aranguren repeatedly engages with Marxism from what Díaz describes as a Catholic-
Ortegan perspective, turning Marxism into his main interlocutor during this period (1983: 
100). In fact, the Marxist-Christian dialogue becomes a central feature of the Spanish socio-
political debate during the 1960s. The publications of Pope John XXIII and the Second 
Vatican Council “open the way to Christian-Marxist dialogue by clearly distinguishing 
between ‘false philosophical teachings’ and the ‘historical movements that have economic, 
social, cultural or political ends’ that they inspired” (Lannon, 1987: 248). These factors lead 
to an increased interest in Marxist ideas in Spain and to the realization of the need for its 
acknowledgment and discussion. It is certainly no longer possible to ignore that Marxists 
are present in Spanish society; during the 1960s even their condemnation requires dialogue 
and engagement (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 201; see also Aguirre, 1985: 214). A considerable 
contribution to this dialogue, from a Marxist standpoint, is made by Manuel Azcárate and 
Manuel Sacristán, which is described by Gracia as a “pieza esencial del comunismo en 
España” (2004: 355; see also Gracia, 1996: 36; Díaz, 2004: 517). Aranguren and Aguirre, 
from a Christian perspective, are also key contributors to this dialogue, as we shall see 
below. 
Another decisive factor in the revival of the Marxist debate in Spain is the reform of 
the censorship system. As Pérez González explains, “with the new Press and Printing Law 
of 1966, a ‘concession’ by Franco’s Information Minister, Manuel Fraga, pre-emptive 
censorship disappeared. Instead a permanent sword of Damocles hung over newspaper 
editors’ heads” (2000: 23; see also Chapter Two). Nevertheless, by relaxing the censorship 
                                                                                                                                       
revolución del espíritu: Tres pensamientos de libertad (1970). During the decade of 1960s, Gustavo 
Bueno’s publications are sparse, but during the next decade, he becomes more prolific and focuses on 
Marxism and on philosophical materialism in particular. Some of his most relevant publications during 
this decade include: Ensayos materialistas (1972), “El materialismo histórico de Gramsci como teoría 
del Espíritu objetivo” (1973a), “Sobre el significado de los Grundrisse en la interpretación del 
marxismo” (1973b), “Los Grundrisse de Marx y la Filosofía del Espíritu objetivo de Hegel” (1974), 
“La filosofía del futuro es solidaria del socialismo (entrevista a Gustavo Bueno)” (1975), “Cuestiones 
sobre teoría y praxis” (1977), “Determinismo cultural y materialismo histórico” (1978a), and “Las 
fuerzas del trabajo y las fuerzas de la cultura” (1978b). Carlos Castilla del Pino relates Marxist 
principles to psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice in Fundamentos de antropología dialéctica 
(1969a) and Psicoanálisis y marxismo (1969b). He highlights, in particular, the relevance and impact of 
the socio-economic context of the patient in the development and cure of different pathologies. 
Incidentally, Castilla del Pino provides the prologue for Marcuse’s Psicoanálisis y política, entitled “La 
inflexión del pensamiento de Marcuse en la antropología freudiana” (1969c).  
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system slightly – even if only on the surface – this law provides enough leeway for the 
discussion in print of issues previously largely silenced, such as Marxism. In addition, the 
centenary of the publication of Das Kapital takes place in 1967. This symbolic event is 
taken by many as an invitation to revive, and, indeed, review the Marxist legacy (see 
Abellán, 1998: 238-43 on the impact of this centenary on the exiled intellectuals). In 
contrast with this, in 1967, the Ley Orgánica del Estado is approved, establishing the 
definitive constitutional structure of the regime. This exacerbates the already present need 
for the search for, or, at least, acknowledgement of, other alternatives.  
In response to this climate, in 1968, Aranguren publishes El marxismo como moral – 
after being deprived of his cátedra and after having travelled extensively as a result of his 
subsequent exile. Only one year after Sánchez Vázquez publishes in Mexico Filosofía de la 
praxis (see Gracia, 1996: 40). In 1968, Aranguren’s “El diálogo futuro entre marxistas y 
cristianos” appears in Cristianos y Marxistas: Los problemas de un diálogo. This 
emblematic collection of essays edited by Aguirre becomes what Díaz describes as the most 
important book on the topic published in Spain, as we shall discuss in Chapter Five (1983: 
143, 147; see also Gracia, 1996: 35).  
As a result of the public nature of this dialogue, during the 1970s, Marxist ideology, 
although still feared and rejected, enjoys a higher degree of toleration, with greater 
availability of Marxist materials (see Gracia, 1996: 40-42). During the Transition, there is 
an increasing awareness that democratic elections would have no validity as such without 
the legalization and inclusion of the PCE in the elections. Therefore, the PCE was legalized 
in June 1977 (Preston, 1990: 227). That same year, the PCE adopts Eurocommunism, thus 
distancing itself from the much-feared Soviet Republic (see Jordan, 2002: 136). It must also 
be noted, however, that after 1968-1969 Marxism experiences a decline in Spain, whose 
lasting effects become evident in the unexpectedly low results obtained in the first 
democratic elections after Franco’s death (1977) (see Díaz, 2004: 518; see also Jordan, 
2002: 164). 
 
3.2.2.2 Aranguren’s relation to Marxism 
Several reasons drive Aranguren to turn Marxism into his interlocutor. As ever, his 
biographical circumstances play a decisive role. Despite the injustice of his expulsion from 
the Universidad Complutense (1965), it is not unreasonable to surmise that, from an 
intellectual point of view, being freed – compulsorily, but freed nonetheless – from an 
oppressing institution ultimately controlled by the government must have been a liberating 
experience; as a result of his being expelled, he accepts a lecturing position abroad, in the 
United States. Thus, his expulsion from university marks a turning point for him, because it 
opens new horizons for Aranguren – quite literally geographically, but also intellectually. 
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The distance and perspective acquired during his stay in the United States, his immersion in 
US consumerist society, and his first-hand experience of the counter-culture promoted by 
the New Left, particularly at the University of California, all contribute to enhancing, not 
only his political engagement – which already has started back in Spain – but his awareness 
of the intrinsic interconnection between socio-economic and political issues. Aranguren 
himself explains that his choice of Marxism as a subject for discussion is the result of his 
decision to engage with the course of events, por compremeterse, as opposed to just 
theorising about them (1994, 3: 180-81); thus, highlighting once again his conscious effort 
to merge his theoretical positions with his actions.  
According to Aranguren, Marxism represents the negation of metaphysics, the 
irruption of freedom in history, and the introduction of the conception that philosophers 
should change the world (1994, 2: 545). It is important to bear in mind that Aranguren 
insists on the concept of philosophy as subversion (1994, 5: 519). Consequently, he agrees 
with Marx in that the aim of philosophy is to transform the world. That is why, for 
Aranguren, Marxism matters more as praxis than as philosophical truth (1994, 2: 552). His 
discussion focuses on three key points, as we shall now see. 
First, aware of the presence of Marxist ideas in a considerable sector of the 
opposition and equally aware of the rejection of Marxism by Christians, Aranguren – a non-
Marxist author – is keen on promoting what he considers to be a very necessary dialogue. 
He is not interested in addressing Marxism to discard it; he is committed to creating a 
constructive dialogue with the aim of fostering comprehension on both sides (see 
Aranguren, 1994, 3: 180-81). In fact, both Aranguren and Aguirre turn this into one of their 
priorities. In order to promote this dialogue, and in an effort to bridge the distance between 
Christianity, in particular Catholicism, and Communism, Aranguren also highlights that not 
only do they have in common their moral concern for social justice, but also that they share 
some of their problems, such as the exaltation of authority, obedience, discipline, and 
dogmatism (see 1994, 3: 223). On a more positive note, Aranguren also points out that both 
Catholicism and Communism are slowly overcoming this rigidity (see 1994, 3: 223). For 
Aranguren, these elements not only provide evidence of the similarities between 
Catholicism and Communism, but also of their shared need for renewal, which makes 
dialogue all the more urgent. Hence, Aranguren is convinced that there are lessons to be 
learnt from Marxism, just as Marxism also has a lot to learn from Christianity (1994, 6: 
209). Similarly, in Soviet Marxism, Marcuse draws a parallel comparison between 
capitalism and Communism (1958: 88, 93, 185, 195, 197, 242). These analyses not only 
provide evidence of the similarities they discuss, but they are also a testimony to the 
subtlety of both authors, who are keen to overlook the formal differences which separate the 
above mentioned systems of thought, to reveal their fundamental similarities which should 
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not be considered as isolated occurrences, but as the manifestation of a shared rationality, 
that is, instrumental reason.  
As a result of this dialogue, Aranguren hopes that those who are Marxist will 
continue to be so in an informed and reasoned way, and not just as a mere reaction against 
the regime. Equally, he denounces the way the anti-communist regimes and the mass media 
in general create a negative emotional response towards Marxism (1994, 3: 24, 59; see also 
Portero, 2002: 100-01). Aranguren encourages Marxists to become critical so that they 
“constituyan su marxismo como problema”; at the same time he hopes that “quienes sean 
anti-marxistas pasen a ser no-marxistas” (1994: 3, 180-181). In fact, he suggests that “el 
más eficaz no-comunismo es el que […] le admite la convivencia política, haciéndole 
aceptar así las reglas del juego democrático” (1994, 3: 185). Thus, Aranguren highlights the 
need for and benefits of a tolerant cohabitation (see 1994: 1, 682, 723). 
Second, in an attempt to move Christians and Marxists closer, Aranguren is 
determined to provide evidence of the moral content of the Marxist discourse. Religion is 
identified at the centre of the discrepancy between Christians and Marxists. Aranguren is 
convinced of the impossibility of the Marxist quest for rationally ruling religion out of 
people’s lives (1994, 3: 220). In any case, Aranguren points out that Marx’s position on 
religion is ambiguous (1994, 3: 221). Marx views religion as a form of expression, mainly 
the expression of a very real misery (1994, 3: 221). It is in this sense that religion is, for 
Marx, the product of the social structure that perpetuates the exploitation and alienation of 
the proletariat. Religion, however, in as much as it represents the need for a sense of justice 
which is lacking in the worldly reality, is also viewed as protest, although insufficient and 
evasive in itself, but protest nonetheless (1994, 3: 221). In fact, Aranguren even questions 
the common assumption that Marx wants to do without religion altogether, describing 
Marx’s opinion towards it as twofold and ambivalent (1994, 5: 527). Aranguren explains 
how this interpretation is the result of the phrase “religion is the opium of the people”82 
having been taken out of context and having been blown out of proportion (1994, 5: 527). 
In addition to this, Aranguren also develops his argument in the opposite direction. He is 
also keen to suggest that certain forms of Catholic commitment are ideologically very close 
to Marxism: “repárese en el hecho de que los ‘progresistas católicos’ se agrupan, en los 
países que se hallan en situación pre-revolucionaria, formando verdaderas sectas [...]. Y ¿en 
                                                
82 This phrase first appeared in 1844 in Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right” (see Elster, 1986: 301). Incidentally, in La democracia establecida (1979b), Aranguren makes a 
counter-reading of Marx’s famous sentence “religion […] is the opium of the people” (Marx, 2002: 
171): “yo pienso que si por ‘opio’ no se entiende estupefaciente paralizador de la actividad mental, sino 
transposición de ésta al plano de una ‘irrealidad’ exaltante, levantado sobre la ‘realidad’ rastrera, 
estrechamente pragmática y ‘política’, la expresión de Marx es, dentro de la nueva cultura, 
perfectamente recuperable” (1994, 5: 527). 
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qué medida son católicos marxistizados o, más bien, paleo o neomarxistas católicos?” 
(1994, 1: 725). In spite of the undeniable theoretical differences, Aranguren is determined 
to highlight the common ground between Christians and Marxists in order to encourage a 
dialogue, going as far as to state that they both share the same core concern: social justice 
(see 1994, 3: 156). 
Aranguren tries to overcome the perceived dichotomy between Christianity and 
Marxism by creating a bridge which connects them; he brings out the moralist in Marx. 
Aranguren argues that beneath Marxism’s scientific veil – which he quickly discards as 
over-pretentious – there is an underlying morality (1994, 3: 63). He claims that “Marx era 
moralista en términos socioeconómicos” (1994, 3: 156). He goes on to explain his claim: 
porque no pudo hablar un lenguaje abiertamente moral, que no estaba vigente en su época; pero 
también porque no quiso hacerlo, precisamente por honradez. Frente al abuso de las palabras, tan 
propio de la era victoriana, conforme al cual todo ciudadano, por proletario que fuese, poseía la 
libertad abstracta de serlo todo… y la imposibilidad concreta de ser otra cosa que proletario, él luchó 
por la liberación real consistente en el acortamiento de la jornada de trabajo, en la elevación del 
trabajo, en la elevación del salario y en la seguridad social; y frente al “idealismo” […], Marx prefirió 
ser “materialista”. Pero los rótulos son, a veces, engañosos (1994, 3: 156). 
In Aranguren’s eyes, Marx develops his materialism mainly because he is more of a 
moralist in the true sense of the word than the moralists of his time themselves. This may 
become more evident when Marxism’s aim is re-examined: the self-liberation of the 
proletariat. Aranguren’s argument is that, insofar as such a liberation is sought, Marxism – 
independently of Marx’s own terminology – can be considered as a moral movement for it 
is chiefly concerned with social justice (1994, 2: 458; 1994, 3: 78, 221; see also Camps, 
1997: 182). That is why Aranguren does not perceive Marxism itself as a direct threat to 
Christianity, since, in Aranguren’s view, the moral dimension to Marxism means that 
Christians and Marxists pursue the very same thing: improving the conditions of our 
existence so as to allow the flourishing of the human being. Furthermore, in an effort to 
underscore the common moral ground of Christianity and Marxism, Aranguren points out 
that both share a common threat, that of capitalism: “una valoración cristiana auténtica y 
una valoración marxista de la existencia coinciden, la primera confesándolo abiertamente, 
la segunda no siempre, en que la oposición al capitalismo tiene que ser, ante todo, una 
oposición moral” (1994, 3: 220). It is not Marxism itself which poses a threat, but, rather, 
people’s interpretation or understanding of it. 
All in all, Aranguren thinks that, historically, Marxism has exerted a good influence 
on the Catholic Church (1994, 3: 220). In Moral y sociedad (1966), Aranguren highlights 
that “la Iglesia, hasta bastante después de Marx, se prestó, sin restricción alguna, a 
representar este papel de aliada al poder civil” (1994, 4: 36). Here, Aranguren’s own 
ambivalence towards the Church can be observed; whereas Aranguren repeatedly criticizes 
the involvement of the Church in politics and he complains about the abandonment of the 
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element of social justice reflected in the distance between the Catholic creed and its praxis, 
the fact that he uses the past tense to make this statement suggests that these problems have 
been overcome. Two years later, however, in El marxismo como moral, Aranguren explains 
that Marxism has had a positive effect on the Catholic Church in the sense that it has 
encouraged it to recover the social character of its morality and gain awareness of the socio-
economic conditionings which have been placed upon Catholic morality (1994, 3: 220). 
Despite this praise, he quickly becomes more critical of the role of the Catholic Church. 
Only one year later, in La crisis del catolicismo (1969a), Aranguren questions and urges at 
the same time the Church’s commitment to let go of its hold of power: “el catolicismo, en 
su estructura oficial, ¿se desligará de los poderosos o, por debajo de ciertas apariencias y a 
la hora de la verdad, seguirá vinculado a ellos? La crisis del catolicismo se manifiesta en 
este campo con extrema necesidad” (1994, 1: 725). That same year, in Memorias y 
esperanzas españolas (1969b), Aranguren argues that there are still lessons to be learned 
from Marxism, namely, “la liberación del individualismo, la abertura del hombre a la 
comunidad y sus problemas, la recuperación de la dimensión social de la moral” (1994, 6: 
209; see also 1994, 5: 319-20). Thus, a tension between Aranguren’s will to safeguard the 
Church and a critique of Catholic practices with the aim of encouraging its evolution can be 
observed alongside the progression of his own views towards more critical stands. 
Third, Aranguren does not defend the righteousness of Communism, but its value as 
a countervailing power (1994, 3: 58). He explains how Marxism has attempted to offer an 
alternative to Western civilisation, although its materialisation, Communism, fails to 
provide such an alternative in the full sense of the word (1994, 5: 588). Despite this failure, 
Aranguren thinks that Communism performs a valuable, even necessary function: serving 
as a countervailing power – at least until the creation of the United States of Europe – 
(1994, 3: 1994, 3: 106, 123, 185). Thus, one of the benefits of Communism is that it 
represents a threat against what Aranguren considers to be the fundamentally unjust social 
disposition of the Western Welfare State (1994, 2: 554). Despite being positive about the 
impact that Communism may have on neo-capitalist societies, Aranguren remains critical of 
the dynamics of both socio-economic formats. In fact, Aranguren, like Marcuse who in 
Soviet Marxism (1958) draws frequent comparisons between Communism and western 
capitalism, also draws a critical comparison between the two systems: “cabe también 
plantearse el problema de si el Welfare State o ‘sociedad de consumo’ no es la réplica 
práctica al materialismo teórico marxista; y, dando un paso más, si uno y otro modelo, el 
neocapitalista y el paleocomunista, por parecerse demasiado entre sí, no serían ambos 
recusables” (Aranguren, 1994, 1: 724-25; see also Bernstein, 1994: 157). Aranguren’s 
concerns about the western Welfare State grow through time, so that, in fact – as the FS 
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does – he deals substantially with the new forms of alienation brought about by neo-
capitalism as we shall see in the next section. 
In conclusion, there is ample evidence to suggest that Aranguren is very much 
interested in Marxism. His engagement with Marxism is moved by an awareness of the 
need for a dialogue and a shared sense of social justice. Moreover, Aranguren is aware of 
the economic, cultural, moral, and, even, spiritual changes that Spanish society is 
undergoing as a result of adopting a capitalist economy. Aranguren is particularly 
concerned with the freedom – or lack thereof – that the Spanish Catholic Church allows its 
devotees. As a result, he insists on the need to overcome the dogmatism of Catholism, to 
allow for intellectual freedom, and to establish a dialogue with Marxism (see 1994, 1: 723; 
see also 1994, 3: 223). He identifies two main factors which hinder this dialogue: the 
resistance of the Church to relinquish its position as a political power and the utilization of 
religion as the ideology of the dominant class (1994, 3: 220-21). In the face of this, 
Aranguren expresses his concern with the future of Christianity facing technological 
materialism, Marxist Communism, and the different forms of contestation (1994, 5: 201). 
At the same time, he also points out some drawbacks of Marxism, or, more precisely, 
Communism (1994, 3: 154). He specifically criticizes the elimination of the private sphere 
in that every aspect of life is absorbed by the State. As Aranguren explains, traditionally, 
according to Plato and Aristotle, “la Ética aparece subordinada a la Política, esto es, la ética 
individual y la ética social” (1994, 2: 194). He argues, however, that Communism extracts 
extreme conclusions from this, reasoning that ethical is that which benefits the party and 
anything which runs counter to its interest would, then, be immoral. Reducing ethics to 
social ethics, dismissing the role of individual ethics is, for Aranguren, a serious 
shortcoming of Communism (see 1994, 2: 195). Consequently, Aranguren considers 
Communism to be a radical political form (1994, 5: 199). As regards the theoretical aspects 
of Marxism, the changes brought about by the consumerist society require the abandonment 
of Marxism’s intransigence and its adjustment to the new circumstances. Aranguren is 
aware of how the evolution of capitalism into what has been referred to as the affluent 
society, consumer society, and the subsequent change of perception that it has brought 
about, requires a revision of classical Marxism in order to face the challenges of the new 
forms of the alienation, the disappearance of the proletariat as understood by Marx, along 
with class-consciousness, and all its implications. As Aranguren puts it, 
el neocapitalismo, el tránsito de la economía de producción a la de consumo, y el acceso de los 
obreros al “bienestar” –buenos sueldos, mucho tiempo libre, automóvil, confort moderno, aparatos 
electrodomésticos y televisión para todos– han logrado la asimilación del proletariado blanco a los 
ideales del American way of life y la pérdida total de la conciencia proletaria (1994, 5: 167). 
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As indicated above, although these issues are first formulated by the FS, they are 
gradually incorporated into Aranguren’s thought comprising his subject matter during this 
late period of his work as we shall discuss below. 
 
3.2.2.3 The shortcomings of Marxism 
Aranguren, like the members of the FS, is painfully aware of the deep changes that society 
has undergone on its way to becoming a consumerist economy. He is concerned with 
identifying the new forms of alienation which arise from these changes and which Classical 
Marxism can no longer address. He briefly explains this in Memorias y esperanzas 
españolas (1969b) using Marx’s own terminology: “Marx dijo bien que la pobreza conduce 
a la alienación. Lo que no tuvo tiempo de ver es que también el proletariado, fuerza de 
liberación según él, puede recaer en alienación, precisamente al salir de la pobreza y lograr 
un bienestar manipulado por los poderosos” (1994, 6: 246-47). Marxism needs to be revised 
if it is in any way to provide a coherent and suitable framework for critique and action. 
Having chosen Marxism as his interlocutor, aware of its shortcomings, Aranguren makes 
the issues of neo-Marxism his own while taking the FS as his main point of reference (see 
1994, 4: 543). Through this process, he experiences a re-evaluation and transformation of 
his own positions into more progressive and critical ones as we shall se below. The need for 
the renovation of Marxism will be illustrated with a brief account of some of its main 
problems. Then, Aranguren’s neo-Marxist critique of consumerist society will be analysed 
in relation to the FS, so as to clarify his relationship to CT. 
The Marxist critique of capitalism falls short on several accounts. First, Communist 
ethics have an instrumental foundation. In the first stage of Communism, the violence of the 
proletariat is justified to overcome the existing power structures, thus seizing the State. 
Then power is given to the State as the great administrator. Hence, ethics is subjugated by 
the pursuit of power; the individual is subordinated to the community. The result is an 
inherently repressive society, which, in fact, has many features in common with fascism 
and, indeed, capitalism, as argued by Marcuse (1958: 93, 197). As Marsal puts it:  
nadie puede negar hoy que el análisis de los marxistas alemanes sobre el fascismo al considerarlo 
como un aliado “objetivo” del gran capitalismo –la identidad no idéntica– con absoluta 
independencia de sus connotaciones psicosociales y sus veleidades ideológicas, es fundamentalmente 
exacto (1979: 24). 
Second, Marxism unnecessarily gives up religion, depriving people of the experience 
of transcendence some of them may need (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 545; see also 5.3.3). 
Third, there is an important gap between the theory of what should be done, who should do 
it, and what shall be accomplished, and the actual pursuit of those goals (see Thiebaut, 
2003: 449-51).  
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Furthermore, Critical Theorist consider that Marxism is in need of revision mainly 
because there are some aspects of the Marxist critique which are no longer applicable to 
advanced capitalist societies (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 196, 215; see also Chapter One). 
The image of the proletariat as opposed to the bourgeois ceases to be functional. As Joe 
McCarney explains, “the most pressing difficulty that faces anyone who today would be a 
Marxist in social theory [...] is that the original nomination of the revolutionary subject 
cannot now be sustained” (1990: 180). The main reason for this is that, with a substantial 
change in the nature of work, the workforce also changes substantially, becoming the 
middle class. The methods of control become more subtle, but also more comprehensive; 
force is relinquished in favour of manipulation – which is far more effective. Thus, the 
concept of alienation is no longer suitably descriptive, whereas false consciousness 
becomes an issue instead (see Marcuse, 2005: 78-79; see also Aranguren, 1994, 5: 167).  
False consciousness is a controversial concept first used by Engels (see Eagleton, 
1991: 89). Whereas eliminating alienation implies the notion of liberation from unwanted 
influences and constraints, eliminating false consciousness implies the liberation from 
influences and constraints which go against the individual’s best interests, even though the 
individual may be unaware of their existence in the first place. As Rosen explains, for the 
FS ,“it [false consciousness] registers the central idea that societies have a systematic 
character and that they are maintained, apparently irrationally in many cases, by virtue of 
the attitudes and beliefs of those who live in them” (1996: 30). Its relevance lies in that the 
neo-Marxist critique of manipulation –particularly manipulation of the mass media in the 
context of political propaganda and commercial advertising– is primarily based on the 
concept of false consciousness or voluntary servitude as Marcuse refers to it (2005: 78).  
Aranguren, aware of the different factors which condition human will, desire, and 
behaviour, elaborates a critique in order to liberate individuals from such conditionings: “la 
ética social, así entendida, operaría sobre los condicionamientos biológicos, psíquicos y 
psicosociales, sociológicos, económicos y políticos de la moral, para conseguir así, 
indirecta y eficazmente, que los hombres lleguen a ser éticamente mejores” (1994, 3: 35). 
Marcuse insists on the need to free people from themselves, that is, to overcome false 
consciousness (see 1958: 92; 1970: 91; 1970a: 32). Similarly, Aranguren also expresses the 
hope that, once people are liberated from their socio-cultural conditioning, their desires 
would not go against their best interest. Thus, people would not only have a better chance 
of fulfilment, but they would have also evolved morally. Aranguren shares with the FS their 
views of false consciousness, although their terminology differs; Aranguren does not talk 
about overcoming false consciousness, but about encouraging egoísmo racional instead (see 
1994, 3: 87-88; 1994, 2: 669). As Aranguren explains, freedom cannot be granted by any 
political regime, because it must first be a personal attitude (1994, 2: 459). 
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False consciousness, however, leads to a circular argument: not only does neo-
capitalism create this type of false consciousness, but more importantly, it is this false 
consciousness that assures the continuity of the system. Thus, it functions as a perpetuating 
mechanism. False consciousness is, in fact, a complex concept which encounters a number 
of difficulties; its conflicts with intentionality and agency are amongst the most salient 
ones. 
A full analysis of this term is beyond the scope of the present work (for such an 
analysis see Rosen, 1996: 24-29, 30-53, 270-75). In an attempt to shed some light on how 
behaviour may be – with no awareness or unreflectively – structured in such a way that it 
may go against the individual’s best interests, the concept of habitus put forward by 
Bourdieu will be compared to that of false consciousness.  
One of its most commonly used definitions of habitus can be found in the Logic of 
Practice: 
the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of 
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and 
‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of organizing action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990: 53; see 
also 2003, 75). 
Habitus as described above succeeds in accounting for repetitive patterns of behaviour − 
often shared with others − which can be explained by psychological and social mechanisms, 
bypassing the issues of intentionality and agency. It must be noticed, however, that 
although, according to this account, Bourdieu and the Critical Theorists share the 
conviction of the existence of a widespread conception of false consciousness in the sense 
that the agent’s rationalization of his own reality and experiences is inaccurate, they differ 
significantly in what the cause and solution for this situation may be. In Bourdieu’s view, 
the relationship between the habitus and the field that agent is embedded in prevents the 
agent from being able to step aside from the game he is participating in with no awareness 
of doing so, and will, therefore, perceive his actions as undetermined and free. Due to this 
sense of integration of the agent into a structure of relationships, but more importantly, of 
meaning, only an external observer equipped with meta-analytical tools can perceive, 
expose, and, ultimately, liberate such an agent from these relationships. Bourdieu’s 
approach, however, is criticized for falling into the scholastic fallacy, that is, Bourdieu’s 
claim that the researcher has an epistemologically privileged position (see Kyung-Man, 
2004: 363). Critical theorists, in contrast, acknowledge the limited epistemological 
capabilities of the human being, accepting that the perception of totality is neither possible 
nor desirable; any such attempts would necessarily take a reductionist approach. Not having 
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a referent or foundation for truth or totality, their understanding of false consciousness does 
not rest on the truth value of their perceptions and conceptions, but on their role towards the 
fulfilment of each agent and his subsequent progression as a person, as can be observed in 
the quotation below: 
Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. 
The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of 
human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free 
choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does 
not abolish the masters or the slaves (Marcuse, 1964: 7; see also García de la Serrana, 2004: 199).  
By re-marrying theory and practice, Critical Theorists hope to empower each 
individual to re-assess and re-invent his relationships to the existing structures – social 
structures, but also, more radically, structures of thought. Having said that, the concept of 
habitus remains an illustrative conceptual tool which may bear an explanatory potential 
which is lacking and, indeed, problematic in false consciousness. 
Thus, Aranguren shares with the FS their eagerness to point out the shortcomings of 
Classical Marxism, but also their interest in its modification. As a result, the FS, but also 
Aranguren, adopt a neo-Marxist perspective from which they identify the new problems 
that neo-capitalism presents; they criticize the manipulation of the mass media and the new 
forms of alienation developed in the consumerist society. Exploring this criticism and its 
implications will be the focus of the following section. 
 
3.2.2.4 A Neo-Marxist critique of advanced capitalism 
“El ‘materialismo’ es la necesidad de los 
pobres y, hoy, el sórdido lujo de los ricos” 
(Aranguren, 1994, 5: 168). 
The implicit standpoint of the Marxist and neo-Marxist critique is the Aristotelian premise 
that the human essence – suppressed by capitalism – may flourish given the right conditions 
in the society people live in (see Kain, 2001: 3, 25, 52). In contrast, the consumerist 
behaviour encouraged by a neo-capitalist economy is considered to be to the detriment of 
the individual. As Aranguren puts it, 
en los países occidentales de la sociedad del bienestar, de la elevación a “virtud” del egoísmo 
consumidor –consumidor de todo: bienes materiales, cultura, juventud, amor, religión- y de la pérdida 
del sentido de la vida. Ya no hay robos, pero sí suicidios gratuitos. No se sabe qué hacer (1994, 3: 
165). 
What links Aranguren to the FS is that, sharing this premise, they provide a wide-ranging 
critique of neo-capitalist society in the hope that such a critique will contribute to creating a 
freer, fairer, and more rational society where each individual is allowed and encouraged to 
participate in a process of self-government and of personal development. As we shall see 
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below, Aranguren’s analysis of democracy suggests that such a society will only flourish in 
a genuinely democratic system. 
Aranguren explains that “democracia es participación activa del pueblo en el 
gobierno, democracia es elección, o dicho en el expresivo lenguaje político-popular, 
‘elecciones’” (1994, 3: 108). Despite his continuous defence of democracy, existing 
democracy is far from fulfilling the characteristics of what Aranguren calls an authentic 
democracy: “una democracia meramente formal no es todavía una democracia, aun cuando 
lo parezca, si no ha establecido, como punto de partida, una igualdad de oportunidades para 
todos los que de verdad quieran aprovecharlas” (1994, 4: 189-90; see also 1994, 5: 431). 
For this reason, the possibility of democracy is dependant on the economic development of 
the nation (see 1994, 3: 136). Hence, Aranguren describes existing democracy as merely 
formal and insufficient (1994, 3: 128-29; 1994, 4: 248). Nonetheless, Aranguren says − 
making a humorous reference to the deficiencies of existing democracy − that “mi posición 
es clara: pienso, con Churchill, que la democracia (parlamentaria) establecida es el peor de 
los regímenes imaginables –con excepción de todos los demás…− que hasta ahora se han 
realizado” (1994, 5: 469). That is why he considers it necessary to strive for a utopian 
democracy which he adopts as a reference, guide, and aim (1994, 5: 400-01). According to 
Aranguren, “la democracia no es un status en el que pueda un pueblo cómodamente 
instalarse. Es una conquista ético-política de cada día, que sólo a través de una autocrítica 
siempre vigilante puede mantenerse. Es más una aspiración que una posesión” (1994, 3: 
111; see also 1994, 3: 108, 123). Thus, democracy is utopian in its very nature in the 
etymological sense of u-topia: not a place. For Aranguren, democracy, like utopia, is not a 
place, not even a state, but an aspiration and a process as seen above. Its high standards also 
account for its utopian nature, for the moral, ethical, political, and, even, educational 
demands it places on its agents can hardly be met, and, yet, cannot be given up (Aranguren, 
1994, 3: 104-05). As Camps puts it, Aranguren “propugnó el compromiso, pero con la 
utopía, no con la imperfecta realidad” (1997: 185; see also 184). Although Aranguren does 
provide some suggestions of how to develop and achieve a genuinely democratic society, 
he does not put forward a detailed plan to do so. His focus is largely the critique of the 
existing − merely formal − democracy, as we shall see below. 
Given that democracy rests on the possibility of free choice which requires sufficient 
information, Aranguren identifies communication as one of the key pillars of democracy. 
According to him, “la auténtica democracia es un sistema omnidireccional de 
comunicación. Nuestra ‘democracia’, el monopolio unidireccional de la comunicación” 
(1994, 5: 431; see also 114-15). With this concise phrase, Aranguren is making reference 
not only to the less than optimal levels of participation in the democratic process, but also to 
the very mechanics of such a process (1994, 3: 122; 1994, 5: 74-75). He criticizes the 
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limited availability of participation in this prefabricated democracy, the limited information, 
the lack of real choice given the manipulative environment in which individuals are 
immersed, and the deficiencies of political education (1994, 3: 108-09; 1994, 5: 74, 113, 
125, 167; see also Wright, 2002: 78). 
Thus, Aranguren is highly critical of the systems of communication: “La democracia 
ha sido ya descrita, en términos de ciencia moderna, como un sistema de comunicaciones 
entre el poder funcionalmente especializado y la masa” (1994, 3: 134; see also 1994, 5: 78). 
Concerned with this gap, Aranguren criticizes the use of the mass media and its effects, 
addressing the issue of manipulation. It is possible, however, to observe a changing, even, 
contradictory attitude towards the subject of manipulation, which bears testimony to the 
evolution of Aranguren’s thought. In La comunicación humana (1965) – this is, before his 
stay in the United States – Aranguren contemplates the possibility of the existence of 
manipulation by the mass media and quickly discards it (1994, 5: 91-92). Instead, he 
discusses “comunicación instrumental”, which refers to any communication whose aim is to 
produce a pre-established response in the receptor (1994, 5: 69; see also Gouldner, 2002: 
84; Wright, 2002: 76-79). In contrast, in Entre España y América (1974) he fearlessly 
denounces manipulation: 
el hombre americano de la “mayoría silenciosa” se siente libre porque puede elegir entre diversos 
modelos de automóviles, entre diversas marcas de otros, de todos los bienes de consumo, entre 
diversas confesiones religiosas y entre dos partidos políticos –últimamente entre Humphrey y Nixon–
. E incluso moverse y elevarse dentro de una escala: pasar de baptista a merodista [sic], a unitario, a 
episcopaliano; pasar de demócrata a republicano; pasar de consumidor de Chevrolet, a través de toda 
la gama, a consumidor de Cadillac, o bien de consumidor de Ford a consumidor de Lincoln. 
¿Es ésta una elección real? No. [...] porque tal asimilación es, en realidad, un conformismo 
conseguido por la manipulación o persuasión escasamente racional, lograda a través de los medios de 
comunicación colectivos (1994, 5: 167). 
The influence that American culture and the existing socio-political atmosphere at the time 
have on him is palpable, encouraging him to take a critical stand towards an unsatisfactory 
cultural ideal, that of consumerist and technological society (see 1994, 5: 167). 
The evolution of his thought can also be observed in reference to the issue of the 
homogenization of society. Even though in 1965 Aranguren is not ready to use the word 
manipulation, he is still concerned with the effect that the mass media have on society. An 
instance of such homogenization is pointed out even earlier, in La juventud europea y otros 
ensayos (1961), in relation to the phenomenon which he describes as aburguesamiento, the 
adoption of a bourgeois attitude. He describes this bourgeois attitude as “sentir como 
necesidades las presentadas como tales por la técnica moderna de la propaganda al servicio 
del capitalismo” (1994, 4: 194). As a result of having raised the standard of living, with 
individuals having a greater spending power than they or their parents used to before the 
adoption of a capitalist economy in Spain, the patterns of education, employment, and 
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leisure, particularly travel, pursued by young people, suggest to Aranguren that the distance 
which separates different social classes is disappearing. Instead, there is great mobility, both 
geographical and social, which results in a social levelling effect (1994, 4: 194). For this 
reason, still in La juventud europea y otros ensayos (1961), Aranguren wonders if Western 
society has chosen a bloodless path to reaching the material objectives of Soviet social 
philosophy (1994, 4: 194-95).  
In contrast, in La comunicación humana (1965), Aranguren is more critical of such 
homogenization; he claims that mass media leads to the homogenization of the people into 
a differentless mass, which results in their conformism and the creation of a sense of 
consensus (see 1994, 5: 74-76). After his prolonged stay in the United States, in Entre 
España y América (1974), Aranguren is ready to denounce homogenization as the result of 
the process of manipulation of the mass media. In this text, he analyses one specific aspect 
of this homogenization, the assimilation of difference into sameness (1994, 5: 166-67). He 
criticizes this assimilation process for two reasons:  
en primer lugar porque, además de las reducidas comunidades indias, hay dos grandes etnias, la negra 
y la de los mejicano-americanos, que se hallan excluidas de la posibilidad misma de la asimilación. 
Y, en segundo lugar, porque tal asimilación es, en realidad, un conformismo conseguido por la 
manipulación o persuasión escasamente racional, lograda a través de los medios de comunicación 
colectivos (1994, 5: 167). 
His concern with the influence of the mass media on the will of the individual, even 
if in La comunicación humana (1965) he is still not really to refer to it as manipulation, can 
also be observed in his discussion of the concept of propaganda. In La comunicación 
humana, according to Aranguren, “las fronteras entre la información y la propaganda son 
difíciles de fijar, no solamente por ésta sino también por otra razón: la interferencia de la 
política en la información” (1994, 5: 89). He explains how linguistic evidence of the 
impossibility of determining where publicity stops and information begins and vice versa, 
can be found in the changes in the use of the Spanish words “propaganda”, which 
etymologically means to propagate information, and “publicidad”, which originally means 
to make a piece of information public (1994, 5: 89). He argues that the deliberately political 
content of this “propagation” with the aim of influencing people’s opinions and behaviours 
motivated the Ministry of Propaganda to become the Ministry of Information (1994, 5: 89). 
Aranguren’s conclusion is that the blur between propaganda and information is revealed in 
the attempt of the media to maintain an appearance of objectivity. His point is that often 
information is tainted by political or economic interests: 
Mas cuando la prensa no es controlada por el Estado, suele serlo por las grandes empresas 
capitalistas, que interpretan la información, con ligeras variaciones, según tendencias muy 
semejantes, permitiéndose así una libertad más formal que real, pues los periódicos que se mantienen 
independientes de los grandes intereses difícilmente pueden hacer, faltos de posibilidades 
competitivas, sino tiradas muy cortas, y así su significación e influencia es mucho más “simbólica” 
que efectiva. Por eso la socialización de las emisoras de radio y televisión es, en el mundo actual, la 
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única manera de salvaguardar la libertad de información: que tales emisoras se constituyan en 
“servicios públicos” a los que todos los grupos político-sociales, cualquiera que sea su ideología, 
tengan acceso por igual (1994, 5: 72). 
Aranguren suggests that information, when mediated by economic interests which are 
common to different companies, becomes one-sided; differences are minimal and there is 
no real critical, socio-political, or economic discussion. He highlights the importance of the 
economic and ideological independence of the mass media in order to ensure the quality 
and impartiality of the information they transmit. Far from being independent, if the 
services of information are run by the State, their political integrity is compromised, 
whereas if they are privately owned, they are subjected to the demands of the market. The 
mass media are dependent on consumption in as much as they become a product to be 
marketed.  
Hence, Aranguren identifies the subordination of the mass media to the market as one 
of the key factors affecting the reliability and quality of the information transmitted. As a 
result, he considers that the information being transmitted is little in quantity and possibly 
biased, in the sense that it will be difficult to tell where propaganda stops and information 
begins; furthermore, it tends to be general and superficial so as not to disappoint any group 
of viewers (1994, 3: 107; 1994, 5: 74, 90). According to Aranguren, the mass media aim to 
entertain the audience with trivia so that they cannot gain a global perspective and full 
awareness of what is going on (1994, 5: 91). The result is that, despite the questionable 
quality of the information received − or precisely because of this − people still feel thirsty 
for information (see Aranguren 1994, 5: 91). His thesis is that this is a thirst which they 
often attempt to quench with the consumption of novelty – not information – in the realm of 
leisure in the form of films, books, and plays, to mention but a few. 
During the early 1960s, Aranguren already shows a growing awareness of the 
phenomenon of consumption: “el hombre necesita hoy consumir sin cesar tiempo, dinero e 
información. Todo está íntimamente ligado en una ‘forma de vida’, que nos puede gustar o 
no, pero que es la que ha adoptado para sí el hombre occidental” (1994, 5: 92; see also 
1994, 5: 147). Thus, Aranguren becomes highly critical of the consumerist economy 
because of how it affects the quality and integrity of the products sold, but also individuals, 
who become consumers: 
lo característico de ésta [economía] es que, en ella, el consumidor se ve atribuido el papel 
fundamental de motor de la rueda producción-consumo. Ha de ser, necesariamente −con necesidad 
impuesta por el sistema económico− el consumidor insaciable que demanda bienes de uso siempre 
nuevos y absolutamente innecesarios. Pero justamente por ser tan importante su función no puede 
confiársele, sin más, a su iniciativa, sino que es menester, a toda costa, estimular ésta. Para ello se 
monta todo un sistema de publicidad o propaganda que, mediante una perfecta técnica sociológica, 
psicológica y aun psicoanalítica del anuncio, alumbre en el consumidor una fuente incesante de 
necesidades siempre renovadas y de necesidades de prestigio y status social (1994, 3: 158).  
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Thus, publicity is identified as the key component of the consumerist economic structure, so 
that when consumption increases, so does production. For this reason, from Aranguren’s 
perspective, the welfare society constantly creates new needs and the impression of scarcity 
with the purpose of increasing consumption and prices (1994, 4: 543-44). That is why 
Aranguren’s critique of consumerist society cannot be understood without his reflections on 
the concept of manipulation. It is this constant fabrication of needs what makes Aranguren 
conclude that  
sí, sin duda es improbable que un campesino andaluz que se muere de hambre se convierta en crítico 
del consumismo. Sólo quien ha pasado ya por esa forma de “felicidad” que brinda la sociedad 
americana establecida puede sentir su insuficiencia (1994, 5: 168; see also 1994, 2: 559; 1994, 3: 165; 
1994, 4: 443; 1994, 5: 587)83. 
Aranguren explains that the American citizen in the silent majority feels free because 
he can choose amongst different automobile brands, amongst a multitude of commodities, 
different religions, and two political parties; yet, Aranguren questions the possibility of the 
existence of real choice, real freedom, that is, real democracy (1994, 5: 167). It is possible 
to observe how he takes the United States as a point of reference as regards the 
development of the consumerist society and its effects on politics and the individual. He 
argues that, considering the manipulation exercised by the mass media, the choices made in 
the political, economic, or, even, personal aspects of life, such as leisure, cannot be 
qualified as free or rational:  
la manipulación publicitaria se traspone del plano económico al político exactamente con la misma 
técnica. El ciudadano es tan libre, o tan poco libre –según se consideren las cosas−, como el 
consumidor. Enteramente libre de coacción violenta, pero heterocondicionado –al menos 
mayoritariamente− por la presión social ejercida mediante los medios de comunicación de masas a 
los que, como no tenga una mente extremadamente crítica e independiente, es muy difícil que pueda 
resistir (Aranguren, 1994, 3: 159; see also 1994, 1: 775; 1994, 2: 689-90; 1994, 3: 53, 109, 158). 
Aranguren emphasizes that the tendency in the Western world is to substitute terror with 
manipulation (1994, 2: 595; 1994, 3: 158):  
el Welfare State o Estado de bienestar no es totalitario, puesto que no pretende absorber la vida 
entera, ni se impone por la coacción y la violencia. Es, en cambio, “manipulador” del ciudadano al 
que, como contrapartida de su sometimiento a la manipulación, le garantiza el bienestar, la 
abundancia y la seguridad. Esta manipulación es doble: manipulación económica y manipulación 
política (1994, 3: 158).  
In Ética y política (1963), Aranguren is of the opinion that a preference for 
manipulation over coercion and violence indicates that the Welfare State cannot be 
considered totalitarian. As time goes by, in El marxismo como moral (1968), he reconsiders 
this position (1994, 3: 109). In fact, Propuestas morales (1983), he describes this 
                                                
83 It should be noted that, as de Miguel points out, “el disgusto que le produce a Aranguren la sociedad 
de consumo no es por lo material, sino por lo moral” (1997: 27-28). Like Marcuse in One-Dimensional 
Man (1964), Aranguren’s aim is not to reject material abundance or technological advances, but their 
role and use in consumerist societies, which renders the individual subservient to them, instead of 
contributing towards his self-actualization. 
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generalized manipulation as a totalitarian form of government (1994, 2: 595). The Welfare 
State is considered totalitarian because of the lack of freedom that manipulation entails, but 
also because of the extent of its reach, its ubiquitousness. The reach of the mass media has 
lead to its presence in and invasion of the private sphere. Moreover, the division between 
private and public becomes blurred for the individual and for the politician. As a result, 
Aranguren implicitly suggests a parallelism between the Welfare State and fascist regimes 
by reminding us of the masterful utilization of the mass media as a powerful tool of 
manipulation made by fascist regimes:  
el fascismo consistió en una utilización de las masas como material plástico, en el doble sentido de 
esta última palabra: moldeable a voluntad, gracias a las dotes estéticas o histriónicas de fascinación 
que había de poseer el Duce o el Führer, y susceptible de ordenaciones estéticas y rítmicas de valor 
plástico (1994, 5: 77; see also 76). 
Democratic societies, however, maintain the appearance of freedom of choice. 
According to Aranguren, “la pregunta que hay que hacer, puesto que están siendo 
manipulados, no es si en efecto quieren tal o cual cosa (lo previsto desde arriba), sino si les 
será posible querer otra cosa” (1994, 2: 595). Manipulation in democratic societies involves 
lack of real choice, not because of the unavailability of choices and alternatives, but because 
of the individual’s ignorance of his own manipulation, that is, because of false 
consciousness (see Marcuse, 1979: 145). It is in this sense that, for Aranguren, the 
dictatorship of manipulation is worse than that of terror (1994, 2: 595). This has a far-
reaching consequence: there is no distinctive agency. There is no one person, institution, 
political party, or regime against which to direct the individual’s anger, frustration, or 
unhappiness; there is no immediate agency to make directly responsible or to take action 
against, thus adding to the confusion and sense of loss of the individual (see Aranguren, 
1994, 5: 434; see also Marcuse, 1979: 32). On other occasions, Aranguren points to the 
Establishment, understood as those who after the Civil War enjoyed a comfortable 
economic and political position, as the agents of power (see 1994, 5: 172; 1994, 4: 425-432, 
583-84, 586-90). It is precisely because of having identified the responsibility of the 
Establishment that Aranguren does not share the sense of hopelessness that runs through 
much of Marcuse’s work. In contrast, with this awareness, Aranguren feels democracy 
empowers Spanish citizens to take control over their own socio-economic and political 
destinies. Awareness of manipulation and its effects are, thus, vital to allow the process of 
liberation and empowerment. To this end, Aranguren discusses at length the effects of the 
mass media in Ética y política (1963), La comunicación humana (1965), and La 
democracia establecida (1979b). Apathy, a powerful ally of power, is pointed out as one of 
the effects of the manipulation of the mass media (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 74-76). 
Apathy is a serious challenge for democracy because, whereas the essential feature of 
democracy is participation, apathy undermines participation and results in conformity (see 
 138 
Aranguren, 1994, 3: 122; 1994, 5: 406, 418). That is why Aranguren concludes that in order 
to have a genuinely democratic society a profound change must take place, although not a 
mere political change, but a generalized personal one:  
Para que haya verdadera democracia, lo hemos visto ya, tiene que producirse una auténtica 
conversión del hombre privado en hombre público. Cada ciudadano ha de anteponer el interés del 
Estado a su interés particular; más aún, debe vivir, obrar y pensar, ante todo, para la patria (1994, 3: 
104-05).  
Aranguren points to rhetoric as one of the main causes of political apathy because it 
obscures the political discussion and makes it very difficult for people to have an opinion 
about that which they cannot understand (1994, 5: 124-25). The challenge remains how to 
achieve political involvement. According to Aranguren, a healthy democratic society, 
where there is a successful process of communication and a comprehensive understanding 
of the problems and challenges faced, where individuals are concerned and involved with 
politics, can only be achieved by means of education: political, economic, and moral 
education (1994, 2: 711; 1994, 3: 89, 109; 1994, 5: 93, 113). Aranguren sees a direct 
connection between interest and awareness. His emphasis on education suggests that he 
believes that a process of enlightenment or awareness will result in the empowerment of 
those who undergo such a process, in such a way that it would have an objective social 
impact, hence his consistent emphasis on the importance of education, particularly political 
education. Aranguren also recognises the value of movements such as environmentalism 
and pacifism as effective ways of involving people in the political arena (see 1994, 2: 664, 
666). It must be stressed, however, that Aranguren envisages a very different concept of 
socio-political transformation from that of the Enlightenment or Marxism, both of which, as 
Camps explains, expect the individual citizen to be the moralizing and revolutionary force 
which ultimately created the desired State (1997: 182). This is an unsatisfactory approach 
because “el Estado parece ser un fenómeno originario, que debe tener implícito el poder de 
su propia transformación” (Camps, 1997: 182). Instead, Aranguren advocates what he calls 
“ética de la aliedad” (1994, 3: 147-65; see also Bonete, 1997: 276): an understanding of 
ethics which results insufficient unless it is linked to a social project, hence his emphasis on 
co-habitation and co-responsibility (see Camps, 1997: 182; see also 3.2.1.1). That is why, 
ethics must be intrinsically linked to politics and transformation can only take place in 
stages; the individuals transform their society and their institutions at the same time, and the 
State also promotes social justice and self-development, which in turn, would have an effect 
on the individuals who would also affect the State. Hence, this understanding of ethics 
advocates the individual integrate into their community and from it to develop a process of 
spiral personal and socio-political transformation. 
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The level of commitment expected from the individual, however, is problematic. 
Marcuse suggests that liberated individuals organized as a community may unite and 
transcend their selfish interests and impulses (1970b: 150). Similarly, in Ética y política 
(1963a), Aranguren seems to suggest the subordination of the individual to the State, not so 
much the naïve assumption that there will be no conflict of interests between the two of 
them, but rather defining the role of the State as seeking the common good. To this effect, 
he explains that “el ‘bien común’, debe prevalecer por encima de las ganancias o beneficios 
de las ‘grandes sociedades’ y por encima también de un Estado concebido como poder y 
dominación” (1994, 3: 163). Having said that, despite this caution against the State as 
power and domination, Aranguren seems to believe that defending the State’s interests will 
have a positive repercussion on the individuals who form it. As he puts it: “en definitiva, las 
decisiones fundamentales para la sociedad han de hacerse desde el Estado y por el Estado” 
(see 1994, 3: 145; see also 111, 163). As a result, Aranguren defends the role of a 
paternalistic State whose intervention should not stop at the economic realm, but should 
also include the spheres of leisure time, education, and the search for justice, welfare, and 
equality. In his own words: “pero la planificación no debe limitarse al plano económico. El 
Estado moderno no puede ser éticamente neutral” (1994, 3: 146). Still in Ética y política 
(1963), when discussing the motivations for the intervention of the State in implementing 
social measures, particularly in reference to socialist government, Aranguren explains that 
“el motor no puede ser –no debe ser– el interés capitalista determinado a dar la primacía a 
los bienes suntuarios de consumo para conseguir así, como un subproducto ético, el 
bienestar material de todos, sino la organización, inspirada en una auténtica voluntad de 
justicia, de dar a cada uno lo suyo, de la democratización económico-social” (1994, 3: 
162)84. That is why, as mentioned above, Camps highlights that Aranguren opts for a 
political approach which must be intrinsically moral, as opposed to a political morality, that 
is, the subordination of morality to politics; thus, for him, “la política debe aspirar a ser 
moral; la moral no debe condescender ante los condicionantes de la política” (1997: 181; 
see also 182). 
This intrinsically moral State would, then, be obliged to adopt a paternalistic attitude 
so as to put in place the necessary mechanisms to promote social justice. Despite this 
necessity, Aranguren is well aware that such paternalistic interventionism on the part of the 
                                                
84 By embedding this quest for social justice in democratic co-ordinates, Aranguren indicates the 
central role that morality ought to play in socio-political and economic organization. At the same time, 
because of his advocacy of the separation between Church and State, these guiding moral principles 
can only arise from a heteronomous morality (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 221). It is, therefore, coherent 
that as a result of these positions, Aranguren does not consider the formulation of a specific proposal of 
how to achieve such a society as his role. Furthermore, such a specific and comprehensive formulation 
would, in his eyes, be undesirable because it would also be necessarily limiting.  
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State results in the limitation of the freedom of the individual. This, however, seems to be a 
sacrifice which he is willing to justify on account of the greater common good referred to 
above. As he puts it, “se trata de limitar en cierta medida la libertad precisamente para 
salvaguardarla y para la democratización de su núcleo esencial” (1994, 3: 163). 
 The preponderance of the State’s interests over those of the individual, however, 
echoes the structure of Totalitarian regimes such as Communism and Fascism. Upon this 
realization, Aranguren becomes more aware of the tension between individual and the State, 
and the individual and society and, like the FS, draws a comparison between the two of 
them. Such a comparison is absorbed by Aranguren’s discourse and, although he does not 
explicitly develop its implications, allusions to such a comparison can be found in reference 
to other issues, particularly manipulation, as can be observed in this example: “ahora bien, 
los regímenes políticos de nuestro tiempo, lo mismo los totalitarios que los que pretenden 
no ser tales, para mover a las masas recurren con frecuencia al llamado ‘culto de la 
personalidad’” (1994, 3: 107; see also above). He perceives society, rather than as a 
nurturing community, as a hostile atmosphere and source of multiple threats to the 
individual which often shapes and limits the possibilities for personal and social 
development through the manipulation of the mass media. As Aranguren puts it in Entre 
España y América (1974) in relation to North American society, 
verdaderamente la sociedad americana de hoy, manipulada por esos mismos medios de comunicación 
de masas […], por la “maquinaria” de una organización de los partidos que impide toda opción 
política real y por la voluntad de poder de las fuerzas económicas, militares y políticas que gobiernan 
el país, no ayuda a ser optimista (1994, 1: 775). 
Regarding the issue of manipulation, the question that inevitably arises is: how is it 
possible to become aware of being manipulated in the first place? Aranguren argues that he 
is personally aware of this manipulation due to his role as intellectual, that is, his informed 
and critical attitude towards the Establishment (1994, 2: 638-39, 641; 1994, 4: 236-39; 
1994, 5: 19-20, 69, 417-18). It is through education and his critique that Aranguren hopes to 
awaken an equally critical attitude in the reader, who would, then, become aware of his own 
false consciousness, initiating a process of liberation. Despite the vital role Aranguren 
assigns to education, particularly on the areas of communication, politics, and ethics, there 
is an elitist air to his positions, due to the privileged position he allocates the intellectual. 
The intellectual is supposedly aware and above the manipulation of the mass media and of 
the economic constraints which may influence his reasoning. Not only does the intellectual 
exercise the role of the invigilator from a political and moral point of view, but the 
intellectual is also able to free himself from false consciousness. Awarding intellectuals this 
high ground brings up the question of who invigilates the invigilators. Although Aranguren 
does not address this issue directly, given his assumptions on human nature, however, this 
question becomes irrelevant for him, for, if intellectuals performed their role successfully 
 141 
and qualitatively change society, there would not be any need for invigilators at all – which 
remains an elitist position which he shares with the FS. 
There is, in conclusion, sufficient evidence to conclude that Aranguren’s later 
thought is strongly influenced by the FS, to the point that he makes their preoccupations his 
own and develops his work in a manner consistent with the Critical Theorists’s approach85. 
Aranguren develops a comprehensive critique of neo-capitalism, focusing on the issues of 
consumerism, mass media, manipulation, and mass society with the aim of liberating the 
individual (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 714; 1944, 5: 69, 328, 379-382, 440, 460-70, 472, 482-83, 
485-86). It is for these reasons, that Aranguren can, therefore, be considered a Critical 
Theorist himself. 
It must be added, however, that whereas Aranguren, like the members of the 
Frankfurt School, does not affiliate himself to any political party, with the advent of 
democracy, he considers that one of the main aims of this critical approach is precisely to 
have an impact on the political realm, so as to effectively crystallize Critical Theory’s 
transformative aspirations as described at the beginning of this thesis. Furthermore, he 
considers – along with many Spaniards – that the Transition is a period of change, 
renovation, and hope, when longed-for utopias have an actual chance of realization86. This 
is, for Aranguren, a period which necessarily demands the political engagement, not only of 
intellectuals and politicians, but of the population at large, because only then – aided by a 
progressive programme of political education as indicated above – can a true transformative 
process take place in the form of an emancipated democratic society. Hence, whereas 
Critical Theory is often regarded as a negative philosophy as discussed in the introduction, 
Aranguren places Critical Theory in Spain in the context of positive action87. 
                                                
85 Motivated by his religious beliefs as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Aranguren strives 
throughout his career for social justice, towards which he contributes with his theoretical efforts in the 
fields of ethics and communication, but also with a more practical approach as he performs the task of 
the intellectual. Therefore, although Aranguren does not explicitly focus on the subject of religion in 
the later stages of this thought his personal religious commitment is incorporated in it and manifests 
itself throughout his work.  
 
86 Such high hopes become, of course, doomed by the limitations of reality and its agents, giving way 
to a generalized feeling of disillusionment which is referred to as desencanto (see 2.2). Even then, 
Aranguren considered his self-appointed task as a critic more crucial than ever. His most radical refusal 
in this context is his refusal to adopt the pessimistic immobility often associated with the FS. 
87 Aranguren’s faith in the democratic process is, in fact, in stark contrast with Marcuse’s Great 
Refusal: “Marcuse rejected, and continued to reject until the end of his life, the idea that transformation 
could be accomplished, furthered, or even aided by working within the existing democratic institutions 
[…]. Thus, the Great Refusal was a refusal to engage in liberal democratic politics. But it also seemed a 
refusal to engage in any type of politics or action” (Chambers, 2004: 224). As Marcuse himself puts it 
at the end of One-Dimensional Man: “the critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could 
bridge the gap between the present and its future, holding no promise and showing no success, it 
remains negative” (1964: 257). 
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Aranguren’s theoretical contributions are designed to have a practical effect on 
himself as a writer, but also on his readers, awakening the individual to become a critical, 
participative, and creative member of society. In Aranguren’s own words, “la lección de 
mayo del 68 es la de la profundidad del cambio y, consiguientemente, la de la necesidad de 
un trabajo lento y asimismo en profundidad, para su logro cultural” (1994, 5: 507). Hence, 
much of his later work is dedicated to bring about this change; his theoretical work is also 
his praxis, his moral vivida, his resistance (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 606; Cerezo, 1991b: 81-84; 
see Soldevilla, 2004: 123-143; see also Camps, 1997: 181-189). Thus, it is possible to 
observe that Aranguren’s writings, like those of Zambrano and Aguirre, are intended to 
have a performative character. His hope is that his critical stand will have an impact in the 
political, but also moral decisions of his contemporaries. His relevance lies in that, as 
Lannon explains, “in these circumstances, any major shift of religious sensibility, any 
severe questioning of intellectual presuppositions, was likely to modify the vocabulary and 
tone of political discussion, and ultimately to affect political values and expectations” 
(1987: 243). 
Despite this, Aranguren, like Marcuse and the rest of the members of the School, 
while a supporter of political dissidence, critique, and reform, refrains from suggesting any 
specific political pedagogical reform or programme (see Chambers 2004: 228). Whereas 
this has often been interpreted as a lack of commitment or consistency, it is, in fact, the 
direct result of their theoretical framework, where the role of a heterodox and autonomic 
ethics as well as the necessary separation between the critique and the politician would 
make it inappropriate and counter-productive for Aranguren – or any Critical Theorist as 
understood by the FS – to develop such a normative programme. 
As indicated above, Aranguren, like Aguirre and Zambrano, eludes providing 
practical details of the specific organization of his political project, since the formalism of 
such a system would act as a constraint impeding the free development of each individual 
as such. In spite of this, he still points to intellectuals as one of the first steps towards 
providing the necessary framework for people to reach a stage in which they can freely 
engage in politics.  
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4 Demystifying Zambrano 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the political dimension of Zambrano’s work and 
how her experiences of the particular historical time she lives in serve her as an intellectual 
starting point, which she uses to widen her understanding of this period, provide a critique 
and an alternative to the established patterns of rationality by developing her razón poética 
− from now on referred to as poetic reason − whose nature and implications shall be 
discussed below. As Mercedes Gómez Blesa puts it, 
el pensamiento de María Zambrano constituye una de las reflexiones más radicales sobre el logos 
filosófico de nuestra tradición, reflexión que abre dos vías o caminos paralelos en su trayectoria 
intelectual. Por un lado, una vía de negación o de crítica frente a la razón discursiva de la tradición 
metafísica, que se traduce en un análisis genealógico de dicha razón, a través del cual María 
Zambrano denuncia la voluntad de dominio del logos sobre lo real, voluntad que se concreta en su 
actitud violenta e impositiva hacia la alteridad al querer subsumirla en el espacio del pensamiento 
(2006: 37) 
On the other hand, Gómez Blesa adds, poetic reason constitutes a positive alternative, as 
opposed to mere critique as she shall see in the course of the present chapter (2006: 37). 
 Zambrano’s thought can be described as superador. Superador is an adjective which 
has no exact equivalent in English. It comes from the verb superar, which means to go 
beyond or overcome. Thus, Zambrano’s thought is essentially understood as an attempt to 
overcome previous limitations or difficulties. It must be noted that the Spanish adjective 
superador does not commit to conveying what is overcome, or even if they – whatever these 
limitations or difficulties are – have been successfully overcome. Instead, this adjective 
focuses on the intention and attempt to overcome them. Even though this lack of 
commitment may seem to indicate that this adjective is essentially uninformative, it is 
actually very well-suited to describe Zambrano’s work because, instead of being limited to 
one task, it suggests that the essence of her thought consists of the action of overcoming in 
an abstract sense, in general; her thought is set to overcome existing patterns of thought and 
behaviour, in other words, to overcome the established framework of rationality. As we 
shall see in the course of this chapter, reasoning, for Zambrano, is articulated through 
language, to the point that the language used shapes and limits the scope of thought and 
expression. That is why Zambrano sets out to specifically overcome these limitations of 
language by developing poetic reason. Thus, by overcoming the limitations of language and 
of the established framework of rationality, specific aspects of the manifestations of human 
existence, such as personal, social, and political ones, may also be overcome as we shall see 
below. It is in this holistic sense that Zambrano’s thought can be described as superador or 
overcoming. 
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Zambrano, by conscious choice and with the purpose of being consistent with the 
content of her work, does not develop her thought systematically (see Maillard, 1990: 27). 
In fact, Zambrano considers that Spanish thought has not traditionally developed 
systematically and warns against the dangers of systematic thought (1939: 34). 
Nevertheless, and in contrast with Maillard, who claims that it would be a mistake to 
present Zambrano’s thought as an integrated philosophy, I argue that, despite her thought 
not being systematic, Zambrano does produce a consistent œuvre (see Maillard, 1990: 28). 
Maillard goes on to explain that the reason for this is that every interpretation is necessarily 
a distortion of the original thought, in as much as in order for the interpretation to be 
possible, it requires a re-thinking of the original (see Maillard, 1990: 28). This is 
particularly true in the case of Zambrano’s thought, whose poetic style invites the re-
interpretation of its words. As Revilla Guzmán explains, Zambrano’s work continues to 
offer new possibilities for its interpretation, which, partly, “surgen de mi experiencia 
particular de lectura” (2005: 212). Re-interpretation, however, does not necessarily imply 
misinterpretation or distortion. In fact, I shall argue throughout the thesis that an important 
characteristic of poetic reason is, precisely, that it is designed to be appropriated and 
reinterpreted by each reader. Consequently, I do not suggest that Zambrano develops a 
finished, complete philosophy, but, rather, as we shall see in the course of this chapter, an 
open, yet coherent, project, which Revilla Guzmán describes as “un proyecto de revelación 
del ser humano, de alcance ético y radicalmente personal” (2004: 3). 
Because of the absence of a system, a comprehensive approach to her work involves 
a substantial process of reconstruction based on the numerous clues that she sparingly 
leaves throughout her work (see 4.4 which is devoted to the reconstruction of her thought). 
Moreover, the unveiling and reconstruction of the premises and assumptions which underlie 
Zambrano’s thought is essential to understand the nature, implications, and range of her 
critique and her alternative, poetic reason. Hence, it is not until these have been analysed 
that we can delve into the discussion of poetic reason, which is why such discussion does 
not take place until section 4.4.6.  
Two premises found in her thought will guide this analysis: the intentionality and 
coherence of her work. First, this intentionality can be found by analysing some crucial 
aspects of her biography, as we shall see below. Second, the coherence of her work can be 
observed not by analysing her work as a totality, because that would imply a self-sufficient, 
complete, product, but by the holistic approach to her work and persona. In order to do this, 
her recurrent main themes as well as their development will be explored. These themes 
include the analysis of the self, the concept of a person as opposed to an individual, her 
views on politics, the structure of time, and transcendence. Doing so is particularly 
important because one of the idiosyncrasies of Zambrano’s thought is the connectedness of 
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her philosophy; it is not possible to fully understand any isolated concept of hers if it is not 
in relation to the rest of her work. This is so because two of the underlying premises of her 
thought are the interrelation of being and the transcendence of reality, concepts which shall 
be explored at length in the course of this chapter.  
Before proceeding with the rest of the chapter, one more feature of Zambrano’s 
thought and expression should be highlighted, because it has a decisive influence in the 
analysis that follows. This feature is best expressed by Abellán, who puts it as follows:  
una cierta familiaridad con el pensamiento de María Zambrano, cuya obra vengo frecuentando desde 
hace más de veinte años, me ha llevado al convencimiento de que una comprensión profunda de su 
pensamiento y de su significado más hondo, exige haber sufrido un proceso iniciático que nos 
permita acceder a su declarado hermetismo (Abellán, 2006: 71).  
Heidegger’s thought also requires a certain degree of initiation as a result of his ontological 
language, without an understanding of which his writings would be inaccessible (see 
4.4.5.3). This, however, does not happen in Zambrano’s work, because in her case, this 
initiation does not require having learnt the use of certain vocabulary or intellectual 
concepts, but having an experiential baggage which would allow a greater degree of 
empathy towards her thought, but also a deeper level of access to it (see 4.4.3). Thus, 
biography and experientiality – an epistemological perspective heavily informed by lived 
experience – play central roles in accessing and understanding Zambrano’s work, which is 
why they are also central to the present analysis as we shall see below (see 4.2 and 4.4.3). 
This chapter shall consist of three core parts, an introductory section, which will 
provide a historical and biographical frame of reference, a section which will explore her 
political views, and a final one focused on the reconstruction of the working premises that 
inform her thought.  
 
4.2 Biography 
“Pero la vida humana es traspasar límites y 
tiempo, trascender la separación” (Zambrano, 
1996b: 170). 
As indicated above, the interrelationship between Zambrano’s life and work is particularly 
significant in her because of the personal nature of her writings; thus, her intellectual work 
is directly linked to her personal evolution (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 5; see also Revilla 
Guzmán, 2005: 50, 212)88. As she puts it: “no se escribe ciertamente por necesidades 
literarias, sino por necesidad que la vida tiene de expresarse” (2004d: 25). 
                                                
88 This interrelationship is also present in the opposite direction, for as Soldevilla puts it, “ha sido sobre 
todo María ZAMBRANO [sic] quien ha defendido con más énfasis la tradición española de 
pensamiento según la cual la articulación entre vida y obra se encarna en todo un ‘estilo de ver la 
vida’” (Soldevilla, 2004: 125; see also Zambrano, 1971: 277-78).  
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One of the first challenges which must be faced when approaching Zambrano’s 
thought is that it is − in many ways − resistant to analysis. This is so because of the level of 
abstraction of her texts, but also, most importantly, because of the hybridity of its content, 
form, and style as indicated in the introduction. As José Luis Mora García explains,  
sobre su pensamiento [el de Zambrano], en cambio, ha habido, en mi opinión, una postura casi 
inevitablemente bifronte pues hablamos de una obra hecha, en buena medida, al margen –no me 
atrevería a decir contra– la filosofía académica. La posición de ésta ha tenido que ser, por una parte, 
de recuperación de un pensamiento que la interpela y del que no puede prescindir sin riesgo de 
empobrecerse, pero, por otra, de cierta incomodidad al ver cómo su lenguaje, método e instrumental 
se muestran poco ajustados para interpretar un pensamiento de los calificados no sólo como “no 
sistemáticos” sino que hace de la no delimitación entre formas de conocimiento su razón de ser (3-4). 
As a result, as indicated in Chapter One, in an effort to overcome these challenges, 
the methodology chosen, in addition to the available textual evidence, also takes into 
account the biography and intentionality of the author. Hence, this analysis aims to go 
beyond literary exegesis and, following Skinner’s methodology as described in the 
introduction, it intends to reconstruct the premises and discuss the implications and 
consequences of Zambrano’s thought as a whole applying and respecting, in as much as 
possible, the co-ordinates of its own rationality. 
 This resistance to analysis is a feature shared by Aguirre and, to a lesser extent, by 
Aranguren. As indicated in the introduction, Zambrano is being analysed alongside 
Aranguren and Aguirre, because I argue throughout the thesis that the thought of these three 
thinkers can be considered to be a manifestation of CT and, as such, there are various 
important points of confluence. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the work of each of 
these thinkers constitutes an idiosyncratic and distinctive critique of the dominant paradigm 
of Western reason. As a result, the specificity of Zambrano’s thought will be discussed 
throughout this chapter, while also highlighting the points of confluence with Aranguren 
and Aguirre when found. In all three cases, the relevance of this resistance to analysis goes 
beyond the methodological challenge its analysis presents. It constitutes one of the key 
characteristics why their thought can be considered to be a form of CT, not only because of 
the inherent subversion present in any asystematic form of thought in as much as it poses a 
challenge to the existing systematic and hierarchical framework of rationality, but, more 
importantly, because in the degree that is analysis-resistant it is also resistant to being 
absorbed and neutralized by the dominant rationality. That is why any form of CT presents 
an initial resistance not just to the exegete, but also to the reader, who must agree to enter 
and function within the parameters offered by CT in order to have genuine access to the 
text. In other words, as we shall see here and in Chapter Five, it demands the engagement of 
the reader with the text, thus inviting him to partake in the alternative rationality the text 
offers.  
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 Thus, Zambrano elaborates a form of CT because of her critique and resistance 
towards instrumental reason, but, crucially, also because of her methodology. Hence, 
Zambrano’s poetic reason cannot be considered to be philosophy or poetry, and certainly 
not science, but a supradisciplinary approach whose key characteristic is the integration of 
theory and practice89. As Revilla Guzmán indicates, 
esta misma “razón poética” es simultáneamente una razón práctica […]. […] la reflexión sobre la 
“razón poética” habría de evitar la reducción de su propuesta a la mera adopción de un lenguaje 
literario poetizante y atender, por el contrario, al sentido del carácter fronterizo de su discurso, a su 
singular inserción en la tradición filosófica y a la dimensión práctica de su pensamiento como 
aspectos indicativos de lo que de original y más auténtico hay en su filosofar (2004: 1). 
This is an essential feature of her thought, even of her rationality, which must be 
considered as part of the methodology adopted for its analysis. That is why life and work 
form and inextricable link whose rupture would result in the misrepresentation and 
misinterpretation of her thought. Thus, the aim of this section is to highlight how many of 
her experiences have influenced the direction, tone, and content of her writings. 
 
4.2.1 Zambrano’s early political commitment 
Zambrano is born in 1904 in Vélez-Málaga. Although she soon leaves Andalusia (1908) to 
move to Madrid, this early Andalusian experience is deeply rooted into her spirit, leaving an 
indelible mark that will emerge in her work. This uprooting is all the more significant 
because it constitutes her first experience of destierro, contributing to the presentiment of 
her long exile (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 19-21). In 1909, the family moves to Segovia, 
where she discovers two key authors: Machado, whom she personally meets, and Aquinas, 
whose mystical poetry she connects with and cultivates an interest in (Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 
27-28). In 1924, Zambrano and her family move back to Madrid where they settle. This city 
is also of central importance for her because it is in Madrid, at the Universidad Central, 
where she studies with J. Beistero, J. Gaos, M. García Morente, the young Zubiri, and, most 
notably, Ortega, who has a deep influence on her thought. There she teaches as an auxiliary 
lecturer (1931) (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 28-29, 32; see also Abellán, 1998: 15, 24; 
Zambrano, 1989a: 32). Abellán interprets this collaboration in the Department of 
Philosophy as a “signo inequívoco de que el renovador impulso filosófico había alcanzado 
ya al mundo femenino” (1989b: 240). More to the point, it is also evidence of Zambrano’s 
integration into Madrid’s intellectual life. 
                                                
89 As indicated above, Zambrano – strictly speaking – does not produce poetry; instead “cuando ella 
habla de poesía se refiere, radicalizando el término de la poiesis aristotélica […], a una potencia 
específica del lenguaje que, por medios no conceptuales y a través de la ‘escucha’, descubre la unidad 
que subyace a la diversidad de la vida humana” (Maillard García, 1996: 53-54). 
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In Madrid, she befriends, even hosting regular tertulias in her home, several 
important intellectuals of that period: Miguel Hernández, Camilo José Cela, Luis Cernuda, 
José Antonio Maravall, Rafael Alberti, amongst others (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29; see 
also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 24). As is also the case with Aguirre, Zambrano fosters 
interconnections of a personal and intellectual nature with prominent figures, playing the 
role of mediator between Ortega and younger writers during the period 1924-1927, which, 
in turn, is reflected in the eclectic nature of her work (see the correspondence between 
Zambrano and Ortega, Fundación María Zambrano)90. 
 During this period, her social awareness grows. In 1928, Zambrano joins the 
Federación Universitaria Escolar (F.U.E.), participating actively in its efforts to engage 
intellectuals in politics, which culminate in the meeting of the students with Valle-Inclán 
and Azaña (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 18-19; see also Fundación María Zambrano). As a 
result of that meeting, the Liga de Educación Social, of which Zambrano becomes a 
spokesperson, is created (see Fundación María Zambrano; see also Zambrano, 1986c: 267). 
She is committed to the ideals of the Republic and actively supports Acción 
Republicana in the 1931 elections during the months of March and April. With the 
proclamation of the Republic (14/04/1931), Zambrano has a hard decision to make. She 
introduces Hacia un saber sobre el alma – a compilation of various introspective essays 
first published in its current form in 1987 – by recounting how she considers giving up 
philosophy three times in her life, once as a result of Luis Jiménez de Asúa’s offer of a seat 
in Parliament for the Socialist Party (2004c: 9, 11). By choosing to introduce herself with 
this episode, Zambrano informs the reader of the huge role philosophy plays in her life, but 
also of the tension she experiences between it and her sense of political responsibility. 
Zambrano declines the offer by saying that “el socialismo me era muy cercano pero no 
servía para la política” (2004c: 11-12; see also Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29). This statement 
summarizes Zambrano’s position on the matter. By saying she feels very close to socialism, 
she expresses her involvement with the party and, yet, at the same time, she successfully 
avoids defining herself as a socialist, in all likelihood, as a result of her ambiguous feelings 
towards this party and party politics in general. 
Several factors may have contributed to this ambiguity. Many intellectuals, such as 
Unamuno who becomes affiliated in 1894, favour the Socialist Party. Her inclination 
towards this party may have also been strengthened by the 1909 rapprochement between the 
Socialist and Republican Parties (see Abellán, 1998: 225). Other factors of a more personal 
                                                
90 Although such correspondence remains unpublished in print, the Fundación has made it available on 
electronic format, which is freely available from the Fundación’s website (for further details see the 
bibliography). In addition, the Fundación also provides biographical information which will be used in 
the course of this chapter. 
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nature also shape Zambrano’s perception of socialists and her views on politics. The 
relationship of her father, D. Blas, to the Agrupación Socialista Obrera, must be 
considered91. In 1913, D. Blas joins the socialist organisation in Segovia, becoming 
president (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 28). His presidency, however, is short-lived. Following 
the murder of a random passer-by by the son of a conservative cacique, landowner, the 
workers of the Socialist Party volunteer to go to the funeral, but on their way there, they 
decide to go to the murderer’s home first to take the law into their own hands. The president 
of the socialist party, Zambrano’s father, opposes such a decision but, after realizing his 
impotence in the matter, he resigns from the party and discontinues his active involvement 
in politics:  
lo dejó, dejó de ser socialista, su padre, y no entró ya a formar parte jamás de ningún partido. Y eso 
ella lo llevaría dentro también en Segovia porque… porque no había nacido para político, claro, pero 
lo que pasó es lo siguiente: había sucedido un crimen, un tonto crimen; [...] Dimitió irrevocablemente 
y no hubo arreglo; jamás volvió a intervenir en política. ‘Había que educar a la gente primero’ decía y 
hacía (Zambrano, 1989a: 81).  
Zambrano does not provide further details regarding the identity of the parties 
involved in the incident or the date (1989a: 81). In a later reference to her father’s political 
tendencies, she states that her father remained a socialist until the birth of the Republic, 
which gives us some kind of temporal indication for this incident (2004c: 12). The 
atemporality with which Zambrano chooses to portray these events is not without 
significance, for it suggests that, from her point of view, they are not relegated to the 
specific date in which they actually occurred, but that the reason why they happened, their 
significance, may still apply to a different moment in time, Zambrano’s time.  
The relevance of this incident lies in that it gives us an idea of the tense socio-
political atmosphere of that time, but more importantly, in that it has a great impact in the 
lives of father and daughter. In fact, in a very similar move to the one her father made, 
Zambrano leaves Acción Republicana in the light of the passivity of the Government of the 
Second Republic to the street disturbances and the burning of churches (see Ortega Muñoz, 
2001: 27; see also Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29). The animosity displayed by several groups of 
left-wing tendencies against religion, its symbols, and institutions must have strongly 
conflicted with her deeply rooted religious feelings, further adding to her disillusion and 
                                                
91 The influence of Zambrano’s father in her life and thought should not be ignored. Zambrano herself 
reveals and acknowledges this influence, not only by means of auto-biographical references to her 
father, as in the case of Delirio y destino (1989a), but also in a meaningful dedication in one of the 
short essays which comprise Bienaventurados first published in 1990, entitled “El filósofo” (2004a: 45-
61). There she says: “a la memoria de mi padre, filósofo y guía” (2004a: 45-61). It is the word “guía”, 
guide, in conjunction with “philosopher”, which is of particular relevance here, because it situates the 
sphere of her father’s influence beyond the realm of parental tutelage and acknowledges his role in also 
influencing or guiding the direction of her thought. 
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ambiguity, which result in Zambrano promising to herself not to belong to any political 
party (see Zambrano, 1996a: 87). The revision of her role in politics as a direct consequence 
of these events strongly suggests an idealised vision of politics or, at least, the clarity of 
vision to distinguish between the real down-to-earth political dynamics of that time and the 
highly idealised, theoretical, and sanitised world of politics that Zambrano hoped for. 
Further evidence of this gap − and of her own awareness of it − are her interest in party 
politics and her simultaneous insistence on her inadequacy for such matters (see 2004c: 11-
12; see also 1989a: 81).  
Zambrano justifies this move by pointing out that is not possible to separate the 
moral and political dimensions of the individual. For this reason, any political programme 
should acknowledge the holistic aspect of human nature and do politics from this awareness 
(see Salguero Robles, 1994: 4). Zambrano, however, acknowledges the distance that 
separates political theory from its practice, and, instead of attempting to bridge the distance, 
she refuses to enter into the dynamics of party politics, looking for a solution which may 
recognise and encourage the unity of the human being. This overarching solution is found 
to reside in the human being, or rather, in being human, what she refers to as being a 
persona. Thus, Zambrano rejects political activism per se as insufficient. She does not, 
however, give up her political engagement. In fact, as Clare Nimmo puts is, “the political 
engagement [is] found at every turn in her writing” (1997: 893). Her solution is the 
integration of this political engagement into her project of development towards becoming 
persona. By doing so, she overcomes the limitations of political theory, which is inherently 
theoretical. At the same time, she renounces a programme of political action which requires 
the adherence and involvement of others. This is a move by which political engagement, 
perhaps paradoxically, does not involve the competition for votes or supporters; it is a 
personal political engagement, not because it renounces the social dimension of politics, but 
precisely because it understands the need for a genuine social involvement. This is a kind of 
social involvement which, from Zambrano’s point of view, cannot take place through 
representation, but through the wide-spread acquisition of a personal political engagement 
of the kind she adopts: a political engagement that is the result of a holistic engagement 
with reality. As Laurenzi explains, “esta práctica tenaz del pensamiento [de Zambrano] 
como intervención en lo real es uno de los tantos rasgos ‘inactuales’ de su personalidad 
filosófica” (2004: 14). 
With the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, Zambrano, alongside a group of young 
intellectuals – Rafael Alberti, José Bergamín, Ramón Gómez de la Serna, amongst others – 
signs a manifesto, the first of many, declaring her condemnation of the military coup (see 
Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 28-29). In September 1936, Zambrano marries the historian Alfonso 
Rodríguez Aldave and they both soon go to Chile as a result of her husband’s job in the 
 151 
Spanish Embassy (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 29). Despite deciding not to involve herself in 
politics, during the Civil War, Zambrano returns to Spain from Chile to support the 
Republic; she is designated Consejero de Propaganda, and Consejero Nacional de la 
Infancia Evacuada (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29, 32; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 29). 
This suggests that she takes it upon herself to carry out the task that her father described as 
a necessary pre-requisite to politics: educating first (Zambrano, 1989a: 81)92. In Horizonte 
del liberalismo (1930), Zambrano describes her motivations for the participation in the 
events that took place from the end of the 1920’s until the late 1930’s as an attempt to 
channel the great unrest of the masses, and explains that “mi actividad en la Guerra, siendo 
moderada, fue intensa, implacable como había sido mi vocación filosófica, que sin duda 
estaba detrás de ella sosteniéndome” (Zambrano, 2004c: 12; see also Zambrano, 1996a: 36). 
By comparing her actions during the Civil War to her philosophical vocation and, more 
crucially, by saying that it is precisely this vocation that is supporting her, Zambrano hints 
that the motivation behind her involvement during the war also comes from her own 
engagement with her philosophical project. It is, thus, hardly surprising that it is during this 
period that she pens her most overtly political writings, such as “Preocupándose de lo 
social, la mujer” (1928), Nuevo liberalismo/ Horizonte del liberalismo (1930), and Los 
intelectuales en el drama de España (1937). After this period, her work turns to matters of a 
more personal and metaphysical – almost mystical – nature; despite this shift of focus, the 
entirety of her work remains the expression of the personal and political project already 
sketched out in her earlier work (see Cerezo, 1991a: 71, 87). 
 
4.2.2 Exile 
One of the common features that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre share is that they all 
spend a period of their lives abroad, which decisively changes their perspective and shapes 
their intellectual and political positions. This experience is lived most dramatically in the 
case of Zambrano, the only one who can – with propriety – be described as an exile. As 
Abellán explains, Spanish exiles are those who having supported the Republicans who leave 
Spain only upon realizing their cause is lost (1998: 34-35). This is precisely the case of 
Zambrano, who crosses the border into France on 28 January 1939 when all hope of a 
Republican victory is lost (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 32-33). 
As Balibrea explains, “exiles are by definition desterrados, absent from the common 
territory of the nation, and the business of interpreting their culture is a plurinational (at 
                                                
92 As indicated in chapter two, this importance placed upon the role of education is not limited to 
Zambrano, but a common trait amongst Republicans. In fact, Antoni Mora argues that “los filósofos 
republicanos viven su idea de paideia. El aspecto pedagógico como impulso básico de la filosofía es 
bien común en todos ellos” (2001: 132). 
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least binational) project. It involves contact with more than one ‘totalidad vivida’’’ (2005: 
4; see also Zambrano, 1989a: 237). Being unrooted and having to adapt to the host culture 
shapes Zambrano’s perceptions, experiences, and, ultimately, her intellectual production 
because “María Zambrano ha sido, ante todo y sobre todo, exiliada, y así se ha considerado 
ella” (Abellán, 1989b: 260). That is why her work must be contextualized in her experience 
of exile.  
What these exiles have in common is first and foremost their Republican background 
(see Mora, 2001: 128). There are other characteristics which can be identified as common to 
most intellectuals in exile (see Abellán, 1998: 35-39). First, they mostly settle in Spanish-
speaking American countries, where – in the absence of Spain – they live in their ideal of 
Spain, holding on to values and traditions as they remember them, giving way to a narrative 
of loss and memory (see Valis, 2000: 126, 131-32). Second, they are influenced by the 
Institución Libre de Enseñanza and share a certain missionary character. Third, Abellán 
argues that they experience a growing depoliticization due to the difficulty of becoming part 
of public life in a foreign country, so they focus their efforts on more academic activities, 
such as translation, research, and teaching; many of them, despite having held left-wing 
positions, adopt liberal political positions, even though liberal economy leads to capitalism 
(see Abellán, 1998: 37). Faber punctuates this further saying that  
most exiles, though active in their own political struggle, kept an exceptionally low profile where 
Mexican or Latin American politics were concerned. Still, the ideological baggage they carried with 
them from the “Spanish revolution” had an important impact on their host societies (2002: xv)93.  
Zambrano’s defence of liberalism, however, is a cultural, even a spiritual one which allows 
for the development of the spirit by avoiding the dangers of an overpowering materialism 
(see Abellán, 1998: 37, 259; see also Bundgård, 2005a: 27). 
This depoliticization, however, must, be further qualified. Although it is true that, for 
the reasons pointed out by Abellán, these exiles take little or no active part in public 
political life, particularly so with the passage of time, some Spanish philosophers in exile 
continue to write political philosophy. Defending this claim, however, requires devoting 
closer attention to the term “political philosophy”, which is inherently problematic. The 
tension of this term lies in that whereas “philosophy” suggests a theoretical, even 
hypothetical analysis, the word “political”, in contrast, evokes an active, pragmatical 
engagement with the world (see Bealy, 1999: 3). Although such analysis of both words 
                                                
93 Despite this apparent depolitization, it is crucial to highlight that because of their very status as 
exiles, their writings have an important weight. As Faber indicates, “for the exile, the simple act of 
writing becomes expressly political – sometimes to the point that literary fiction gives way to 
autobiography and memoir or to the polemic immediacy of the essay or the pamphlet” (2002: x). This 
political nature of writing can also be found in Zambrano, as argued below. In addition, Delirio y 
destino (1989a) provide the most obvious example of this blur between literary fiction and 
autobiography in Zambrano’s work, although it is by no means its only occurrence. 
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individually may suggest that political philosophy consists of a meta-analysis of politics, 
this is not the case, for this is the function of political science. Instead, political philosophy 
is, to a large extent, a meditation upon social life and organization, discussing how it ought 
to be and how it can be, while also providing a critique of what is. This is, indeed, a vast 
disciple whose boundaries are unclear. As Mora puts it,  
‘filosofía política’ expresa una tensión, una violencia interna; se refiere a la lucha (una de ellas) de la 
historia de Occidente entre dos de sus creaciones mayores: la filosofía y la política. 
Emblemáticamente, la muerte de Sócrates –y toda la reflexión que arranca con ella– es lo que 
podríamos llamar el acta fundacional de lo que denominamos filosofía política (2001: 130).  
That is why, after naming Walter Benjamin, the Frankfurt School, Georg Lukács, Hannah 
Arendt, Ernst Cassirer, Karl Jaspers, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Popper, Emmanuel Lévinas, 
and Jean-Paul Sartre as just some examples of twentieth century political philosophers, 
Mora goes on to say that it is precisely in this context of political philosophy that Spanish 
Republican philosophers such as Ramón Xirau, José Gaos, Juan David García Bacca, 
Eduardo Nicol, José Ferrater Mora, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Eugenio Imaz, José María 
Gallegos Rocafull, and, of course, María Zambrano, should be placed, because “su reflexión 
parte de la conciencia de una gran crisis filosófica y política” (2001: 131). 
It is in this sense that many exiled Spanish philosophers develop their political 
philosophy and are, thus, far from depoliticized. Having said this, it is true that on the one 
hand, with the passing of time and the prolongation of her situation as an exile Zambrano’s 
writings become less and less overtly political, being more inclined towards inner and 
spiritual concerns, which are explored through the development of her poetic reason. This, 
however, by no means should be interpreted as the abandonment of her political interests, 
but as the subsequent methodological development of a coherent political aim. As Abellán 
puts it, “el sentido iniciático del proceso señalado [el vínculo entre biografía, obra, y crítica 
social] queda así asumido en un proyecto de regeneración moral de la sociedad” (2006: 84). 
Her turn to self is, therefore, part of this project identified by Abellán. For this reason, for 
Zambrano, the social and, therefore, also the political spheres start with the self, more 
precisely, with the moral implications that any individual choice carries: 
Descubrir un camino, abrirlo, trazarlo, es la acción más humana, porque es al mismo tiempo acción y 
conocimiento; decisión y una cierta fe que regula la esperanza en forma tal de convertirla en 
voluntad. Es pues una acción moral entre todas (Zambrano, 1988b: 43; see also Abellán, 2006: 83). 
 Thus, morality is what binds the personal and the socio-political, which become necessarily 
interconnected (see 4.3.3 where this is developed in more detail). On the other hand, 
although Zambrano’s work deals with matters of political philosophy and integrates political 
philosophy into her thought, it goes beyond political philosophy by proposing and adopting 
an alternative rationality, that of poetic reason. 
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4.2.3 Zambrano’s journey 
With the fall of the Republic (1939), Zambrano enters France starting a long displacement 
which takes her to several different countries through Europe and Latin America (see 
Abellán, 1998: 24, 282; for more details on the Republican emigration to Latin America see 
Soldevilla Oria, 2001: 35, 36, 46, 55, 72). From France, she travels to Mexico, where, in 
1939, she holds a series of lectures in La Casa de España and she teaches at the Universidad 
de Morelia (see Faber, 2002: 45; see also Abellán, 2001: 21). In 1941, she moves to Cuba, 
teaching at the Universidad de la Habana and in the Instituto de Altos Estudios e 
Investigaciones. In 1943, she teaches at the Universidad de San Juan, Puerto Rico. This 
initial period of exile is particularly influenced by the situation of Spain and her physical 
distance from it: 
muchos de los libros importantes del exilio aparecen también en esos años. La “circunstancia vital” 
era para todos ellos el recuerdo, la añoranza de España, la esperanza de la vuelta, la zozobra de la 
situación política internacional. Son libros que derivan todavía, en su mayor parte, de lecturas, 
influencias y estudios de la preguerra española. Deberán recordarse, entre otros muchos, los 
siguientes: de 1939, Filosofía y poesía, de María Zambrano (Díaz, 1983: 38; see also Abellán, 1998: 
39). 
Spain, as a cultural entity, becomes for the exiled intellectuals one of the central 
topics of reflection (Abellán, 1998: 38). Zambrano shares with her compatriots this concern 
for Spain. As Zambrano says through the voice of Antigone, which is equally applicable to 
the circumstances of the Spanish exiles, “gracias al destierro conocimos la tierra” 
(Zambrano, 1986c: 256)94. Reflecting Machado’s and Unamuno’s influence, Zambrano, like 
many other Republicans − most notably Francisco Ayala (see Faber, 2002: 46, 171) − 
perceives Spain as a spiritual community, whose singularity, in contrast with the rest of 
Europe, lies in that, from their point of view, the Spanish form of knowledge is asystematic 
and oblivious to the form of reason of modernity (Faber, 2002: 44-47, 49; see Zambrano, 
1988a; see also the section below). As Francisco Caudet explains, exile is for Zambrano, 
                                                
94 According to Sophocles’s play, Antigone is the daughter – and half-sister – of the unwitting 
incestuous marriage of King Oedipus of Thebes with his mother Jocasta (see Sophocles, 2003). Her 
name is remembered because, when as a result of his struggle for power her brother Polynices is killed, 
she strives to provide him a traditional burial, even though she knows it is forbidden by pain of death. 
Consequently, her act of defiance earns her a death sentence. This story captures Zambrano’s 
imagination. In fact, she produces two works which focus on this figure; an article, “Delirio de 
Antígona” (1948), part of which she narrates in the first person, thus poetically appropriating 
Antogone’s fate at the same time that she empowers her with a voice; and a play, La tumba de 
Antígona (1967), which is re-edited in Senderos (1986c). The latter commences with a reflection on the 
figure of Antigone and the revelation that Zambrano identifies her sister Araceli with Antigone, for 
Zambrano perceives both women as sharing a similar disposition and fate (see Laurenzi, 2004: 55). 
Moreover, Zambrano alters Sophocles ending by keeping Antigone alive in her grave, so that she can 
become aware and reflect on the meaning of her sacrifice (see Laurenzi, 2004: 57). By conferring the 
protagonist this awareness, as Laurenzi observes, “su hazaña se coloca en el ámbito de lo ‘político’, 
pues se inspira en la búsqueda de la ley nueva, redentora, que parece dominar toda la historia 
occidental” (2004: 62; see also footnote eleven). 
 155 
and many like her, almost a process of initiation into the human condition (2005: 21-24): 
exile challenges individuals to such an extent that it encourages them to look into their inner 
selves and develop their own personal project. Abellán also reiterates this point. According 
to him, “Zambrano vive el exilio y lo considera también para otros como un rito iniciático 
al conocimiento humano en sí” (Abellán, 2006: 72).  
From 1946 − the year of her mother’s death − to 1948 Zambrano resides in Paris, 
where she is reunited with her sister. They both remain there until 1949 when they go to 
Mexico, where Zambrano is offered the chair of metaphysics previously held by García 
Bacca (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 33). This time (1946-1953) is marked by writings that 
make reference to the situation in Spain as well as to the political panorama in Europe (see 
Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 33; see also Faber, 2002: 44). This is also a period in which she is 
greatly concerned with the relationship between philosophy and poetry.  
Zambrano returns to Europe in 1953; she stays in Rome until 1964, when she moves 
to La Pièce, near Geneva (1964-1972), and, after her sister’s death, to Geneva itself. Juan 
Fernando Ortega Muñoz describes this period as the most fruitful (1992: 35). Although she 
does not abandon her interest in socio-political issues, as can be observed in Persona y 
Democracia (1958), this can be considered a period of a more metaphysical nature, 
mirroring to some extent the complexities and direction of the journey of her own life. She 
explores the concept of God and the differences between lo sagrado and lo divino. During 
this period, her thought takes her through less accessible paths, which require from the 
reader immersion and active co-operation in the interpretation of the chains of symbols that 
fill her pages. Personal experience comes to the fore in her work while it aims to unravel 
the intricacies of being; biography and intellectual production become, then, inextricably 
linked as observed in El hombre y lo divino (1955). Zambrano employs her experience of 
exile as a path which leads her on a journey into her inner self, subsequently reaching 
dimensions of herself, such as her descent to the ‘ínferos’, the underworld, which she may 
not have reached otherwise. It is during this European period (1953-1984), after having 
come to terms with the implications of exile, that she integrates her experiences shaping a 
more spiritual philosophy. In fact, Zambrano is aware of this internal process early on 
(1989a: 17). Using the third person to refer to herself, Zambrano already confirms in 
Delirio y destino − originally written in La Habana in the early fifties − this path to inner 
discovery opened by the pain she experienced: “y ahora, al no haber podido morir sentía 
que tenía que nacer por sí misma” (1989a: 11). The use of the third person in autobiography 
is a frequent occurrence with relevant connotations. The third person may be used to refer 
to a younger version of oneself which no longer exists. This, however, is unlikely to be the 
explanation for Zambrano’s use of it, for she is very aware of a sense of progression, that is, 
she is the person she is at the time of writing partly as a consequence of the person she was. 
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A more plausible explanation can be found in Bretz’s analysis of the modernist 
conceptualization of selfhood, according to which  
[it] emphasizes the presence of multiple I’s and in other theorizations takes the form of a subject that 
contains within itself one or multiple ‘others’. The two modes often coexist and although their 
difference appears slight, the shift in emphasis from an I constituted by multiple selves to an I which 
contains multiple others proves immensely productive in reimagining the self and its relations with 
other individuals and groups (2001: 77). 
 Although Zambrano is not a modernist, her use of the third person in reference to herself – 
which, in fact, is not constant, but shifts between ella and yo – is part of her deliberate 
attempt to blur the differentiation between the self and the other as described by Bretz, 
which is of great significance in understanding her overall thought, as we shall see in the 
course of this chapter95. 
Zambrano insists on further exploring the concept of “exiliado”, not only from a 
theoretical perspective, but also by taking a very conscious attitude towards her own 
position. As she explains in relation to herself and others who suffered a similar fate, “eran 
ya diferentes. Tuvieron esa revelación: no eran iguales a los demás, ya no eran cuidadanos 
de ningún país, eran exiliados, desterrados, refugiados…” (Zambrano, 1989a: 237). 
Although it cannot be said that Zambrano welcomes her first hand experience of exile, 
because this would imply some degree of desire for it, despite the strain of exile, she does 
embrace this experience. As Armando López Castro puts it,  
María Zambrano supo aceptar la realidad desconocida sin renunciar a la historia que le tocó vivir, 
antes padeciéndola en su desnudez, por eso el exilio no fue para ella […] sino una forma de 
liberación y transformación constantes, el nacimiento de una vida más íntegra y completa (2001: 125; 
see also 120). 
She embraces exile intellectually by exploring the concept of exile and its implications, but 
also at a personal level. Rather than settling down in any of the countries she emigrates to, 
creating a new ‘homeland’ for herself as many others in her situation do – an experience 
conveyed by José Gaos’s concept of being transterrado (see Abellán, 2001: 23) – Zambrano 
does not settle down until she is nearing the end of her life, when she finally returns to her 
motherland. 
It is not until November 1984 that Zambrano returns to Spain and settles in Madrid, 
where she passes away in 1991. Ortega Muñoz, describing this period (1984-1991) of 
Zambrano’s thought, says: “el pensamiento de María Zambrano se torna más poético, se 
estiliza y se depura hasta alcanzar cierto aire místico” (1992: 37). This certain mystical 
flare, however, does not mean that her writings are strictly speaking mystical, as I shall 
argue in section 4.4.6.2. Instead, it refers to a turn to self, to being; for in an effort to 
                                                
95 As indicated in the introduction, modernism in Spain constitutes the attempt to reach and embody 
modernity (see Abellán, 1989a: 17-18; see also 1.2). In contrast with this, Zambrano criticizes 
modernity and its consequences, as we shall see in the course of this chapter. 
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express the ineffable, her writings become more intimate and her style more cryptic (see 
4.4.5 and 4.4.6). 
 
4.3 Zambrano’s socio-political dimension 
Before delving into Zambrano’s political positions, the question of how she fits in the 
context of this research must be addressed. Zambrano’s engagement with Marxism is 
limited to her early work and it is of a critical nature, although some points of convergence 
with Marxism can be found, namely, the socio-political relevance placed in historical 
processes and the revolutionary role of political change assigned to the people (see Ortega 
Muñoz, 2001: 16, 48; see also Dorang, 1991: 107-08 respectively). However, unlike 
Aranguren and Aguirre, Zambrano does not associate herself with the CT developed by the 
FS96. 
There are, nevertheless, several reasons to include Zambrano in this line of research. 
Zambrano’s work, as argued throughout this thesis, can be considered CT for two main 
reasons: its critique of instrumental reason and its methodology. Although, given her 
distance from the FS, it could well be argued that this is an ad hoc conclusion, there are 
biographical and intellectual elements which contribute to it. As we have seen with 
Aranguren and we will see with Aguirre, Zambrano’s interest in politics and spirituality 
lead her to adopt very critical positions towards instrumental reason. The specific direction 
of her thought is also very much shaped by the intellectual climate, particularly the 
influence of Ortega – which is also common to Aranguren −. She comes into contact with 
Heidegger as a result of Ortega’s teachings. It is through the influence of Heidegger that 
Zambrano shares a common intellectual background with Aranguren and Aguirre, but also 
with the FS97. What CT does in relation to Heidegger’s work is to move away from the 
question of Being to the question of being-in-the-world. This shift is not only common to 
the members of the FS, but also to Aranguren, Aguirre, and Zambrano (Heidegger’s 
influence on Zambrano will be explored in greater detail in 4.4).  
                                                
96 Although it is not possible to argue the intellectual engagement of Zambrano with the FS, as is the 
case with Aranguren and Aguirre, it should be noted that Zambrano did enter into contact with their 
thought. Evidence of this is her possession of an edition of a compilation of Benjamin and Adorno’s 
letters − Allemands. Une série de letters (1979) − and Adorno’s Sulla metacrítica della gnoseologia 
(1964b), which can be found in the contents of her personal library (see Fundación María Zambrano). 
Because of this, and based on the nature of Zambrano’s own writings, it is possible to surmise that 
Zambrano is more inclined towards Adorno, given his sensibility towards music and poetry, as well as 
his poetic style which characterizes his writings as discussed in the introduction (see Brier, 2001: 113). 
Incidentally, Zambrano’s long trajectory of exile is visible in the language of the titles of the books of 
her personal collection, which provide a glimpse of Zambrano’s numerous relocations and cultural 
immersions. More to the point, they are also evidence of her familiarity, although limited, with CT.  
97 For Heidegger’s influence on the FS, particularly on Marcuse and Habermas, see McCarthy, 1991: 




Given the pivotal role that the influences received by these authors have in understanding 
their own positions, as well as how they relate to each other, this section will now explore 
such influences.  
As Jesús Moreno Sanz explains, Zambrano was initially linked to the generation of 
1929, a generation marked by the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, which is also known as 
the generation of freedom, in an allusion to its left-wing tendencies (1996: 14); in addition, 
Moreno Sanz observes that given Zambrano’s intellectual relationship with Ortega and her 
views about art and her aesthetic positions, she is also linked to the generation of 1927 
(1996: 14-16). Aranguren, however, describes her as belonging to the generation of 1936, in 
the sense that her life is marked by the generational event of the Spanish Civil War and its 
consequences, in her case, exile (1983: 126; see also Gullón: 1969: 163, 167). Although it is 
possible to link Zambrano to all of these generations, her thought should also be understood 
in reference to the Madrid School; in fact, Abellán refers to Zambrano as one of the core 
members of the Madrid School (1989b: 236; see also 3.1.1). Her thought, however, 
diverges significantly from Ortega’s. As Abellán quotes from Zambrano’s own CV, “la 
razón vital de Ortega es su punto de partida; mas, tanto los temas como su pensamiento 
mismo, no siguen ese camino, como puede verse ya desde el ensayo Hacia un saber sobre 
el alma (1934)” (1989b: 259-60; for Zambrano’s views on Ortega’s thought and influences 
see Zambrano, 2004c: 13-14). Whereas Ortega’s vision of art and textuality is essentially 
harmonic, masculine, and hierarchically ordered, Zambrano propounds a subjective 
relationship towards art and, particularly, textuality which challenges traditional 
hierarchical divisions (see Bretz, 2001: 511). As Aranguren explains, “la gran distancia que 
separa a María Zambrano de todos los demás orteguianos es su tratamiento del lenguaje” 
(1983: 112; her use of language and the role assigned to it will be further explored in the 
context of analytical and post-structuralist philosophy in 4.4.5.1). Nonetheless, and despite 
the significance of her own intellectual contributions and her formal achievements, most 
notably poetic reason, the influence of Ortega is patent in the direction and content of her 
work. It is because of this and because, as Zambrano explains, “el ser discípulo de aquel 
maestro no dependía de seguir los estudios filosóficos, por eso tantos en España sentían 
serlo, por eso la vida española había cambiado indudablemente al ir impregnándose de su 
pensamiento”, that she can be considered a member, if somewhat heterodox, of the Madrid 
School (1989a: 94). 
Unamuno, whom she does not meet despite being a personal friend of her father, is 
also amongst the key authors who influence her thought (Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 31; 
Zambrano, 1989a: 85, 88). Her link with Unamuno is particularly patent in the privileged 
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role her faith took throughout her work; this faith co-existed with intense periods of anguish 
in her life, which find expression in her work by exploring los ínferos, the personal 
underworld (Zambrano, 1977a: 41-42, 55; 1986a: 15, 37). The difference lies in that 
“mientras que Unamuno admite la dialéctica irredenta entre la razón lógica y cardíaca, 
María Zambrano supera la dialéctica en su razón poética” (Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 20). 
Other influences include Max Scheler’s concepts of co-understanding, co-love, and 
particularly his ordo amoris, order of love, which goes back to Aquinas, as well as some 
religious writers, such as San Juan de la Cruz and Pascal (see Zambrano, 1996a: 57; 1989a: 
118; 2004c: 13, 24). She also acknowledges the influences of Parmenides, Hölderlin’s 
Empedocles, German Idealism, Nietzsche, phenomenology, Bergson, and Jung (see 
Zambrano, 2004c: 54; 1992a: 25; see also Marí, 1983: 126; Moreno Sanz, 1996: 38; 
Maillard, 1992: 25).  
 
4.3.2 Zambrano’s particularity 
Ortega Muñoz affirms that the key to the particularity of Zambrano’s approach lies in that 
“ella une a su extraordinaria sensibilidad poética su misma condición de mujer que le 
permite captar ese susurro interior, sentir originario” (1992: 12). This statement, however, 
must be carefully considered. It suggests that thought and expression in general are 
necessarily gendered manifestations of the self and, specifically, that the originality of 
Zambrano’s contribution heavily lies in her being a woman. Laurenzi also defends this 
position. As a result, she argues the need to “reconocer que el pensamiento tiene siempre 
carácter sexuado, y por consiguiente dual, […] que representa el pensamiento de una mujer 
o de un hombre concretos, que han trazado una trayectoria inseparable de vida y 
pensamiento” (2004: 14). Whereas there is a link between biography and intellectual 
production which is particularly integral to Zambrano’s work, the extent to which 
understanding Zambrano’s thought as essentially gendered is helpful or, even, faithful to 
Zambrano’s own intentions has to be questioned. Laurenzi herself, in an effort to support 
her point, brings up in the same page what I consider to be the main objection to arguing 
that Zambrano’s thought should be regarded as essentially gendered and dual in nature:  
María Zambrano defendió siempre este vínculo necesario [entre vida y pensamiento], afirmando la 
necesidad de superar la abstracción y la fragmentación de las disciplinas distintas y dispersas para así 
recuperar un saber pleno, integral, que fuera saber de la vida y para la vida (2004: 14).  
The point here is far from denying that the parameters of Western rationality have 
been defined by a reason which is gendered and as a consequence the manifestations of 
thought which take place within these parameters are considered gendered in relation to 
whether they conform with or react against existing gendered forms of expression. As Rosi 
Braidotti argues, 
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in European culture, history and philosophy, the notion of “difference” is central. It functions through 
dualist oppositions which assert a monological system of sameness through subcategories of 
difference. [...] Phallogocentrism as an apparatus of subjectivity works by organizing the 
significant/signifying differences according to a hierarchical scale that is governed by the 
standardized mainstream subject (2002:158). 
Having acknowledged this, it must be underlined that the suitability of such parameters for 
the analysis of Zambrano’s thought is questionable. Whereas the notions of difference and 
sameness can be considered useful, even accurate when applied to the structure and 
dynamics of Western rationality, Zambrano’s thought is not merely one more manifestation 
of Western rationality. Instead, it constitutes a distinctive and comprehensive rationality 
which aims to overcome previous frameworks of reason by providing a viable alternative. 
For this reason, I argue that applying the very co-ordinates which Zambrano’s thought aims 
to overcome is not only unsuitable, but also a counter-productive exercise which risks the 
misrepresentation of the aim of her rationality.  
Revilla Guzmán’s description of Zambrano’s rationality as “una forma de 
racionalidad receptiva e integradora, abierta a la transmisión, materna y, en último término 
por ello, poética” constitutes an example of such misinterpretation (2005: 19). On the one 
hand, the term materna, maternal or motherly, sits at odds with the previous claim of being 
integrating. Being motherly, suggest a protective/authoritative, emotional, and 
stereotypically feminine approach which is inadequate to describe Zambrano’s thought. 
What is more, this position belittles the intentionality, nature, function, and reach of 
Zambrano’s poetic language. Interpreting her adoption of a poetic language as a genre-
related action is to misunderstand its significance. Moreover, when discussing other authors 
who, in Zambrano’s view, have integrated or attempted to integrate philosophy and poetry 
together, her referents, such as Heidegger and the Presocratics, are masculine (see 
Zambrano, 2004a: 51). On the other hand, Revilla Guzmán describes Zambrano’s 
rationality as poetic only in the last instance, pointing out that this poetic quality is the 
result of the previous adjectives: integrating, open, and, crucially maternal. This 
relationship of causality, however, betrays Revilla Guzmán’s position. First, the terms of 
this relationship of causality must be inverted, for whereas integrating, open, and poetic are 
adjectives closely linked to the observational evidence present in Zambrano’s writings, 
maternal, however, is a description which relies more heavily on the interpretation of such 
evidence. In fact, this interpretation reveals more about Revilla Guzmán’s own framework 
of rationality than it does about Zambrano’s; it suggests that Revilla Guzmán considers 
Zambrano’s rationality maternal because it is poetic and not the other way around, and it 
also reveals that Revilla Guzmán’s own framework of rationality is binary-structured with a 
clear opposition between paternal and maternal, between masculine and feminine discourse. 
What must be underscored is that the concept of a gendered expression, the division into a 
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feminine and masculine language, expression, or rationality – even if they do not 
necessarily correspond to male and female agents – is, in itself, the fruit of a dualistic 
understanding of reality. What Zambrano does is to step away from this dualist division, by 
making it inappropriate and inapplicable to her thought. 
 Another example can be found in Nimmo’s article entitled “The Poet and the 
Thinker: María Zambrano and Feminist Criticism” (1997), which shall now be discussed. 
As Nimmo indicates from the outset, although Zambrano is concerned with the situation and 
role of women, as manifested in some of her writings, she is, nevertheless, not a feminist 
(1997: 893)98. Moreno Sanz shares this view, and emphatically describes feminist accounts 
of Zambrano’s thought as “una grave tergiversación” (1996: 49; see also Moreno Sanz, 
2003: 358). In spite of this, Nimmo points out that there are important points of convergence 
between Hélène Cixous and Zambrano’s thought, namely, their denunciation of the binary 
nature of Western culture and Western reason, and their poetic language (1997: 894, 896). 
However, there is also an important divergence in the premise that sustains and motivates 
their thought. Whereas, as Nimmo explains, “Cixous decries this two-term system in which, 
she maintains, the male side consistently triumphs over the female to the point where 
woman is equated with passivity, defeat, and death”, Zambrano is more concerned with the 
limiting divisiveness inherent in this form of reason than with the gender allocation of roles 
or characteristics (1997: 894). This is not to say that Zambrano is not concerned with the 
                                                
98 As Revilla Guzmán explains, it is true that “el tema de la mujer reaparece en los escritos 
zambranianos bajo diversos registros –de hecho se ocupará de la condición de la mujer en la actualidad 
y de su presencia en la historia, de figuras femeninas, cuyo protagonismo es más o menos destacado, y 
de personajes en virtud de la importancia que les concede justamente por su condición y por las 
implicaciones de la misma” (2005: 20). Zambrano, particularly her early writings, offers a testimony, 
even a denunciation, of the situation of women (see Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 26; see also Moreno Sanz, 
2003: 59-61). Her concern for women continues throughout her work and is more explicitly manifested 
in writings where she lends a voice to various other women, such as “Eloísa o la existencia de la 
mujer” (1945), “Delirio de Antígona” (1947-48), and “Diótima de Mantinea” (1956), compiled by 
Laurenzi in María Zambrano; Nacer por sí misma (1995; see also Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 30). In these 
writings, Zambrano acknowledges and praises those forms of knowledge and understanding which 
have historically been associated with women and have, therefore, consequently been relegated. 
Nevertheless, Zambrano does not insist on highlighting and promoting this difference. Instead, her aim 
is to vindicate the value of these forms of knowledge, of thought, and ultimately, of being; her aim is to 
incorporate these into a wider, richer rationality which promotes overcoming a dualistic sense of being. 
As Maillard García explains, “la filósofa tiene muy claro que cuando llegue el momento de llevar a la 
luz de la conciencia el ser propio de la mujer, éste no debe seguir el camino de individuación que el 
hombre occidental agotó en la modernidad. En ella, dicho proceso que deja atrás el hecho de ser ante 
todo, criatura, toma visos de traición” (1996: 60). That is the reason why it must be highlighted that 
Zambrano’s pledge for the liberation of women, like the rest of her work, is done from a perspective of 
integration. As Revilla Guzmán herself indicates, “al considerar la situación actual de la mujer 
introduce, entre otras nociones, la de ‘integración’” (2005: 26). That is why, Moreno Sanz argues that 
Zambrano can only be considered a feminist in the sense of a “feminismo integrador” (2003: 60-61). 
The implication is that Zambrano does not set out to be a feminist, and her feminism is only the result 
of a by-product of a larger project of self-actualization with social and political ambitions, as shall be 
argued in the course of this chapter.  
 162 
treatment of women or with their place in society as indicated above; this is not, however, 
the focus of her project, but an inherent aspect of it. 
Nevertheless, as a result of these convergences, their resistance against a binary 
rationality and their use of poetic language, Nimmo argues that Zambrano’s work may be 
very close to the materialization of what Cixous refers to as l’écriture feminine (Nimmo, 
1997: 897)99. This conclusion, however, is the result of applying ad hoc an external 
structure to the analysis of Zambrano’s work (see 1.5). Instead, it is crucial to take into 
account the role of intentionality in order to understand the distance which separates 
Cixious’s use and role of poetic language from Zambrano’s. As Nimmo explains, for 
Cixous, the value of the use of poetic language in her écriture féminine lies in that, because 
this type of writing situates itself outside the male-centred philosophical discourse, it 
constitutes a liberation, in particular, a liberation “from the law of gender” (Nimmo, 1997: 
897). In contrast with this, and as we shall see in more detail in the course of this chapter, 
for Zambrano, the value of poetic language is multifold. Poetic language allows the writer 
to say the ineffable. As a result, and in line with Heidegger, Zambrano also believes that 
truth, Being, reveals itself in poetry. Zambrano’s poetic expression does not respond merely 
to a desire for aesthetic achievement; it is based on her belief that poetry may reveal and 
communicate truth where ordinary language is insufficient or ill-equipped. What is more, as 
discussed above, the metaphorical and symbolic expression achieved through poetic reason 
also allows for a multilayered text, whose ultimate meaning is individually constructed in 
the process of reading. In addition, as argued throughout the thesis, form and content are 
inextricably linked in Zambrano’s thought. Thus, Zambrano’s choice of adopting a poetic 
expression must be understood also as an ideological statement by which she refuses to 
sacrifice beauty in the interest of rationality. With poetic reason, Zambrano achieves the 
unity of these two elements, whose dichotomy is understood merely as the result of an 
unnecessarily limiting perception. Hence, although it is true that one of the goals of poetic 
reason is to overcome the binary division existing at the root of the prevailing gendered 
rationality, this is just one of the dichotomies which poetic reason aims to overcome. So, 
whereas when analysed from Cixous’s écriture feminine, as Nimmo argues, Zambrano’s 
work may not be “so far removed from such working in the feminine [Cixious’s 
understanding of working in the feminine]”, it becomes essentially different from it when 
                                                
99 For Cixous, l‘ecriture feminine constitutes a challenge to the phallogocentric discourse (see Klages, 
2006: 102-06). As Mary Klages explains, Cixous considers that l‘ecriture feminine is possible only in 
poetry because, on the one hand, poetic language is more flexible in that its meaning is less determined 
in as much as it is closely related to the unconscious; it is also because of this relationship that poetry is 
more conducive to the expression of the repressed, such as female sexuality (see Klages, 2006: 102). 
On the other hand, l‘ecriture feminine represents a rupture with the phallogocentric structure and, as a 
result, offers a transformative potential (see Klages, 2006: 102). 
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analysed in terms of poetic reason’s own framework and intentionality (Nimmo, 1997: 
897). 
In conclusion, analysing Zambrano’s thought and discourse in terms of gendered 
reason is misleading because such an analysis emphasizes the very differences which 
Zambrano’s rationality sets out to overcome. Hers is a rationality which arises from an 
integrating view of existence, to the point that her specificity is not the integration of 
opposites, but the realization that such opposites are just a perceived manifestation of 
transcendental unity, as we shall see in section 4.4.2.2. 
 
4.3.3 Zambrano’s political thought 
There are several ways in which Zambrano’s work is political. As explained above in the 
section on exile, from a theoretical, even philosophical point of view, Zambrano’s work, can 
be considered political philosophy. It is important to underscore, however, that – as I have 
been arguing throughout the thesis (see particularly 1.3.3) – Zambrano’s thought goes 
beyond political philosophy, and is, in fact, political in nature, not least because thinking 
politically is also politics in itself (see Palonen, 2003: 3, 29; see also 1.5). 
The word “politics” carries a multiplicity of meanings; thus, without the intention of 
being comprehensive, some of these meanings will now be highlighted here with the 
purpose of clarifying what politics is in relation to the authors here discussed and Zambrano 
in particular. First, politics is primarily regarded as an activity which refers to the process of 
making decisions for all or part of a given community. More precisely, it is understood as 
the activity which constitutes the professional object of politicians and an activity which, in 
democratic societies, is only exercised through a process of democratic participation by the 
rest of citizens who choose to do so (see Bealy, 1999: 3). Second, the understanding of 
politics is sometimes restricted to “politics as what the government does (Bealy, 1999: 4). 
Third, politics is also understood as “conflict and the resolution of conflict” (Bealy, 1999: 
4). And fourth, politics is often equated to current affairs (see Bealy, 1999: 4); it includes, 
for instance economic, social, and defensive decisions and situations both nationally and 
internationally. In this sense, people’s attitudes, positions, and behaviours not only have 
political implications, but are political in nature in as much as they have an effect on the 
state of things. In addition to these, as argued in the introduction, politics can also be 
considered as paideia, in as much as these authors in particular, hope to have an impact on 
the social organization and social practices of the society they live in by means of making 
people aware, “educating” (see 1.3.3). In the case of Zambrano, as argued above, she 
establishes an explicit link between education and politics, for she considers that – on a 
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large scale – only the former will enable the latter, thus, she takes on educational tasks as 
part of her political efforts100. 
 Furthermore, politics may still be understood in a more general and overarching way. 
As György Lukács explains borrowing Gottfried Keller’s expression,  
“everything is politics”. [...] Every action, thought and emotion of human beings is inseparably bound 
up with the life and struggles of the community, i.e., with politics; whether the humans themselves 
are conscious of this, unconscious of it or even trying to escape from it. Objectively their actions, 
thoughts and emotions nevertheless spring from and run into politics (2006: 386).  
Zambrano herself has a similarly overarching view of politics, for she states that “se hace 
política siempre que se piensa en dirigir la vida” (1930: 13). This is precisely what 
Zambrano aims to do through her thought and work. It is crucial to highlight that, for 
Zambrano, the criteria for doing politics is not whether the individual does have an impact 
in the world, but whether he intends to have it. Thus, by taking into account intentionality 
and defining politics according to Zambrano’s own standards, it becomes clear that 
Zambrano considers her own work as political because, as has been established above, 
Zambrano intends to have an impact on her world, her reality, through her writings and, by 
her own account, it is this intention to manage or lead life in a certain direction that 
constitutes politics. 
 Hence, although it is true that there are no explicitly political books in the strict sense 
after 1965, all of Zambrano’s work is the expression of an early political commitment and a 
project which encompasses the whole of her life, since, paraphrasing Moreno Sanz, it is her 
political conclusions that mark the rhythm and turns of her thought (1996: 148; see also 
Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 31). This commitment can be observed in the interview that Zambrano 
gives Juan Carlos Marset in 1989, just two years before her death. There, looking 
retrospectively at her life and work, she declares that  
la filosofía me era irrenunciable, pero más irrenunciables me eran la vida, el mundo. Yo no podía 
apartarme de lo que sucedía en el mundo, ni considerarme aparte, ni podía estar sola, desligada, ni 
podía restringirme a una sola actividad (1989b: 70; see also Moreno Sanz, 1996: 19).  
In this statement made towards the end of her life, it is possible to see how Zambrano has 
managed to bridge what she used to perceive as separate, even conflicting activities: her 
philosophical and her political commitments. Here, although there are still traces of this 
tension, Zambrano’s resolution overcomes it; she renounces neither activity, developing a 
philosophy which is at the same time the expression and the exercise of her involvement 
with the world. From a theoretical perspective, the premise of her project is based on the 
                                                
100 Evidence of this link can be found in the Liga de Educación Social, a political group which 
integrates education in its aims and its name, and whose spokesperson is Zambrano (see Fundación 
María Zambrano; see also Zambrano, 1986c: 267). As a result of this link, Zambrano continues to 
participate in different educational projects as argued in 4.2.1. 
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assumption that the revelation and incorporation of truth in the etymological sense of 
aletheia – which can be achieved through poetic reason – will lead to a process of 
empowerment and liberation101. As she explains, “no es que todo lo que se sabe tenga que 
ser sabido por todos; pero sí tendría que serlo, su centro vivo, aquello que va a constituir la 
nueva mentalidad” (2004c: 77). 
 Due to the holistic nature of the alternative rationality which Zambrano develops, 
traditional divisions, such as the separation between biography and intellectual production, 
as discussed above, become obsolete; a comprehensive approach to the different aspects of 
her person and thought becomes necessary to grasp the coherence and reach of her project. 
Zambrano’s approach is the unfolding of her person through her work; she develops a 
rationality where the personal is inextricably linked to the social, and, therefore, the political 
is at the very core of her project, as indicated above. 
The social and political content of Zambrano’s thought – present even in her later 
work – is highlighted by Abellán’s María Zambrano: Una pensadora de nuestro tiempo, in 
a chapter entitled “El universo iniciático de María Zambrano: Un camino hacia la redención 
social” (2006: 71-84). Abellán successfully summarizes how by approaching Zambrano’s 
thought from an experiential perspective and looking at the diverse manifestations of her 
thought in its globality, it is possible to observe how poetic reason, a rationality which 
apparently belongs to the realm of the personal is, in fact, intrinsically linked to the social 
and political aspects of existence:  
la pensadora afronta la crisis del racionalismo europeo –raíz de su actual agonía–, mediante un 
diálogo entre cielo e ínferos que nos abra el acceso a la ‘razón mediadora’ –versión a su vez de su 
razón poética–, único camino para reconvertir la historia sacrificial de Occidente en una historia ética, 
donde el fondo trágico de la naturaleza humana quede superado en la construcción de una sociedad 
democrática, regenerada de sus dolencias ancestrales” (Abellán, 2006: 84). 
This aim, although not explicitly stated in each work, does run through the entirety of 
Zambrano’s writings, granting their diversity and dispersion a sense of cohesion.  
Zambrano incorporates key elements from Heidegger’s and Ortega’s thought, and, 
yet, overcomes both of their approaches. Heidegger draws attention to the question of being 
and rethinks its meaning and significance, but more importantly, its place and interrelations, 
and, in doing so, highlights the insufficiency of ordinary language (see Heidegger, 1976: 
291; 2000: 40; 2001: 181-182, 184-185). On the other hand, Ortega’s ratiovitalism sets the 
basis for the reincorporation of the vital element into philosophical discourse (see 
                                                
101 In ancient philosophy, aletheia means “unconcealing, bringing out of hiding” (Moyle, 2005: 112). 
Aletheia means truth in two basic respects: “aletheia means both the truth of things in-themselves and 
telling or speaking the truth” (Moyle, 2005: 121). Heidegger also uses the concept of aletheia, initially 
in its etymological sense, although the later Heidegger reinterprets it to mean “the truth of Being 
[which] needs the truthfulness of the thinker, the thinker is inspired with the truth only insofar as he 
belongs to Being” (Moyle, 2005: 121). 
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Zambrano, 2004c: 89). Nevertheless, neither of them sees these elements as inextricably 
linked to political theory or practice. For Zambrano, however, theory and practice form an 
intrinsic unity; they are but dimensions of the same reality. That is why poetic reason as a 
holistic methodology and realization of CT must find expression in the political realm by 
developing a theoretical and vital stance in line with her overall work. Despite the utopian 
elements of her project, her political theory provides a bottom-up approach that solidly 
links the personal to the political, offering the possibility of real, personal, but also socio-
political change, as we shall discuss below (see Zambrano, 2004d: 53; see also 2004c: 77). 
 
4.3.4 Politics and the human condition 
 As argued above, history and politics are inherent aspects of human life: where there is 
human life there is history, and where there are living human relationships there is politics; 
although, of course, both history and politics may be experienced and practiced at different 
levels of formality and involvement. The purpose of this section is, thus, to further explore 
the relationship between human life and politics which exists in Zambrano’s work. 
According to Zambrano, “toda política parte necesariamente −aunque no lo sepa− de 
una supuesta concepción del hombre; de una idea que éste tiene de sí, de su situación ante el 
mundo” (1996a: 206). Thus, the importance of analysing Zambrano’s conceptualization of 
human nature, which she describes in the following terms: 
cada hombre está formado por un yo y una persona. La persona incluye el yo y lo trasciende, pues el 
yo es vigilia, atención; inmóvil es una especie de guardián. La persona, como su mismo nombre 
indica, es una forma, una máscara con la cual afrontamos la vida, la relación y el trato con los demás, 
con las cosas divinas y humanas. Esta persona moral, es verdaderamente humana, cuando porta 
dentro de sí la conciencia, el pensamiento, un cierto conocimiento de sí mismo (1988b: 79). 
Thus, integrating these two parts of the self is considered as a great achievement (see 
Zambrano, 1988b: 80). She later goes on to explain that “la persona es algo más que el 
individuo; es el individuo dotado de conciencia, que se sabe a sí mismo y que se entiende a 
sí mismo como valor supremo” (1988b: 103). There is, nevertheless, a danger when the 
image of oneself exceeds the limits of the human condition, because in this situation 
responsibility is evaded and the self becomes a dream of deification (see Zambrano, 1988b: 
70). Zambrano characterises a person as a living being who breathes in time and feeds on 
truth (1988b: 132). According to her, a person advances by integrating the different 
dimensions of time into a pro-active present; “la inclusión de lo social en la vida moral de la 
persona, requiere de ella una movilidad a través del presente, como si el presente fuese 
pasado y futuro a recorrer” (1988b: 161). In fact, the individual as a person is a new reality 
being unravelled throughout history (see Zambrano, 1988b: 135; for more details on the 
incomplete nature of the human being see 4.4.2). 
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Zambrano, while maintaining her Heideggerian and Ortegan heritage in the 
conception of the person as a project, overcomes their limitations102. As Bretz explains: 
Ortega’s text [La rebellion de las masas] reflects the widely recognized view in modernist and 
postmodernist thought that the individual constructs his own selfhood, but it evades the consequences 
of such a vision by creating an elite subject that recognizes disorder and then dispenses with it 
through an arbitrary imposition of order (2001: 355). 
Like Ortega, Zambrano considers life to be a process of becoming: 
 El hombre tiene un nacimiento incompleto. Por eso no ha podido jamás conformarse con vivir 
naturalmente y ha necesitado algo más, religión, filosofía, arte o ciencia. [...]. Por eso tiene que 
acabar de nacer enteramente y tiene también que hacerse su mundo, su hueco, su sitio, tiene que estar 
incesantemente de parto de sí mismo y de la realidad que lo aloje (2004c: 112).  
It is this incompleteness or limitation that makes everyone equal in their quest for 
transcendence and self-development. This project reflects the limitations of human 
existence, while also emphasizing the role of hope. Zambrano considers the human 
condition as limiting for three main reasons: the human being is born into darkness, has to 
bear injustice throughout life, and death is inevitable (1988b: 55-56). Human existence is 
conflictive; both at the level of the individual, and even more so at a social level. At the 
same time, all human life is projected from an original feeling of hope, which originates 
from the human constitution of reality (see Zambrano, 1996a: 37). Hope is, quite literally, a 
vital component of the human condition.  
Being as a project involves a continuous processes of death, resurrection, and rebirth 
(see Zambrano, 2004c: 18, 112). As Maillard García explains, “para Zambrano lo 
importante para comprender la estructura de la vida humana es el paso previo a la 
intencionalidad: la ensoñación que precede a la elección” (1996: 56). It is only because of 
having dreamt of or envisaged the possibility of an action or event in the first place that the 
will can be projected onto that action or event. Hence, that which has not yet been 
conceived cannot be willed. That is why our relationship with the realm of dreams plays a 
decisive role in opening possibilities for rebirth. According to Zambrano, a dream “es una 
ocultación desde la vigilia, el lugar donde el sujeto humano ve y se reconoce a sí mismo” 
(1992: 24). Dreams provide a different perspective to perceive the self; a certain dichotomy 
occurs so that the subject becomes its own object, we become spectators of our own 
performance. That is why successive awakenings, both literal and metaphorical may 
contribute to completing his project of personal existence. In fact, according to Zambrano, 
                                                
102 More specifically, for Zambrano, the nature of the individual is in itself a path. In her own words: “y 
abrir camino es la acción humana entre todas; lo propio del hombre, algo así como poner en ejercicio 
su ser y al par manifestarlo, pues el propio hombre es camino, él mismo” (1988b: 31; see also 43, 117, 
165; Abellán, 2006: 83). That is to say that the human being is a path in as much as being human 
requires creating and walking a path. 
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this process of death and resurrection involved in rebirth lies at the very core of human life 
(2000: 18, 112).  
Zambrano identifies hope as an essential element in making this continuous self-
engenderment possible (2004c: 111). At the same time, her definition of hope relies heavily 
on the concept of transcendence: 
la esperanza es hambre de nacer del todo, de llevar a plenitud, lo que solamente llevamos en 
proyecto. En este sentido, la esperanza es la substancia de nuestra vida, su último fondo; por ella 
somos hijos de nuestros sueños de los que no vemos, ni podemos comprobar (2004c: 112).  
Hence, hope is going beyond; going beyond the present self towards a more complete, 
fulfilled stage of the self. The loss of hope, the loss of this capacity for self-engenderment 
results in the individual’s disconnection with reality. Such an existence, instead of engaging 
with reality by being-there, leads to loneliness and disorientation. Instrumental reason copes 
with this loss and limits its own perception of reality by means of its reliance on objectivity, 
which guarantees certainty, stability, and order, while shutting out any element which may 
disturb this system:  
todas las creencias y también las ideas, que se refieren al orden del mundo, la figura de la realidad, 
están sostenidas por la esperanza. El hombre, que es al mismo tiempo algo fallido y solitario, necesita 
hacerse una realidad entera donde vivir: por eso edifica una objetividad. Objetividad que es la 
estabilidad vigente, el orden que a todos llega y cobija, que todo lo ordena y aquieta (Zambrano, 
2004c: 114; see also Kuhn, 1962: 5, 24, 52). 
As opposed to this controlling and self-perpetuating existence which results from the 
loss of hope, hope is identified as a regenerative force. It plays a crucial role in politics and 
history, for it is the element of hope which makes change, first, thinkable and, then, 
possible (see Zambrano, 1989a: 247; 1988a: 62). 
 
4.3.4.1 A political animal 
Zambrano questions the social nature of humankind. She argues that if society were a 
natural phenomenon, then societies would have differed according to atmospheric and 
spatial conditions. Instead, a great variety of societies is found and none of them is perfectly 
adapted to their medium (see 1988b: 98-99). In Delirio y destino, Zambrano insists on this 
point when she makes a reference to Scheler’s view about the human being as the only 
living creature which is not perfectly adapted to any medium (1989a: 118). The human 
response to this intrinsic inadaptation is, according to Zambrano, violence:  
y es que la unidad en lo humano, ¿habrá de lograrse siempre por la violencia, nunca en la 
espontaneidad? No es posible, por lo visto, no lo fue entonces [en referencia al tumultuoso pasado 
español anterior a la Segunda República], que se lograra historia “natural” humana, realización 
espontánea de un orden, madurez de una nación al modo de un fruto de la naturaleza, como logro del 
influjo de los cielos en un tiempo configurado de antemano que lo albergara (Zambrano, 1989a: 129).  
Society is, therefore, not natural, although it is, however, necessary. Loneliness is a key 
element of the human condition in the understanding of society, or at least, community. As 
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Zambrano says, “la persona vive en soledad”, a kind of loneliness and isolation that can be 
conquered with solidarity, solidarity with the other because, by realising the other is like 
ourselves, we will no longer be completely alone (1988b: 17; see also 1989a: 22). 
Furthermore, we need the community to help us define our own identity. As Zambrano 
explains: 
y en la soledad [sentimos], el terror de lo invisible y presente; de esta condición humana que es 
sentirse sin verse. […] La inmediatez de nuestro propio “ser” resulta amenazadora, porque al 
quedarnos solos, no sabemos quién es ese que vive y piensa en nuestro fondo, y necesitamos regresar 
al lugar de la convivencia, allí en la comunidad, donde sabemos quién somos porque lo 
representamos (1988b: 98). 
Thus, it is our sense of belonging to a community which shapes our identity based on the 
interrelationships that we develop and in the functions we adopt. 
For this reason, Zambrano often avoids the treatment of society as an entity. Instead, 
she stresses that society is formed by individuals, that it is individual actions and attitudes 
that shape society: “individuo y ciudad, más tarde individuo y sociedad, están mutuamente 
condicionados: la ciudad ya está ahí cuando el individuo nace; mas él ha de hacerla, sin 
tregua” (1988b: 112). By this, Zambrano does not simply express their interrelation; she 
emphasizes the element of responsibility. Although social relations are established prior to 
their acceptance by the individual, it is the individual who will later reinforce, shake, or, 
even, destroy such relationships. Hence, once that awareness is developed and 
responsibility is accepted, the individual – quite literally – constantly creates, and re-creates 
a given society. Despite these possibilities, the individual capacity for change is presumably 
limited. Considering the scope and complexity of societal relationships, in the first instance, 
the individual can only hope to change some of society’s characteristics or relationships, 
rather than changing society itself. A city, as Zambrano refers to it, that is, a given society 
placed in a specific historical time, is for an individual who belongs to such a time his 
framework of perception and understanding, even an a priori to a certain extent, 
functioning very much like a sieve through which perception and particularly values are 
filtered before they can be conceptualized. Hence, a change in society as a whole, if such a 
concept can be accepted, can only be carried out across generations, because the dimension 
of time in both society and human existence must be acknowledged. As a result of time 
becoming a crucial factor in allowing such change or evolution to be possible, it is 
necessary to introduce the concept of spiral evolution, according to which, initially, small 
qualitative changes produce more substantial changes beyond the individual, which in turn 
make it possible for the individual – and in time also the institutions and society as a whole 
– to evolve further in a continuing chain of qualitative change. This quality of society as an 
a priori brings Zambrano to draw an analogy between city and conciencia, both as places – 
topographical and inner or spiritual – to live in and to live with (1988b: 111).  
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The concept of conciencia plays a huge role in Zambrano’s conception of the 
individual and hence of society. Although a complex term, three distinct meanings prevail 
in Zambrano’s usage of the word “conciencia”: first, consciousness as opposed to 
unconsciousness, second, awareness in the sense of knowledge, and, third, the ability to 
make moral distinctions. Although in any given instance of the use of the term “conciencia” 
one of these three meanings will prevail upon the others, Zambrano’s use of this term often 
harbours the connotations of the remaining two meanings. An example of this can be 
observed in the following quotation extracted from Persona y democracia (1958), which 
also succinctly synthesizes Zambrano’s moral position: 
si tenemos en la mente que no importa qué acontecimiento habido en no importa qué lugar del 
planeta y aún, en no importa qué momento del pasado tiene influencia en nuestras vidas, entonces el 
destino deja lugar a la conciencia y al afán de comprensión (1988b: 16).  
Here “conciencia” involves a certain awakening, that is to say, to be alert to and aware of 
the events which take place in the world, to open one’s eyes to them – the opposite from 
unconscious. At the same time, this also implies gaining knowledge of the existence and 
nature of these events. Finally, while this process of awakening and awareness takes place, 
the moral sense of the individual is expected to develop and to be applied to this reality (see 
1988b: 13-14)103; thus, as regards consciousness, particularly the senses of responsibility 
and compassion complement and reinforce each other (see also 2004d: 55-57). 
Being conscious, as opposed to unconscious or asleep is closely related to the 
possibility of awareness. Both of these concepts are central to understanding Zambrano’s 
development of the self, as Zambrano’s recurrent metaphors – soñar, ensoñar, despertar, 
nacer, renacer, morir, resucitar – indicate (see 1988a: 43, 45, 48; 1988b: 67; 1989a: 17, 62, 
291; 1992b: 3-4, 6, 24, 45, 49-50; 2004c: 18-19, 112-13, 121). Consciousness in the moral 
sense is also present in her discourse as responsibility, as seen in the quotation above (see 
1988b: 20, 126); one can hardly speak of responsibility without awareness (see 1988b: 16, 
39). Thus, all three aspects of conciencia intertwine.  
These three aspects as well as an emphasis on a sense of responsibility can be 
observed in Zambrano’s understanding of conciencia histórica or historical consciousness. 
Zambrano argues that “el hombre puede estar en la historia de varias maneras: pasivamente 
o en activo. Lo cual sólo se realiza plenamente cuando se acepta la responsabilidad o 
cuando se la vive moralmente” (Zambrano, 1988b: 11). This statement is key to 
understanding what Zambrano later refers to as conciencia histórica, which she identifies 
                                                
103 For other examples of this three-fold use of the word “conciencia” see Zambrano, 1988b: 39, 67, 
103; 1992: 29. 
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with historical responsibility (1988b: 20)104. Zambrano develops her own version of false 
consciousness and concludes, as the FS does, that the key is awareness, that is, knowledge 
and understanding. When Zambrano points out the extent of the interrelation of events, she 
rationally appeals to the person’s conscience, that is, his compassion towards others, but 
most importantly, it highlights what she considers to be the inseparable responsibility which 
goes hand in hand with awareness; the awareness of this interconnectedness demands an 
active engagement with reality and the development of a sense of responsibility towards 
that reality. By raising the issue of historical consciousness, not as an abstract choice, but as 
having a direct effect on us, therefore being in our best interest, it is reasonable to surmise 
that Zambrano must have believed that there is no conflict of interests – not between two 
individuals, nor between society and an individual – when the true good is pursued – as 
opposed to what is considered to be good in a state of false consciousness – (see 2004c: 
205; 2004d: 105-106).  
Consciousness and awareness are two processes very much immersed in time. 
Personal and historical consciousness in reference to the past serves as an 
acknowledgement of the interconnection between all events, thus, rationally justifying a 
secular sense of responsibility. Even more important is its future dimension: “la conciencia 
pues, corresponde a un futuro que hemos de hacer nosotros en parte; a un futuro, creación 
del hombre, aunque sólo sea porque él puede cerrarlo o abrirlo, porque le sirve de paso y lo 
puede negar o servir” (1988b: 126). The combination of these elements, a certain awareness 
and a projection of the future, is what makes the development of revolutionary politics 
possible. 
Zambrano provides another definition of politics: “política es reforma, creación, 
revolución siempre, por tanto: lucha −conjunción− entre el individuo y la vida” (1996a: 
204). That is why, according to Zambrano, politics demands historical consciousness, 
describing History, in turn, as a dramatic dialogue between the individual and the Universe 
(1996a: 204). 
In Zambrano’s view, “existen concepciones de la vida en que religión, ética y política 
se confunden” (1996a: 203). They all have in common their non-conformity and their 
concern for what reality should be like. One of the core differences between them is their 
range of action; religion and ethics are oriented towards the isolated individual, while 
                                                
104 Zambrano’s sensibility goes beyond historical consciousness; she also discusses what she calls 
conciencia poética or poetic consciousness. As she explains, “una conciencia poética pues, recoge los 
varios conflictos de la condición humana” (1988b: 56). Here, the three aspects of consciousness 
discussed above also intertwine; the main difference between the two is one of degree, for this poetic 
consciousness requires a more subtle sensitivity to human needs and suffering; it focuses more on the 
experience of being human, than in the events which result from human behaviour. 
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politics needs society for the possibility of its own existence (1996a: 204). Thus, Zambrano 
acknowledges, as does Aranguren, the interrelations between these three fields (see 3.2.1.1).  
Zambrano, influenced by Ortegan perspectivism, thinks that individual political 
inclinations are determined by the individual’s temperament (see also the discussion of 
talante, 3.2.1.2). According to her, the basic temperament for revolutionary politics is a 
vital optimism founded on an attitude of having faith in life (1996a: 225). Individualism, 
however, leads to subjective rebellion, to rebelling against one’s individual or social share 
in life; excessive individualism leads to anarchy and nihilism: a state of disintegration (see 
1996a: 223). According to Zambrano, revolutionary or conservative politics can be chosen 
because of a search for justice, or because of cowardice or lack of enthusiasm respectively 
(1996a: 223-24). The tools of the politician are also different; the conservative politician 
would use reason as his most effective and reliable tool. The revolutionary politician, 
however, would rely mainly on intuition, which does not necessarily discard reason 
completely; but it is intuition, and not reason alone, that according to Zambrano would 
allow the politician to feel the beat of time, to sense its rhythm, and to be sensitive to its 
subsequent demands for change (1996a: 226). Zambrano summarizes the characteristics 
needed by a revolutionary politician in the following way:  
afirmación de la vida, desconfianza de la razón, valor moral de todo lo que es aumento de la vida, 
superación constante, aprovechamiento del dolor en beneficio de los valores positivos, heroísmo del 
individuo como encarnador de los valores vitales… Nietzsche, en fin, o algo de él (1996a: 227). 
Utopia is considered to be, by Zambrano, the germ of revolutionary longings (2004c: 
156; 1996a: 65); she considers it the conceptual germ which enables change, enables 
history (1989a: 63). Furthermore, utopia extends even beyond that, because Zambrano’s 
philosophy in itself can be viewed as utopian in the sense that it accepts and absorbs 
paradoxes: 
movilizándose hacia el núcleo de los más radicales interrogantes que suscitan las aporías a que ha ido 
llegando el pensamiento (y la vida) occidentales; de condescender, y no instalarse, sino seguir 
circunambulando alrededor del “punto oscuro” que le marca a la esperanza lo impensable, lo 
imposible (1996a: 65).  
The crucial role of utopia will now be discussed in reference to democracy and also hope. 
 
4.3.5 Democracy 
Zambrano criticizes Western reason and the socio-political systems it has led to. Instead, she 
proposes what can be considered a utopian socio-political organization. In the context of 
poetic reason, she opts for a democracy that goes beyond the traditional parameters of 
representative democracy (1996a: 27, 69-70). She deals extensively with the term 
democracy in her book, Persona y democracia, first published in Puerto Rico, in 1958 
(1988b: 7). Although abstract and undetermined, Zambrano provides her own definition of 
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democracy: “si hubiera que definir la democracia podría hacerse diciendo que es la sociedad 
en la cual no sólo es permitido, sino exigido, el ser persona” (1988b: 133). In addition, for 
Zambrano, an individual can only develop himself to fully become a person in an 
atmosphere of freedom. As Ortega Muñoz explains, “Zambrano llega a identificar el ser-
libre con el ser-persona, que es ‘la suprema grandeza del hombre’” (1992: 54). Thus, 
Zambrano does not have in mind an ordinary democracy, but a system of socio-political 
organization which promotes not only the political participation of its integral members, but 
also their personal development (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 56)105. Hence the apparent 
circularity of the argument: it is only on the assumption of a pre-existing personal 
development that a political system which promotes personal development can be 
conceived. However, no such circularity exists because these changes are conceived as an 
exponential and progressive process, rather than as an absolute and definitive result. 
For this utopian democracy to be possible, first, the interest of individual and society 
must coincide. As Zambrano puts it,  
en la expresión “individuo” se insinúa siempre una oposición a la sociedad, un antagonismo. La 
palabra individuo sugiere lo que hay de irreductible en el hombre concreto individual, mas en sentido 
un tanto negativo. En cambio, persona incluye al individuo y además insinúa en la mente algo de 
positivo, algo irreductible por positivo, por ser un “más”; no una diferencia, simplemente (1988b: 
133). 
Democracy, however, is not without its problems. Zambrano refers back to the traditional 
meaning of democracy as a regime that serves the people to remind us of its original aim 
(1988b: 134). In this context, she reminds us that one of the dangers people face is that of 
becoming a mass. For her, this happens as a result of demagogy, which alienates people 
from reality, thus altering their sense of responsibility, consciousness, and time (1988b: 144, 
149-50). Zambrano suggests re-examining the term pueblo, people, upon which democracy 
rests; pueblo, as a totality, includes all the members of a particular society, or pueblo as 
opposed to the individual (1988b: 144). The first may lead to a people oppressing other 
peoples, whereas the second can be described as a totalitarian majority where the individual 
is dismissed. An option which surmounts these difficulties must be sought instead; tensions 
must be integrated, diversities relished (1988b: 162). Zambrano concludes that  
el orden democrático se logrará tan sólo con la participación de todos en cuanto persona, lo cual 
corresponde a la realidad humana. Y que la igualdad de todos los hombres, “dogma” fundamental de 
                                                
105 It should be noted that Zambrano avoids providing or even outlining any of the practical principles 
and structures necessary for the materialization of a political system. This is not the result of an 
oversight on her part, but a consequence of the nature of this type of democracy. Because a democratic 
state for her is one which encourages the purpose of their citizen’s self-actualization, for Zambrano, 
this democracy entails the morality of the State as well as of their citizens. At the same time, and as a 
result of understanding the person as a Project and of the important role allocated to freedom rejects 




la fe democrática, es igualdad en tanto que personas humanas, no en cuanto a cualidades o caracteres; 
igualdad no es uniformidad. Es, por el contrario, el supuesto que permite aceptar las diferencias, la 
rica complejidad humana y no sólo la del presente, sino la del porvenir. La fe en lo incomprensible. 
¿Será utópico pensar que este orden, en lugar de excluir realidades, las irá incluyendo todas? Orden 
es límite y límite es exclusion (1988b: 164).  
Zambrano finds the key to overcoming the conflict between pueblo and individual in 
the development of the person, a person who, having acquired a higher, more integrating 
level of consciousness understands that ultimately there is coincidence between personal 
and common good. As a result, such a person cannot genuinely go against the interests of 
anyone in the community nor the community itself. A person in Zambrano’s sense is an 
individual who has understood and interiorised his transcendence and that of reality, 
integrating both as part of a more elevated unity, thus not solving − strictly speaking − but 
overcoming the conflict. This concept of unity shall be discussed below. 
 
4.4 Zambrano in (re-)construction 
Although, as I have already pointed out in the introduction, this re-construction of 
Zambrano’s, and, indeed, also Aguirre’s work, may seem to fall dangerously close to what 
Skinner calls the “mythology of coherence”, where the exegete provides an interpretation 
which unjustifiably assumes that an author has a coherent theory by moving from ideas to 
abstract principles in a desperate attempt to find coherence where there was, and, in fact, has 
always been, a certain amount of disorder and incongruity, this mythology is not applicable 
to the work of Zambrano nor Aguirre’s (see Skinner, 1988b: 38-43; see also Skinner, 2002: 
67-72). With no intention of denying the existence of such practice as illustrated by Skinner, 
the work of Aranguren, and even more so that of Zambrano and Aguirre, exhibits the 
characteristics of digression, diffusion, elusion, and even contradiction in a deliberate 
manner, as a matter of methodology in their attempt to offer an alternative rationality. It is 
their awareness and intentionality, their deliberate characterization of their expression in the 
terms described above, which provide ample evidence of the coherence and unity of their 
project, for as Skinner states, “we need to understand what strategies have been voluntarily 
adopted to convey their meaning with deliberate obliqueness” (1988b: 51; see also 52, 60-
61). It is this unravelling of evidence and the reconstruction of such a project that a large 
part of this section and the thesis as a whole will focus on. 
Having discarded the pitfall of the mythology of coherence, the aims and method for 
this re-construction are best explained by borrowing Skinner’s words:  
I seek to elucidate concepts not by focusing on the supposed ‘meanings’ of the terms we use to 
express them, but rather by asking what can be done with them and by examining their relationship to 
each other and to broader networks of beliefs (2002: 5). 
Thus, this is precisely what will be attempted below in relation to Zambrano’s ontology, 




A re-construction of Zambrano’s arguments and, more importantly, assumptions, as well as 
the contextualization of her work in the trends of post-war European philosophy, will now 
be carried out. The immediate difficulty encountered is the resistance of the text to such a 
process. The aim of this section is to make Zambrano’s ontology explicit, which will shed 
light onto the rest of her thought. The interconnectedness of her philosophy, however, 
means that it is not possible to dissect different elements of her thought – not even for the 
purpose of systematic analysis – because they can only be understood in relation to the 
whole. That is why, in the course of this discussion of ontology, certain assumptions that 
Zambrano makes will be used, along with various key terms which will only be developed 
at a later point. Only at the end of this discussion will the argument become clear and gain 
sense as a whole. 
 
4.4.2 Ontology 
4.4.2.1 Post-Heideggerian Zambrano 
Zambrano’s thought is explicitly an attempt to overcome the co-ordinates set by Western 
thought often exemplified in Cartesian rationality. As she explains, “el drama de la Cultura 
Moderna ha sido la falta inicial de contacto entre la verdad de la razón y la vida” (2004d: 
17; see also 21). She expands this idea explaining that 
[la razón] nada dejaba de lo que en la vida quiere transcender. Dejó de haber alma y espíritu, si por 
espíritu entendemos la posibilidad infinita de toda vida y su necesidad (la necesidad individual) de 
renacer, pues el individuo, para serlo, necesita renacer, ser de nuevo engendrado (2004d: 23). 
Thus, what she refers to as modern reason is perceived as limited and – more critically – 
limiting.  
 Although the term “instrumental reason” is not used by Zambrano, she is critical of 
the instrumentalization present in human life. She criticizes instrumentalization in a material 
sense, in reference to the proliferation of instruments and technology. As she puts it, 
Mientras la vida se llenaba de instrumentos técnicos, de maravillas mecánicas, de cachivaches de 
todas clases, el alma y el corazón quedan vacíos, y las horas, al ser liberadas del trabajo opresor, 
transcurren más oprimidas todavía, porque están sujetas a la terrible opresión de la vaciedad de un 
tiempo muerto. La quietud se hacía imposible. Paralelamente a los medios de comunicación y a las 
posibilidades de ir y venir, el vacío se adueña de las vidas (2004c: 74-75). 
She forcefully summarizes this critique in the next pages as follows: 
La vida necesita del pensamiento, pero lo necesita porque no puede continuar el estado en que 
espontáneamente se produce. Porque no basta nacer una vez y moverse en un mundo de instrumentos 
útiles (2004c: 76-77). 
Zambrano is also critical of instrumentalization in reference to the specific rationality which 
is based on criteria of self-interest and which treats beings as means and not ends in 
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themselves (see 2004d: 21). Thus, Zambrano develops a critique of such rationality and its 
material consequences, which she refers to as historia sacrificial (Zambrano, 1988b; see 
also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 43). With the term sacrificial history, Zambrano makes a direct 
allusion to the negative consequences of the instrumentality of reason: the development of 
history at the cost of human sacrifice (see Zambrano, 1977b: 16; see also Cerezo, 1991a: 80-
82).  
In the process of developing her critique and her poetic reason, Zambrano engages 
critically with the defining currents of post-war continental European thought, becoming 
herself a major figure in relation to the post-Heideggerian debate, and offering a genuinely 
original approach. In Aranguren’s words:  
esta fusión de filosofía y mística, que no tiene nada que ver con la poesía filosófica y mística, que no 
tiene nada que ver con la poesía filosófica o la lírica filosófica alemana, me parece que es algo 
genuinamente de María Zambrano y aunque tenga semejanzas o analogías con el pensamiento de 
Heidegger, y sin duda las tiene, esto no obsta para que se trate de un pensamiento profundamente 
original (1983: 130). 
Zambrano’s thought has to be understood in reference to Heidegger’s. The terms of the 
debate are that whereas, traditionally, being has been studied by means of prioritising 
essence over existence, one of the key characteristics of Heidegger’s thought is that he 
defends the primacy of existence, giving priority to existence over essence, life over reason. 
Whereas according to Hegel, “all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real”, hence 
turning reality/rationality into his main object of study, Heidegger insists on the primacy of 
the ontological, that is, being understood as existence (Hegel, 2001: 18). From this point 
onwards, there is a shift in the line of philosophical inquiry, much of which focuses 
increasingly more on the concept of existence and develops and explores its consequences 
for ontology in general and for a philosophical interpretation of the human being in 
particular. This is the context from which Zambrano’s thought develops.  
The consequence of this shift is that instead of a fixed being, now being is conceived 
as an unfolding. This, however, is not the determined unfolding of a pre-existing set of 
possibilities. Instead, being is conceived as self-construction. For Heidegger, existence is 
conceived as absolute actuality, a project. Existence is a process of free appropriation of 
one’s own possibilities106. The scope of this process of taking charge depends on the 
individual’s understanding of his “being-in-the-world”, hence, Dasein, being there (see 
Abbagnano, 1994: 729). Dasein is being situated in time and space; therefore, Dasein 
involves an engagement with history (see Davis, 1996: 15); Dasein is a form of being 
which finds vital the understanding of its own existence (see Schalow, 2001: 24). 
                                                
106 Given the strong influence that German philosophy has had on Spanish thought, as indicated in the 
introduction, it is hardly surprising that this position bears important resemblances with Ortega’s 
vitalism and Zubiri’s morality. 
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Zambrano engages with this conception of existence. Being, for Zambrano, as for 
Heidegger and Ortega before her, is being as a project. Zambrano, as discussed above, is 
careful to draw a distinction between being an individual and being a person. Whereas the 
term individual emphasizes individuation, interpreted here as the separating and 
isolating element present in the human being, the term person suggests integration, 
which is what Zambrano is aiming for. Person, for Zambrano, is an actualization of 
being which is reminiscent of the Heideggerian concept of Dasein; person, in this sense, 
integrates the social and the historical in the process of the appropriation of freedom and 
reality. According to her, the human being is faced with an array of possibilities which he 
needs to take charge of. This array of possibilities is determined by his horizon of creativity, 
which directly shapes the possibilities of reality. Hence, in Zambrano’s view, a person, 
understood as being in the world in the form of Dasein, is intimately linked to the world 
and to other beings because of his essentially unfinished and open reality. She, however, 
shifts the emphasis from existence to experience, from theory to practice. This is, in fact, 
the key point of Zambrano’s departure from Heidegger. 
Heidegger’s key question is: what is being? Zambrano does not dispute the relevance 
of the question posed by Heidegger, but she develops an experiential approach, rather than 
an entirely theoretical one. As Emile Cioran explains, “María Zambrano has not sold her 
soul to the Idea, she has safeguarded her unique essence by setting the experience of the 
Insoluble above reflection upon it, in short, she has transcended philosophy” (1992: 227). 
What is specific to her is that instead of attempting to resolve the question rationally, her 
work provides an answer because her œuvre is the very process of fulfilment of the project 
of becoming a person. It is no coincidence that Aranguren and Aguirre criticize the 
dissonance between Heidegger’s philosophical project − and tangentially also Ortega’s in 
the case of Aguirre − and his biographical choices (1991: 7-10; 1985: 79-81 respectively), 
thus, also highlighting their own commitment to bridge such gap. Hence, Zambrano goes 
one step beyond Heidegger, turning her work into the practice of Dasein.  
Despite their many coincidences on core theoretical arguments, such as Dasein, the 
understanding of being as a project, the inherent temporality of being, the dangers of 
positivism, science and technology, and the liberating possibilities of art – particularly 
poetry – Zambrano still finds Heidegger’s positions insufficient. Zambrano’s key 
divergences from Heideggerian thought, such as her views on transcendence, unity, politics, 
language, and anti-elitism, spring from her recognition of the importance of experience, 
experiencing the theory proposed in her work, becoming a life project, but also the value of 
experience as a succession of subjective events which shape life. Zambrano still maintains 
the ontological primacy of being; what sets Zambrano apart from Heidegger and from other 
thinkers who may also have advocated the transcendental nature of being, such as Scheler, 
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Pascal, and Hölderlin is that her theoretical work is simultaneously the practice of her 
philosophy. There is, however, no contradiction with the argument above; practice in 
Zambrano encompasses theory; at the same time, theory does not exist isolated from life 
and experience, but it is intimately linked to praxis. In poetic reason, Zambrano finds a 
manner of expression that, by successfully combining content, form, and style, becomes a 
mode of expression of her own self-development, a tool for such development, and an 
invitation and guide for the development of others. It is an interactive, dynamic reason 
which cannot be considered as a fulfilment, but rather as a process; a process of 
multidimensional development which offers a plausible alternative to instrumental reason. 
 
4.4.2.2 Transcendental unity 
“Todo ser vive en función de un orbe, límite 
envolvente de todas sus actividades y sostén 
de su ser, quien, a su vez, le sostiene. Y este 
mutuo sostenerse, este equilibrio de 
existencias, es lo que crea el universo, la 
unidad” (Zambrano, 2003: 62). 
The concepts of unity and transcendence, as well as their inter-relation and implications, 
will now be explored, for they are at the heart of Zambrano’s ontology, which the rest of her 
philosophy is built upon, for as she puts it: “llegar a ser, sólo es posible logrando la unidad” 
(2004d: 62). 
One of the reasons why the concept of unity becomes problematic is because the 
defence of unity has been used as one of the founding principles for the project of 
modernity (for a critical account of modernity and responses to it see Hanssen, 2004: 285-
287)107. Despite the diversity of perspectives and interpretations, in general terms, it can be 
said that moderns claim unity as one of the founding principles so that they can maintain 
the autonomy of the subject, and defend at the same time the existence of a purpose, both 
individual and social. This unity, however, means that they seek a foundation which they 
cannot provide, “for a foundation, in this context, would imply producing a homogeneity 
between empirical facts and a Grund or foundation which cannot be grasped empirically, 
since it is precisely the founding basis of the empirical realm” (Reijen, 2000: 225). The 
                                                
107 As Habermas observes, people have been considering themselves moderns since the twelfth century 
– although not continuously – to refer to the distance which separate them from the ancients, whom 
they revere and seek to imitate (see 1981: 3-4). With the French Enlightenment, however, reverence 
towards the ancients is changed by and replaced with reverence towards science. It is modern science 
that inspires the belief “in the infinite progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social 
and moral betterment” (see Habermas, 1981: 4). Consequently, these are turned into be the aims of the 
project of modernity: “the project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, 
and autonomous art, according to their inner logic. At the same time, this project intended to release the 
cognitive potentials of each of these domains to set them free from their esoteric forms” (Habermas, 
1981: 9). 
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unity defended by the moderns is one which lays the foundations of epistemology, which in 
Western rationality is synonymous with science. It is the impossibility of offering an 
empirical validation for such foundation which makes the modern concept of unity nothing 
more than an illusion. In contrast, the existentialist approach is fundamentally anti-
Romantic and anti-Idealist; it propounds the abandonment of a founding infinite principle, 
such as Reason, Absolute, Idea, or Spirit, so frequently invoked by modernists (Abbagnano, 
1994: 726; see also Zambrano, 2004d: 75). Zambrano shares with existentialism the 
rejection of such principles, and is particularly opposed to such foundations: “soberbia de la 
razón es soberbia de la filosofía, es soberbia del hombre que parte en busca del 
conocimiento y que se cree tenerlo” (1939: 19). Zambrano is keen to highlight the dangers 
of this epistemological foundationalism which is why, linking them to the realm of politics, 
she describes it as absolutist (1996a: 180). She still harbours a moderate intellectual 
optimism based on the concept of unity. In contrast with this arrogant reason, Zambrano 
proposes to infuse reason with poetry: 
la nueva historia se va a juntar inmediatamente con otra cosa relegada y humillada por la soberbia 
filosófica, se va a juntar con la poesía. Porque, el poeta ha sido siempre un hombre enamorado, 
enamorado del mundo, del cosmos; de la naturaleza y de lo divino en unidad. Y el nuevo saber 
fecundo sólo lo será si brota de unas entrañas enamoradas. Y sólo así será todo lo que el saber tiene 
que ser: apaciguamiento y afán, satisfacción, confianza y comunicación efectiva de una verdad que 
nos haga de nuevo comunes, participantes; iguales y hermanos. Sólo así el mundo será de nuevo 
habitable (1939: 20-21). 
This poetic form of history and reason is to be informed by a poetic epistemology. As 
she puts it, 
por el conocimiento poético el hombre no se separa jamás del universo y conservando intacta su 
intimidad, participa en todo, es miembro del universo, de la naturaleza y de lo humano y aun de lo 
que hay entre lo humano y más allá de él (1939: 76). 
Zambrano’s concept of unity, however, does not intend to provide the foundation for her 
epistemology. In contrast with the principles of modernity, Zambrano’s conception of unity 
is not the unifying element of a system that proclaims itself to be the explanation and aim of 
a universal, deterministic, and systematic project whose culmination is itself. Hers is a 
transcendental unity which forms the synthetic features of her ontology, not the founding 
principle of a deterministic system. Hence, unity and transcendence are the two synthetic 
arguments which underlie Zambrano’s ontology.  
Although the concept of unity leads to deterministic conclusions, following 
Heidegger and Ortega, Zambrano’s understanding of being as a project grants her 
philosophy an indetermination and openness that distances it from such determinism. Both 




4.4.2.3 Unity and the subject 
Transcendental unity is of serious significance in unveiling Zambrano’s conception of the 
subject, and, ultimately, her political project. As discussed above, Zambrano’s conception of 
unity can only be understood within the Heideggerian tradition.  
Zambrano subscribes to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, according to which being is 
being-in-the-world-with-others (see 2004d: 54). The implication of this statement is that the 
self can only be understood insofar as it involves being-in-the-world and being-with-others, 
a starting point shared by Lévinas. Lévinas, however, accuses Heidegger of reducing the 
other to the same, the self: “the Dasein that Heidegger puts in place of the soul, of 
consciousness, of the Ego, retains the structure of the same” (Lévinas, 1974, 196). Contrary 
to Lévinas’s accusation, for Heidegger the world and the other have distinct existences 
which cannot be reduced to that of the self (see Davis, 1996: 32). According to Lévinas, 
“Western philosophy coincides with the unveiling of the other in which the Other, by 
manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity” (Lévinas, 1966: 35; see also Bretz, 2001: 
442). In Lévinas’s view, this reduction of the Other to the Same (self), is precisely at the 
root of the lack of a satisfactory ethical proposal in Western philosophy. 
Zambrano’s standpoint is diametrically opposed to Lévinas’s; she escapes this 
reductionist loophole despite the centrality of the self. For Lévinas, phenomenology, 
Heidegger in particular, and Western philosophy in general, share the “inability to envisage 
an encounter with the Other which does not entail a return to the self” (Davis, 1996: 24; see 
also 1996: 19, 21; for a clear introduction and overview of phenomenology see Moran, 
2000). Although this is an accurate observation − also applicable to Zambrano’s thought − 
it does not necessarily involve a reduction of the other to the self. Such a reduction is based 
on Lévinas’s misinterpretation of Heidegger (see Davis, 1996: 64-66). Whereas from 
Lévinas’s perspective Dasein and Mitsein, being-in-the-world-with-others, means the 
assimilation of the other and the elimination of differences, for everything is reduced to 
being, being is, in fact, something larger than the self and the other; it is existence itself, 
which is why its different manifestations − the self and the other − retain their 
idiosyncrasies. This is also what happens in Zambrano’s ontology. Like Lévinas, Zambrano 
criticizes the abstract nature of Heidegger’s being; Zambrano also focuses on the relation of 
being with others, but instead of dwelling on its linguistic limitations as Lévinas does in 
relation to ethics, she develops a poetic use of language that, because of its performative 
qualities, becomes simultaneously the expression and basis of her rationality.  
Mitsein, con-vivir, is the axis of the relationship with the Other, which from an 
ethical perspective revolves around the concept of compassion (Zambrano, 1989a: 16; for 
the political significance of compassion see above). Thus, what Lévinas would qualify as 
the reduction of the Other to the Same is only part of the first layer of Zambrano’s reality; 
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her proposal is not the absorption of the Other by the self, but rather the transcendental 
dissolution of both in the realization of the transcendental unity which forms the basis of 
her ontology.  
For Zambrano, Being, existence itself, has an interrelated nature which accounts for 
what I have been describing as transcendental unity, that is, unity at a different layer of 
reality beyond sensorial experience: ontological experience (see 2004d: 49-51). In order to 
clarify the argument, it will now be illustrated with symbolic logic, commonly employed in 
philosophical thought to this purpose: 
s = self 
o = other  
B= Being 
 
(s ^ o) → S Here, the result of the interaction between the self and the other, is the 
cannibalization of the other, which is the reductionism that Lévinas is referring to. From the 
other’s perspective, it could also be reasoned that (s ^ o) → O, leading to a similar 
reductionism. 
Zambrano’s proposal to overcome this problem has the form of (s ^ o) → B There, 
the result of the interaction between the individual self and the individual other is their 
transcendental fusion, while still preserving their individuality – in the sense of uniqueness, 
not in the sense of separation. 
Expressing unity in this form, however, leads to a contradiction, and as Gutting 
points out in relation to some of the criticism directed against Derrida, any project of 
rational thought which is not consistent with the basic laws of logic − identity and non-
contradiction − is meaningless; defending p ^ ¬ p, that something is and is not at the same 
time, would be saying nothing (Gutting, 2001: 304). 
If (s ^ o) → B  
s = B ^ o =B, which ultimately means that s = o  
This is Lévinas’s objection as discussed above. In contrast, in Zambrano’s view, the 
self does not cannibalize the other, nor does it equate. However, if the self is not the same 
as the other, then it may seem that it claims that s ^ ¬ s, which as indicated above goes 
against the first rule of logic. Zambrano overcomes this aporia by distinguishing between 
different levels of reality, immediate and transcendental; it is only in the transcendental 
plane of reality where there is unity and therefore no contradiction.  
s = s  
s ≠ o  
S = O 
(s = B ^ o =B) → B because B = ! , that is to say that if the self equals Being and the 
other equals Being, then they both are Being because, ultimately, Being is everything. 
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Heidegger suggests that Being, as opposed to being, is God, that is a higher being 
(see Schalow, 2001: 3). In contrast, Zambrano – following the Krausist tradition – adopts a 
panentheist position, which in ontological terms means that being is a manifestation of 
Being, furthermore, being is Being, hence the inescapable interconnection of being and the 
transcendental unity of all that exists (Velasco, 2003: 11-12). Thus, there is only Being, 
although there are multiple manifestations of this Being; the transcendence of these 
manifestations reveals the unity of existence, that is, the transcendence of Being.  
This statement does not suggest that s ^ ¬ s, it expresses that although at an 
immediate level there is no identity between the self and the other, upon realizing the 
transcendental unity of being, ultimately, there is equivalence between the self and the other 
at a transcendental level given that everything that is is an aspect of Being. Hence, the 
transcendental level no longer refers to the specific manifestations of being, but to Being, 
the entirety of everything which exists, which is beyond the scope of predicate logic. 
It is only in the sense of this transcendental unity that Zambrano suggests the 
dissolution of the self, although she does so not by decentring the subject, but by de-
individualising it; not by melting away the perceived boundaries between the self and the 
Other, but the very concepts of self and Other, distinctions which dissolve in light of the 
transcendence of their being, that is, upon realizing their unity. The centrality of her 
conception of unity, however, prevents Zambrano from renouncing the autonomy of the 
subject and announcing the dissolution of the self as Lacan and Foucault do (see Gutting, 
2001: 239; Bruns, 2005: 364-65 respectively). Although Zambrano does acknowledge the 
unconscious – in fact, she praises some of the achievements of psychoanalysis – she is not 
prepared to give up the autonomy of consciousness (2004c: 124, 132). For her, the subject, 
at least initially, is still the centre. She denies the ruling power of the unconscious in a 
psychoanalytical sense (2004c: 134). Zambrano acknowledges the existence of underlying 
forces, such as instinct and repressed desire, as well as the tension they might create. 
Although Zambrano criticizes the alleged unity of the Cartesian self, she still defends a 
united vision of the subject to the extent that, for her, the conscious self is ultimately 
responsible for this subject (see Zambrano, 2004d: 92, 94, 107-108). Zambrano is reluctant 
to embrace the decentering of the subject in the Lacanian sense − the denial of the stability 
of the ego, which is deemed a mere illusion − because that would involve the 
relinquishment of intentionality, responsibility, transcendence, and the possibility of 
knowledge itself. So while post-modern thinkers view the idea of a ruling self as tyrannical, 
Zambrano rejects the decentering of the self in order to save ethics, and, with it, the very 
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possibility of personal development (see Appleby, 1996: 387-88)108. This translates into two 
interconnected arguments based on the possibility of identity and ethics respectively. 
First, Zambrano adopts the Heideggerian concept of being as a project, which implies 
existence of identity, the introduction of time, the existence of possibility, choice, and 
intentionality.  
A project requires the identity of the self with itself. This does not mean that the 
different elements should be identical amongst themselves forming just one, but that, even 
if there are different aspects of the self, they should form a cohesive self such that it must be 
identifiable at different times. 
A project requires projection. If the dissolution of the self is accepted, then being can 
no longer be conceived as a project. A project is always a project for something to be 
developed; in this case, the self develops itself in several directions; however, if the self 
does not exist there is nothing to project from or towards. Even if it exists but has been 
decentred, then the elements of choice and intentionality disappear when the impact of time 
is considered. Although it could be argued that choice and intentionality can be maintained 
with a decentred self, this is so only in the present time; when the prospective and 
retrospective possibilities are explored (future and past), the decentred self − not being able 
to claim identity to itself in a cohesive manner − is unable to maintain the consistency of a 
project. Hence, being as a project requires a cohesive, responsible, knowledgeable – able to 
acquire and retain knowledge so that it is possible to speak of choice –, and recognizable – 
so it is possible to establish identity – self. 
Second, Zambrano states that  
cuando lo mido [mi yo], siento que es mío, que podría ir más allá, pero que este más acá a donde he 
ido a parar, ahí soy yo, ahí no tengo más remedio que aceptar responsabilidad, porque es el punto de 
la moral y es un punto también de revelación (1987: 70-71; see also Maillard García, 1996: 56).  
The notion of responsibility is only meaningful in relation to a self; the possibility of 
ethics involves choice and personal identity. What is more, for an action to be considered 
                                                
108 As Ihab Hassan explains, the word postmodernism, or rather, postmodernidad, is first used by 
Federico de Onís in his Antología de la poesía española e hispanoamericana (1934) in order “to 
indicate a mild reaction to modernism already latent within it” (1982: 260-61). Since then, this term, its 
usage, and its meaning have gained great complexity, to the point of becoming contentious. Several 
reasons account for the difficulties associated with this term. First of all, it encompasses a huge 
diversity, for it can be applied to numerous manifestations of cultural life, such as artistic, architectural, 
philosophical, and literary, to mention but a few (Hassan, 1982: 260). But perhaps more crucial to the 
disagreement is the fact that postmodernism is to a large extent a term created ad hoc for the purposes 
of classification and academic analysis, instead of a coherent and purposefully developed movement or 
school (see Hassan, 1982: 260). That is why, for Hassan, postmodernism is best described by the 
neologism “indetermanence”, which he uses “to designate two central, constitutive tendencies in 
postmodernism: one of indeterminacy, the other of immance” (1982: 269). With this terminology, he 
aims to make reference to the concepts of heterodoxy, randomness and various forms of unmaking: 
typically a string of concepts which require the prefix de- or dis-, such as decenterment, detotalization, 
and discontinuity (see Hassan, 1982: 269). 
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ethical the subject must have self-awareness as well as the possibility of self-control. 
Without them, it makes no more sense to consider that subject’s actions ethical than it 
would to do so with an animal’s actions − acting on instinct − or with natural phenomena − 
resulting from necessity. Choice and responsibility are only meaningful when: first, 
synchronically, there is a centred, conscious self who not only provides cohesion to the 
different dimensions of the self, but also rules over them, and second, diachronically there 
is personal identity, for if the subject who carried out a certain action disintegrates as such, 
then the concept of accountability is deemed irrelevant. Even if at best such a subject could 
be considered responsible for such an action at a present time, the decentred self − whose 
key characteristic is the lack of a unified ruling self – by being multiple, unpredictable, and 
inconsistent, lacks the cohesion necessary for the establishment of psychological personal 
identity, which in practical terms means that, regardless of present responsibility, where 
there is no identity there is no accountability.  
All in all, from Zambrano’s point of view if there is no subject everything else falls 
to pieces; there is no knowledge, no choice, no ethics, and no future. Even time is reduced 
to the present, because with no sense of personal continuity there is no past or future to 
properly speak of, there is only now.  
 
4.4.2.4 Ontological thirst: transcendence 
 A religious character is common to the three authors, but whereas Aranguren and Aguirre 
often refer to religion, evolving from a deeply rooted Catholicism to a more critical 
Christianity, Zambrano does not use the term religion as often; she prefers to talk about 
transcendence, thus avoiding stale orthodox formulae. 
For Zambrano, “el anhelo es la primera manifestación de la vida humana” (1988b: 
63). The defining characteristic of this longing is its indetermination, as we shall now see. 
As opposed to a need, a longing does not necessarily require an object; it is rather a sign of 
emptiness, the kind of emptiness that only manifests itself in human life. This accounts for 
the search for transcendence in human existence: “el alma no puede estar en sí, pues en la 
vida está el salir de sí, el no bastarse a sí misma, el ser trascendente” (2004d: 44). The 
satisfaction of the basic needs for subsistence is not enough for the fulfilment of a human 
life. The existence of this emptiness, of this longing, in different degrees for each one of us, 
only stresses the need for a journey of self-discovery because “conocerse es transcenderse” 
(1986a: 25). Thus, another kind of need is revealed; the need for transcendence, the need to 
explore our humanity, our very existence. As Zambrano puts it: “el hombre es el ser que 
padece su propia trascendencia. Y, por tanto, padece su realidad: la suya y la realidad en 
tanto que le es dada, que le concierne” (1992b: 9; see also 5).  
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The DRAE assigns to the word trascendencia, transcendence, three distinct meanings, 
all of which are crucial to apprehending Zambrano’s understanding and role of this concept 
so deeply rooted in her ontology. These meanings are: “1. Penetración, perspicacia. 2. 
Resultado, consecuencia de índole grave o muy importante. 3. Aquello que está más allá de 
los límites naturales y desligado de ellos.” Neither transcendence nor unity, despite being 
the central characteristics of Being, are immediately obvious. As a result of this concealed 
character, transcendence cannot be experienced just from any mental state; it requires a 
certain shrewdness, the penetration into the fabric of reality to see beyond immediate 
sensorial appearance. Influenced by phenomenology, Zambrano understands transcendence 
as the action by which the subject, the person in Zambrano’s terminology, directs himself 
towards the exterior, an exterior which includes not only the world but also the other. 
Heidegger understands “transcendencia como superación: es transcendente lo que realiza 
este sobrepasar” (Abbagnano, 1994: 733). Zambrano shares this view. For her, 
transcendence means project as well as projection, that is why it is an act of freedom (see 
Abbagnano, 1994: 734). From Heidegger’s perspective, however, “el transcender, y todo lo 
que en el trascender se revela (incluyendo la realidad fáctica), es una imposibilidad radical, 
es una nada aniquiladora” (Abbagnano, 1994: 739). Transcendence is nothingness. In 
contrast, Zambrano, based on her concept of unity, perceives transcendence as everything-
ness, transcendence is the connectedness of Being. It is by the experience of transcendence 
that the unity of existence can be perceived and the nature of Being can be understood:  
desde los grados más humildes del ser la trascendencia se muestra como carácter último de la realidad 
que comienza ya por mostrarse en todo conjunto o estructura, en que el todo es algo más que la suma 
de las partes, que si lo son es porque se penetran unas a otras trascendiéndose (Zambrano, 2004c: 
105).  
Transcending, then, suggests the surmounting of limits, in Zambrano’s case, the limits of 
sensorial experience, the limits that separate the self from the world and the other, to access 
the realm of ontological experience where there is only unity, Being. Poetic reason, thus, 
stems not from the constant perception of unity, but from the awareness of and openness to 
the experience of transcendence which will in turn encourage the grasp of such unity. 
Consequently, two different levels can be discerned in the concept of transcendence: 
an ontological and a personal one.  
Trascendencia que no es sino la capacidad que tienen los seres para salir de sí rebasando sus propios 
límites, dejando una huella de otro ser, produciendo un efecto, actuando más allá de sí como si el ser 
de cada cosa terminara en otra. Trascendencia que se agudiza y llega a su extremo en la vida humana 
en esa ‘irrefrenable tendencia de la persona’ (2004c: 105-06).  
Personal transcendence, therefore, is intrinsic to the person. Transcendence and unity are 
intrinsic qualities of reality at an ontological level. That is why this experience of going 
beyond, of overcoming limits, is also the experience of the disappearance of separation. 
Differences and opposites vanish (see Zambrano, 2004d: 93). The self, the other, and the 
 186 
world become one. Hence, transcendence and unity are but aspects of one experience, the 
experience of Being. This experience, although inherent, is also unassailable; it is an 
irrefutable tendency which cannot be eradicated. It can, however, be faded or ignored, 
although at a great cost:  
tal vez esta irrefrenable tendencia [la de la trascendencia] no pueda ser cumplida jamás 
adecuadamente, pero al quedar incumplida por bajo de un cierto límite, la vida humana se hunde en 
inquietud y soledad, en una soledad y una agitación estériles (Zambrano, 2004c: 106).  
The disregard of the intrinsic tendency for transcendence results in loneliness and 
restlessness, which Zambrano describes as the two major ingredients of crisis (2004c: 100-
01). Inquietud, restlessness, is, then, the key symptom of transcendence; of its existence, but 
also of its denial. Two aspects of restlessness may be experienced: a positive kind of 
restlessness, inherent in human nature, which is an expression of our reaching for 
transcendence and an initially negative – in the sense of unpleasant, disagreeable – kind of 
restlessness. The latter is suffered as a result of the disregard for the call of transcendence 
and it leads to a crisis that goes beyond that which is bearable. It is negative only initially 
because, despite its unpleasantness, it may open the path for self-development; once the 
limits of that which that particular human being is willing or able to bear are surpassed, he 
is forced to look for alternatives, and one of his choices is the acknowledgement of and 
search for transcendence. The influence of San Juan de la Cruz’s concept of “noche oscura 
del alma” − a stage of anguish and darkness necessary before a mystical encounter with 
God − is particularly visible in Zambrano’s depiction of this process (see Zambrano, 1983: 
17-32). 
Loneliness is also inherent in human nature, being the result of our limiting and, 
ultimately, isolating perception of being. When the individual finds transcendence 
impossible, then, the self is closed to reality and is overcome by a feeling of loneliness 
instead (see Zambrano, 2004c: 105). Ignoring transcendence results in an endogenic type of 
loneliness, one which is the result of a lack of knowledge, of a feeling of uncertainty which 
leads, once again, to restlessness. Such loneliness is only conquerable once the immanent 
perception of being is replaced by a transcendent perception which reconnects the self with 
the original unity. Only the grasp of transcendence can provide meaning to existence and 
discard loneliness by providing a sense of belonging (see Zambrano, 1988b: 17; 2004c: 
104). This accounts for the dual relation with transcendence. Transcendence involves a 
longing which may lead to loneliness and despair, but it may also provide meaning and 
hope to those who perceive it (Zambrano, see 2004c: 104).  
 
4.4.3 Experiential philosophy 
El existencialismo se ha desarrollado, por un lado, como 
una metafísica ontológica u ontocosmológica; por otro 
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lado, como espiritualismo radical; y en fin, por otro lado, 
como una forma de empirismo igualmente radical, por la 
cual la experiencia, entendida como existencia, ha perdido 
el carácter de inclusividad total y se ha convertido en 
abertura al mundo (Abbagnano, 1994: 729). 
 
Zambrano’s thought, having developed her own ontology based on the transcendental unity 
of reality understood from a deeply spiritual perspective, incorporates these three strands. 
As discussed above, unlike post-war French philosophy, Zambrano refuses to acknowledge 
the disintegration of the subject and embraces, instead, an experiential philosophy. The 
meaning and implications of experiential philosophy shall now be explored. 
Experiential philosophy can be traced back to the German tradition, to Hegel, whose 
dialectical proof is necessarily experiential (see Rosen, 1982: 22, 164)109. Foucault divides 
pre-structuralist French thought between philosophy of experience and philosophy of 
knowledge (see Gutting, 2001: 228). According to this division, the thought of Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty is described as experiential, due to their perspectives on the subject, 
language, and epistemology (see Gutting, 2001: 228). Although Zambrano differs from 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in her views on the subject, language, and epistemology, her 
thought is also experiential. Complex and multidimensional as Zambrano’s philosophy is, 
experience is the key element that underlies all of her work, setting her apart from other 
trends and thinkers whom she might have been influenced by or sought inspiration in. As 
Gómez Blesa explains, 
la nota más distintiva de este tipo de ensayo [el ensayo zambraniano] es la ‘autoimplicación del yo en 
lo escrito’ que marca el carácter experimental del conocimiento, de modo que éste no aparece 
desligado de la vida, sino imbricado en ella” (2006: 36). 
 It is worth punctuating the sense in which the word “experience” is being used in 
this context. As Williams indicates, experience may refer to “(i) knowledge gathered from 
past events, whether by conscious observation or by consideration and reflection; and (ii) a 
particular kind of consciousness, which can in some contexts be distinguished from ‘reason’ 
or ‘knowledge’” (1983: 126). It is in this latter sense that the concept of experience plays 
such a crucial role in understanding Zambrano’s thought in particular, but also CT at large. 
As Williams continues to explain, “experience, in this major tendency, is then the fullest, 
most active kind of consciousness, and it includes feeling as well as thought” (1983: 127). It 
is precisely because of this inclusive and democratic, in the sense of non-hierarchical, 
nature of experience that it constitutes such a valuable platform for Critical Theorists. That 
                                                
109 Adorno, whom as seen above is read by Zambrano, develops what Rosen calls an “interpretative 
discipline of experience” (1982: 164). According to this, his philosophy can be considered experiential 
not only in what there is of first-hand account, but also because – influenced by phenomenology – his 
starting point is the everyday, non-philosophical experience; a trait also common to Zambrano and 
Aguirre.  
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is why Laurenzi emphasizes the role that experience plays in Zambrano’s epistemology: 
“sólo el saber de la experiencia le parecía legítimo, porque obedece a la vida y le da 
sustento sin sofocarla con superestructuras conceptuales” (2004: 24). In other words, 
Zambrano’s epistemology, her poetic reason, requires a form of perception and knowledge 
that is prepared to accept and not distort the reality which the person intends to engage with. 
Juan José García argues in relation to Zambrano’s motives to develop her poetic 
reason that, “la realidad humana [...] requiere para ser pensado [sic] un peculiar medio de 
visibilidad” (2005: 39). The breadth of reality which Zambrano and Critical Theorists aim 
to access, analyse, and communicate without resorting to artificially slicing this reality 
requires not only the immersion of the researcher into such reality, but also his adopting a 
way of relating to it which allows him to perceive it and explore it in its richness and 
complexity. This is what García refers to as medium of visibility. It is experience, 
understood as indicated above, that provides such a medium of visibility, because it allows 
the integration of feeling and thought in a particular state of consciousness and as such 
constitutes a form of rationality. That is why, henceforth, this will be referred to as 
experiential rationality. It is this state of consciousness, this experiential rationality, which 
can be found at the base of Zambrano’s poetic reason. As she puts it, “antes que definir hay 
que sentir y ver” (2003: 62). 
In the light of the primary role that Zambrano awards to experience, the focus of this 
section will be on elucidating the different levels in which Zambrano’s philosophy is 
fundamentally experiential.  
First, her intellectual progression is, to a great extent, the result of her own life 
experiences. That is not to say that there is a deterministic relationship of causality between 
her intellectual progression and her life experiences; the production of her work is not the 
only and necessary the result of her experiences, although it is a result of such experiences 
nonetheless (see 1.5.1). As Revilla Guzmán observes, this is “un aspecto fundamental del 
filosofar zambraniano: el carácter biográfico y personalmente comprometido de esta obra, 
al que su autora se refería al hablar de sus escritos como fragmentos de una imposible 
autobiografía” (2005: 212; see also 50). This is particularly so because, as indicated above, 
her philosophy is to a great extent a philosophy of exile (see also 6.1.3). 
Second, an analysis of the main topics she focuses on and develops reveals the 
centrality of this experiential element. To be born, reborn, unborn, to awaken, to dream, to 
envisage, sacrificial history, tragedy, transcendence, even poetic reason itself, are not 
objectifiable realities; they are experiential ones. Whereas, as discussed above, Hegel 
equates rationality to reality, Zambrano seems to defend an equation of a very different 
nature, that between experience and reality. Existentialism initiates a process of 
subjectivization which Zambrano continues without reaching relativist, irrationalist, or 
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nihilist conclusions. As Revilla Guzmán puts it, “la autora parece haber conservado siempre 
la confianza en la razón” (2005: 49). Consequently, Zambrano does not criticize reason 
itself, but the abuse of reason and its limitations; she criticizes Cartesian reason. She 
denounces the effects of objectivity starting from the separation between subject and object, 
which in her opinion has lead to stagnation and a false sense of control and order (see 
Zambrano, 2004c: 114). The anxiety experienced by the individual living in a society which 
supports such values is the result of accepting a dissecting rationality as the framework of 
most of life’s expressions. Zambrano is very critical of the rationality which insists on 
promoting a dissecting and fragmentary perception of reality. That is why she concludes 
that 
no hace falta insistir en mostrar la atomización de todo lo humano, la tristísima fragmentación a que 
se ha llegado, primero en el pensamiento, luego en el arte, y por último en el hombre mismo, en el 
hombre vivo al cual se le ha mutilado con la más horrible de las mutilaciones extrayéndole su 
dignidad, extrayéndole su primacía moral (1939: 77). 
For her, such rationality fails to provide a satisfactory model which acknowledges all 
dimensions of the human being and society.  
In contrast with this, Zambrano advocates a more flexible reason which may be 
opened to all the different dimensions of human existence: 
la razón humana tiene que asimilarse el movimiento, el fluir mismo de la historia, y aunque parezca 
poco realizable, adquirir una estructura dinámica en sustitución de la estructura estática que ha 
mantenido hasta ahora. Acercar, en suma, el entendimiento a la vida, pero a la vida humana en su 
total integridad (1977b: 93; see also Revilla, 2004: 2). 
Poetic reason, which can be described as an integrating experiential rationality, provides 
such a model. Poetic reason aims to overcome the divisiveness of reality inherent in 
Cartesian rationality which functions according to dualist models and binary logic (see 
Maillard, 1998: 268). As Maillard explains, Zambrano’s thought develops “un movimiento 
dialéctico de progresiva superación de dualidades” (1990: 134). Zambrano’s rationality 
identifies the duality of our epistemological categories at the same time as, based on 
transcendental unity, dualism is exposed as an artificial abstraction. Accepting such 
abstractions as the accurate reflection of the structure of reality is what prevents the 
individual from becoming a person, from perceiving the healing unity and transcendence of 
existence. Hence, subjectivity, in the experiential sense, is the element which restores unity 
to rationality. Once the conceptual framework is one of a comprehensive rationality that 
mirrors reality, and not vice versa, then the unity and transcendence of being can be 
perceived. 
Third, the experiential element in poetic reason is not limited to its theoretical 
framework; the element of practice is also essential to it. Zambrano’s work is often 
reminiscent of a religious allegory which can be understood and interpreted on many levels, 
where the content of the message largely depends on the reader’s own experiences as well 
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as on his readiness. As Abellán explains: “una comprensión en profundidad de la filosofía 
de María Zambrano exige penetrar en un universo iniciático producto a su vez de 
determinadas experiencias autobiográficas” (2006: 84). This explains why the meaning of 
Zambrano’s work is partly created by each reader as a result of the process sparked by the 
interaction of the text with the reader’s own experiences. This is also largely the reason why 
the content of Zambrano’s work exhibits a multilayered nature, for each reader’s level of 
access to it depends on his own experiences. Furthermore, because her work may be read 
and understood at different levels which depend heavily on the experiences of the reader, 
they are not intersubjective. This reliance on the experience of the reader for the creation of 
meaning makes the objective analysis of the different layers of Zambrano’s thought 
unfeasible. Bearing this in mind, in order to illustrate this point, an example of this can be 
found in the use of the word ínferos, underworld (although this is not a comprehensive list, 
instances of this term can be found in the following works: 1977a: 39, 40-41, 77; 1986a: 15, 
37; 1986c: 12, 202, 204, 220)110. On top of its literal meaning, the word ínferos in 
Zambrano’s texts also refers to the personal underworld, which some of Zambrano’s 
readers may have no personal experience of, or, if they have, these ínferos would take a 
different meaning for each reader, a meaning which may even change over time for any 
given reader. This is why an objective analysis of each one of the layers of meaning in 
Zambrano’s poetic language is unfeasible. 
The key issue in poetic reason is to provide a different kind of rationality as discussed 
above. This rationality would not be complete and coherent unless it reconciled duality, 
particularly, the duality between theory and practice. In Zambrano’s philosophy, this 
duality, this separation, is only possible conceptually. The theoretical element, the 
intellectual development of poetic reason, and the practical element of her philosophy, the 
actual linguistic expression as well as the praxis of poetic reason in her life, are inextricably 
connected. Another duality is also overcome in this process, that between writer and reader. 
Although physical and mental separation obviously still exists, this separation has been 
experientialy overcome because, not only do they share the text, but they are also engaged 
in the same process. The text increases the reader’s awareness towards poetic reason by 
means of intellectual explanation and by direct contact with it. This direct contact is 
                                                
110 Because the term “ínferos” is borrowed from the ancient Greek, no definition of this term has been 
found in either the DRAE, the Spanish dictionary produced by María Moliner, or the Oxford English 
Dictionary. Only the Isodore of Seville’s Etymologies feature one entry devoted to this word, which 
states that “the underworld is named inferus because it is below, infra. Just as in the body, the lower 
things are all heavier, if they keep the order of their weight, so with the spirit, lower things are all 
sadder. This name originates in the Greek language, where it is called inferus because it is shown to 
have nothing pleasant to resound” (2005: XIV.9.10). Thus, we find that this term is grounded in the 
Greco-Roman tradition and it has topographical as well as anatomic and anaemic connotations loaded 
with spiritual significance. 
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particularly relevant because far from a passive experience it becomes an active one. As 
Zambrano explains in relation to art: “el arte verdadero disipa la contradicción entre acción 
y contemplación, pues es una contemplación activa o una actividad contemplativa, una 
contemplación que engendra una obra, de la que se desprende un producto” (2004d: 97). 
The text encourages the reader to adopt a poetic rationality, which once it has triggered an 
experiential approach to reality works at a multiplicity of levels. She achieves this multi-
level text by developing a digressive style which is full of symbolisms and metaphors. This 
is not the result of caprice, but of the consistency of her project. The unfinished nature her 
philosophy is the key feature, because the focus is not on the result, but on the process 
itself, a process that applies to her and to others. The implication is that she has not 
elaborated a corpus of knowledge which to pass on to others. Paradoxically, the closer she 
gets to this knowledge, the greater is the awareness of the need to persevere in the process 
itself. Symbolism and metaphor, not to forget her digressive style, provide the clues of an 
ever-unfinished puzzle leading to the reader’s – and writer’s – own self-development. As 
Cioran explains, “everything in María Zambrano leads to something else, everything 
involves an elsewhere, everything” (1992, 227-28). Hence, this active reading often leads to 
yet another process, that of discovering the reader’s own creative potential (see Maillard, 
2004: 244). As Zambrano explains: 
El verdadero ser creador en arte como en pensamiento ha de transcribir la experiencia del “secreto” 
mediante un lenguaje activo, ahondando cada vez más en el sentir de lo originario, hasta hundirse en 
un centro, donde la palabra es simultáneamente pensamiento, ritmo, imagen y silencio, ‘pura acción 
creadora’ (2004c: 42; see also Bundgård, 2004: 476). 
The development of the person’s potential through artistic creation – particularly 
writing – is encouraged as part of a liberating process (see 4.4.5.4). For Zambrano, art, 
particularly poetry, constitutes a liberating phenomenon insofar as it contributes to our own 
self-development by the re-creation of being. Thus, in consonance with the later Heidegger, 
but also with Nietzsche, both of whom see art as the revelation of being, for Zambrano, the 
creative process and the revelation of being are intrinsically linked together (see Zambrano, 
2004a: 51; see also Maillard, 1992: 51; 1990: 34; Bundgård, 2004: 480). As Bundgård puts 
it, “no cabe duda de que Zambrano, como Heidegger, considera a la poesía ‘la morada del 
ser’, por ser la poesía un lenguaje próximo al originario, es decir, por ser la poesía lenguaje 
autorreferencial y no comunicativo” (2000: 432). For Zambrano, however, the focus of this 
revelation is not the happening of truth as presence or actuality as is the case with 
Heidegger (see de Beistegui, 2005: 140); the emphasis, for her, is on the experience and 
internalization of this revelation of being, which is expected to have a progressive 
transformative effect in the person who experiences it, hence contributing to the process of 




The reliance on foundationalist knowledge is one the key characteristics of modernity (see 
Stiver, 2001: 5; see also 4.4.2.2). Post-modernity, however, shatters the illusion of absolute 
knowledge, providing a diversity of answers; “postmodernism […] calls for a redefinition of 
knowledge that displaces the relative/absolute dichotomy and identifies all knowledge as 
hermeneutic” (Hekman, 1990: 135; see also 4.4.2.3)111. Hence, post-structuralists and 
existentialists reject the possibility of absolute knowledge. A common objection to 
existentialism, however, voiced by Levi-Strauss is that “by remaining in the level of lived 
experience, Sartre and the other existentialists have limited themselves to the partial truths 
of subjectivity” (see Gutting, 2001: 225). Zambrano shares with existentialists the shift to 
the subject; however, along with Critical Theorists – despite regarding knowledge as 
essentially experiential – her embrace of subjectivity does not lead to a partial reality, but to 
an integrating one, as we shall now see.  
Zambrano does not reject a priori science’s claims of objectivity or rather validity. 
She rejects, however, the consequences of an ideological treatment of science: the belief 
that the discovery of truth may only come through scientific research, the abstraction of 
reality – and of the human being – in its quest for objectivity, and the instrumental approach 
it fosters. As she puts it, 
la verdad que se le servía era verdad que no enamoraba su vida, que no la reducía [al hombre 
concreto]. Y que, además, sólo ha aprendido a través del interés […]. La vida real, el hombre real y 
concreto, quedaba, o ensoberbecido por la ideología positivista, que es lo único que se derivó de la 
razón dispersa, o humillado. Soberbia y humillación son las dos notas de la desesperación del alma 
moderna; sus dos polos (2004d: 21). 
 Zambrano’s proposal is one of integration, of fusion. She defends the role of 
subjectivity, although in doing so she does not elevate subjectivity to the position of being 
the only epistemological path. She proposes an anthropomorphic epistemology. Science has 
focused its efforts on building a construct of its object and its method. These criteria of 
objectivity have emerged from the realm of science, effectively fencing in the scope of 
cognoscibility. Cognoscibility is reduced to objectifiable phenomena which fit the 
established criteria of validity – not truth. The result is that, first, reality, in order to be 
cognoscible, must adjust to such criteria, hence the knowledge gained might well be a 
distorted version of reality – science itself, quantum mechanics in particular, suggests that 
the result of an experiment is determined by the expectations of the conductor of the 
                                                
111 This can also be observed in literature, where one of the features of the postmodern condition is the 




experiment (see Schrödinger, 1996: 486, 500)112. Second, those aspects of reality which do 
not adjust to the criteria of cognoscibility cannot be accepted as contributing factors to the 
knowledge obtained as a result of those aspects of reality which do adjust to the criteria of 
cognoscibility; hence, the resulting knowledge obtained is necessarily incomplete.  
Zambrano is aware of this incompleteness. In fact, she argues that “el conocimiento 
debe alargar sus fronteras en las múltiples dimensiones de la vida humana en el espacio y 
en el tiempo” Zambrano, 2003: 132). As a result, her writings suggest an epistemology 
based on a different understanding of cognoscibility. She does not have a set of criteria 
which reality must fit into in order to be cognoscible; rather, cognoscibility depends not on 
the nature of the intended object but on the capacity of the person searching for knowledge. 
Reality in all its fullness is potentially cognoscible. However, specific cognoscibility 
depends on the capacity and capabilities of the person who intends to grasp it, which are 
necessarily limited. These capabilities may include subjective and intersubjective methods, 
logical, and poetic reasoning, not discarding but enhancing traditionally rational 
epistemological methods. From her point of view, cognoscibility is a person’s capacity to 
grasp reality. Hence, hers is an anthropomorphic epistemology.  
Such an epistemology seems to further provide reasons for criticism on the grounds 
of limiting subjectivity. However, this subjectivity must be understood within, and applied 
to, a wider context, the context of poetic reason, bearing in mind that poetic reason should 
be viewed as a commitment to personal development. Zambrano’s insistence on becoming a 
person, rather than an individual is precisely to overcome the separation and isolation of the 
individual. Thus, in understanding a person as Dasein she is simultaneously sketching the 
guiding principles for her moral philosophy, her political theory, and her views on science. 
Despite the component of subjectivity involved in such an anthropomorphic epistemology, 
Zambrano does not give up the achievements of science; her objection goes against 
instrumental rationality, not science itself. Zambrano is opposed to the extension of 
scientific principles to epistemology, but not to the inclusion of science as an integral part 
of epistemology. It is not the scientific method that needs changing; it is its range of 
application. Science has provided humankind with a chance to suppress scarcity, hence, 
raising general living standards. However, science must be pursued bearing in mind the 
essential characteristics of Being, such as being-in-the-world and being-with-others. 
Consequently, Zambrano – by means of facing the reader with semi-rhetorical questions – 
                                                
112 This is one of the consequences of the uncertainty principle formulated by Heisenberg, according to 
which “it is not possible, even in principle, to know the momentum and the position of a particle 
simultaneously and with perfect accuracy. The uncertainties in these two quantities are always such 
that ∆p∆x>~h” (Crowell, 2003: 96). This is to say that light is both particle and energy; however, it is 
impossible for the observer to measure both simultaneously; thus, it is the observer’s choice of 
experiment which determines its result (see Heisenberg, 1996: 121-122; see also Crowell, 2003: 85-
110).  
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warns against the dangers of pursuing scientific and technological achievement while 
dismissing personal and spiritual awareness: 
¿podría el hombre ir realmente a otros planetas sin llevar consigo la representación simbólica y 
efectiva de la unidad humana? […] ¿Podría realizarse adecuadamente [la unidad humana] si aquí los 
hombres no han trascendido, sin necesidad de borrarlas, sus diferencias? (2003: 132). 
It is by gaining awareness of this transcendental unity, by realizing that being is necessarily 
being-in-the-world, that instrumental rationality is no longer perceived as rational. By doing 
so, science would cease to be instrumental, while it would continue to be intersubjective in 
essence. Hence Zambrano’s embrace of the subject, an essentially integrating subjectivity, 
does not necessarily hold her to the limitations of generally associated with subjectivity.  
 
4.4.5 Zambrano’s relationship to language 
The importance of the use of language lies in the fact that knowledge is always mediated by 
language. Language is one of the first acknowledgements that the reality of the self is 
inextricably open to and dependent on the reality of the other. Language makes 
intersubjectivity possible, but, more fundamentally, is a testimony to the inherent nature of 
such intersubjectivity. Language is not only based on our existing rationality, but it 
contributes to its perpetuation. For this reason, language shapes dramatically the nature and 
quality of the intersubjective exchange. The intersubjective dialogue is a necessary 
requirement in the project of development and actualization of the self, which is why their 
realities are interdependent. Other thinkers such as Ricoeur and Habermas also underscore 
the centrality of the other, of the intersubjective exchange, to the development of human 
identity, and even justice (see respectively Stiver, 2001: 179; Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 243). 
Aware of the essential role of language, Zambrano’s idiosyncratic usage of language 
is an attempt to develop a plausible alternative to instrumental reason. In line with her 
epistemology, poetic reason is the result of a constructive effort to open up the horizon of 
creativity and possibility. Thus, poetic reason will be explored after discussing the essential 
features of language which make poetic reason possible in the first place.  
 
4.4.5.1 Language and reality 
Zambrano does not elaborate a systematic theory of language in the sense that analytic 
philosophers do in their quest to clarify the very process and possibility of language, and the 
explanation of key controversial points, such as meaning and sense. The systematic nature 
of this attempt, along with the conceptualization of reality and experience within a 
theoretical paradigm goes against the very project of poetic reason. Nevertheless, Zambrano 
does make certain assumptions regarding the nature and possibilities of language which, 
although not developed in the form of an argument, are of key importance in understanding 
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poetic reason and the pivotal role of its language. In fact, her philosophy of being, in an 
attempt to overcome the standpoints of Heidegger and Derrida, must be contextualized 
within the post-1945 linguistic developments of analytical philosophy and post-
structuralism.  
As indicated in the introduction, Anglo-Saxon philosophers, influenced by Frege, 
argue that the basic meaning of a text is independent of the intentions of the author. The 
hermeneutic tradition which draws on the writings of Dilthey and Heidegger − including 
Zambrano − however, is opposed to such separation between author and text, on the 
grounds that meaning cannot be reduced to its literal embodiment in a given text (see 
Rosen, 1982: 2).  
Zambrano’s usage of language in poetic reason suggests that, for her, meaning has 
various – often overlapping – levels. On the first level, meaning is regarded as public 
property, as Frege and Carnap claim (see Putnam, 1996: 5). It belongs to a public domain, 
regardless of its reach; its social dimension is what makes communication possible in the 
first place. Yet, there is also a personal, although not necessarily private, level. Bakhtin 
points this out in relation to the socio-ideological implications of language: 
language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The 
word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it 
with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own 
semantic and expressive intention (1998: 35). 
Thus, the creativity of poetic reason lies in Zambrano’s usage of the language, but 
also in the exploitation of the reader’s ideolect – the idiosyncratic nature of each 
individual’s linguistic system – which leads to the re-creation of meaning through a series 
of interconnections which develop as a result of how language relates to lived experiences. 
Only after such interconnections have taken place is the process of reception and re-creation 
of meaning complete. As Maillard explains: 
Nombrar poéticamente es crear por la palabra, dar existencia, esto es, sacar del ser oculto y 
misterioso, innombrado, al ente: lo visible. Es necesario, con respecto a esto, entender a María 
Zambrano bajo el prisma de Heidegger: la palabra poética es primera porque abre relaciones entonces 
in-existentes (no en el sentido de ‘no-existentes’, sino de ‘existentes en el interior’, ocultas a simple 
vista) (Maillard, 1992: 51). 
As a result, Zambrano, as Lévinas, identifies in language the potential for revelation, for 
communicating content that is beyond individual experience or pre-existing knowledge (see 
Davis, 1996: 47). 
Zambrano acknowledges the existence of reality aside from language. To do 
otherwise would be an immanentist reductionism. That is not to say that they are not 
interconnected and do not influence each other heavily, but despite this strong link one 
cannot be reduced to the other. Externalism, the suggestion that meaning is entirely outside 
the self is an oversimplification based on the illusion of correspondence between reference 
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and referent. The conceptualization of meaning as a mental state must also be rejected, 
because if this were the case, then sharing meaning – despite the differences produced by 
idiolects – would involve being in the same psychological state, even for the same 
individual at two different times (see Putnam, 1996: 5). This would annul the possibility of 
personal progression. What Zambrano’s conception of mind and language suggests instead 
is a number of overlapping psychological states that together form meaning, meshing the 
public and personal spheres of meaning, resulting in the intersubjectivity of meaning 
without excluding individuality. Hence, communication is enabled by the aspects which are 
shared by the interlocutors, while the idiosyncracies of their experiences and their 
personalities account for the creative, unfinished, progressive aspect of language which 
encourages personal development. 
One key question remains unanswered: what is meaning? According to Norris, “it is 
a major precept of modern structural linguistics that meaning is not a relation of identity 
between signifier and signified but a product of the differences, the signifying contrasts and 
relationships that exist at every level of language” (1987: 85; see also 86). For Zambrano, 
however, there must be meaning beyond differences, particularly because her whole 
philosophy is about the overcoming of differences; the suggestion that everything is one is 
the ultimate negation of differences. Hence if meaning resides solely in a system of 
differences as structuralists and post-structuralists claim, Zambrano’s defence of unity 
would result in the lack of meaning; the impossibility of intelligibility (see Saussure, 1966: 
120; see also Gutting, 2001: 302). As Zambrano explains: 
Apegados a cultivar discernimientos y diferencias, habíamos olvidado la unidad que reside en el 
fondo de todo lo que el hombre crea, por la palabra. Es la “poiesis”, expresión y creación a un mismo 
tiempo, en unidad sagrada, de la cual por revelaciones sucesivas, irán naciendo, separándose al nacer 
–nacimiento es siempre separación–, la Poesía en sus diferentes especies y la Filosofía (2004c: 53). 
In conclusion, based on Zambrano’s usage of language, the reconstruction of her 
premises and assumptions regarding this issue leads to conclude that in Zambrano’s view 
there is not just one element that determines the complex concept of meaning; instead, 
meaning depends on a myriad of factors, such as perceived differences, but also perceived 
similarities, intentionality, preconceptions, and archetypes. 
Another issue to consider is the relationship between meaning and truth. According 
to Strawson, “we connect meaning with truth, and truth, too simply, with sentences; and 
sentences belong to language” (2004: 145). This is an argument which Zambrano does not 
enter into. She does not attempt to make this direct connection between meaning and truth; 
what Zambrano is concerned with is the experience of the world, which is mostly, if not 
entirely, mediated by language. Hence, the connection she does make is that between 
meaning and personal experience – be this personal or interpersonal experience, be this 
sensorial or conceptual experience. Whereas for Russell and Wittgenstein language mirrors 
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the world, for Zambrano it mirrors the self (see Fitzpatrick, 2005: 108; see also Zambrano, 
1977a: 82). 
 
4.4.5.2 The possibilities of language 
There are some coincidences to be found between Zambrano and French post-war thought, 
particularly in relation to language. As Gutting explains, Derrida argues that “all thought is 
mediated through language and can never attain such total clarity. There is always a 
difference between what is thought (or experienced or said or written) and the ideal of pure, 
self-identical meaning” (2001: 292). For Zambrano thought is also mediated by language 
and as a result there is no identity between both. As Maillard explains, “el poeta descubre la 
poesía, recreándose la re-crea, y en el acto creativo vuelve a crearse también a sí mismo” 
(1990: 34). This is why the concept of process is central to poetic reason, because both the 
poet and the text are part of an open process of creation and re-creation of meaning. Thus, in 
this context it is impossible to maintain the full identity of thought and language in any 
given transmission primarily because there is never a fully finished content of the mind to 
transmit; the content of the mind is processual and, as such, unfinished.  
 Despite these coincidences, and unlike post-structuralist thinkers, such as Lacan who 
maintains that thought/consciousness is structured as a language, Zambrano does not defend 
this reductionist view. Instead, Zambrano conceptualizes language as our thinking medium, 
which by no means implies they share the same structure. From her point of view, thoughts 
are not necessarily either reduced or constrained by it. What is more, rather than 
constraining, Zambrano defends the liberating possibilities of language. It is certainly the 
case that a certain structure, as well as different types of rules and conventions, are inherent 
in language, which may initially limit the possibilities of expression within a given 
language. This fact is not, however, limited to language; it is rather a fact of life that can be 
experienced when facing the practical aspect of any activity, which is necessarily limited 
within its (chosen) medium of expression or materialization. However, this limited nature of 
the medium is not necessarily limiting. In this context, the workings of language may be 
compared to the very workings of the Universe. One of the hypotheses generally accepted is 
that there is a limited amount of matter and energy, which may be compared to the rules and 
vocabulary in a language. This matter and energy is located in an infinite vacuum. In the 
case of language this would relate to the unlimited number of possible worlds the human 
mind is able to conceive, that is, to the potentially infinite horizon of creativity. This limited 
matter and energy located in an infinite vacuum do not stand still, quite the opposite: it is in 
a continuous process of expansion. This process of expansion is precisely what makes it 
possible to describe the Universe as limited (it has limited matter and energy, and it also has 
boundaries, those which separate them from the absolute vacuum, from nothingness) and yet 
 198 
as infinite (endlessly expanding). Similarly, the key to understanding the liberating 
possibilities of language is to view it as a process; as a medium which has to abide by 
certain rules necessary to make linguistic intersubjectivity functional, and, yet, the 
potentially infinite number of linguistic combinations makes the possibilities of language 
equally infinite. In Bourdieu’s terminology, language, as Zambrano understands it, is best 
described as habitus. As explained in Chapter Three, habitus is a number of structured 
structures, one of which is language (see Bourdieu, 1990: 53). That is why language 
conditions its users insofar as these structures are also structuring. Nevertheless, habitus, 
that is, these structured structures integrate a subjective dimension which is the reason why 
habitus has an in-built capacity to develop itself, thus, resulting in a limited, but infinite 
structure (see Bourdieu, 1990: 53). 
There are at least two aspects which contribute to these infinite possibilities. On the 
one hand, when using language in a speech (in the Saussurean sense of parole) the 
possibilities of combination at the disposal of the speaker or writer are endless. On the other 
hand, from the listener’s or reader’s point of view, the communication of this speech never 
reaches a blank mind. Hence, the receiver not only absorbs and interprets the message, but 
this message may also lead to interconnections, creation and re-creation of meaning on the 
grounds of the new message in relation to the prior content of the mind. From this 
perspective, a text considered in its different layers of meaning, will convey, not so much 
different meanings, but different messages. It will evoke different associations in the mind; 
it will mesh or clash differently with the mind’s other content, leading to different and 
potentially infinite receptions. Unlike analytical philosophy, which searches for conditions 
of truth and the relationship between meaning and truth/referent, what Zambrano does is to 
open these relations to a multiplicity of possible referents that come up through individual 
connections, while maintaining intersubjectivity. When Strawson highlights the relevance 
of intentionality in the linguistic debate, he opens the doors to an array of subjective factors 
that influence the linguistic exchange (2004: 146). The subjective factor is, for Zambrano, 
the keystone which allows for the expansion possibilities of language (2004c: 48-49).  
Ortega also reflects on the tension between the possibilities of language and its 
limitations:  
escribir bien consiste en hacer continuamente pequeñas erosiones a la gramática, al uso establecido, a 
la norma vigente de la lengua. Es un acto de rebeldía permanente contra el contorno social, una 
subversión. Escribir bien significa cierto radical denuedo. [...] Se encuentra [el traductor] ante el 
enorme aparato policíaco que son la gramática y el uso mostrenco (Ortega, 1946, 5: 430). 
He identifies the roots of such tension not only in grammar, but also in common usage, in 
culture itself. Rebelling accounts for the possibility of linguistic communication itself; it is 
this stretching exercise that makes the possibilities of language endless. Rebelling against 
such constraints results not only in a wider scope of expression, but also in a wider mental 
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framework which overcomes – even if only partially – the restraining conventions imposed 
by socialization. Zambrano’s contribution lies in her shift of emphasis; the writer/speaker 
opens the path for new possibilities of language, but it is an open process, one that opens up 
in as many branches as there are potential readers/listeners who process that information, 
making new associations of their own and expanding the message expressed yet further (see 
Burke, 1958: 173-74). Hence, by emphasising the dynamic aspect of language, counting on 
the active perspective of both writer and reader as manifested in poetic reason, Zambrano 
overcomes the post-structuralist limitations of language. 
 
4.4.5.3 Zambrano’s conceptualization of language in relation to Heidegger’s 
The later Heidegger places language at the centre of the hermeneutic effort, for language is 
understood as logos (see Schalow, 2001: 25). His strong reliance on language is visible in 
the well-known phrase “language is the house of being” (Heidegger, 2002: 232). As 
Abbagnano expresses it, “la única manifestación auténtica y directa del ser es, según 
Heidegger, el lenguaje” (1994: 745). Hence, poetry is for Heidegger a path inwards towards 
being (see 2002: 200-241). Although Zambrano does not go as far as claiming language is 
the foundation of being – a foundation which she does not seek – she does perceive 
language as its manifestation (see 2004c: 162). She also assigns poetry a primary position 
(see 2004c: 162). According to Heidegger, philosophy coincides with poetry because both 
of them discover through words the meaning of being; “no es el hombre el que habla sino el 
lenguaje mismo y, en el lenguaje, el ser” (Abbagnano, 1994: 746). Zambrano, influenced by 
Heidegger, perceives the potentiality of this relationship and develops it in her poetic 
reason. 
Despite the theoretical coincidences, as a result of Zambrano’s experiential attitudes, 
language becomes a central point of divergence between her and Heidegger. Although to a 
certain extent both of them seek to reinvent language, these attempts have resulted in very 
different and deliberate styles, which constitute an ideological statement, as we shall now 
see. 
One of the first striking features of Heidegger’s language is its specificity. Unlike 
analytical philosophers, he does not reduce philosophical problems to linguistic problems. 
Instead, Heidegger devises a pre-emptive strike: he develops a language for ontology 
largely relying on etymology. He creates new and specific meanings for already existing 
words, while still moving within the limits prescribed by German grammar. He uses 
nominal phrases such as Dasein, In-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world), and Vorhandensein 
(presence-at-hand). He also confers new meanings to several key verbs. For example, 
besorgen, generally translated as “to be concerned”, is used in the sense of being-with; and 
fürsorgen, solicitude, becomes being-alongside. It constitutes an attempt to enhance his 
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linguistic precision and to avoid the creation of philosophical problems as a result of 
deficient expression as denounced by analytic philosophers.  
Some of Heidegger’s terminology is adopted by Zambrano; the concept of Holzwege, 
whose translation entitles one of Zambrano’s publications, Claros del bosque (1977a), 
probably constitutes the best known example (see Marí, 1983: 125). Zambrano, however, 
far from being concerned with the precision of her vocabulary, opts for an “open” style 
which relies on the active role on the part of the reader. By doing so, Zambrano overcomes 
Heidegger’s work, which has a predominantly theoretical nature. Zambrano does not only 
develop the concept of what becoming a person is and justifies its importance, but, by 
expressing it in terms of poetic reason, she and the reader have already undertaken this 
process. Similarly, by developing the concept of transcendence, she and her reader come 
closer to the experience of such transcendence. An analogous process can be identified in 
relation to unity. Hence, poetic reason is not only a matter of expression, but also of the 
simultaneous experience/practice of the content of the text, which can be done at several 
overlapping levels. 
 
4.4.5.4 Art: Beyond the horizon 
Zambrano, like Heidegger, sees art as the antidote to the crisis of our times (Young, 2001: 
18). In fact, Heidegger’s conception of art has decisively influenced Zambrano’s. That is 
why Zambrano’s views on art will now be explored in relation to Heidegger. 
As Young explains, “in the sense in which Heidegger is interested, the origin of the 
artwork is not the artist, but rather ‘art’” (2001: 15). The traditional answers to the question 
‘what is art?’ are based on the creator (Nietzsche) or on the receiver (Kant and 
Schopenhauer). From Heidegger’s point of view, in either of these two the essence of art 
will be a psychological state, and it will therefore degenerate into aesthetics. For Heidegger, 
then, the artist is the causal origin of the work of art, although not the origin of its status as 
such. That is why he intends to focus on the work of art itself instead. Heidegger describes 
art as the ‘happening of truth’ or, rather, as one of the ways of this happening (see Young, 
2001: 16-17). Thus, he relates art to the act of seeking truth and refuses the idea of art for 
art’s sake (Heidegger, 2000: 50; see also Clark, 2002: 41-42). Zambrano agrees with this 
initial definition of art as the happening of truth, although − to be precise − in her case it 
involves the happening of personal truth, that is, art as a means and materialisation of self-
discovery. It is at this point where Zambrano differs from Heidegger; for her, the nature of 
art rests on the work of art itself as much as on the artist and the receiver. The reason for 
this ultimately lies in the ontological assumption of unity. Given that everything is Being, 
the different expressions of that Being – such as artist, receiver, and work of art – are all 
equally relevant, for none of them could be understood without the others. Their separation 
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is the result of the conceptual effort to understand the different aspects involved in the 
process of Art. This is also directly related to Zambrano’s experiential approach. 
Zambrano’s understanding of art as the happening of personal truth provides the initial 
criterion for deciding what constitutes a work of art, namely, a human creation which may 
bring about the experience of personal truth for the artist as well as for the receiver. In this 
conception, the artist and receiver need not be different people. The differentiation between 
artist and receiver points initially to the nature of the relationship of the subject to the work 
of art – regardless of whether this subject has created or not the work of art. Thus, the artist 
who contemplates and engages with his own work becomes at that moment the receiver, 
just as any other person who contemplates and engages with it also does. 
According to this understanding of art, as long as the above criterion is met, all forms 
of artistic expression would be considered equal; however, Zambrano is openly biased 
towards the written word, particularly poetry (see 2004d: 29). This predilection for the 
written word as the preferred artistic medium is not gratuitous; its causes and implications 
shall now be discussed. Initially, it seems to be because of the influence of the Heideggerian 
conception of the projection of truth as poetry (Dichtung). As Young explains, Heidegger is 
not making reference in this sense to linguistic poetry, “but rather poetry in a ‘broad’ sense 
that is equivalent to the happening of truth” (2001: 17). Hence, although influenced by 
Heidegger, Zambrano’s fondness for the written word, and particularly poetry, may come 
from a different direction.  
Art is perceived as a liberating transcendent remedy. Zambrano describes it this way:  
el arte parece ser el empeño por descifrar o perseguir la huella dejada por una forma perdida de 
existencia. Testimonio de que el hombre ha gozado alguna vez de una vida diferente. Pero en esta 
persecución las artes de la palabra parecen encerrar la clave más que las plásticas, siempre más de 
este mundo, más adaptadas a la realidad que se nos ofrece. La razón no es difícil de encontrar: las 
artes plásticas tienen menos que ver con el tiempo (2004c: 45).  
Like Derrida, Zambrano inverts the traditional supremacy of speech over writing. Derrida 
denies the logocentric claim of the subsidiary nature of writing, according to which 
language is based on phonocentric principles, hence writing would only have a 
supplementary function; a mere transcription open to numerous misinterpretations as a 
result of the lack of immediacy (see Norris, 1987: 66, 69). In “Por qué se escribe” (1934) 
Zambrano explains the existing contrast between speaking and writing, and she expresses 
her preference for the latter:  
escribir viene a ser lo contrario de hablar; se habla por necesidad momentánea inmediata y al hablar 
nos hacemos prisioneros de lo que hemos pronunciado, mientras que en el escribir se halla liberación 
y perdurabilidad –sólo se encuentra liberación cuando arribamos a algo permanente– (2004c: 37). 
Furthermore, criticism of the priority traditionally awarded to speech over the written word 
can be inferred from her argument: 
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hay un escribir hablando, el que escribe ‘como si hablara’; y ya este ‘como si’ es para desconfiar, 
pues la razón de ser algo ha de ser razón de ser esto y solo de esto. Y el hacer una cosa ‘como si’ 
fuese otra, la resta y socava todo su sentido, y pone en entredicho su necesidad (2004c: 37). 
Nevertheless, important divergences in relation to Derrida can be found in the implications 
of this critique. This vindication of the written word does not mean that Zambrano focuses 
on literal meaning in the same way as Derrida does. For Derrida, “a precise and exact 
language should be absolutely univocal and literal [prope]: nonmetaphorical” (1976: 271; 
see also 275-79, 294). Consequently, as Norris explains, “Derrida will turn the argument 
round and insist on a rigorous literalism of the text” (1987: 86). Zambrano’s awareness of 
the lack of perfect identity between thought and language, however, deems linguistic 
expression, oral and written, incomplete. For this reason, the reception and subsequent 
analysis of any given linguistic expression as a finished product would result in a partial and 
deficient interpretation. Oral and written linguistic expressions are just aspects of a more 
complex process which involves a myriad of components, components which a rigorously 
literal analysis of the text would overlook (see 4.4.5). It is the open nature of the linguistic 
process that accounts for the possibility of expression. Despite admitting the lack of identity 
between thought and language in a specific linguistic expression, Zambrano does not give 
up on the possibilities of communication of language, which are achieved precisely by going 
beyond literal meaning. What makes poetic reason possible is precisely going beyond the 
text, acknowledging, but also surpassing its literal meaning. Furthermore, reluctance to stick 
to the literal meaning of the text indicates an “opposition between the letter and the spirit of 
the text, between a debased, merely literal way of understanding and a privileged access to 
revealed truth” (Norris, 1987: 87), an opposition which has been firmly maintained by 
Western tradition. Zambrano’s refusal to adhere only to the literal meaning may initially 
suggest that she defends such oppositions. Oppositions are, however, fruit of a dualist 
position. By contrast, the whole of Zambrano’s work exhibits the effort to overcome the 
dualism that is at the root of Western rationality, a dualism that instrumental rationality 
relies very heavily upon. In her thought, essentially monist, there is no opposition of 
meaning, but layers of it (see Revilla Guzmán, 2004: 4); layers which are not opposed to, 
but ultimately based on literal meaning.  
Time also plays an important role in establishing a hierarchical relationship between 
oral and written language. Derrida perceives the element of time as one of the key 
differences between these modes of linguistic expression (see 1976: 141-42). That is why 
he argues that “the history of truth, of the truth of truth, has always been [...] the 
debasement of writing, and its repression outside ‘full’ speech” (Derrida, 1976: 3). From 
Derrida’s point of view, one of the marks of the logocentric prejudice is the identification of 
truth with the instance of self-present (oral) language (see Norris, 1987: 77). Like Derrida, 
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Zambrano inverts this relationship, manifesting her preference for the written over the 
spoken word on the basis of time (see 2004c: 45). Zambrano, echoing structuralists, 
recognizes and highlights the Saussurian contrast between langue and parole and feels that 
writing is the opposite of speaking, because “se habla por necesidad momentánea inmediata 
y al hablar nos hacemos prisioneros de lo que hemos pronunciado, mientras que en el 
escribir se halla liberación y perdurabilidad –sólo se encuentra liberación cuando arribamos 
a algo permanente” (2004c: 37). Spoken words are the result of an external necessity, but 
they are soon lost as a result of time (see 2004c: 35-36). The written word, however, is the 
response to an internal need; first the need for solitude and isolation, a combination that will 
encourage the writer to search and find secrets which then he feels compelled to write, and, 
second, the need to communicate defeating time (see 2004c: 37-39, 42).  
Moreover, contrary to the logocentric prejudice which locates truth in the present, for 
Zambrano the perception of truth is directly related to the perception of unity. As she puts 
it, “conocimiento del hombre que no será sino el movimiento de reintegración, de 
restauración de la unidad humana hace tiempo perdida en la cultura europea” (1939: 77). As 
a result of this, for her, truth located is in the past, an indefinite, possibly merely imaginary 
past, when the perception of unity is effortless and immediate (see Zambrano, 2004d: 41). 
This unity, however, is transcendental and universal, which means that it also refers to time 
itself (see Zambrano, 2004d: 51). As a consequence, truth can also be found in the future, 
when the individual’s search for transcendence has resulted in a corazón transparente, 
transparent heart (see Zambrano, 2004d: 53); then, the perception of unity becomes 
apparent (see Zambrano, 2004d: 53). It is writing what provides the connection between 
past and future which makes the search for personal truth possible. Communication by the 
written word results in surmounting the limitations of the self by reaching others and by 
expanding its temporal possibilities. The linear dynamics of time itself are defied by 
creating an expression of the self which connects present, past, and future, not as mere 
retro/pro-jection, but as simultaneous presence. Thus, writing is the transcendence of the 
self and time. Zambrano’s interest in time and its perception, and, what is more, the impact 
of that perception on our interaction with reality, is, in fact, part of the effort in post-war 
European thought to understand and re-examine the position of the individual in a fast-
changing world. This can also be observed in Bergson’s thought, which offers another 
understanding of time away from linearity and which influences Zambrano’s view of time 
(see Guelarc, 2006: 1-13). As Zambrano explains: 
 si viviéramos en uno [tiempo] sólo quizá no hubiera confusión; si el solo tiempo fuese ése que tanto 
trabajo –ahora se daba cuenta– le había costado establecer: el tiempo sucesivo: antes, después, ahora, 
linealmente; el tiempo invención de la conciencia. Cuando leyó a Bergson le embriagó la crítica del 
tiempo a imagen y semejanza del espacio; el descubrimiento de “la durée” […]; […] ese tiempo de la 
superficial conciencia, el tiempo cadena, condena (1989a: 115). 
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For Bergson durée, duration, is the time which refers to the subject’s immediate experience, 
which should not be confused with the spatial articulation of passage of time (see Gutting, 
2001: 56). As Bretz points out, the rejection of lineal time is influenced by the 
transformations of the scientific outlook on the subject; the overcoming of Newtonian 
theories and the theoretical alternatives proposed by other thinkers such as Bergson (2001: 
147-48). Bretz goes on to explain that “the geological concept of strata, with variable 
components coexisting within a thick layer, displaces the image of time as a line” (2001: 
150; see also 264, 278; Salguero Robles: 1994: 156, 273). Hence, Zambrano concludes that 
el tiempo no tiene una estructura simple, de una sola dimensión, diríamos. Pasa y queda. Al pasar se 
hace pasado, no desaparece. Si desapareciese totalmente no tendríamos historia. Mas, si el futuro no 
estuviese actuando, si el futuro fuese simple no-estar todavía, tampoco tendríamos historia. El futuro 
se nos presenta primariamente, como “lo que está al llegar” (1988b: 18; see also 1988b: 23, 75; 2004: 
22). 
There are yet other factors which – although not explicitly defended by Zambrano – 
are also at the root of her privileged treatment of writing, particularly poetry (see 2004c: 
162). Unlike structuralists, Zambrano does not explicitly defend that the mind is structured 
as a language, and there are no indications to presume she held this conviction. Zambrano 
coincides with the structuralists, however, in that there is a strong relationship between 
language and the unconscious, particularly the pre-conscious. She sees in language not the 
structure of thought, but its medium, its vehicle (see 2004b: 131). She considers creative 
writing as a way of expressing more than the person is aware he knows: “pero la poesía 
nació como ímpetu hacia la claridad desde esas zonas oscuras, por eso precede a la 
Filosofía, lenguaje meramente inteligible, y le ayuda a nacer” (2004c: 162). Thus, this form 
of creative linguistic expression may bring to the fore pre-conscious and even unconscious 
knowledge. 
This is particularly relevant for self-development. Although creativity, regardless of 
the art form, may also unleash the expression of the self, writing particularly encourages a 
liberating process because the linguistic process generates a number of interconnections of 
thoughts which may reach all spheres of human life, whereas the medium used for other art 
forms may trigger connections limited to that medium, unless these connections are made 
through language. This concept of expansion seems to be the development of Heidegger’s 
concept of art as “opening up the world” (Young, 2001: 19). Zambrano emphasizes the 
liberating possibilities of artistic creation. Art is highly regarded in Zambrano’s thought 
because it is considered to hold the key to the person’s development. This development can 
be considered and explored in different ways and levels, but this is initially so because of 
art’s interaction with freedom. Art may not only free the individual from the constraints of 
time, but it may also contribute to shaping freedom itself. Every individual chooses a life 
for himself, but in order to make such a choice, first, there must be a stage of ensoñación, 
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daydream. Daydreaming or envisioning reflects the scope of our freedom and enables 
choice (see Zambrano, 1989a: 63). The practice of art – particularly poetry – broadens the 
horizon of freedom by the exercise of creativity, for – as in Nietzsche and Heidegger – it is 
in the artistic creation where Being reveals itself (see Zambrano, 2004c: 53; see also 
Bundgård, 2004, 408). Thus, Zambrano places her hopes in the liberating possibilities of the 
written word: “por la palabra nos hacemos libres” (2004c: 35; see also 42). 
The assumption that underlies Zambrano’s concept of creativity is that human beings 
already posses a number of latent ideas about the world and about themselves: “para la 
vida, conocer es siempre recordar y toda ignorancia aparece en forma de olvido” 
(Zambrano, 2004d: 41). In this context, it is possible to surmise that she implies that there is 
set of pre-cognitive conceptions or immanent ideas (see Zambrano, 2004d: 104). Another 
interpretation – not necessarily at odds with the previous hypothesis – could lead to 
claiming that transcendental unity involves (pre)-existing knowledge about Being. This is to 
say that s ^ o → B, where B = ! ; in other words, if the self and the other are both Being 
because everything is Being, then the self should have immediate knowledge not only about 
himself, but also about Being, about everything. This unity does not manifest itself in 
sensorial experience, but at the level of ontological experience. However, this would imply 
(pre)-existing knowledge of everything that exists which is difficult to maintain, 
considering that even the immediate knowledge about the self as a whole is open to 
discussion. In any case, there are also indications that Zambrano believes that there is 
certain latent knowledge which is the result of the process of socialisation and living-in-the-
world itself (2004d: 94). The theoretical defence of this position takes Zambrano very close 
to Jung’s archetypes, whose influence also accounts for the importance she places in 
metaphor and symbolism.  
Although Durkheim first coined the phrase collective consciousness in Les Règles de 
la Méthode Sociologique (1895), it is Jung’s concept of collective unconscious that is 
relevant to Zambrano’s thought. As Jung argues in The Archetypes and the Collective 
Unconscious (1959), humanity possesses a collective unconscious which consists of 
ancestral images and thoughts. The content of this collective unconscious manifests itself 
through dreams, myths, religion, and unconscious fantasies. The key concept used by Jung 
to describe this content is that of archetypes, that is, condensed, universal and archaic, yet 
dynamic notions central to cultural organisation. These archetypes, such as the mother, the 
father, and the shadow, have a considerable effect upon the individual, not least because the 
individual is often unaware that these archetypes function as pre-conceptions through which 
to filter information. This idea of the collective unconscious often leads to the 
misconception that its contents are transmitted somehow genetically. Jung does not make 
such a claim. The collective unconscious refers to the common psychological ground which 
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leads to a common interpretation and retention of information and images. It is not a matter 
of a communal heritage of information; what is inherent is the predisposition to react in a 
similar way to similar stimuli. This common predisposition, added to having undergone a 
common process of socialization, in addition to the stress placed on certain experiences or 
concepts common in a given culture, accounts for the development of basic archetypes as 
the contents of the collective unconscious. Other terminology used includes the objective 
psyche and the historical unconscious; Zambrano prefers to refer to it as historical 
unconscious, given how it shapes and is shaped by history (see 1986b: 60). 
Jung’s works have a strong influence on Zambrano; many of Zambrano’s attitudes 
are a reflection of Jung’s understanding of the historical unconscious (see Maillard, 1992: 
25; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 79-81). It is helpful to refer to Jung’s account of the 
historical unconscious in order to understand and explain Zambrano’s conception of 
creativity as the expression of the inner self, which might contain knowledge inaccessible to 
the conscious mind, and her use of metaphor and symbolism as a means to communicate a 
deeper, transcendental reality. Its relevance to Zambrano’s thought is better perceived in 
relation to metaphor, which – as discussed above – reflects some sort of latent knowledge 
that very much resembles the Jungian archetypes (see also Fernández Martorell, 2004: 57-
58). Zambrano forcefully summarizes the role she assigns to metaphor in Hacia un saber 
sobre el alma:  
pero la metáfora ha desempeñado en la cultura una función más honda, y anterior, que está en la raíz 
de la metáfora usada en la poesía. Es la función de definir una realidad inabarcable por la razón, pero 
propicia a ser captada de otro modo. Y es también la supervivencia de algo anterior al pensamiento, 
huella en un tiempo sagrado, y por tanto, una forma de continuidad con tiempos y mentalidades ya 
idas, cosa tan necesaria en una cultura racionalista. Y la verdad es que en sus momentos de mayor 
esplendor, la Razón, no hubo de temer ante estas metáforas que podemos llamar fundamentales. O 
quizá es que al decir cultura, tengamos la imagen de una unidad entre la más pura razón y esos otros 
modos de conocimiento, entre los que se destaca éste de las metáforas (2004c: 60). 
As Gómez Blesa explains, “Zambrano defiende la capacidad cognoscitiva de la 
metáfora como forma originaria con la que el hombre percibe el entramado de relaciones 
con lo real” (2006: 36). It is by making use of metaphors, poetry and poetic reason that one 
can access and express concepts beyond their literal meaning, thus accessing a deeper or 
transcendent reality which is otherwise inaccessible (see Maillard, 1990: 34). As Bundgård 
indicates, “la enunciación del texto zambraniano recurre a imágenes o símbolos, pues lo 
inefable propio de ‘la comunicación de lo oculto’ desborda obviamente las posibilidades de 
las palabras del lenguaje habitual comunicativo” (2000: 72; see also 433-35). Thus, the 
informative connotations of metaphors will have a vital role in the development and use of 
poetic reason as we shall see below. 
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4.4.6 Poetic Reason 
As a result of her epistemological position discussed above, Zambrano finds herself 
compelled to challenge existing patterns of thought and expression, even overcoming them. 
As Laurenzi explains, for Zambrano, “la filosofía debería romper la hegemonía de la mente 
y prestar atención al ser humano en su totalidad, explorando la inteligencia del cuerpo y del 
corazón” (2004: 26). Zambrano’s work, however, in as much as it accomplishes precisely 
that, the reclamation and incorporation of emotional, intuitive, and, even spiritual forms of 
knowledge, is no longer mere philosophy, it effectively becomes an alternative form of 
rationality; it becomes poetic reason113. 
 
4.4.6.1 What is behind poetic reason?  
 “La superación de esta escisión sería posible, dice 
Zambrano, mediante la sustitución de la razón 
racionalista como método de aprehensión de la 
realidad por la razón integradora poética, concebida 
como método de conocimiento y como razón 
práctica” (Bundgård, 2000: 27). 
 
There are implicit assumptions from which Zambrano develops her work, turning this study 
to a certain extent into an archaeological task of uncovering and reconstructing such 
assumptions. Unveiling such assumptions and their implications has been the main focus of 
the previous section. During this process, reference has been made repeatedly to poetic 
                                                
113 Although as emphasized throughout the thesis, Zambrano’s work goes beyond philosophy, it is not 
uncommon to find critics who equated the field of her thought to philosophical enquiry. An example of 
this is found in Nimmo, who states that Zambrano adopts an unconscious metaphysical position by 
believing that she is thinking from outside of philosophy (see 1997: 894). Nimmo argues that she 
adopts this position “through her explicitly poetic reinterpretation of the dominant element of 
philosophical discourse: reason, or the logos” (1997: 894). In stark contrast with this, Zambrano’s 
thought is neither metaphysical in nature – although it may have metaphysical components – nor does 
it constitute a reinterpretation of the dominant philosophical discourse. I argue that far from a 
reinterpretation of the existing paradigm of reason, what Zambrano attempts is to think and express 
herself from a different and alternative framework of rationality, poetic reason. Furthermore, I argue 
that understanding Zambrano’s work as the reinterpretation of reason is the result of attempting to 
assess Zambrano’s thought by applying an external epistemological standard of what reason is, namely, 
the prevailing standard in what Nimmo refers to as “the dominant philosophical discourse” (1997: 
894). As Skinner explains, “the very idea of assessing the rationality of beliefs is thus dismissed as 
nothing better than an intrusion, a forcible imposition of our own epistemic standards on an alien 
‘universe of discourse’ or ‘form of life’ (2002: 37). The danger in doing this, is not only the distortion 
of the author’s thought, which is interpreted from an external – and therefore inapplicable – 
epistemological and rational framework, but also that by so doing, the author’s thought, in this case 
Zambrano’s, becomes bound to this external rationality, making the possibility of offering an 
alternative inconceivable. It is because of this frame of interpretation that Nimmo undermines the 
subversive component of Zambrano’s poetic discourse by concluding that it offers a reinterpretation of 




reason; however, it is not until the key assumptions which underlie her thought and provide 
it with coherence and cohesion have been explored, that poetic reason can be analysed.  
As Bundgård points out, Zambrano already takes the first step towards poetic reason 
in her “Hacia un saber sobre el alma” (1934) and “en Horizonte del liberalismo, primer 
libro de María Zambrano, ya se encuentra formulada la noción de razón-poética” (2000: 21, 
60). Despite these early foundations and the fact that the seed of poetic reason can be found 
throughout her entire work, poetic reason is the reflection of her mature thought. In fact, it 
is best exemplified in the works that follow her American exile, particularly from her 1953 
return to Europe, a period which is often regarded as more mystical. This development is 
only consistent with the essence of Zambrano’s formulation of poetic reason. Unity, one of 
the key features of poetic reason, means that theory and practice – even of poetic reason 
itself – have to be integrated. The integration of opposites, however, is not conceived as an 
exercise which can be carried out leading to the perfect union and identity of its parts. 
Instead, as I have already indicated, poetic reason is conceived as a process which attempts 
such integration. This integration is rarely – if ever – complete; it is rather a spiral ladder 
with multiple steps or levels of complexion −completud− (see Zambrano, 1988a: 48). The 
importance of preserving this unity, while also relishing diversity, multidimensionality , and 
movement, change, can be observed below: 
 Hoy [1928] más que nunca rechazamos la visión del dogmatismo, que quisiera hacer de nuestra vida 
una gran avenida recta de gran unidad, grandiosidad, monotonía y ausencia de verdadera unidad. La 
unidad de la avenida es la unidad de la recta: unidad de agregación. Preferimos la unidad orgánica, 
integrante, de la curva, de la esfera que tiene centro vivo. Y la perspectiva de un paseo a gran 
velocidad por el centro de la urbe: diversidad de aspectos, sorpresas y dimensiones, también 
dinamismo. Que nuestro vivir tenga un centro y muchas dimensiones: las tres clásicas –conocer, 
sentir y obrar–, tres coordenadas, que fijan la vida, y otras nuevas, insospechadas, que engendra el 
espíritu máximo aparato de sorpresas (Zambrano, 2003: 61-62)114. 
In Bienaventurados, in a short essay entitled “La corona de los seres”, Zambrano herself 
explicitly favours shaping the development of thought in the form of the spiral (see 
Zambrano, 2004a: 27-28). On reflecting on the relationship to Being and knowledge that 
authors may achieve through their work, Zambrano highlights the limitations of a thought or 
work whose shape is a circle, and expresses a preference for the spiral instead: “pero si el 
autor nos regala una obra espiral entonces hay esperanza todavía, el círculo no la da porque 
está cerrado para siempre. La espiral del ser. Los gnósticos se darán en espiral, en la que no 
hay reiteración” (2004a: 27). This is a shape which she also strives to achieve in her own 
thought. As Maillard explains, Zambrano’s thought does not form a complete, closed 
system, one which follows the trajectory of the circle (1990: 31). Instead, Maillard describes 
Zambrano’s thought as a spiral, as the spiral trajectory of personal evolution (1990: 31; see 
                                                
114 It should be noted that it is no coincidence that the geometric shape which integrates a circle and a 
sphere in a dynamic way by accommodating different dimensions is the spiral. 
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also Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 51, 103). Thus, as with Aranguren and Aguirre, Zambrano’s 
thought is spiral, for its development is based on the integration of opposites, leaping into 
the next layers of reality. This spiral process − which extends ad infinitum − is a conceptual 
strategy used to grasp the already existing transcendental unity of reality. 
We are now in a position to discuss instrumental reason. We shall question 
Zambrano’s mysticism, and aim to elucidate the nature of poetic reason and its value as an 
alternative rationality. 
 
4.4.6.2 Demystifying mysticism 
Zambrano is dissatisfied with traditional Western rationality. Several reasons may account 
for this dissatisfaction. In line with the concept of gendered reason discussed in section 
4.3.2, Maillard suggests that traditional forms of Western philosophy, particularly those that 
arise from Greek heritage, are based on specifically masculine forms of rationality, based on 
the concept of One as opposed to the Other, and which, in turn, is at the very core of our 
culture and organisation (1998: 268). Zambrano also perceives this primarily dualist vision 
which is at the basis of Western rationality. It is this binary division, which encourages 
opposition, difference, confrontation, separation, and, ultimately, loneliness, one of the 
aspects she attacks (see 2004d: 74; see also 1939: 77). Because of this awareness of 
separateness at all levels, instrumental reason is widely exercised and morally accepted. 
Even Heideggerian existentialism reflects such a mentality. As Abbagnano explains, for 
Heidegger “el ser de las cosas está, en consecuencia, subordinado y es relativo al ser del 
hombre” (1994: 734). Its reality consists in serving as instruments to the human being (see 
Heidegger, 2001: 80-85). Hence, in spite of himself, Heidegger is instrumentalist because 
the human being is the centre of existence and the rest of reality is only insofar as it is 
being-for the human being.  
This rationality rejects transcendence, either by equating transcendence to God who 
is different and separate from the world’s realities or by rejecting transcendence altogether, 
by denying God and anything else that implies going beyond sensorial experience. Either 
way, being is immanent. The scope of reason is, then, limited to the interaction of the 
factual and the logical, where the factual dictates the logical and, ultimately, the possible. In 
contrast, because Zambrano understands being as project, possibility is inherent in it. 
Possibility is not limited, however, to the factual because it refers to that which has not yet 
happened, or to the logical as pretended by mechanicist interpretations of reality; possibility 
goes beyond the logical to harbour the illogical, the improbable, the inconsistent, the 
unreasonable, and above all, the indeterminate. That is why, according to Zambrano, 
traditional Western rationality fails to reflect the essential nature of being. Instead, she 
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argues that “lo que ha de salvarnos, [no es] sino algo que sea razón, pero más ancho” (2003: 
102). 
Far from this wider reason, “el entendimiento moderno llegó a su desrealización a 
través de un cierto racionalismo que pide cuentas, que comienza con la duda. La realidad 
entonces parece huir” (2004d: 42). That is why, unlike Cartesian rationality, restricted to 
the factual and the logical, poetic reason attempts to be a reflection of existence. Hence it 
has to include non-rational components, such as emotion and faith. In Zambrano’s words,  
y delirando la verdad increíble se hace cierta. Aparece entonces la razón. La razón que para mostrarse 
necesita una cierta certidumbre, una cierta verdad realizada y aun corporeizada. Lo increíble la ha 
precedido. Lo increíble viene a ser la prehistoria de la razón” (Zambrano, 1996b: 169).  
That is why hers is not an irrationalist philosophy, because she does not rely solely on these 
components, which overall contribute to a more organic philosophy. Adopting poetic reason 
and hence undergoing the evolution from individual to person leaves no room for 
instrumental reason. When existence is viewed as a whole, and this vision has lead to 
personal involvement, instrumentality is no longer a valuable option, it becomes senseless.  
Zambrano claims that many of the problems experienced by Western civilisation, an 
expression of which can be found in the experience of crisis, are due to the failure of the 
Western tradition to provide a rationality that would account for and adequately reflect the 
nature of being (see respectively 2004c: 99, 100-101; 2004c: 29). That is why she sees the 
need to propose a different rationality, a rationality which instead of being limited to the 
factual and logical mirrors being; a rationality guided by and extended to transcendental 
unity (see 2004c: 105). This alternative rationality is called by Zambrano poetic reason. It is 
tempting after discarding Cartesian reason as limiting, to opt for an irrationalist philosophy, 
but she does not do this. Poetic reason is above all reason, because “el conocimiento que 
aquí se invoca [...] pide que la razón se haga poética sin dejar de ser razón” (Zambrano, 
1986a: 30). 
There is a tendency to over-emphasize Zambrano’s criticism of Cartesian reason, in 
the sense that it is often equated with the rejection of reason altogether, stressing in contrast 
the mystical character of Zambrano’s writing, with all the religious connotations it carries. 
Aranguren, in praising Zambrano’s uniqueness, describes her thought as the fusion of 
philosophy and mysticism (1983: 130). Bundgård’s characterization of Zambrano’s thought 
also exemplifies this position:  
al hilo de este proceso, y siempre desde la perspectiva de la razón poética como método de 
aprehensión de la realidad profunda de la existencia, la filosofía-poética zambraniana se transforma 
en una religión-poética de carácter místico que busca rebasar la escisión sujeto-objeto propia de la 
Modernidad en una unidad originaria supratemporal, previa a toda diferenciación de carácter lógico o 
racionalmente reflexivo (2004: 15).  
This would be, however, an over-simplification. Rather than thoroughly rejecting it, 
Zambrano filters the qualities of Cartesian reason to overcome its shortcomings. It must not 
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be forgotten that, Zambrano, like Heidegger before her, is particularly concerned with the 
horizon of Cartesian reason, identifying the selectively restrictive nature of its scope as one 
of its main problems. Instead of filtering our perception of reality through a pre-imposed 
external framework of rationality, Zambrano advocates a poetic reason, a reason which may 
allow the person to engage with reality as is, thus allowing the person to participate more 
fully of such reality and to gain an improved knowledge of the self in the process. As 
Zambrano puts it, “y es que al encontrar la realidad nos encontramos a nosotros mismos, 
entramos en ella y, sin suponer nada parecido a ninguna identificación mística, lo cierto es 
que cuando entramos en esa realidad descubierta nos revelamos a nosotros mismos” (2004d: 
43). 
Poetic reason does not conform to the characteristics of religious or mystical thought: 
expresión y creación unidas constituyen lo que Zambrano entiende por poíesis: unión ‘sagrada’, 
‘religiosa’ –religioso entendido en un sentido más próximo al significado del término religatio 
(acción de ligar) que de aquel otro, más legítimo al parecer etimológicamente, de religio (escrúpulo) 
(Maillard, 1992: 31).  
Religious thought implies faith in a received system of beliefs which is not to be found in 
Zambrano’s work. Faith is, in fact, one of the distinctive features in Zambrano’s thought, 
although her faith does not conform to a received system as above. The factors contributing 
to the description of Zambrano’s thought as mystical shall now be explored.  
The fact that her work is written in layers accounts for the multiplicity of meanings 
and its deceptive simplicity. Furthermore, her use of metaphor and spiritual symbols has 
often led to mystical interpretations of the contents of poetic reason. In addition, as a result 
of its accessible, although abstract, nature, the existentialist critique embedded in her work 
has often been overlooked, having been labelled as mystical instead. 
Another factor which may have contributed to these seemingly mystical qualities is 
the influence of Spanish Golden Age mysticism found in her work. She expresses her 
interest in this aspect of the Spanish heritage by writing about one of the most celebrated 
mystics of this period San Juan de la Cruz (see 1977b: 81, 194, 196). His influence can be 
traced not only to the relevance she assigns to faith and transcendence, but also the style 
chosen, often drawing on the same symbolism, such as noche oscura, to refer to the 
loneliness, anguish, and uncertainty experienced by the soul (see 1977a: 142; 1986a: 95; 
1989a: 249, 282). This influence alone, however, is insufficient to accurately qualify 
Zambrano’s thought as mystical.  
The Catholic conception of mysticism refers to the union of the individual with God, 
that is, the part with the absolute; oriental mysticism, one the other hand, refers to the fusion 
of the part with the whole (see Abellán, 1979b: 245-46). Zambrano, however, does not 
admit this initial difference between God and the individual which is equally present in both 
traditions. From her point of view, such difference, as well as the experience of union, is 
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only a matter of perception for according to her ontology, everything is one, everything is 
Being. 
Mysticism is above all experience, a personal and untransferable experience. It has 
been described as a state of the soul, which is as such, of course, unverifiable (see Abellán, 
1979b: 245-46). This means that the qualification of an experience as mystical can only 
commence by the admittance of the individual who supposedly had such experience. 
Zambrano, however, never claimed such mystical state. Therefore, there is no evidence 
suggesting Zambrano ever had a direct mystic experience, which is not to be confused with 
the experience of transcendence. 
In any case, Zambrano’s conception of unity clashes with the ontological supposition 
behind the mystical experience. Her experience is neither transcendental – in the sense of 
beyond of this world – nor ineffable; instead, she expresses in her writings the gradual 
integration of this transcendence in her being so as to become persona. As for the sense of 
this experience being inaccessible to reason, it is Zambrano’s endeavour to integrate such 
an experience of transcendence in a wider reason, poetic reason. Zambrano’s transcendence 
does not elude reason, it is at the very foundation of the poetic reason she advocates. It will 
be in reference to this daily transcendence that Zambrano’s thought will be referred to as 
spiritual at the most, resisting the stronger religious or obscurantist connotations. 
 
4.4.6.3 What is poetic reason? 
In a prologue to a compilation of her work, Zambrano describes her own thought as 
fragments of “una órbita que ininterrumpidamente se recorre y que solamente se mostraría 
entera si su centro se manifestase” (1971a: 10). This elusive image does succeed in 
conveying Zambrano’s unruly, although not unstructured, approach. Her works do not form 
a closed totality, instead they are open. Although, open not in the relativist sense to every 
possible interpretation, but open like being itself, in that they are not a given, but a project, a 
process. Her work places the reader in an active position as he is invited on to a personal 
and communal journey of self and mutual discovery and development. 
One of the challenges of analysing Zambrano’s thought is that, as indicated above, it 
is – in many ways – resistant to analysis. First, the systematic exposition of her thought is 
itself a betrayal of its contents because it involves stepping away from poetic reason, that is, 
separating theory from practice. Second, the interconnectedness that according to her is 
intrinsic to reality expands to the contents of her thought, resisting the necessary linear 
exposition imposed by systematic language. Thus, although an overall account of 
Zambrano’s interconnectedness is possible, only the exposition of the whole of her thought 
– which is beyond the scope of this research – would escape the ghost of partiality and 
incompleteness. Third, definitions, as Socrates established, should be at the basis of debate. 
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The definitions of Zambrano’s concepts, however, are elusive and often circular, in the 
sense that most of them go back to the transcendental unity which grounds them. 
Nevertheless, these features – which are often interpreted as a creative or mystical flair, or 
even as plain elusiveness – are precisely what make poetic reason a feasible alternative to 
Cartesian rationality.  
Unlike Heidegger, Zambrano’s key question is not so much being from an 
ontological perspective, but rather being from an anthropological and transcendental one. 
The result is that the key issue in her thought is co-being: being a person defined by the 
relation to the alterity of that which exists. This impossibility of separation, even if only 
methodological, is at the very core of her ontology and determines poetic reason. Poetic 
reason is the proposition of an integrating reason, una razón superadora. On the ontological 
basis of transcendental unity, poetic reason overcomes the limits set by the traditional 
dualist mentality. The separation and differences between the self, the other, and the world 
are surmounted and integrated in the unifying concept of Being. This ontological 
framework extends to all aspects of reason. Zambrano’s thought is also superador because 
in a process which initially is reminiscent of Hegelian dialectics, poetic reason strives to 
find an integrating synthesis to any opposing duality. However, unlike the Hegelian 
process, Zambrano’s does not continue ad infinitum, it continues describing a spiral form 
until it reaches unity, that is, Being. This integrating drive can be observed in what 
Aranguren describes as ‘espíritu transdiciplinar’, the attempt to find a more comprehensive 
reason which absorbs a multitude of disciplines offering new possibilities, what is more, 
new realms of investigation (1983: 137). In practical terms, poetic reason can only be 
understood, and, indeed, practiced from the perspective of Dasein, that is, being-in-the-
world and being-with-others. For this reason, ontology, ethics, politics, arts, and any other 
spheres of human existence are closely intertwined, and, consequently, interrelated. Hence, 
for poetic reason to be consistent it has to be primarily a project, a process; a project of self-
development that results in the process of the individual becoming a person. Poetic reason 
is an interactive, dynamic reason which cannot be considered as a fulfilment; instead, it is a 
process.  
 
4.4.6.4 The power of the written word 
As Jordan explains, for Barthes,  
writing was no simple copy of things, no neutral vehicle for the transmission of determinate, pre-
existing meanings, but annoyingly slippery, unstable, indeterminate: in short, an anti-communication. 
Thus the idea of writing as a shared communication between author and reader was an illusion, based 
on the fallacy that writing speaks (1990: viii).  
It is precisely this indeterminate quality, the need to create meaning as opposed to extracting 
it, that accounts for the subversive value of the writing in CT. The focus is not a meta-
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analysis of communication −or its (im)possibility− but its potential for expression and self-
development. According to Foucault, “the transformation of discursive practice is linked to 
a whole range of usually complex modifications that can occur outside its domain (in forms 
of production, in social relationships, in political institutions)” (1977: 200). While 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre share this view, they also invert this relationship. In 
accordance with CT, they change their discursive practice in the hope that it will bring about 
a process of individual and societal transformation.  
Poetic reason is not only a mental framework, a rationality, but in its written 
expression it also becomes a method. Poetic reason is an invitation to acknowledge the 
condition of project of our existence, but also a suggestion, or rather an array of suggestions 
of how to attempt to fulfil such a project. Poetic reason is the proposition of an alternative 
reason which intends to reach all aspects of life and the creative attempt of liberation 
through the written use of such a reason. In this latter sense, poetic reason is primarily a 
project of self-development, one that needs the medium of the written word as referral (and 
self-referral), that is, as a point of reference in time.  
The main features of the rationality proposed by Zambrano have been laid out above, 
but what linguistic strategies does she use to explain, explore, experience, and exercise 
poetic reason? One of the characteristics that make her style so distinct is the intentionally 
digressive nature of her work. By means of this digression Zambrano’s discourse mirrors 
reality, emphasizing the intertwining of its facets, its complexity, its elusiveness, its depth, 
and its interconnection (see Grohmann, 2005: 142-43). That is why a focused, centred text 
is an indication of a distorted perception of Being, just as the linear representation of time is 
no more than an illusion. Unity means the intertwining, intermingling, interconnection, and 
interrelation of all different aspects of reality. This impossibility of linearity requires a 
different style of expression which can convey this wealth of meaning and connections. As 
I have shown, this is achieved with the multilayered discourse which results from her use of 
metaphor and symbolism (see 4.4.3). Going beyond literal meaning and yet taking it into 
account, facilitates a multilayered interpretation, but because these interpretations have to 
be anchored in the initial literal meaning relativism is avoided. 
As Putnam argues, it is an idealization to consider that words have a definitive and 
defined extension or sense in which they can be understood and referred (1996: 4). 
Zambrano’s strategy is to rely on the problems posed by attempting to establish a perfect 
correspondence between reference and referent, because this opens up the multiple 
possibilities of language and the interactive construction of meaning becomes then feasible. 
It is precisely the incompleteness of words what makes Zambrano’s usage of them in a 
different kind of interplay − that of metaphors and symbolism − possible. 
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4.4.6.5 Textual analysis 
The reconstruction and integration of Zambrano’s thought reveals a project of self-
development which is to be attained through a non-instrumental rationality, that of poetic 
reason. Hence, poetic reason is not merely a stylistic feature or an alternative mode of 
reasoning; poetic reason is the integration of a holistic experiential rationality with the 
process of self-development.  
Zambrano’s theory of the self, in addition to the liberating and revolutionary potential 
of art through the framework of poetic reason, points to textual analysis as an alternative to 
mainstream psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Lacanian. In this context, textual analysis, 
rather than attempting to understand the individual through the various manifestations of 
the unconscious, attempts to understand the person through its textual manifestations. The 
assumption which underlies this concept of textual analysis is parallel to Derrida – who 
states that “Il n’y a pas de hors texte”: “there is nothing outside the text” (1967: 227; 1976: 
163). For Zambrano, everything is understood and interpreted through language, given that 
– as argued above – for her, language is the medium of thought.  
Thus, poetic reason, considered as an art form in its own right, can be employed as 
such an exercise of textual analysis. This interpretation of poetic reason would result in the 
practical application of Zambrano’s theory of art, according to which art’s liberating 
possibilities are not only in the materialisation of art, but also and essentially, in the 
widening effect that it has over the horizon of possibility, as perceived by both the artist and 
the receiver. The key to self-development in Zambrano’s writings lies in the process set off 
by the possibilities of interpretation and interconnections. Similarly, a text − in the sense of 
a creative artistic expression − also opens up the possibilities of interpretation for the artist 
as well as for the receiver, who both become simultaneously the analyst and analysand. 
Thus, Zambrano is connected to Aranguren – who was discussed in the previous 
chapter – through their reaction against instrumental reason and their efforts to provide an 
alternative to it. The same connection exists with respect to Aguirre, as shall be argued in 
the course of the following chapters. They should all be considered Critical Theorists 
because, very much in line with the project already put forward by the members of the FS, 
regardless of their relationship with it, they develop a critique, in the case of Aranguren, 
and a rationality in the case of Aguirre and, especially, Zambrano, that challenge and 
overcome the existing co-ordinates of instrumental rationality, as opposed to reproducing 
and perpetuating them as standard critique does. Parallel to the FS, who in an effort to 
expand the field of sociological research by embracing a supradisciplinary approach 
incorporate the element of psychoanalysis in their critique, taking the psychological as a 
symptom of the socio-political, Zambrano’s poetic reason integrates the personal and the 
social in a project where theory and practice inform and feed on each other in such a way 
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that an insight into the personal psyche is sought in order to understand and shape the 
dynamics of the social and the political, calling for introspection and self-development 




5 The unity behind Aguirre’s multiple faces 
5.1 Introduction 
Aguirre is perhaps the most enigmatic of all the three authors. His varied writings are 
scarce. They have hardly received any attention and never before have they been the object 
of academic research despite or, perhaps, because of the public attention other facets of his 
life and work have enjoyed. His writings, but also the other dimensions of his work and, 
even, the very unusual and fascinating trajectory of his life are of great interest for this 
research, for − although in a very different way from Aranguren or Zambrano − the 
conjunction of these facets embodies the development and expression of a project of CT.  
The analysis of Aguirre’s work presents two central problems: first, his publications 
are less extensive than those of Aranguren and Zambrano, and second, his content and, 
particularly, his expression are more obscure and vague. For these reasons, as indicated in 
the introduction, his contribution is best understood after having explored what CT is, and 
having established the characteristics and strategies of its development in both Aranguren 
and Zambrano, for his work − not having developed a solid theoretical grounding − 
acquires a clearer sense as a whole when looked at in the context of the struggle against 
instrumental reason. Aguirre and Aranguren – who knew each other well and remained in 
close contact – develop similar interests and themes in their work115. It is perhaps more 
surprising that Aguirre’s thought coincides with Zambrano’s in a number of key features, 
for there is no evidence that would indicate that Aguirre has been directly influenced by 
Zambrano’s work116. One reason to explain such attunement is the fact that they share a 
similar heritage and they are both hugely influenced by Heidegger, whom Aguirre listens to 
in person (1985: 105). In fact, unlike Zambrano’s case, critical engagement with 
Heidegger’s persona and work is present throughout Aguirre’s publications. However, this 
alone does not constitute a satisfactory explanation. There are some key influences that they 
do not share, or, at least, not to the same degree, such as the influence of Ortega on 
Zambrano, or the FS on Aguirre117. What they do have in common, however, is a common 
goal: the rejection of and struggle against instrumental reason. In fact, they develop similar 
processes of resistance, mainly the destabilization of instrumental reason with a thought-
                                                
115 In an interview with Francisco Umbral, Aguirre says the following: “diría que Aranguren ha sido mi 
maestro si no sospechase que esa palabra no le gusta ni le suena bien” (1984b: 11). 
116 The only reference which establishes some sort of connection between Aguirre and Zambrano is an 
article in El País, which reports that Aguirre delivers the closing conference at a course of Filosofía y 
Letras held in Seville in her honour (Aguilar, 1982: n.p.).  
117 Although there is evidence of Aguirre’s familiarity with Ortega’s work and, indeed, his influence 
emerges in some aspects of Aguirre’s work, Aguirre is neither an Ortegan disciple nor a member of the 
Madrid School (see Aguirre, 1985: 81; 1989a: 64, 103). 
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provoking and subversive use of language, and the incorporation of faith to the realm of 
epistemology as a cornerstone of the alternative rationality that is proposed. 
 As pointed out in the introduction, Aguirre is not a systematic thinker. The 
consequence of this for the present research is that, as in the case of Zambrano, the analysis 
of his thought involves an important element of reconstruction, which is carried out first, by 
developing the theoretical implications of his positions, but also by developing and 
interpreting the implications of what may initially seem marginal comments in the light of 
the rest of his thought, because these seemingly marginal comments are, in fact, a deliberate 
aspect of his style and an intentional attempt to demand the engagement of the reader with 
the text, as we shall see in 5.4.4. 
 
 
5.1.1 The underpinning of Aguirre’s thought 
Me inicié a la lectura y a una expresión literaria adolescente en la humedad verde y el fuego 
subitáneo, catastrófico, de Santander, una ciudad norteña que del sur sólo al viento presta oídos. Más 
tarde, me entretuve con ‘los rigores de la idea’, ya filosófica, esto es, sentimental y descriptiva, ya 
teológica, y en mi caso razonada hasta el límite, en una Europa con larga y abundante vocación de 
consonantes, diéresis y nieve. Llegaron luego los madrileños, siempre de aprendizaje y nunca 
magistrales, en los que la critica predominó, acertadamente, sobre la dialéctica. Sofoca ésta la 
libertad, mientras aquélla la vincula a la historia propia, cuyas razones cordiales, que la razón sí 
entiende, dan cuenta de la secreta gimnasia de nuestros saltos cualitativos (Aguirre, 1987a: 57). 
This is how Aguirre summarizes his intellectual progression. Even from this short 
paragraph, it is already possible to discern in Aguirre’s life a key tension, dichotomy at 
first, between reason and faith, and conciliation later, between reason and lived experience. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to expand the evolution outlined above, particularly 
exploring the process, technique, and underlying critical framework by which this 
dichotomy is overcome, and to analyse it in the light of its socio-historical context. Special 
attention will be drawn to his style, a taste of which can be extracted from this passage, 
which − both personal and enigmatic − endeavours to avoid the beaten path of instrumental 
rationality. 
Throughout this chapter we shall attempt a reconstruction of Aguirre’s life and 
intellectual contributions in the different roles he plays, such as priest, translator, editor, 
writer, and cultural ambassador. These will be examined in the light of CT and of his 
relationship to the FS, paying particular attention to the implications of his writings, and his 
views on the liberating possibilities of art. 
 
5.2 Who is Jesús Aguirre? 
As argued in previous chapters, one of the defining features of CT is the complementarity 
of theory and practice, where the actions of the agent become the materialization of his 
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theoretical discourse. This is even more relevant in the case of Aguirre because, not only 
does he have a considerable impact on intellectual, political, and public life, but also given 
the scarcity of his writings, the element of reconstruction involved in studying the work of 
Aguirre, as with Zambrano, makes the link between work and biography crucial. In fact, in 
line with CT, he demonstrates an awareness of the key role of the biographical component, 
as well as an overt willingness to incorporate it into his work. As a result, most of his 
writings incorporate a strong autobiographical component, even when the content is 
markedly non-biographical. An example of this can be found in his literary reviews, in 
which instead of aiming to express himself with objectivity, he deems this objectivity 
neither possible nor desirable, and embraces his subjectivity. Hence, he openly approaches 
all content from the perspective of his own experience and preferences. In fact, he points 
out how this is a conscious practice he follows as a result of the influence of the FS (see 
Aguirre, 1985: 237). This constitutes yet another attempt to vindicate the relationship 
between biography and work, whose separation is considered artificial and counter-
productive as we shall see in the course of this chapter. 
Jesús Aguirre has been described by Roberto Mesa − who knows him personally − as 
multifaceted, highlighting the variety of enterprises which he has embarked upon during his 
life, as well as his ability to deal successfully with each one of them (2002: 300). This 
multiplicity of interests and, indeed, endeavours, makes it difficult to clearly establish the 
different stages of his life. Such an attempt will be made, however, in order to provide a 
historical contextualization, thus gaining a better insight into his circumstances and possible 
motivations. 
 
5.2.1 Aguirre’s early years 
Jesús Aguirre Ortiz de Zárate is born in 1934 in Madrid, only two years before the outbreak 
of the Spanish Civil War. Little is known about his childhood, except that he soon moves to 
Santander where his father, a military man, is stationed. There, he receives a conservative 
education, studying at the Catholic school of La Salle. He first stands out when, in July 
1951, he becomes “premio extraordinario en el examen de Estado” (Lago Carballo, 2004: 
26-27; see also Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 281). Then, he starts his theological education in 
the seminary school of Comillas.  
He furthers his religious education in Munich with the support of a grant awarded by 
the Humboldt Stiftung. This period abroad is crucial in understanding Aguirre’s 
development and interests. While in Germany, he studies under the theologians Schmauss, 
Paschen, and Söhngen, and he is deeply influenced by the progressive liberal theologians 
Rahner and Ratzinger, whom he translates and publishes − the former contributes 
significantly to shaping the outcome of the Vatican Council, and latter was an influential 
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ecclesiastical figure at the time, to the extent of becoming the present Pope – (see Aguirre, 
1985: 22; see also Lago Carballo, 2004: 26-27, 29)118. Evidence of Aguire’s interest in them 
as well as of their impact on Aguirre is the fact that their work becomes the object of 
Aguirre’s first published translations119.  
Aguirre recalls that “mediada la década de los cincuenta empecé, tembloroso, mis 
estudios de teología en Múnich. La capital del Isar y una beca, felizmente suculenta, de la 
Fundación Humboldt, me procuraron libros sin censura e inolvidables contactos personales” 
(1985: 22). Having received what can be considered as a reactionary education and coming 
from a totalitarian regime which severely restricts the exercise of a political, social, and, 
even, cultural debate, this experience has a decisive effect in broadening his horizons and 
shaping the young Aguirre into the politically engaged intellectual he later becomes. As 
Lannon explains,  
it was not possible to study in Paris or Rome or Munich and then find the orthodoxies of the Spanish 
ghetto in the 1950s and early 1960s other than stifling. Nor was it possible to engage in serious 
discussion with foreign Marxists or even Catholic democrats and then tolerate the stultifying 
complacency of the Spanish Catholic dictatorship (1987: 48). 
 Aguirre himself explains in Casi ayer noche (1985) − a collection of auto-
biographical essays − how, influenced by Hegel, Goethe, Adorno, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and 
Beethoven, he reaches what he describes as an early desencanto burgués, a bourgeois 
disillusionment, making a reference to how these figures have contributed to the awakening 
of his socio-political conscience (see Aguirre, 1985: 24). The authors selected when 
reflecting upon the influences which shape his own development are very informative in 
what he includes and in what he leaves out. This list is a testimony to the constant element 
of self-reflection and subjectivity present throughout his work. It is worth noting that other 
authors of great socio-political importance who also constitute an important influence on 
Aguirre, such as Lukàcs, Gadamer, and the rest of the members of the FS, have not been 
included in this list (see Aguirre, 1985: 26). The most obvious omission for the external 
observer is probably that of Benjamin, who left a strong mark on Aguirre’s literary 
production. Should we then distrust the personal information volunteered by this author? 
                                                
118 Considering the amount of books which discuss religious matters which is translated and published 
by Aguirre during the Second Vatican Council, it is reasonable to surmise that Aguirre himself must 
have effectively played a very influential role in disseminating progressive religious ideas and, thus, 
fuelling the religious debate amongst Spanish readers during this period (see bibliography for details 
regarding his translations of religions publications). 
 
119 The first one of Aguirre’s published translations is Söhngen’s El cristianismo de Goethe (1959), 
followed by El camino de la teología occidental (1961), also by Söhngen. In fact, as one would expect 
from his position as director of religious publications, his early translations focus mainly on matters of 
religion, although his scope quickly becomes wider (see his translations of Ratzinger, 1962; Schmauss, 
1962; Rahner, 1962a; 1962b; Paschen, 1966; 1967; see also bibliography for more details).  
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Perhaps. Should we take this as evidence of the lack of knowledge or honesty about and 
with the self? We could do so, but we would be better off taking this information as an 
instance of experiential rationality, where this information corresponds to those authors that 
have been felt by Aguirre to have borne the most impact on his focus, thought, and process 
of production, rather than being the result of observation and measurement of the most 
frequent occurrence of the inclusion of the influence or thought of the aforementioned 
authors. Georges Gusdorf observes regarding the nature of the autobiographic text that  
it shows us not the objective stages of a career – to discern these is the task of the historian – but that 
it reveals instead the effort of a creator to give the meaning of his own mythical tale. [...] the 
testimony that he does produces constitutes no ultimate, conclusive authority – not only because 
objective scrutiny will always discover inaccuracies but much more because there is never an end to 
this dialogue of a life with itself in search of its own absolute (1980: 48). 
In relation to Aguirre, this indicates that the fact that the evaluation he makes of his own 
influences differs substantially from an evaluation produced by an external observer is not 
necessarily evidence of his deceitfulness or lack of self-awareness, but it is more likely to 
correspond to the expression of, on the one hand, his own perception and, on the other, how 
he would like to be perceived and remembered, and who he would like his name to be 
associated with. That is why it is significant that none of the authors listed are Spanish. This 
invites the conclusion that Aguirre − despite having taken a proactive part in Spanish 
intellectual life − has deliberately distanced himself from Spanish intellectual tradition, 
even though its heritage is still visible in his work. Instead, most of the names listed are of 
Germanic origin. 
Having obtained a degree in Philosophy and Theology and having been deeply 
influenced by the experience and contacts made, he returns from Germany in 1960 (see 
Villa Rodríguez, 2002: 285). Although it is not possible to refer to Aguirre as an exiliado 
because his leaving Spain is not the result of political pressure and the duration of his stay 
abroad is relatively brief, he still establishes strong contacts with Spanish exiles, to the 
point that he experiences a feeling of participation in exile through these contacts120. This is 
how he explains his relation to las Españas: “volví a España, a la primera, que será 
probablemente la geográfica; tenía amigos en la segunda, la del exilio, y compañeros en la 
tercera, que se llamaba disidencia interior” (1985: 26). The Spain he finds upon his return is 
hungry for dialogue and thirsty for change. His homecoming signals the start of his public 
life, which runs until 1992 with Crónica en la Comisaría, his last published work, which 
marks his retreat from the spotlight (see Villa Rodríguez, 2002: 285-86). From this point 
onwards, he progressively retires from the public sphere until 2001, when he passes away at 
the age of 66. 
                                                
120 Even after Franco’s death his affinity and certainly his respect for the Spanish exiles is manifest in 
his indignation towards the political exploitation of their memory (see 1985: 55-58, 67-71). 
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5.2.2 Aguirre the priest 
As with Aranguren and Zambrano, understanding Aguirre’s Christianity and its evolution is 
of crucial significance because it is at the foundation of the rest of his thought. Aguirre is 
ordained a priest in 1961 in his hometown of Santander. Soon after, he moves to Madrid 
and joins a small group of priests who work with Federico Sopeña at the church located in 
the Ciudad Universitaria (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 27). His work there is best understood 
within the context of a Church in deep need of renewal. This is a time when the Catholic 
Church − until then a strong ally of the regime and one of the hegemonic powers − 
experienced a process of marked division: inner division at first, but most visibly, the 
partial, but increasing process of rupture of the alliance between the Church and the State 
(for more details see 2.2). 
This is also the case even at an individual − as opposed to an institutional − level. 
Despite the apparent compliance with religious rituals, there is an increasing gap between 
religious practice and religious faith. A survey undertaken in 1957 amongst 15,491 
industrial workers by the HOAC (Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica) reveals that 
whereas over 86% declared themselves to be Catholic in rites of passage, over 41% 
describe themselves as anti-religious, and almost 55% are uninterested in religion (see 
Atkin, 2003: 276). Faith or, rather, the lack thereof, becomes a matter of concern for the 
Church121. During the 1960s and 1970s, many priests and some concerned Catholics 
harbour fears that religious observance has become for many an empty formalism (see 
Lannon, 1987: 34). This is poignantly portrayed by García Berlanga in Plácido (1961), 
where the gap between truly charitable actions and keeping up class and religious 
commitments is patently visible (see Evans, 2000: 215). They hope, instead, that genuine 
religious commitment would be “expressed by action for social justice as well as pious 
exercises” (Lannon, 1987: 34-35). 
Aguirre, a progressive priest, adopts a socio-politically engaged position. Given the 
restrictive and repressive characteristics of the regime, as well as the rigidity of the official 
line of the Spanish Catholic Church in moral and social issues, this translates into a growing 
dissent in both respects: dissent towards the regime and the Church, for even the reforms 
undertaken at the Vatican Council seem insufficient to Aguirre (see Aguirre, 1985: 169-93; 
see also Cazorla, 2000: 273-74). From this religious platform, Aguirre chooses a path of 
                                                
121 The Church has a clear awareness of this crisis of faith, which can be observed in some of its efforts 
to win acolytes, such as the organization of country camps where it tries to convert working class 
atheists to the Catholic faith (for a study of working-class consciousness around this time see Comín, 
1974). 
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socio-political activism which takes different shapes: those of his ministry, his political 
activity, and his role as translator and editor. 
The reflection encouraged by the Vatican Council on issues in relation to faith and 
religious practices, the discussion of the challenges posed, and the changes proposed all 
contribute to the growing awareness, particularly amongst young priests in the early 1960s, 
of the existing gap between Catholic discourse and Catholic practice during Franco’s 
dictatorship. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Catholic Church in Spain becomes, to the 
astonishment of many observers, a force for political change (see Lannon, 1987: 243). In 
response to the changes in Spanish society and the new trends in Catholic theology, many 
priests, lay leaders, and, eventually, bishops publicly distanced themselves from the Franco 
regime, costing the Church much of the support of the regime (see Lannon, 1995: 276). 
Toward the end of the regime, the Church is certainly “lejos de aquella época en que, 
principal beneficiaria de la ‘Cruzada’, saboreaba sus éxitos” (Vilar, 1985: 169). 
Aguirre – aware of the privileged position enjoyed by the clergy during the regime – 
sees in his ministry a chance to encourage a much-needed change (see 1985: 170, 172-73, 
177, 217-25). Although in a semi-coded manner, Aguirre often uses his sermons to discuss 
issues, such as the incongruities of the Catholic practice with the Christian faith. As 
Aquilino Duque recalls:  
dado el clima eclesial y social de la época en que desempeñó su ministerio, hubo de envolver en 
sutiles circunloquios proposiciones tan audaces en su día como la del paralelismo entre la analogía 
escolástica y la dialéctica marxista, o la contraposición de la ortopraxis de la esperanza a la ortodoxia 
de la fe, o la misa como banquete frente a la misa como sacrificio, o la equiparación moral del 
creyente y el ateo y la consiguiente renuncia del cristianismo a su catolicidad (2002: x).  
Aguirre’s views regarding the excessive formalism of the Church echo those of 
Krausism, whilst at the same time, he also defends the desirability of an active engagement 
of the Church with social welfare − not directly politics − (see Aguirre, 1985: 141-51; see 
also Velasco, 2003: 10-11; Morillas, 1956: 158-59). This suggests that some of the basic 
difficulties of the Church as perceived by Aguirre are, in fact, very similar to those already 
denounced a century earlier by prominent left-wing intellectuals, who despite the 
incongruities of the Church are also reluctant to abandon their faith. 
As with Aranguren, Aguirre’s interest in religion also sparks questions of a socio-
political nature. The problematic approach that Spanish society takes towards religion is 
discussed in La religión como sistema establecido (1995), where Aguirre puts together a 
number of the points made by a group of secular and non-secular contributors on the 
occasion of a religious Congress (see Gómez del Castillo, 1995: 2). This work, although 
theoretical in nature, has an incisive practical orientation in terms of criticizing current 
religious practices, as well as informing and guiding future religious activity. However, 
despite having been written in the late 1950s, this book is not published until 1995, in all 
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likelihood due to the boldness of its criticism and the political circumstances at the time 
when it was originally written122. Even so, this work still constitutes a testimony to its 
socio-political atmosphere, to the nature of the religious debate, and to Aguirre’s early 
positions as we shall see below.  
Its aim, as stated in the prologue, is the revision of Spanish social life and of the 
sociological aspect of the Church in particular (see López, 1995: 3). The argument is that 
“la vida social, por lo mismo que es pública, exige una revisión pública también” (López, 
1995: 5). As a result, the need for a public dialogue regarding the socio-religious issues is 
emphasized (López, 1995: 7). This publication raises the very relevant question of what it 
means to be Catholic in the climate of that time. Thus, it discusses not only questions of 
faith, but particularly the relationship between the social structure and religion.  
One of the central topics it deals with is the division between the bourgeoisie and the 
people, and the relationship of this bourgeoisie towards God. In Aguirre’s words, 
en la burguesía, el testimonio corre a cargo de su inconsciencia y su frivolidad; de su entrega, sin 
hondura ni consistencia religiosa, al disfrute bobo e inelegante de la paz actual; de su 
desentendimiento de todo noble afán de justicia social y de mejoramiento de la situación del pueblo; 
de su lujo injustificado e insultante; de su inmoralidad, cuyo aumento hace aumentar en proporción la 
hipocresía de su fiero egoísmo (1995: 10). 
This critique towards bourgeois behaviour is evidence that Aguirre establishes an 
inextricable relationship between religion and social justice (see Aguirre, 1995: 10-16). He 
criticizes Spanish society using Heideggerian terminology; he criticizes its inauthenticity 
which he understands as “su terco distanciamiento de lo real” (Aguirre, 1995: 17). Aguirre 
explains how this inauthenticity leads to the division between an official Spain – 
materialized in the State, the Church, and the bourgeoisie – and what he describes as a vital 
Spain – represented by the common people – (see Aguirre, 1995: 17-18). He accuses this 
official Spain of inmovilidad, that is, of adopting an inflexible posture whose lack of 
dynamism gives rise to political scepticism, class resentment, and anticlericalism (see 
Aguirre, 1995: 18). His proposal is a new understanding of Catholicism, which is evidence, 
once again, of the link between social and religious issues. As he explains, 
se trata de un catolicismo ansioso, expectante; nada “clerical” y hasta “anticlerical”, pero muy 
“eclesial” y eclesiástico; un catolicismo social, radical y radicalmente social, social hasta sus 
tuétanos; angustiado y decidido en todo lo que se refiere a la suerte humana y sobrenatural de los 
humanos que sufren y se ven humillados. Un catolicismo que envuelve un nuevo patriotismo, amargo 
y sincero. Que se considera totalmente ajeno a la serie de identificaciones históricas que la España 
oficial ha venido cometiendo (1995: 19).  
                                                
122 Although this book is not published until 1995, it is possible to find more evidence of Aguirre’s 
insistence on the need of dialogue and revision regarding religious practices in his choice of material to 
translate and publish, and more explicitly, in introductions provided to such texts, particularly during 
the late 1960s (see Aguirre, 1967: 9-18; see also 1969d: 13-19). 
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This text constitutes evidence of Aguirre’s efforts to push for revision and renovation of 
Catholicism in Spain and of its relationship with the State; it is a call for meditation on the 
role of faith and its social implications. The rest of the book elaborates on these topics and, 
as a result of its eminently practical orientation, it also explores how young people relate to 
religion (see Aguirre, 1995: 33-51). 
By expressing these criticisms, Aguirre is, in fact, representing a large portion of the 
Spanish public: 
creemos que coincidiremos con todos los que más o menos detenidamente, y desde distintos ángulos, 
han dedicado alguna atención al tema [de la situación religiosa en España]. Nos adelantamos a 
calificar de inquietantemente grave la situación. Como que nos encontramos, nada menos, con una 
sociedad llamada católica que, en su dimensión religiosa, va definiéndose, cada día con más 
indudable relieve, por su vaciamiento de Catolicismo (Aguirre, 1995: 9). 
 As Gracia points out, “la tendencia a supuestos agnósticos o a un catolicismo muy crítico 
es la forma de responder a una omnipresente espiritualidad ritualizada, cínica y tan tosca 
como indigesta” (1996: 13). As a result, Aguirre advocates the renovation and 
modernization of many of the Church’s attitudes and perspectives, pointing to the Vatican 
Council as the turning point that, while being insufficient by itself, leaves room for such 
changes. In Aguirre’s eyes, “los católicos seriamente postconciliares [...] [son] aquellos para 
los que vivir postconciliarmente no es vivir ‘después’ sino por delante del Concilio” 
(1969c: 23).  
Thus, as observed above, the most salient feature of Aguirre’s Christianity is its 
social dimension – a position which he maintains throughout his life – for, from his point of 
view, calling oneself a Christian is meaningless unless religious practices are accompanied 
by a genuine social concern for justice. Faith, as a personal experience, is understood as a 
radical inwardness. This inwardness is not to be interpreted as reclusion or isolation. On the 
contrary, “esta interioridad radical obliga al hombre a enfrentarse, sin selección previa de 
ningún tipo, con la realidad entera en la que vive” (Aguirre, 1969d: 15). As in the case of 
Heidegger and Zambrano, for Aguirre, even such a personal and spiritual experience as 
faith, is, first and foremost, being-in-the-world123. This applies not only to the individual 
experience, but it extends to a wider view of Christianity. As he puts it: “un cristianismo 
meramente interior ni es viable ni tampoco tiene por qué serlo” (1985: 235). This accounts 
for his critical and rebellious relationship with Catholicism. It is also this commitment 
                                                
123 Incidentally, it should be noted that Heidegger himself also initially joined the seminary (1901), 
although he would soon renounce his initial priestly vocation (see Schalow, 2001: 1). As a result of the 
awareness and significance of these connections, Aguirre is keen on highlighting Heidegger’s religious 
background: “el talante de Heidegger, personalmente católico de origen, ha de ser interpretado, según 
madrugadoramente advirtiera entre nosotros Aranguren, ‘como de una inequívoca procedencia 
luterana” (1969c: 27). 
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which drives him to encourage the opening up of the Church to the issues of the world 
outside it and, ultimately, to abandon the priesthood. Aguirre, almost anticipating the 
morality of a global society, realizes the multilayered process of inter-action whose effects, 
as well as the symptoms it manifests, cannot be ignored. This is best exemplified in the case 
of Marxism, as we shall see in the next section.  
 
5.2.3 Speaking about the unspeakable: the Christian and Marxist 
dialogue 
5.2.3.1 Aguirre: a Marxist priest? 
Although a highly cultivated intellectual, far from burying his head in books, Aguirre seeks 
to adopt a serious role of socio-political engagement. He succeeds in doing this at a variety 
of levels. As discussed above, Aguirre becomes engaged with his local community through 
his religious ministry, which he uses as a platform for raising complex issues for debate and 
opening up his parishioner’s horizons into directions which in many cases would not have 
been previously publicly unexplored. He also explores writing as a way of reaching a more 
specific audience. Through translation, he assures the availability of work −and thought− 
that would not otherwise reach the wider public in Spain. Moreover, he actively participates 
− alongside Ignacio Fernández de Castro, Julio Cerón, Juan Gerona, Alfonso Carlos Comín, 
and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán − in the Frente de Liberación Popular, a political group in 
the opposition which sympathizes with socialism and advocates a revisionist Marxism 
(Díaz, 2004: 513; Baldó, 2003: 146). As Mesa remembers, “eran, también, los tiempos del 
compromiso político de Jesús con el Frente de Liberación Popular, los ‘felipes’; el grupo 
político más creativo, más interesante y más original de la oposición al franquismo” (Mesa, 
2002: 301; see also Herralde, 2006: 11). These daring positions earn him a reputation as a 
cura rojo, communist priest, as Savater affectionately remembers (2004: 306).  
Despite this reputation, Aguirre is not a communist or even a Marxist at any point. 
An analysis of the titles he publishes, edits, or translates reveals an intellectual progression 
very similar to that of Aranguren. His entering the priesthood, as well as the religious nature 
of his early publications, is evidence of his strong interest and commitment to religion. 
However, as in the case of Aranguren, Aguirre progressively becomes more critical of 
Spanish Catholicism and turns to more political issues. Aguirre shares Aranguren’s 
concerns regarding the need for a Christian-Marxist dialogue124. As Aguirre himself 
explains in his introduction to his translation of Girardi’s Marxismo y cristianismo (1968), 
Aguirre was an active participant in regular debates between Catholic theologians and 
                                                
124 Along Aguirre with Aranguren – who have enjoyed recognition as the precursors of the Christian-
Marxist dialogue – Alfonso Carlos Comín should also be mentioned as a promoter of this dialogue 
from his position as editor (see Herralde, 2006: 13). 
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Marxist intellectuals since 1965 (held in Salzburg). This interest in the debate leads to the 
publication of the collection of essays Cristianos y marxistas; los problemas de un diálogo 
(1969a) (see Chapter Three). Gracia describes this publication as emblematic for gathering 
together essays by such diverse authors as Karl Rhaner, Althusser, Sacristán, and 
Aranguren (1996: 35; see also Díaz, 1983: 143, 147). This collection of works does, in fact, 
mark a cornerstone in the socio-political and religious debate in Spain, not only because of 
the representative character of its contents, but also because despite all efforts to suppress 
this much-feared, although much needed-dialogue. The Christian-Marxist dialogue acquires 
a very public and popular dimension during the 1960s and, by means of this publication, 
this dialogue receives acknowledgement and, even, encouragement, as we shall see below 
(see also 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2). What is more, the importance of the engagement with 
Marxism is such that it seems to be one of the key tensions defining modernity in Spain. 
With the outbreak of the Civil War, modernity is halted. The liberal tradition is recuperated 
only as a result of anti-fascist positions adopted by some Spanish intellectuals. Only as a 
result of these efforts does Spain retake the path to modernity: 
nuestros orígenes están escondidos en aquel intento por resistir a la hegemonía fascista y todo ello 
equivale a reanudar el ciclo de una modernidad que había perdido el uso de la razón con la pérdida de 
la lengua, o con la difusión de una lengua corrompida, propaganda y legitimación ideológica de una 
victoria medievalizante (Gracia, 2004: 387). 
Marxism becomes an important contending ideology for it vows to tackle many of 
those socio-economic problems which shake the credibility and integrity of the Church. 
Given these circumstances, it is understandable how some priests, reluctant to let go of their 
faith, adopt Marxism as a way of facing the regime’s disregard for liberties and the 
perpetuation of strong social inequalities. Thus, they become curas rojos, “red priests” (see 
Callahan, 2000: 407). Some sectors of the clergy adopt a very active political stance, 
sympathizing with or defending Marxist ideals, particularly from the late 1960s onwards. 
Evidence of their involvement in socio-political issues in conflict with the interests of the 
regime can be found in their participation in political demonstrations like Barcelona’s 
Caputxinada (1966) and their support for regionalist movements, particularly in Catalonia 
and the Basque Country (see Atkin, 2003: 276)125. As Gracia argues, “el origen de una 
conciencia política de clase, anduvo para muchos en esas formas de cristianismo politizado, 
aunque a menudo fuese confusamente politizado, que el padre Llanos emprende entonces” 
(2004: 359). The Jesuit priest José María Llanos, despite having assisted Franco spiritually 
during the 1940s, becomes during the 1960s a remarkable and inspiring figure who as a 
result of his faith engages in social work, combining his vows with his support for the 
                                                
125 This involvement should not be interpreted as a change in the position of the Church; instead, it 
represents a deviation from the established practice and from the official position on the role played by 
the Spanish Church as an institution. 
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Communist union Comisiones Obreras (see Lannon, 1987: 49; see also Gracia, 2004: 360, 
362). Similarly, some Catholics, priests, and theologians, such as Alfonso Carlos Comín, 
González Ruiz, Olegario González de Cardedal, and the Jesuit Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, 
develop progressive or even Communist views (see Lannon, 1987: 49; see also Gracia, 
2004: 36). 
Nicolas Atkin explains that  
contact with the underprivileged urban poor, whose numbers were swelled by a rural exodus in the 
1950s, brought about a growing awareness of the social divisions upon which the Francoist regime 
rested, and resulted in the appearance of “red priests” who took advantage of the privileged position 
of the clergy in respect of the law to stage workers’ meetings and sit-ins in their churches, and to rally 
striking workers with fiery oratory and impassioned pamphlets (2003: 276).  
It is in this latter sense, more as an activist than a communist priest, that Aguirre has 
sometimes been considered a red priest, because as Savater explains, 
ser rojo era facilísimo. Ser cura, un cura que no estaba dentro de la ortodoxia, y además que citaba a 
Marx y Engels en alemán, y a Habermas, pues te puedes imaginar que eso, en aquella época, era 
bastante escandaloso (2006; see Herralde, 2006: 11; see also Atkin, 2003: 276). 
 
5.2.3.2 Aguirre’s contribution to the Christian and Marxist dialogue 
As explained above, Aguirre’s greatest contribution to this dialogue is, first of all, the 
compilation and edition of a number of essays whose purpose is to voice different views 
and sides of the debate, which are published under the heading of Cristianos y marxistas; 
los problemas de un diálogo (1969a). He also writes the introduction to this publication, 
which he feels the need to entitle “Justificación”, and one essay under the title of “La 
historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos”.  
It can be observed from his work how Aguirre perceives engagement in a Christian-
Marxist dialogue as crucial for Spain’s socio-political evolution. As Aguirre puts it, “la 
utilidad del diálogo en sus diversas etapas hasta la actualidad es innegable. Los marxistas y 
los cristianos han reconocido una parte de su pasado, han luchado contra su propio 
integrismo, en suma, han eliminado prejuicios mutuos” (1969c: 33). The fact that Aguirre 
deems it appropriate to include his essay “La historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos” in 
another compilation of essays some fourteen years later – with no changes other than a 
slightly longer and contextualizing title: “Marxismo y cristianismo: la historia del diálogo y 
algunos pronósticos” − is evidence of Aguirre’s continuing interest in and perceived 
relevance of this matter (see Aguirre, 1985: 195-216). 
As indicated by the title, Aguirre is keen to trace the history of the Christian and 
Marxist dialogue, possibly with the purpose of overcoming the resistance and rejection of 
Marxism by emphasizing that Marxist views have existed in Spain since the publication of 
Marx’s political-economic works written in 1844 (see 1969c: 13-14). More importantly, he 
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underscores that Marxism has been an object of debate since then (see Aguirre, 1969c: 13-
14). Aguirre briefly highlights the historical evolution of this relationship, which he says 
has progressed from an open antagonism which finds expression in a violent form during 
the nineteenth century to the frequent and often public dialogue in the late 1960s (see 
1969b: 7; 1969c: 18). His point is to, first, acknowledge the existence of such a dialogue 
and, then, to engage non-Marxists in the dialogue, especially Christians, so that it can 
become a constructive debate that may help to re-address Marxism itself, which has often 
been misinterpreted, as well as issues of faith (see Aguirre, 1969c: 18-19). 
Aguirre briefly points out that this publication may seem belated, given that this 
debate has already taken place throughout the 1960s and this book dates from 1969 (1969b: 
7). In line with Aguirre’s digressive and often obscure style, this point is not expanded until 
eleven pages later, where he explains that  
antes de llegar a la década de los años sesenta, el diálogo […] transcurre en libros y revistas 
predominantemente. Es además un diálogo en el marxismo, y los coloquiantes principales son por lo 
menos marxistizantes de una manera activa o estudiosa. En nuestros días cobra empaque de 
notoriedad pública el diálogo entre los marxistas y los cristianos. […] Sociológicamente, por tanto, el 
fenómeno actual [de diálogo] es distinto, hasta en su expresión externa, del inmediato precedente 
(1969c: 18). 
Thus, this dialogue is essentially different because, first, it is no longer one-sided; although 
only Marxists or marxistizantes, Marxist sympathisers, tend to enter the debate, during the 
1960’s others join in. Christians, in particular, become more vocal; as a result, it has turned 
into a multi-sided dialogue. Second, it is no longer confined to the written word expressed 
in books or journals of limited circulation; it has become a public debate. By way of 
justification, he simply highlights once more the need for this dialogue and for the 
demystification of its nature. It is the inevitability of this dialogue that accounts for its 
necessity and importance. As he explains,  
el diálogo existe hoy con dimensiones de amplia resonancia pública simplemente porque es 
necesario. [...] Hegel enseña que la libertad es la necesidad comprendida. Nuestro volumen quisiera 
contribuir a que el diálogo cristiano-marxista se realice en la libertad más difícil de conseguir: la 
libertad de sí mismo (1969b: 8).  
Thus, in contrast with Aranguren’s position, Aguirre’s motives for this publication are not 
to invite a dialogue between the two confronted ideologies, but rather to contribute to its 
viability and fertility. 
Aguirre suggests that the first step in enabling a successful dialogue is a 
“fundamentación filológica”, the understanding of the terminology involved (1969c: 17). 
This almost Socratian importance placed on terminology is not a demand solely placed on 
the other, on the non-Marxists, to achieve an informed perspective, for he also identifies the 
need and willingness for a “lucha marxista contra su propio integrismo” (Aguirre, 1969c: 
19). His call to reflect upon Marxists’s own fundamentalist positions reflects the need to 
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reconsider the views of classical Marxism, for much of its critique and doctrine are no 
longer applicable to Aguirre’s society, as argued by neo-Marxism. It is relevant how 
Aguirre repeatedly chooses the term integrismo, which he uses to qualify a Christian and 
Marxist standpoint, effectively criticizing the intransigence of both positions (1969c: 19, 
33). Flexibility and tolerance are pre-requisites which need to be exercised by both sides. 
The premise, therefore, is that no understanding of the other and no communication is 
possible without a previous understanding of and preferably also reflection on the self. 
Examples of terms which are often misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misused include 
“dialectic”, “historicism”, and “alienation” (see Aguirre, 1969c: 15, 19). The latter, 
“alienation”, is particularly interesting. Aguirre defends a wider understanding of this 
concept, one that encompasses the ethical dimension of existentialism, as well as the 
psychoanalytic implications as explored by Marcuse and Fromm (see Aguirre, 1969c: 16). 
As he points out, “debe, sobre todo, considerarse qué textura de realidad marxista y no 
marxista –no marxista todavía o nunca marxistizable– hace posible que un concepto 
marginal en Marx [la alienación] preocupe hoy a sus seguidores en direcciones muy 
diversas” (1969c: 17). Here the manifold reach of Aguirre’s analysis can be observed. This 
is an exercise geared towards the reflection and understanding of Christianity and Marxism 
and their relationship and interaction. At the same time, it also constitutes a socio-political 
meta-analysis; this dialogue and its main issues are identified as symptoms which may 
reveal the socio-political inclinations of the society they occur in, as well as the lurking 
challenges which need addressing. He warns his readers that  
es, desde luego, mala filología, esto es, fundamentación dañada para el diálogo, empeñarse en 
proyectar retrospectivamente la interpretación de una expresión de la actual realización marxista 
sobre las ‘intenciones’ del autor de El capital y otras obras escritas después de 1845 (1969c: 17-18). 
Aguirre is, thus, well aware of the challenges and pitfalls involved in the exercise of 
interpretation of a text in relation to its terminology and intentionality. As a result, this text 
functions as an invitation to further the scope of this dialogue, by first establishing a clear 
socio-historical contextualization of classical Marxism, so that a clear distinction between 
classical Marxism and, its re-interpretations and revisions can be drawn in the light of the 
changing symptoms and needs of society (see also Aguirre, 1969c: 16). This is also 
evidence of Aguirre’s own awareness of the evolution of Marxist thought and of his early 
awareness of neo-Marxist thought and the work of the FS – whose relevance will be 
discussed at a later point in this chapter –, as can be observed in the references he makes in 
this publication to Marcuse, Fromm, and Adorno (see Aguirre, 1969c: 14, 16, 26 
respectively). 
At the core of Aguirre’s argument there is the realization of the connection between 
Christianity and Marxism. He draws a comparison between Christian and Marxist 
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behaviour when motivated by fundamentalist positions; “formalmente y en lo que respecta 
al mecanismo de los comportamientos, un catolicismo a troche y a moche está emparentado 
en múltiples aspectos con un marxismo a ultranza y de orejeras” (Aguirre, 1968: 14). This 
comparison hints at the shared characteristics that totalitarian forms may share, whilst also 
suggesting that a certain application of Christian or Marxist ideology may materialize in a 
totalitarian expression. This totalitarian aspect of religion and of Catholicism in particular is 
more explicitly addressed in his prologue to the translation of Vaticano II. La libertad 
religiosa, first publishied in 1967 (1969d: 16-17). The Vatican Council had decisive 
religious and political consequences, for “the Vatican Council in 1962, demolished the 
theological and ecclesiastical underpinnings of National-Catholicism and state 
confessionalism, as they plotted a new, more liberal, and more tolerant course for the 
Church” (Lannon, 1995: 278). As Lannon argues, the implication is that a participatory 
democratic society adjusted better to the new papal ideal than the existing dictatorship 
(1995: 278-279). Given the climate of growing social dissidence and growing internal 
tensions in the Church, the Vatican Council is a hard blow for the already fragile relations 
between Church and State in Spain. Aguirre, well aware of the political implications of the 
religious policies discussed at the Council, does not miss the opportunity to draw a 
comparison between the kind of religious practice widespread during the regime and the 
totalitarian government, thus subtly bringing to the fore, and questioning, the issue of the 
close relationship existing between the regime and the Church. He puts forward his 
criticism stating that Catholic faith is often more the compliance with duty rather than the 
result of individual decision, which has regrettable consequences;  
la creencia adopta figuras y comportamientos más de fenómeno social que de acontecimiento 
personal. Tal hábito de indiscriminación rezuma por diversos canales. La fe se oficializa, lo cual nada 
tiene que ver con una vida religiosamente estructurada, que es la Iglesia. No solamente ‘se es’, sino 
que ‘se tiene’ que ser católico de una determinada manera única, que se descubre, a la postre, cargada 
con graves determinantes temporales extrínsecos en sí a la religión. [...] La Iglesia parece entonces 
una sociedad que opera como un partido único (1969d: 17). 
 That is why the need for dialogue is closely linked to the need for reflection on one’s own 
position. Freedom is essential for this, since both dialogue and reflection are only 
meaningful and defendable from a religious and spiritual point of view, as free individual 
choices.  
 In fact, the problem of freedom takes centre-stage. Aguirre’s demand for freedom 
goes beyond the understanding of freedom as lack of external pressures or constrains; 
religious and political freedom is insufficient because genuine freedom, for Aguirre, can 
only be understood as freedom from the self (see 1969b: 8). This requires a reconsideration 
of the popular definition of freedom as the possibility to do one’s will, for it is the nature of 
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that will that is called into question, thus bringing in the issue of false consciousness, one of 
the key issues discussed by the FS (see 3.2.2.3). It is important to notice how, by 
acknowledging the existence of false consciousness, which Aguirre does by insisting on the 
need to become free from oneself, the implicit conclusion is that socio-political change 
starts in the self; only by liberating one’s own consciousness can socio-political decisions 
truly be free. 
Despite defending the need for freedom, in his introduction to Vaticano II. La 
libertad religiosa (1967), Aguirre reflects upon the moral difficulties which arise with the 
enjoyment of religious freedom, for he is well aware and concerned with the religious and 
moral disorientation that has come about as a result of this change. He observes how, in 
many cases, Spaniards’s relationship to freedom follows the trajectory of the pendulum, 
that is, it goes from an imposed lack of freedom to its wide embrace, without a process of 
reflection and digestion of this personal and social development:  
en el problema de la libertad religiosa, como en tantos otros, los españoles hemos pasado, sin rendir 
los adecuados derechos de aduana, de una manera crispada de vivirlo, feroz incluso no pocas veces, a 
otra que más que tranquila resulta inerte, ya que no se enfrenta propiamente con el problema, sino 
que de hecho supone que éste ha dejado sin más de serlo. [...] hemos digerido casi sin trastornos este 
manjar [la libertad], que hasta ahora estuvo drásticamente excluido de nuestra dieta privada y pública 
(Aguirre, 1969d: 13).  
This apparent contradiction between defending the abstract value of freedom, while having 
reservations regarding consequences of religious freedom suggests two things. First, it 
suggests Aguirre is more concerned with the various aspects of the practical implications of 
theoretical concepts, such as freedom, than with the systematic coherence of thought. 
Second, it also indicates that, in Aguirre’s view, change, in this case the award and exercise 
of freedom, should take place progressively in order to allow the individual to adapt to the 
consequences and demands of this process.  
 Influenced by Benjamin’s work, Aguirre does not conceive progress – in religion, in 
politics, and in the exercise of thought itself – as a necessary movement forward; he 
distrusts the benefits of progress for its own sake (see Aguirre, 1971d: 9). Instead, radical 
change, revolution, is achieved going back to the past and integrating that experience in a 
continuum of thought and history (see Aguirre, 1971d: 9). In line with this, thought is not 
conceived only as movement, but also as pause (see Aguirre, 1971d: 9); in other words, 
thought needs to be reflexive and integrate in the present the experience of the past as well 
as the projection of the future (see Aguirre, 1971d: 10). Geometrically, this combination of 
movement and pause is achieved by means of the spiral, which looked from above may be 
mistaken for a circle because each point of the circle coincides in diameter with those other 
circles above or below itself, hence representing a pause; it is only by acknowledging the 
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three-dimensionality of this geometrical shape that difference is perceived in each of the 
circles which comprise the spiral, it is this sense of change and progression which, in the 
spiral, represents movement. Hence, like in the case of Aranguren and Zambrano, for 
Aguirre, effective thought and effective change do not describe a linear trajectory, but a 
spiral one. According to Aguirre, this kind of thought is not to be understood merely as a 
theoretical position, for he urges to apply this kind of thought to deal with the socio-
political situation of Spain at that time; that is, the final phase of Francoism and the glimpse 
of a possible transition to democracy. 
The Vatican Council is perceived as a key step towards the revision of the role of the 
Catholic Church in Spain; it is crucial for opening the door to religious freedom, and with 
it, to prepare the Spanish people to deal with the possibilities of other freedoms which may 
come. According to Aguirre, after the Council, Catholicism should strive for a conception 
of the Church which accommodates, not excludes, the future, particularly the future that 
crystallizes in every new present (see Aguirre, 1969c: 21-23). One of the circumstances 
referred to in that present is lack of faith or atheism, whose increasing expansion constitutes 
another one of Aguirre’s key concerns and motives for this dialogue. Atheism is perceived 
not only as a problem, but, more crucially, as a symptom of the socio-economic and, even, 
political problems which Spain is faced with. According to Aguirre, atheism gains 
importance not because of its association with Marxism, but as a current human reality for 
which Marxism may just be a suitable vehicle (see 1969c: 24). In fact, in an essay entitled 
“La renovación intelectual del clero español”, included in Casi ayer noche, he wonders 
“¿por qué si no los diálogos más frecuentes, los únicos casi, han enfrentado a cristianos y 
marxistas? El marxismo no cubre hoy el fenómeno general de la increencia, si bien ocupa 
en él una porción considerable” (1985: 189). Raising these concerns already points to the 
relevance that faith plays throughout his work, more significantly in his engagement with 
neo-Marxism. Which yearning are they attempting to fulfil with Marxist atheism? And 
would a Christian alternative be able to fill that vacuum? Even more pressing for him is to 
find out why so many Spanish people have turned to atheism, because, as he observes,  
en España, hijos de familias en las que se educa cristianamente no pierden la fe, sino que descubren 
un día que nunca la han tenido. El proceso llega a su término sin dramatismo, con una tranquilidad ni 
siquiera polémica (1985: 177).  
These are the questions that Aguirre considers important for the individual and the 
Church to answer or at the very least to consider. However, in analysing these questions, 
another one arises: why is a religious alternative preferable to an atheist one? Despite his 
obvious concern with atheism, this is not a question which he answers satisfactorily. He 
does, however, engage more directly with the issue of atheism in “El ateísmo de la 
realidad”, published in Casi ayer noche (1985: 169-80). 
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Aguirre spends the first six pages of this essay accusing Catholicism and the Second 
Vatican Council in particular of not being able to deal appropriately with atheism: 
preconciliarmente estábamos acostumbrados a explicar el ateísmo por la ceguera o por la mala 
voluntad de los ateos. Los especialistas católicos del tema –como también sobre protestantismo o 
comunismo– practicaban una cierta necrofilia, la de la acumulación indiscriminada de errores y 
puntos débiles de quien no merecía otro nombre que el de adversario. El ateo estaba fuera de 
nosotros. Dicha actitud pervive aún entre nosotros (1985: 174).  
In fact, Aguirre argues that “es, sin duda, en el tema del ateísmo donde al Vaticano II se le 
transparentan mejor sus limitaciones” (1985: 173; see also 170). Aguirre is critical of the 
limitations of the perspective adopted by the Second Vatican Council, and by the approach 
of Christian theology to religion and faith. He argues that  
la ética de la situación insiste en el sujeto determinado únicamente por sus circunstancias exteriores y 
no por una serie a priori de objetividades indebidas. […] La creencia en Dios se explicita como razón 
de una aceptación de los dogmas. […] Esta profundización del sujeto prepara a ésta para que sin 
disolverse puede ser objetivado (1985: 173).  
 In contrast with the perception of atheism as the absolute other and the enemy, 
Aguirre argues that “nuestra deformada expresión, sobre todo práctica, del cristianismo 
hace que el ateísmo cobre hoy su avanzada magnitud social. El cristiano tiene razones y su 
historia somos nosotros, cristianos insinceros” (1985: 174-75). This is one of the chief 
reasons why he considers it is necessary to reflect upon atheism, because, as he puts it, 
“hablar de ateísmo es también hablar de nuestra equivocaciones” (1985: 175).  
With this argument Aguirre is very nearly refusing to acknowledge the existence of 
atheism in its own right. Instead, he argues that atheism is a reaction – which he 
patronisingly considers understandable – to the shortcomings of Christianity. This 
argument, however, seems to be more the fruit of Aguirre’s keenness to get through to those 
Christians who may feel threatened by atheism than Aguirre’s own understanding of the 
nature of atheism. It is evidence of Aguirre’s involvement with the discussion, for he 
chooses to sacrifice logical and theoretical coherence in favour of gaining closeness to those 
to whom his essay is addressed– Christians who are intolerant towards atheism. 
Unlike Aranguren, who as discussed in the previous chapter seems unable or 
unwilling to contemplate the existence of a fully atheist position, Aguirre does not share 
this belief. In fact, Aguirre goes beyond the subordination of atheism to Christian values, as 
he explicitly puts it one page later: “el ateísmo no es algo que hoy suceda en una sociedad 
cristiana. El ateo no lo es porque no sea cristiano, sino porque es ateo simplemente. Para ser 
increyente no es necesario apearse de la fe; basta con no adentrarse nunca en ella” (1985: 
176). He insists on this point: “el ateísmo tiene una razón, que es positiva porque no 
consiste en una negación de la fe, sino en una afirmación de sí mismo” (1985: 178). 
Furthermore, Aguirre argues that the refusal to acknowledge an atheism whose roots are 
independent from Christianity only reveals the self-centred disposition of Christianity: 
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“explicar el ateísmo presente como secuela de nuestras deficiencias es seguirnos sintiendo 
el centro del mundo” (1985: 179). 
Instead, Aguirre, by way of conclusion, equates the ontological reality of atheism 
with the ontological reality of faith by comparing the origin of both of them: “la increencia 
del ateo arranca de una realidad antecedente a su ateísmo, la misma que sustenta nuestra fe” 
(1985: 180). What is interesting about Aguirre’s account of the atheist’s or the believer’s 
position is Aguirre’s perspective. He chooses not to defend or attack either or these 
positions on the basis of their truthfulness. Aguirre does not base his argument on the 
inherent and self-evident existence – or non-existence – of God. Instead, like Aranguren, 
his argument is based on the primary concept of human freedom. Aguirre argues that 
whatever process drives a human being to either believe or disbelieve in God’s existence 
constitutes an exercise of such freedom, that is, a choice. That is why, in reference to 
atheism, he says: “no me refiero a una realidad en la que no intervenga, 
conformadoramente, el destino y la libertad del hombre” (1985: 180). In other words, 
human freedom does play a role in atheism. However, Aguirre argues from a patently 
religious position and the result is that he gets entangled with the role played by God in this 
issue. That is why he refers to destiny above and that is also why he continues the statement 
by saying that  
es una realidad en la que, como su fundamento y finalidad, existe operativamente la libertad de Dios. 
[…] Desde luego que la referencia a la libertad divina es de orden trascendental. […] No es una 
referencia que “sirva”. Imposible habilitar la libertad de Dios como causa del ateísmo (1985: 180).  
Consequently, and despite having argued that the existence of atheism is an independent 
phenomenon from religion, Aguirre’s own beliefs seem to taint his argument which, in the 
last instance, reserves a place for God in the gestation process of atheism even if his role is 
not at all clear. It is because of this lack of clarity that Aguirre concludes that “la 
explicación de la fe y la explicación del ateísmo serían siempre inadecuadas” (1985: 180).  
It is perhaps because of Aguirre’s own ambivalence towards the nature of atheism 
that he does not fully address the question of why a religious position is preferable to an 
atheist one. It is only tangentially that Aguirre points to the comforting and guiding role that 
faith may play in contemporary society, thus drawing an unspoken comparison with 
discomfort, loneliness, or even emptiness that the atheist may supposedly feel (see 1985: 
231; see also 5.3.3). 
Setting this digression on atheism aside and focusing again on the issue of the 
relationship between Christianity and Marxism or, more generally, between politics and 
religion, Aguirre concludes his introduction to Vaticano II. La libertad religiosa (1967), by 
focusing on the often difficult and by no means obvious relationship that has existed and 
exists between religion and politics. He is well aware of the political implications of 
 236 
religion. This is not to say that Aguirre discusses the political role that religious figures 
should or should not play. What he does is to highlight the ideological implications of 
religious or non-religious positions. This idea is expressed in his essay “La renovación 
intelectual del clero español”, where he states that  
los clérigos españoles y, clérigos o no, todo pensador católico español, tendrán pues que afrontar, si 
es que están decididos a una verdadera renovación, una actitud de doble filo: por un lado, la del 
acercamiento al Concilio, pero por otro, el que más quema, la de una toma de conciencia, seguida de 
una puesta al descubierto, de su índole histórica, esto es, también de su insuficiencia” (1985: 182). 
By insisting on the need to provide a worldly contextualization of religious practices, 
Aguirre criticizes what he considers inconsistencies and inadequacies in the way that 
Christianity has played its social role, often by lacking a sufficient involvement in social 
issues, at the same time as it played an excessive role in politics. Nonetheless, he avoids 
advocating the well-known formula of a depoliticised religion, for he considers political 
implications are inescapable and that ignoring such implications results in a dangerous 
naivety. He expresses this idea forcefully when discussing the motives for the dialogue: 
“Dios ha dejado ya de ser pretexto que se invoca para no hacer una política, esto es, para 
hacer otra” (1969c: 33). This awareness of the almost ubiquitous nature of politics is visible 
throughout his work, for – although without becoming a militant in any party – he plays an 
active role in the development of the Spanish political panorama.  
It is possible to observe, by the scope of people’s engagement – intellectuals and 
people at large – with the Marxist-Christian dialogue and by the implications of this 
dialogue, that this engagement with Marxism is one of the key features of Spanish 
modernity or, more precisely, “la recuperación que [...] tiene que llevar el cristiano a cabo 
de una ‘modernidad’ en la cual en cuanto creyente ha vivido un poco como invitado mosca” 
(1969c: 21). In fact, although perhaps not directly, these discussions have a decisive impact 
on the process of Transition that will develop soon afterwards. The encouragement of the 
rapprochement and tolerance, if not understanding, of initially diametrically opposed views 
proves to be an extremely valuable exercise in the path towards democracy. Ringrose 
explains how “where such [peaceful] transitions have been relatively smooth the historian 
invariably finds that essential elements of the new polity and economy actually took shape 
over several generations” (1996: 4). As discussed in the introduction, Cruz finds in habitus 
and unconscious structures, as well as the hegemonic structure, the roots for social change 
(see 1996: 9, 13, and 10-11 respectively). Equally, this exercise of acceptance, tolerance, 
and dialogue can be interpreted as the preamble to the events yet to come; these are 
elements and attitudes which, as indicated above, Aguirre consciously hopes that they 
would help in preparing people to deal with an increase in their freedom, first religious and 
then political. Consequently, it is possible to argue that these debates and, more crucially, 
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these attitudes, in line with the theoretical framework referred to above, have contributed to 
create the basic structures that have contributed to making the peaceful Transition into 
democracy possible. 
 
5.2.4 Aguirre the editor 
Aguirre’s path is one of increasing awareness; an awareness of the lamentable situation 
Spain finds itself in, as well as an awareness of his own position and his possibilities. By 
means of his experiences as a priest, where he comes into contact not only with his 
parishioners, but also with a considerable number of young people whom he teaches, he 
soon becomes painfully aware of the difficulties Spain is facing and he feels he can 
reasonably venture their sources and solutions. Even as a priest, Aguirre has already 
discovered the powerful potential of cultural transmission, and he is determined to 
disseminate that content which he considers will further the cause he first champions when 
he becomes a priest.  
Still as a clergyman, Aguirre joins Taurus in the early sixties as director of religious 
publications, before becoming editor-in-chief in 1967 (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 26). 
Aguirre’s roles as priest and editor overlap for a short while; however, they will not co-exist 
for long. As Gullón points out, “su disentimiento se explica por el trasfondo de 
insatisfacción cada vez más perceptible en su comportamiento y en sus escritos” (1989: 16). 
In the prologue to the collection of sermons pronounced while preaching at Madrid’s 
Ciudad Universitaria significantly entitled Sermones en España (1971c), Aguirre already 
confesses that “me siento ahora lejos, más en sensibilidad que en fechas, de la trama de 
hechos e ideas desde la cual actuaba entonces” (1985: 217). This early distancing, along 
with his later decision to leave the clergy (1970), reflects an intellectual and personal 
progression which is by no means unique in the Spain of that period. A similar development 
in relation to faith and the Church is found in Aranguren (see Gracia, 1996: 13). 
It is possible to identify in the earlier Aguirre an idealist young man who, influenced 
by his conservative upbringing and religious education, sees in priesthood the best way to 
bring to life these ideals. He is soon fascinated by German liberal theologians as well as by 
neo-Marxist thinkers. This fuels his sense of mission which is reflected in his immense 
capacity for crystallizing and transmitting these ideals, these high hopes, which he does in 
the form of carefully chosen translations and publications. Aguirre is, thus, a man who lives 
by his convictions. The problem is, however, that convictions do not always live up to 
expectations. Disillusioned by the limitations of the Vatican Council and by the distance 
between the core of his religious beliefs and a society which to a great extent makes a 
showcase of Catholicism, Aguirre stops preaching in 1969, and leaves the clergy soon 
thereafter (see 1985: 170, 173, 182, 218). In fact, during the 1960s unprecedented numbers 
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of priests seek laicization, with many abandoning religion altogether: “five priests were 
secularized in 1962/3, but 85 in 1966 and 125 in 1968; in the years 1975-7 no fewer than 
845 left the priesthood” (Lannon, 1987: 90; see also 1987: 105, 224). In the case of Aguirre, 
however, this does not respond to a crisis of faith, which is present throughout his life126. 
On the contrary, Aguirre professes himself a Christian throughout his life. Hence, this 
progression is testimony to his faith, but also to his social commitment, a commitment 
which, once again, Aguirre has expressed in different forms throughout his life. 
The birth of Taurus provides an outlet for the expression of discrepancies and 
intellectual traditions which are not in consonance with the regime (see Gracia, 1996: 
29)127. Aguirre’s links and progression within Taurus is not only a testimony to his personal 
evolution, but it also provides evidence of the expansion of his interests. His duties soon are 
extended so that he also takes charge of the “Cuadernos Taurus”, including foreign authors, 
particularly those of the FS in the collection “Ensayistas” (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 27; see 
also Gracia, 1996: 34)128. Here it is possible to observe the significance and influential 
nature of the existing friendship between Aguirre and Aranguren, because as Jean 
Bécarud suggests,  
                                                
126 Aguirre explicitly confirms this in his interview with Umbral: 
U: -Teología y filosofía. ¿Cómo se desprende uno de la teología? 
A: -Yo no me he desprendido, yo no comparto la famosa máxima de Ortega de que en la creencia se está. La creencia es viva, 
fluctuante (1984b: 11). 
The importance of his use of the adjective fluctuante should not be overlooked, for it indicates that 
Aguirre has experienced his faith dramatically, that is, not as a godly gift, but as a human endeavour 
and pursuit. That is why, in “No confesión, sino desmaquillaje”, he explains that “y para mí, sobre todo 
en cuanto a hombre que lucha por poder ser creyente (y no sólo por poder seguir siéndolo), cuenta el 
presente como el lugar menos equívoco de acción y de pasión, de salvación y de condena (1985: 218). 
127 In 1954, Taurus is founded by Francisco Pérez González, Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot, and Miguel 
Sánchez López (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 11). Francisco Pérez González, its first director, publishes 
books which, although not directly opposed to the regime, are critical towards it (see Lago Carballo, 
2004: 16). During the first few years, a number of collections which are continued by successive 
editors are launched. The collection “Ensayistas de hoy” includes Aranguren’s Crítica y Meditación 
(1957) and a wide range of other essays which deal with, in a first instance with spiritual concerns and, 
later, with essays of a socio-political nature. It is under this collection that Aguirre translates and 
publishes works by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, Ernest Bloch, Walter 
Benjamin, and Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno to mention but a few (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 18). The 
next collection to be launched is “Cuadernos Taurus”, a series of paperbacks which includes well-
known authors such as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, José Ortega y Gasset, Pedro Laín Entralgo, 
Julián Marías, and, of course, José Luis Aranguren (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 18-19). The aim of the 
collection “Sillar” is to recover and re-publish Spanish texts of historical and literary interest, such as 
El Quijote (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 19). Other collections are “Ser y Tiempo”, whose orientation was 
so similar to “Cuadernos Taurus” that it is soon replaced by it, “Ciencia y Sociedad”, which deals with 
the topics indicated in its title, and the humoristic “Club de la Sonrisa” (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 20-
21). 
128 The success of his translations of Benjamin and Adorno, as well as the publication of Cioran, 
translated by Fernando Savater (see Savater, 2004: 260) is such that they are re-edited on several 
occasions after Aguirre leaves Taurus, on account of their popularity, not only amongst students, but 
also amongst the greater public (see Vivas, 2004: 39; see also Pradera, 2004: 302). 
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Jesús Aguirre debió de verse orientado por Aranguren a la hora de decidirse a dar a conocer en 
España determinados autores: algo que tiene que ver en particular con la prestigiosa colección 
«Ensayistas», en la que figuran por lo demás seis de los propios títulos de don José Luis (2004: 287).  
The nature of the collections he encourages and develops reflects some of the ongoing 
interests throughout his life, which, although ever present, vary in intensity at different 
stages of his existence. During his period as editor-in-chief of Taurus, Aguirre continues 
with the collections which are already being published, showing special interest in the 
collections “Ensayistas” and “Cuadernos” (Lago Carballo, 2004: 29)129. He also launches 
other influential collections such as “Publicaciones Religiosas”, which includes the work 
of renowned theologians such as Joseph Ratzinger and Karl Rahner, and “Biblioteca 
Política”, which is partly inspired and directed by Enrique Tierno Galván (Lago Carballo, 
2004: 29). 
Despite the pressure to make the publishing house a profitable enterprise − it belongs 
primarily to the bank Banco Ibérico (Pradera, 2004: 297) −, the orientation of Taurus’s 
publications during this period clearly obeys more a cultural and socio-political agenda, 
than an economic one130. Aguirre – and with him Taurus – endeavours to expand the 
horizons of a present which he feels to be distant and isolated from the rest of 
European thought (see Mesa, 2002: 303). It is in this context that Aguirre translates 
and publishes the works of the FS.  
 
5.3 The value of a critical perspective 
5.3.1 Aguirre and the Frankfurt School 
In the previous chapters I aimed to demonstrate Aranguren’s connections and parallels to 
Marcuse, as well as Zambrano’s efforts to provide an alternative to instrumental rationality. 
                                                
129 Unfortunately, no records of Aguirre’s work for Taurus have survived the successive removals that 
the publishing house has experienced throughout the years. Therefore, no exhaustive list of works 
translated and edited by Aguirre has been produced. Although more work needs to be done to produce 
such a record, the present bibliography offers an extensive account of his work.  
130 As Aguirre himself explains, his editorial work is not primarily guided by economic interests: 
“nunca saqué de prensas un best-seller o, según tartamudeaba un colega que ahora suda la academia, 
un west-seller. Precisamente por ser miembro entusiasta de la Muy Noble y Muy Desleal Cofradía del 
Despilfarro, les puse con frecuencia cara de perro a los agentes literarios, ballenas blancas, tigres 
apaisados” (1985: 45). It should be noted that although, unlike Aranguren, Aguirre does not explicitly 
focus on the analysis or critique of the consumerist society and the workings of neo-capitalism, it is 
possible to discern his negative attitude towards consumerism indirectly in some of his passing 
remarks. An example of this can be found in the following comment: “a través de su enfática 
lacrimogenia la Constitución Gaudium et Spes cifra la llegada de la Iglesia católica a un mundo 
moderno, que de facto, aunque la Constitución no lo sepa del todo, es más un mundo de producción 
que de progreso” (1985: 227). Here it is possible to observe that, although Aguirre is discussing the 
Catholic Church, he seizes the opportunity to contrapose progress to production, thus, infusing 
production with negative connotations which he does not elaborate on. 
 
 240 
However, the reach of CT in Spain cannot be properly addressed without analysing the role 
played by Aguirre in introducing the writings of the School to Spain.  
In the light of this, it may seem logical to dedicate the first chapter to the analysis of 
Aguirre’s thought. However, as explained in the introduction, he is best understood after 
coming into contact with the concepts previously explored, because, despite the nature of 
his writings, being more personal and less strictly philosophical, and despite not having 
such an extensive corpus of written work, his work in a way encompasses some key 
elements found on the other two authors. On the one hand, Aranguren’s rapprochement to 
the work of the members of the Institut can also be found in Aguirre’s writings and, on the 
other, Aguirre develops his own style of experiential rationality which, although differing 
from Zambrano’s, shares the same aims and many of the basic assumptions. The focus of 
this section will, therefore, be placed on the development of his experiential rationality as 
an alternative to instrumental rationality and as an expression of CT. 
As indicated in the introduction, Aguirre is generally considered to have introduced 
the FS in Spain131. However, although this statement is to a certain extent true, it requires 
clarification. Contrary to popular opinion, the first book ever published in Spain by one of 
the members of the FS is not translated or edited by Aguirre. Instead, it is translated by 
Manuel Sacristán, and published by Ariel in 1962. In fact, in 1962, Ariel publishes not one 
but two of Adorno’s books translated by Sacristán. The books in question are Notas de 
literatura and Prismas, la crítica de la cultura y la sociedad. Nevertheless, Aguirre has 
generally been considered the introducer of the FS into Spain on account of the fact that 
most of the works by Adorno and Benjamin published in Spain since shortly after this date 
and until the end of the Transition are published by Taurus at his request, and are often 
either translated or revised by him. The first of such books are Adorno’s Filosofía y 
superstición (1964a) and Justificación de la filosofía (1964b), which is translated by 
Aguirre when he is still a priest. What is more, in the case of Adorno, eight – possibly nine 
– out of the seventeen books written by Adorno and published in Spain during this period 
are, in fact, published by Taurus and are directly linked to Aguirre132. 
Aguirre plays a more exclusive role in the introduction of Benjamin. With the 
exception of Angelus Novus (1971a), which is translated by Héctor Murena and published 
                                                
131 Aranguren points on various occasions to Aguirre as the person chiefly responsible for having 
introduced the FS into Spain (see 1994, 4: 544; 1994, 5: 376). 
132 It is unclear whether Aguirre is responsible for the publication of Teoría estética, which takes place 
in 1980, well after he resigns his position as editor-in-chief in Taurus. However, there is evidence that 
he maintains a strong association with Taurus after he leaves this position, as his continues translation, 
publication, and even edition of different works after this time. This is particularly the case in relation 
to his literary translations (see bibliography where a list of Aguirre’s translations has been provided).   
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by Edhasa, Aguirre is responsible for every publication of a work by Benjamin in Spain 
since his translation of Iluminaciones and Imaginación y sociedad in 1971 until 1975. Not 
only that, he also translates and prefaces all such books. Hence, although there is a gap of 
almost a decade between the introduction of Adorno and that of Benjamin, Aguirre is more 
involved than ever with Benjamin’s works, in all likelihood, as a result of his personal 
affinity towards his thought, as we shall discuss below.  
The case of Horkheimer’s works, chronologically the second one of these authors to 
be introduced in Spain, is entirely different. Although Taurus is the first to publish one of 
Horkheimer’s books in Spain, La función de las ideologías (1966), it is unclear whether 
Aguirre is involved in its publication. It is translated by Víctor Sánchez de Zavala and its 
early date, 1966, before Aguirre becomes editor-in-chief, suggests that he does not 
commission this publication. This is not to say that Aguirre does not suggest it, which is a 
probable conjecture given on the one hand that Aguirre’s collaboration with Taurus dates 
from 1959 and, on the other, the evidence of his interest and affinity for the School; 
nevertheless, this remains only a conjecture as it cannot be verified. In any case, this and 
Sociológica (1966), which Horkheimer co-authors with Adorno, are the only ones of 
Horkheimer’s books to be published by Taurus. In fact, out all of the members of the FS, 
Horkheimer is the least published of all in Spain during the period that extends from his 
introduction in 1966 until the end of the Transition. Only five of his books, including 
Sociológica (1966), are published in Spain in the ten-year period from 1966 until 1976, and 
no other books by him appear from 1976 until 1982, when Alianza publishes Historia, 
metafísica y escepticismo. Five are dramatically fewer titles than in the case of Adorno, 
who, during the same period, has seventeen of his books published in Spain, or Marcuse, 
with sixteen. This is even fewer titles than Benjamin, who only has eight of his books 
published in Spain.  
 The reasons for this disparity are not clear. One might surmise that one of the factors 
involved may be that those books which are considered Horkheimer’s seminal work, such 
as Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947a) and Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunft (1967) are 
already translated into Spanish in Buenos Aires, where they are published as Dialéctica del 
Iluminismo (1969) and Crítica de la razón instrumental (1969), respectively. It would seem 
that as a result of their translation, they may have been already accessible to a Spanish 
audience, hence eliminating the need for their publication in Spain. However, it should also 
be noted that some books by the rest of the members of the School are translated and 
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published in Latin America, and this does not detract Spanish publishers from publishing 
yet more titles by these authors133. 
 Marcuse is introduced to Spain in 1967 by Revista the Occidente, who publishes El 
marxismo soviético. From this point onwards, given Marcuse’s popularity, numerous 
publishing houses publish his works in Spain; out of sixteen books Seix Barral, Ariel, and 
Alianza publish two each, and various other companies publish the rest. In contrast with the 
authors discussed above, only one of Marcuse’s books is published by Taurus, namely, 
Ética de la revolución, which appears in 1969 when Aguirre is already editor-in-chief of 
Taurus.  
As a result of the evidence discussed above, it is possible to affirm that Aguirre is the 
person who, in the capacities of translator and editor, has done the most to promote the 
introduction of the FS into Spain134. Moreover, he is the first person to introduce 
Horkheimer and Benjamin to a Spanish readership.  
These efforts to introduce and promote the FS in Spain are also evidence of his 
interests and his theoretical background in the work of the School. These publications 
demonstrate Aguirre’s awareness of the existence of the School. What is more, they also 
demonstrate, on the one hand, an affinity with their thought, and, on the other hand, that he 
considers their work sufficiently relevant to commit to their translation and publication, 
passing over the opportunity to publish other currents, such as structuralism (see Romero de 
Solís, 2002: 295). Knowing Aguirre’s critical positions and subversive style together with 
his rejection of systematization, it is easy to understand why he does not feel as close to 
structuralism as he does to CT, thus declining the chance to publish the former (see 5.3.3 
for more details on Aguirre’s style). In stark contrast with that, he perceives the need to 
translate and publish the FS. As he explains, “lo de Frankfurt, Benjamin sobre todo, Adorno 
y los otros, tenía que ver con el aburrimiento insoportable que me causaban los catecismos 
marxistas” (1985: 47). Aguirre had already acknowledged the importance of Marxism, 
having even encouraged a dialogue; however, he is also well aware that the Marxist co-
ordinates no longer apply to neo-capitalist societies. Furthermore, Marxism is perceived as 
a set of dogmatic formulae. The alternative lies, therefore, with the FS, who offer a critical 
and penetrating approach to the challenges posed by the new forms of alienation, as 
discussed in Chapters One and Three. 
                                                
133 An example of this can be observed in the case of Benjamin, whose work is prolifically translated 
and published by Aguirre as indicated above, despite having already been translated and published in 
Spanish in Buenos Aires since 1961 (see Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 282). 
134 Although, as explained above, there is no exhaustive list of works edited by Aguirre, his 
engagement in the publication of works by the FS can be observed in the titles listed in the appendix 
one. 
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Therefore, although the choice of titles for this exercise of translation and publication 
could have well been arbitrary or it could have followed reasons completely unrelated to 
their contents, there is evidence to suggest the contrary. This evidence is closely linked to 
Aguirre’s own biography and his socio-cultural context. In fact, he explains that he 
translates these texts because 
quise que los estudiantes españoles leyesen textos escritos en la posguerra, y no sólo, engañados por 
la intemporalidad que lleva consigo el retraso de las traducciones, los de Lukàcs y Korsch, que poco 
o nada supieron del pacto de Hitler y de Stalin y de cómo al primero le derrotó no la revolución, sino 
la sociedad liberal, en la que no se había extinguido la dialéctica de la ilustración (1985: 47). 
Although Aguirre does briefly explain why he is moved to translate and publish the 
works of the FS, as seen above, one may still ask why the FS is favoured over other trends 
of post-war European thought. What is there in the FS that resonates with Aguirre? What is 
there in its content that makes it relevant to the situation of Spain? His answer, echoing 
Marcuse’s terminology, is that “España se desvivía en una inquebrantable apariencia 
unidimensional” (Aguirre, 1985: 47). This statement, like much of Aguirre’s language, is 
rich in implications. By using the adjective unidimensional in a clear reference to 
Marcuse’s most influential work, One-Dimensional Man (1964), Aguirre is alluding to the 
totalitarian rule of the Franco regime, but also to the fundamentalist practices and attitudes 
that it fosters, as discussed above in relation to Christianity and Marxism135. However, there 
is much more to this one-dimensionality. Aguirre uses the word apariencia, appearance, to 
suggest that, in fact, there is an under-layer of the Spanish population abundant with variety 
and alternatives, ready to embrace multidimensionality. Thus, he strives to provide the 
theoretical co-ordinates to create a platform which may activate these latent forces of 
change. 
In conclusion, Aguirre has been largely, although not solely, responsible for the 
introduction of the thought of the members of the FS into the Spanish socio-cultural debate. 
Despite having discarded the element of exclusivity, Aguirre’s role in the introduction of 
neo-Marxism and CT has an important impact on Spanish intellectual thought, which is 
experiencing a period of expansion by having access to a wider range of material. Díaz 
suggests that, as a result of these editions of the School’s work, a wave of interest in the 
authors and some key topics discussed by the School, such as utopia or consumerism, is 
sparked during 1969-1975, a period during which they have very direct repercussions on 
                                                
135 A helpful interpretation of Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality can be found in Kellner’s 
introduction to the second edition of “One-Dimensional Man”, where he says: “I would propose 
interpreting ‘one-dimensional’ as conforming to existing thought and behavior and lacking a critical 
dimension and a dimension of potentialities that transcend the existing society. In Marcuse’s usage the 
adjective ‘one-dimensional’ describes practices that conform to pre-existing structures, norms, and 
behaviour, in contrast to multidimensional discourse, which focuses on possibilities that transcend the 
established state of affairs” (1991: xxvii; see also 1.2.1). 
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the realm of political action (see 1983: 166; see also Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 283). More 
importantly, as a consequence of this contact, some Spanish intellectuals, most notably 
Aranguren and Aguirre himself, develop their own brand of Critical Theory; they identify 
the key issues raised by the School making them their own subject matter. Whereas in 
Aranguren’s case, Marcuse is the most visible influence, in Aguirre’s case Benjamin is 
often echoed in terms of style and themes. A number of Benjaminian themes, such as the 
impoverishment of experience, the preference for an oral style, and the need to re-invent 
oneself, can be found in Aguirre (see 1975b: 12; see also 5.3.2).  
 
5.3.2 Benjamin 
We shall now explore Aguirre’s relationship to the FS’s theoretical framework and his 
connection to the different authors, Benjamin in particular, for he seems closest to his 
thought (see Herralde, 2006: 12-13).  
Not only is Aguirre Benjamin’s translator, but he gains international recognition as 
an expert on his work, although this is something which has, at times, been called into 
question;  
Jesús Aguirre, autor de defectuosas traducciones de Walter Benjamin, fue un peculiar especialista en 
Walter Benjamin de renombre mundial: aunque no se conoce un solo ensayo y menos aún un libro 
suyo sobre Benjamin, fue invitado por los germanistas norteamericanos a dictar conferencias en 
varias universidades norteamericanas (Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 282-83).  
There are others, however, who praise his translations as well as his expertise on the subject 
(see Atienza, 2002: 307; see also Mesa, 2002: 302). Although the quality of Aguirre’s 
translations and understanding of Benjamin is open to argument, the lack of publications on 
the subject of Benjamin requires clarification. It is true that Aguirre does not write any 
books on Benjamin; however, it must be noted that Aguirre is no scholar. He is a translator 
and an intellectual. As such, he translates most of Benjamin’s work; in fact, as Juan García 
Hortelano points out, “Aguirre, en la década de los setenta, tradujo, anotó, comentó, y editó 
la obra de Benjamin” (1985: 12). In addition to Aguirre’s editions, translation, prologues, 
notes, and comments to the works of Benjamin, he also publishes – although in a rather 
informal and personal style – at least two newspaper articles in El País devoted to 
Benjamin, entitled “Moscú, capital del dolor” (1989b) and “Músicas para Walter Benjamin” 
(1990a), as well as an essay entitled “Walter Benjamin. Estética y revolución”. This essay 
first appears as a prologue to his translation of the first volume of Iluminaciones (1971b), 
which then reappears in the collection of essays Casi ayer noche under the name of 
“Estudios sobre Walter Benjamin” (see 1971b: 7-14; 1985: 115-40 respectively). Given the 
very limited number of his publications on Benjamin on the one hand and his reputation as 
a Benjaminian scholar on the other, it is possible to conclude that the comments about 
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Aguirre’s expertise on Benjamin are mainly based on his work as a translator and not on the 
production of works of a scholarly nature. Even so, there is no contradiction in defending 
his expertise and renown, for as is widely known, an exercise of translation is not a mere 
“transportation of meaning” into a different language, but it presupposes an understanding 
of the œuvre of the author in question, as well as its interpretation, because ultimately every 
translation is precisely this, an interpretation. As regards the quality of Aguirre’s 
translations of Benjamin, this is a matter which is beyond the scope of this thesis. On the 
other hand, Gutiérrez Girardot’s criticism of Aguirre’s expertise on Benjamin – other than 
his translations – is unfounded, as observed in the evidence of Aguirre’s work in this 
respect provided above. What his statement provides, however, is confirmation is the 
international renown of Aguirre’s reputation as an expert on Benjamin. Aguirre’s 
relationship with the School, however, goes beyond his interest in Benjamin. In the true 
fashion of CT, this relationship combines the intellectual aspect with the personal one. This 
relationship and its weight in the transmission of the works of the School are visible in 
Adorno’s will: “Adorno había dejado una disposición testamentaria de que cualquier 
traducción o cualquier cosa que saliera suya en castellano tenía que pasar por la revisión de 
Jesús Aguirre” (Savater, 2006). 
Returning to Benjamin, Aguirre explains the choice made in selecting Benjamin’s 
texts as the object of his translations, saying that “no se trata, sin embargo, de una selección 
retrospectivista, sino de una cala en la experiencia de una sensibilidad que nos parece 
necesaria para llegar a un enriquecimiento del ámbito de lo subjetivo” (1971d: 14). Thus, 
Aguirre manifests his main interests. He is moved by a pedagogic intention, his aim is to 
expand the capabilities of perception of his readership in such a way that a further 
development of the self, a self-realisation, may be possible. Making use of Goethe’s 
terminology, García Hortelano describes Aguirre’s predilection for Benjamin in terms of 
elective affinities, making a reference to Goethe’s novel by the same title (1809) (1985: 12; 
Aguirre, 1985: 113-40)136. Such an affinity can be first spotted in the existence of some 
parallels between the two thinkers, such as their views on art, the concept of aura, the 
fragmentation and discontinuity of their work, and their overall highly cultivated and 
complex style. It is also possible that Aguirre may see in Benjamin’s dissension and 
fragmentation a reflection of Spain. Aguirre may also be drawn to Benjamin’s thought 
because a number of traditional elements are intertwined with other very progressive 
                                                
136 This influential term, “elective affinities”, Wahlverwandtschaften, whose central idea is that 
individuals experience an attraction towards other individuals according to the compatibility of their 
character, has also been employed by Weber in his essay “The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of 
Capitalism” (1905), as well as by Benjamin, who writes an essay entitled “Goethe’s elective affinities” 
(see 2002: 36; 1924 respectively). 
 246 
attitudes, as is the case with Aguirre himself. The latter aspect is particularly visible in their 
conception of time and progress. As Aguirre explains,  
en su último texto [de Benjamin], Tesis de filosofía de la historia, la revolución es un ‘salto de tigre’ 
no al futuro, sino al pasado, [...] para hacer con él una experiencia que ‘haga saltar el continuum de la 
historia’. No hay aquí cabida para el progresismo futurista, ya que la acción revolucionaria debe 
liberar ‘el pasado oprimido’. Con estas tesis, Benjamin combate la ‘testaruda fe en el progreso’ de la 
socialdemocracia y del marxismo vulgar (1971d: 9).  
In this aspect, Benjamin shows a more conservative attitude than that of other members of 
the Institut, which may contribute to further understanding Aguirre’s preference of 
Benjamin over the other members of the School. Benjamin refuses to venerate progress for 
its own sake. In fact, his concept of progress is not tied in to mechanical achievement and 
the increase of productivity. Progress for him does not follow a straight line forward, but 
rather a trajectory curved backwards. If progress is to be a synonym of improvement, then, 
for Benjamin, such improvement can only be found in the redemption of the past. Once this 
has been achieved the linear, hierarchical perception of time can no longer be sustained, 
hence history is perceived as a continuum, in which every point in time is in contact with 
every other point. This must have resonated in Aguirre, who, submerged in the last stages 
of the Franco dictatorship, sees both the necessity as well as the danger of change. The need 
for change is undeniable, but it involves a risk to the country’s stability. Hence, this change 
should not represent a break with their present time, but a recuperation of a past, which 
need not be real; instead, a conceptual past – one which may not have necessarily taken 
place – grants continuity and therefore stability. Placing the values sought in this conceptual 
past has yet more advantages. When the values are thought of as something that once was 
but is no more two things happen: first, their worth increases as a side-effect of the sense of 
loss, and second, their possibility is also increased in the knowledge that it once was, thus 
dissipating doubts as to whether they can come into being again. Hence, as he says in 
relation to Benjamin, “así será la memoria una facultad con función de futuro” (1971d: 14). 
Aguirre reinterprets Benjamin’s thought in relation to the situation in Spain, that is to say 
that he is cautious regarding the future of Spain, and firmly believes that any change – 
religious, political, or otherwise – must take place not with the desire to break with the past, 
but to integrate it in the exercise of shaping the future. His positions are, therefore, 
imminently practical when their role as engines for change is considered. As indicated 
above, this is but the reconstruction of Aguirre’s premises; however, the unfolding of this 
point can be observed in relation to Aguirre’s concern regarding religious freedom as 
discussed above. 
There are a number of elements in Aguirre’s thought, such as the conceptions of 
progress and time discussed above, and even more in his personal life, such as having 
belonged to the clergy and becoming Duque de Alba, which reveal his conservative 
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tendencies. Despite these tendencies, it would be unfair to describe Aguirre as a 
conservative figure. In the first instance, he constantly promotes change: religious, in his 
early days as a priest, political, in the case of the Transition, cultural, when he becomes 
Duke. Second, he expresses rather daring views, as can be seen in his criticism of the 
insufficiency of the revolutionary movement, that is, the insufficiency of its scope: “la 
contracultura pudo haber recurrido al ‘acto gratuito’ (Los sótanos del Vaticano), a la 
protesta contra la heterosexualidad dominante (Corydon), al estado de lirismo constante e 
intramundano (Los alimentos terrenos). Pero no lo hizo” (1985: 96). Therefore, in some 
ways, he perceives some his own thought as more progressive than the thought of those 
who, at that time, are considered to be the revolutionary force. The insufficiency of their 
positions, however, lies in that they do not offer a radical change, but a change that allows 
for the continuation of existing models and power structures. In contrast, Aguirre cultivates 
and promotes a mode of thought and expression distant from instrumental reasoning, as is 
patent in his style. It is the combination of these elements that accounts for Aguirre’s 
description as a Critical Theorist. 
 
5.3.3 Epistemology 
There is sufficient evidence to support the view that Aguirre has a strong interest in the 
School and that his thought and sensibilities are very much attuned to those of the members 
of the Institut. His work, however, is not one of mere repetition or transmission. He 
contributes actively to the debate by becoming a Critical Theorist himself. In addition, 
Aguirre brings to the fore and re-addresses an issue not generally associated with the FS, 
namely, faith. This section will, thus, explore the role of faith and how it shapes his 
epistemology. 
The peculiarity of the CT developed by Spanish thinkers such as Aranguren, 
Zambrano and, of course, Aguirre is that having stripped materialist and religious 
standpoints of the possibility of absolute certainty, they advocate faith − now 
conceptualised as a life-choice in the sense of Pascal’s wager − as the most effective 
alternative to instrumental reason. Aguirre forcefully summarizes this position when he 
says that “con éstas [anécdotas utilizadas en la argumentación del hecho religioso], me 
ocurre un poco como con las argumentaciones profusas, que enfilan los escolásticos para 
convencernos de que Dios existe. En unas y otras faltan la apuesta y la ironía” (1989a: 
78)137.  
                                                
137 Aguirre’s disapproval of the search for proof for God’s existence may reflect the influence of the 
theologian Karl Rahner, who – as indicated above – is translated into Spanish by Aguirre himself. 
Rahner, who attends Heidegger’s lectures and is visibly influenced by his thought, defends natural 
knowledge of God, that is, that the human being possesses a latent knowledge of God’s existence and 
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Aguirre underlines that “todos ellos [los componentes de la Escuela de Frankfurt] se 
refieren ‘críticamente’ al estado de la cuestión del binomio ‘razón y revelación’ durante la 
coyuntura existencial” (1985: 238). Despite their Marxist background, the FS does not 
reject religion or transcendentality, but, unlike Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, for 
them, these concepts do not play a central role in the liberation of the individual (see 
Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 230-31; see also Sánchez, 1994: 617-46). Aguirre is interested in 
the relation between reason and revelation. For him, part of the process of overcoming 
instrumental reason is the integration of revelation into the scope of reason. This issue leads 
to Aguirre’s analysis of the contraposition of religion to consumerist behaviour, which he 
discusses in an essay entitled “Sociedad de consumo y comportamiento religioso”, 
published in Casi ayer noche (1985). Here he admits that “lo que me preocupa no es la 
desaparición de las conductas religiosas en la llamada sociedad de consumo, sino que 
aquéllas, con todas las mediaciones que se quiera, se acomoden a las leyes de ésta” (1985: 
227). He goes on to explain that 
en la sociedad de consumo la fe cristiana no debe resignarse a constituirse en una mercancía más con 
su precio de impuesto, su frecuencia semanal en la consumición, sus vendedores especializados, que 
serían sacerdotes y teólogos, incluso con sus diferentes marcas para satisfacer la variedad accidental 
de un mismo gusto básico. La vuelta a Dios es vislumbrada por Horkheimer como contrapeso de las 
condiciones oprimentes de la ‘sociedad totalmente planificada’ (1985: 231).  
Making reference to Horkheimer’s position, Aguirre emphasizes faith, which is the key 
element of his response to the new forms of alienation. Highlighting this aspect leads to the 
development of a response that surpasses the problems posed by foundationalist and anti-
foundationalist positions.  
Whereas foundationalism sustains that there is a foundation, one or several basic 
assertions which are intrinsically true and cognoscible, upon which all other knowledge is 
based, Critical Theorists defend that this is not the case. 
There are several reasons for this. As explained in the previous chapter, adopting a 
foundationalist approach means accepting the rationality and epistemology it involves (see 
Parsons, 2007: 103-04). The implications are as follows. First, only that belief which is the 
result of a finite and non-circular chain of reasoning, supported by other beliefs acquired by 
the same procedure which can be ultimately traced back to the self-evident or indubitable 
foundation/s, is considered rational (see Parsons, 2007: 104). Second, there is an absolute 
truth. Furthermore, this truth is cognoscible. Hence, in this hierarchical epistemological 
system, knowledge is first acquired inductively, in the case of the natural world, or is self-
evident, justified without inference, in the case of mathematical or logical truths, and 
                                                                                                                                       
that any attempt to provide evidence will necessarily ratify the mystery associated to such existence 
(see Kilby, 2004: 102). 
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anything which goes beyond this must be deductively inferred. That is why, according to 
this approach, theology and metaphysics do not fall into the scope of rationality or even 
epistemology.  
This proves to be problematic. Proving the existence of an absolute truth is a difficult 
enterprise, even more so if the premise is that this absolute truth may be fully cognoscible 
by a human being. Defending this position turns out to be a lot more than an 
epistemological standpoint. It is first and foremost an ideological statement; one which 
suggests a modernist view of the world, where humans enjoy a privileged position to access 
and understand reality, or, at the very least, a very generous dose of confidence in our 
capabilities (see Neville, 1997: 316-17).  
As opposed to this – influenced by Ortega – Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre have 
adopted a perspectivist epistemology138. According to Aguirre,  
la verdad social es patrimonio de todos, pero no de unos contra otros, sino de todos juntos, y por ello 
dicha verdad es tan utópica como irrenunciable. Alcanzar la utopía sería igual a quemarse en ella, y 
suprimirla como astro de cada mañana equivale a vivir en el hielo (1985: 61).  
A number of implications stem from this statement: the rejection of totalitarianism, the 
defence of political equality, and the vindication of the worth of utopia. This theoretical 
standpoint finds expression in a number of specific instances. Aguirre’s rejection of 
totalitarianism can be observed in relation to politics, but also religion, and particularly the 
connection of the two. Aguirre opposes the systematisation of religion. He points out that  
el respeto por la libertad de Dios es la consecuencia última y más grave del ejercicio de la libertad 
religiosa humana. El pecado religioso –mágico, dirían los historiadores de las religiones– consiste 
precisamente en que el hombre pretende dominar a Dios. Una pretensión semejante significaría hoy 
la ‘integración’ de la libertad religiosa (1969d: 18).  
This statement is a reflection of Aguirre’s rejection of foundationalism. From this 
perspective, human attempts to dominate God which materialize in the systematization of 
religion are the expression of an arrogant overconfidence in our own faculties. The 
presupposition that humankind may know God’s will to such an extent as to systematize it, 
implies the equation of such a system to the absolute truth, one that is beyond 
understanding or questioning, one which demands acceptance, one which ultimately leads 
                                                
138 This position – as any epistemological position – is also the result of ideology in the sense of 
worldview which shapes our perception and understanding as explained in chapter one. Ideology and, 
consequently, politics cannot be detached from epistemology. As the FS highlights in their critique of 
positivism, “science and knowledge are political in an analogous way that feminists remind us that the 
personal is political. Claiming to be apart in a separate private or value-free zone is itself a value-laden 
move that has an implication in the political world” (Chambers, 2004: 221). Consequently, from this 
point of view, the personal and the social, the political and the religious, and existence as a whole, are 
perceived and processed by the individual from a specific ideological, political, and epistemological 
perspective. In Aguirre’s case – also in the case of the FS – such a perspective involves the 
interconnectedness of the different spheres of reality. 
 250 
to totalitarianism. That is why faith, in Aguirre’s view, must incorporate individual and 
social elements; it must be an individual choice with a social projection. It is possible to see 
in this rejection of the systematization of religion a global understanding of reality; the 
spheres of life and reality are no longer neatly separated; being is thought of in terms of 
Dasein. As with Zambrano, such a conceptualization of reality brings out the 
interconnectedness of being in such a way that the existing separation between the private 
and public spheres is overcome, not because the private sphere is invaded by the public one, 
as is often the case with instrumental reason, most visibly in the scope of mass media, but 
because the political significance and weight of the personal is highlighted, thus, 
empowering the individual. From Aguirre’s point of view, being cannot be mastered from 
within a system, for liberty is the very grounds of being, and rediscovering being 
necessarily implies experience and the expression of such an experience in a creative 
horizon where liberty can be exercised. That is why the only language that would reflect the 
reality of being must be an asystematic one. Only by challenging experiential reason and 
adopting CT, does Aguirre see a plausible path to the re-connection of our rationality and 
experience with our ontological reality. 
It is then apparent how, for these Spanish thinkers, an absolute truth might exist but, 
if this were the case, it would be well beyond human grasp. Their position is also 
ideological; it suggests an alternative to the hierarchical epistemology as described above. 
This is an epistemology which springs from an understanding of human capabilities and 
needs because it has developed from them, instead of having been created as an abstract set 
of principles and rules imposed on human processes often constricting them. 
That is not to say that these thinkers can be considered anti-foundationalist either, 
because the certainty of the non-existence of absolute truth as the starting point for 
elaborating an epistemology and a rationality leaves no room for doubt. It also reveals a 
governing principle which is absolute. Foundationalist and anti-foundationalist attitudes are 
deemed equally insufficient by these authors because they are both based on the parameters 
and possibilities of certainty. This is concisely summarized by Aguirre who claims that “la 
explicación del ateísmo y la explicación de la fe serán siempre inadecuadas” (1985: 180). In 
his view, no satisfactory answers can be achieved by exclusively intellectual means; a fuller 
conception of the rational, one that leaves room for the existential wager is needed (see 
Aguirre, 1989a: 78). In order to avoid these insufficiencies, the focus is shifted from 
knowledge to perception by defending the impossibility of absolute Knowledge, regardless 
of the existence of an absolute Truth.  
Absolute Knowledge is conceived as a dangerous ideological chimera, one that 
shares with foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches a sense of certainty in their 
conclusions, a certainty that is more a construct than a reflection of reality or, indeed, of the 
 251 
human epistemological capabilities. What these Spanish Critical Theorists advocate instead 
is the expansion of Pascal’s theological wager to the realm of epistemology. The emphasis 
is no longer placed on the possibility of truth or knowledge, because it has shifted to the 
scope of our capacities. Certainty is no longer sought. The claim for Knowledge is dropped 
in favour of knowledge; a knowledge that is the result of informed choices, but choices 
which are ultimately based not on certainty of any kind, but on the acknowledgement of our 
own fallibility. Hence, this knowledge is not ultimately based on absolute truth or certainty, 
but is, above all, a rational choice and an exercise of faith in that choice.  
In these thinkers’s view, there is no Knowledge; only reasonable, functional and 
experiential knowledge is possible. Theirs is not a relativist position. Not just anything is 
considered knowledge; there is a requisite for reasonability. This knowledge does not aspire 
to the status of absolute truth, and for this reason it does not aspire to be fully satisfactorily 
explicative, although it should be functional for the existing paradigm of reality, not in an 
instrumental sense, but more from a Kuhnian perspective139. Finally, because of their 
perspectivism, knowledge is experiential. This focus on experience changes the shape of 
epistemology, which ceases to be hierarchical, it is no longer vertical, it now becomes 
horizontal, integrating formerly shunned forms of knowledge – at least in Western 
civilization – such as faith and intuition. Broadening the methods for knowledge acquisition 
results in the readmission of metaphysics and theology into the realm of epistemology.  
That is why their non-foundationalism expands the realms of the cognoscible but, 
more importantly, by first admitting the limitations of the human capabilities, it liberates 
reason from the constraints of foundationalist rationality, ultimately expanding the horizon 
of possibility of the individual who discovers a new kind of freedom, one which when 
experienced in sufficient number may even lead to the outcome of a more genuine form of 
democratic reality. This is in stark contrast with instrumental rationality. Instrumental 
rationality, which is supported by arguments traditionally accepted as rational, has 
developed a social structure in which the individual is subjugated, in the same way as the 
Enlightenment subjugates nature for instrumental purposes (see Adorno, 1986; see also 
Horkheimer, 1973). This subjugation, along with the criteria of self-interest is what 
                                                
139 According to Kuhn, “these [paradigms] I take to be universally recognized scientific achievements 
that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (1962: x). In 
order for a paradigm to be accepted, its theories have to be considered better than those of its 
competitor paradigms. This does not mean, however, that the competing paradigm must provide a 
satisfactory explanation and prediction for all facts, which so far, no one theory does. A paradigm is 
adopted when it is proved to be more satisfactorily explanatory than the previous paradigm was – 
having said that, it is possible for more than one paradigm to co-exist for a period of time. Scientific 
achievement by itself, however, is not enough for a paradigm to be generally adopted. Its acceptance by 
the community also requires that community to have been trained in the paradigm and, more crucially, 
the technological application of the paradigm – which is not to be equated per se with the 
instrumentalization of knowledge. 
 252 
ultimately makes instrumental rationality, in fact, irrational. Far from this dynamics, this 
epistemology paves the way for an equally alternative rationality; one which moves away 
from the governing principle of instrumentality, favouring the promotion of self-
development instead, a development which is hoped will ultimately translate into socio-
political change. Hence, from this perspective, rational is that which, having satisfied the 
criteria of reasonable, functional, and experiential epistemology as outlined above, is a 
genuine expression of being, which implies that, at the same time, it encourages future 
expressions of being, when being is understood as an unravelling project in the 
Heideggerian sense, that is, as an interdependent being-in-the-world.  
Despite Aguirre’s conscious and purposeful decision to express himself in a 
destabilising and thought-provoking manner – as we shall see below – by exercising his 
discourse from the platform of experiential reason, he does not develop a system of thought 
because any attempt of systematization would have defeated the purpose of the 
comprehensive and inclusive rationality he is committed to. The option of formal 
systematisation has to be rejected. Experiential reason, however, still demands a consistent 
application of supradisciplinarity. Only then does it become meaningful. Used otherwise, 
applied to individual sections of reality, experiential analysis would turn into no more than 
a tool for instrumental reason. Hence, Aguirre’s experiential rationality is expressed 
repeatedly throughout all areas of his thought. Although he does not theoretically develop 
any of these positions, the arguments as well as his overall style reveal this underlying 
theoretical standpoint, as the analysis of the most relevant features of this discourse will 
show. 
 
5.4 Aguirre the Critical Theorist 
This section will extract and analyse the underpinnings of Aguirre’s CT, by analysing the 
strategies he employs in order to develop his experiential rationality at the same time as the 
discourse of instrumental reason is undermined and destabilized by him and by those who 
engage actively and critically with the text. With this purpose in mind, close attention will 
be paid to specific aspects of his discourse, the nature and role of his style and structure, 
and the relevance and implications of the biographical component in particular. 
  
5.4.1 Style and structure 
Although many of Aguirre’s positions are progressive, the profoundness and reach of his 
wager for change can only be fully understood in relation to his writings. Only after a close 
analysis of his works, when not only their extension, topic, and content are considered, but 
when these are examined holistically in reference to their tone, style, structure, and the rest 
of his trajectory, does it become clear that the element that conveys unity to his thought as a 
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whole is precisely the struggle against instrumental reason. The rejection of instrumental 
reason and, indeed, the search for an alternative, is a common element in both his practical 
and literary work, for despite the diversity of the projects he undertakes or, rather, precisely 
because of this diversity, they retain a certain unity as a project of CT.  
Style is, thus, one of the key aspects in which the influence of and parallels with the 
FS, Benjamin in particular, can be observed. Aguirre explains in reference to Benjamin that 
“las vías por las que acarrea sus materiales no son doctrinales, sino oblicuas, aquellas que él 
mismo describiera como propias de los surrealistas” (1971d: 8). This is also very true of 
Aguirre himself, as will be demonstrated below. It is important to recognize that despite the 
lack of systematic pretensions, Aguirre’s thought does contain a high degree of coherence 
as a project.  
At the end of Casi ayer noche Aguirre explains that  
las reflexiones que anteceden, como algunas otras desperdigadas en prólogos, conferencias y otros 
textos aparentemente de circunstancias, deben mucho, si no en su contenido material, desde luego 
que sí en la aprehensión formal, al estudio de la llamada Escuela crítica de Frankfurt. La lectura y la 
traducción –relectura múltiple– de Horkheimer; del malogrado Benjamin, de Adorno, muerto en olor 
de teoría, vienen siendo desde hace años tarea reflexiva de cabecera (1985: 237).  
Despite having acknowledged his intellectual debt to the FS, Aguirre does not confirm 
whether or not, from his point of view, the content of the FS’s thought constitutes his 
subject matter. However, he readily admits that the way that they approach writing, 
presenting, and even structuring their thoughts is central to what he does. There are two 
important implications to be drawn from this. First, this reluctance to discuss the content of 
his work is consistent with the conscious tendency to opacity that he maintains, resisting 
any readymade formulae140. Second, Aguirre acknowledges the influence that the form and 
structure of the FS’s writings have had on his work. This is of extreme importance to 
support the claim that Aguirre is a Critical Theorist, because in CT – as indicated in Chapter 
One – form and content are bound together as part of an effort to overcome instrumental 
reason. Hence, by adopting the form and structure employed by the FS, whatever the 
orientation of each individual article of book, its focus will still be the de-stabilisation of 
instrumental reason. An array of de-stabilising strategies, such as interdisciplinarity, 
perspectivism, fragmentation, but also integration, and contradiction are all key 
                                                
140 When asked directly the succinct question “Francfurt [sic]”, Aguirre replies: “La Escuela de 
Francfurt me ha dado, sobre todo, una osatura [sic] mental. Su rigor filosófico lo aplico hoy a otros 
problemas de la cultura y de la vida” (Umbral, Aguirre, 1984b: 11). Here, once again he highlights the 
influence that the methodology, structure, and style of FS has had on his thought. Aguirre explains that 
while these are present in his thought, its contents – at the time of the interview – have gone beyond the 
topics which are the primary concern of the School. Thus, this quotation provides further evidence of 
his rejection of readymade formulae, although by using the word “hoy” the implication is that the 
contents of his thought used to be closer to those of the FS and that they have expanded in relation to 
the evolution of his own occupation and interests. 
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characteristics of Aguirre’s holistic approach which, as is the case with Zambrano, aims to 
overcome the dualism of instrumental reason, by fostering experiential reason instead. The 
presence of these strategies in his style and structure will now be explored. 
 
5.4.2 Know thyself 
Aguirre’s style is insistently autobiographical. Although he does not elaborate on this topic 
by way of explanation, he has provided enough comments and indications to reasonably 
surmise that he has developed this style of personal analysis as a consequence of the 
conviction that the œuvre of a person cannot be separated from his biography and can, 
consequently, only be understood in relation to or, rather, in the light of it, echoing Ortega’s 
razón vital, vital reason (see Aguirre, 1985: 105).  
As argued in the introduction, every text is autobiographical to a certain extent (see 
1.5.1). In addition to this, there are other texts which are purposefully autobiographical, not 
only as a descriptive attribute, more also in terms of genre. As Gusdorf explains in relation 
to autobiography as a genre, it “requires a man to take a distance with regard to himself in 
order to reconstitute himself in the focus of his special unity and identity across time” 
(1980: 35)141. This distance, focus, and desire for unity and identity, however, are not 
present in Aguirre’s writings. He is not so concerned with providing a clear, lineal, 
coherent, cohesive, and comprehensive portrait of his own life, as he is with sharing with 
the reader some of his experiences, interests, and views, from a deeply personal, but also 
scattered, sometimes even chaotic and – at least initially – incoherent manner. Hence, his 
writings cannot be considered to belong to the genre of autobiography sensu stricto. Despite 
this, he is not only aware that he writes in an autobiographical manner, but he fully intends 
to do so. Even though Aguirre does not write an autobiography in the sense described 
before, he does write autobiographically, in the sense that autobiography may also be 
described as inwardness, as “the inward journey” (see Marcus, 1994: 235). It is in this latter 
sense that Aguirre himself admits that he is deliberately autobiographical in relation to his 
attitude and style, as we shall see below (see Aguirre, 1985: 27).  
The importance that Aguirre accords memory, and, consequently, also to 
autobiography, becomes clear in Francisco Umbral’s interview: 
U: -¿Qué importancia le concedes hoy a la memoria? 
A: -Toda, muchísima, absoluta. 
U: -Y la cultivas, a lo que veo. Tanto la memoria histórica de los Alba como tu memoria personal 
(1984b: 11).  
                                                
141 It must be noted, however, that although these constitute the ideal co-ordinates which shape the 
genre of autobiography, in reality, autobiography may sometimes is expressed in a serial of even 
fragmentary manner, effectively raising questions regarding the nature and characteristics of personal 
identity (see Marcus, 1994: 238-39).  
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The value Aguirre awards to biography can be observed in two different facets. On the one 
hand, he turns to the personal life of whichever figure he is studying whenever possible to 
complete his view of the matter discussed, as can be observed in his work on Benjamin 
(1975b: 10-11). Even more relevant is that his writings – with the exception of his 
translations – are infused with his own autobiographical perspective; how he first 
encounters the topic or author discussed, the impact it has on him, and how he remembers 
these experiences; the most patent example of this can be found in Casi ayer noche (1985) 
and Las horas situadas (1989a), whose auto-biographical component will be discussed 
below. Thus is why, when Umbral pushes Aguirre to tell him how he would describe the 
style of his writings, he highlights the element remembrance, by choosing it from the 
various examples offered by Umbral: 
U: -¿En qué estilo escribes? 
A: -Depende del género. No se escribe igual un discurso para la Academia que un artículo urgente 
que le piden a uno de un periódico. 
U: -Estás evitando contestarme. ¿Eres rememorativo, crítico, ácido, sentimental?, ¿cómo es la 
psicología del hombre que saca de ti el escrito¡ [sic]? 
A: -Rememorativo (1984b: 12). 
The importance of memory is crystallized in his autobiographical style. In relation to 
Casi ayer noche, Aguirre says that “sin duda son las primeras autobiografías que publico, y 
bien les viene, porque me viene bien, que la actitud de aprendiz se haga en ellas patente”, 
which demonstrates Aguirre’s deliberate choice of an autobiographical expression, but also 
his attitude of apprentice suggests an experimental and processual – rather than finished or 
complete – approach (1985: 27)142. This attitude of apprentice is not limited to his 
autobiographical style and is not motivated by his self-proclaimed status of neophyte in 
these matters. Far from it, it reveals his attitude towards life, as this statement indicates: “si 
algún día, hipotético y ciertamente lejano, alguien hubiese aprendido algo de mí, se hubiese 
alguien sentido ‘impulsado a lo alto’ con mi ayuda, me gustaría, entonces, mirar hacia esa 
altura y, a mi vez, aprenderla” (1985: 27). 
His autobiographical writings – particularly Casi ayer noche (1985), Altas 
oportunidades (1987a), Crónica de una Dirección General (1988c), Las horas situadas 
(1989a), and Crónica en la Comisaría (1992) – are far from the straightforward narration of 
memories and experiences following a mostly lineal time sequence from a first-person 
perspective that one may expect from this genre. This autobiographical component also 
leads to a certain opacity which is manifested in several ways. There is a certain 
whimsicality to the structure of some of his works. This is particularly so in Casi ayer 
                                                
142 The fact that he refers to the work in Casi ayer noche using the plural is an indication of Aguirre’s 
own perception of the fragmentation of his work, which shall be discussed below. 
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noche (1985) and Las horas situadas (1989a), where there is no obvious guiding criterion 
for the choice and inclusion of the essays compiled. His writings seem autobiographical 
almost despite himself, as many of the titles of the essays which make up his books 
indicate. In Casi ayer noche, these titles include: “El decir y el hacer de José Hierro”, 
“Santander, sitio de los vientos”, “Et in Arcadia ego”, “Como la turquesa, amargo”, “El 
mismo Julien Green”, and “Frankfurt 1971: Leyendo con gafas oscuras”, to mention but a 
few representative titles. Topics and titles equally varied are found in Las horas situadas 
(1989a): “Fausto y sus variaciones”, “La crueldad del texto”, “Lecciones de geografía”, 
“Academia en Sevilla”, and “Desconocido por su excelencia” are examples of this. A 
similar diversity is found – to various extents – in his other books143. A look at these titles 
quickly reveals that – despite the autobiographical nature of these writings – the topics set 
out for discussion tend to be an author, a place, or, even, an event, very rarely putting 
himself at the centre of the discussion from the outset. Despite this tendency to act as a 
literary critic, or even an intellectual in Aranguren’s sense of the word, whichever views he 
transmits are very openly filtered through his persona.  
This strategy maximizes his visibility within the text. He resorts to a form of 
experientialism to eliminate the illusion of objectivity; given that any transmission is 
necessarily mediated and therefore transformed in varying degrees as a necessary result of 
that mediation, the medium should be a visible part of the resulting transmission, because 
ignoring this fact or, what is more, taking great pains to erase all traces of such mediation – 
as it often happens with scientificist discourse – results in the obscurity, not only of the 
process of transmission, but of the transmitted content itself. Aguirre, therefore, makes 
himself visible, perceptible, and at all rates present in his writings, even if they are, as is 
often the case, a review of another author’s work.  
At the same time, the contents of Aguirre’s writings may come across as bursts of 
disperse reflexions and memories rather than as an effort to elaborate a comprehensive 
account of his past, resulting in a fragmentary style (see 1985: 151)144. An example of this 
                                                
143 Whereas his two volumes of Memorias de un cumplimiento seem to enjoy thematic cohesion, for 
they recount his memories in public office, the choice of the focus of their contents may also be 
described as whimsical, a perception which is emphasized due to the fragmentary and erratic nature of 
his style, as we shall discuss below. 
144 In this context, fragmentation should not be confused with lack of coherence or, even, cohesion. It is 
fragmentary, above all, because it rejects a sense of unity, of totality, which does not necessarily affect 
the coherence of the text. The DRAE defines “fragmentación” as “acción y efecto de fragmentar” and, 
in turn, “fragmentar” as “reducir a fragmentos”. “Fragmentos” proves to be more informative, for it is 
defined as: 
1. Parte o porción pequeña de algunas cosas quebradas o partidas. 
2. Trozo o resto de una obra escultórica o arquitectónica. 
3. Trozo de una obra literaria o musical. 
4. Parte conservada de un libro o escrito. 
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fragmentation can be observed in his essay “El asesinato del abanico”, the first two 
paragraphs of which have been reproduced here to give the reader of sense of Aguirre’s 
idiosyncratic style (1989a: 43-46): 
No ha muerto el abanico, sino que ha sido asesinado. Por sus despojos nos persiguen como fantasmas 
que una mano empuña a deshora o que trasluce una vitrina iluminada, subitáneamente, desde un atrás 
sin fondo. Es como si supiesen, los abanicos, que no hemos encontrado al malhechor y, como sin 
saberlo, los mantuviese ajados, desasidos largamente, en el tris majestuoso de la penúltima 
resistencia. 
En años en que el peligro era inminente, las fechas de entreguerras, avió alguien del mal color 
que iban cobrando las figuritas de mazapán. Al buhonero, un mercado ambulante, le habían sustituido 
los pasajes por los que se deambulaba entre escaparates abigarrados y fijos. ¿Se habían aterido los 
enseres? No; los había maniatado –abanicos, quimonos, mazapanes o flores de tela y de papel–, 
convirtiéndolos en objetos, en meras cosas. Los escaparates son la fosa común de la economía de 
mercado, y la vitrina doméstica, que se instala en las estancias de respeto, alejadas temerariamente de 
los cuartos en que se vive, un enterramiento de lujo. Constituyen unos y otra el lugar donde 
empezamos, con memoria borrosa, a reconstruir el crimen (1989a: 43). 
As can be observed in this sample of his work, Aguirre’s style is not only fragmentary, but 
also often disperse – even erratic –, erudite, almost cryptic, and, decidedly complex, as we 
shall discuss below145. 
Fragmentation is found at different levels; there is an almost unavoidable 
fragmentation of its content as a result of the writing practice which we shall discuss in 
more detail in section 5.4.5, namely, lack of revision, speed, and reliance on memory alone 
(see Aguirre, 1988c: 91). There is a structural fragmentation, that is, the components of his 
writings appear as fragmented, for their choice is not always transparent146. The time of his 
writings is also fragmented, not only because, as one would expect, the writings appear over 
an extensive period of time, but also because the criterion and order for the publication and 
                                                                                                                                       
Hence, this fragmentation refers to the lack of unity of Aguirre’s writings; it stresses that, structure-
wise, his texts are formed by putting together different parts. In other words, the description of his style 
as fragmentary is a reflection on the distinctiveness of the fragments, or parts, which form it. This 
fragmentation stresses that the binding principles of the text are not always obvious to the reader and 
many not follow the expected patterns, such as thematic cohesion or temporal progression, or such 
patterns of cohesion may be applied very loosely. Instead, the guiding principle for structuring different 
parts seems to respond to the author’s preferences or subjective judgement. In any case, in reference to 
textual style – and in contrast with the definitions found in the dictionary – in as much as the different 
fragments form a whole text, this text has a basic degree of cohesion – even if it is only a material 
cohesion. 
145 Umbral recalls that Aguirre used to say “elegí la pedantería como mi levita preferida” (1997). 
146 Again, Casi ayer noche provides a good example of this structural fragmentation, for neither theme 
nor genre seem to be the guiding principle for the compilation of their contents. As Carlos Funcia 
states, “se trata de una recopilación de artículos y reportajes publicados entre 1967 y 1984 en Triunfo, 
Cuadernos para el Diálogo, EL PAIS [sic], Abc y libros colectivos” (1985: n.p.). It should be noted 
that it also includes a number of prologues, as it is the case with the essays on Benjamin and 
“Sermones the España”, thus, they are not compiled in relation to the original purpose or function of 
the texts. Instead, it seems to obey to the criteria of importance and cohesion as perceived by the 
author, who, as Funcia recalls, describes Casi ayer noche as “toda mi vida anterior” (1985: n.p.). 
García Hortelano further confirms this view, by referring to this book in his prologue to it as “el primer 
capítulo de las memorias de Jesús Aguirre” (1985: 15). 
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later re-edition and compilation of his prologues, newspaper articles, public speeches, even 
books, do not correspond to the time-frame in which they are originally written or 
published. Another aspect in which time is perceived as fragmentary is that, as indicated 
above, his narrative does not necessarily follow a lineal trajectory of time. Finally, 
Aguirre’s multifaceted life has also led to a generic fragmentation, because his writings 
have taken so many forms as expressed above, and also, because this variety has lead to the 
blending of these genres. This is not a casual feature of his work. It is in fact the result of, 
on the one hand, his close intellectual relation to Benjamin, whose work is typically 
fragmentary, and, on the other hand, it is one more exercise of resistance against 
systematisation. It represents the subversion of the traditional patterns of expression – and, 
indeed, also patterns of living– into a comprehensive and deliberately incomplete discourse. 
The result is a – fully intentional – de-systematised and anthropomorphic discourse. 
 
5.4.3 Contradiction as coherence 
The endeavour to produce an anthropomorphic discourse is patent in a number of different 
features, such as his autobiographical style, his fragmentation and reliance on memory, as 
already discussed, but also in his taste for contradiction.  
The influence of Adorno, whom he refers to as “mi maestro Adorno”, can be 
observed in Aguirre’s rejection of systematic thought (1989a: 103). In his prologue to 
Adorno’s Dialéctica negativa, Aguirre explains that dissonances and contradictions must be 
recognized and accepted, even if not immediately understood, because the admission of this 
irrationality stirs reason away from domination (1975a: 7-9). Thus, Aguirre appreciates the 
value of contradiction, in fact, cultivating it in his own work. Influenced by perspectivism, 
he is aware of the multiple aspects of reality and, as a result, at times he may equally defend 
two opposites without the intention of reaching a harmonizing conclusion (see below for 
more details on the relationship between personal and public, and between solitude and 
social participation). This is mirrored in the multiplicity of roles that Aguirre performs 
throughout his life. As Mesa explains, “esta diversidad de facetas no encubría un ápice de 
frivolidad, como más de uno de sus muchos detractores proclamaba. Otra cosa muy distinta 
era que disfrutase con el juego de las ambigüedades” (2002: 300). These ambiguities and 
contradictions are for him an opportunity to explore and acknowledge a wider concept of 
reality, refusing to align himself with the established patterns of rationality and encouraging 
critical thinking.  
 
5.4.4 Getting personal 
Other elements, not strictly biographical, also contribute to enhancing the personal in his 
writings, both as a feature of the text, as well as in the sense of the relationship established 
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with the reader. Aguirre says about Benjamin that “más bien narra procesos de ideas, 
realizando la propuesta de Schelling de una ‘filosofía narrativa’” (1971d: 10). As discussed 
above, because of the influence that Benjamin has on Aguirre’s thought, the analyses which 
Aguirre makes of Benjamin’s work are often applicable to his own texts as well. This is the 
case with the statement above, which is also true of his own style in the sense that both 
Benjamin’s and Aguirre’s writings reflect the way they think, more precisely, their trains of 
thought. As Duque observes, “Aguirre escribía como hablaba” (2002: x). The use of this 
oral style, not only humanizes his discourse, but it also brings it closer to the reader, who 
may get the impression of familiarity and of an atemporal exchange or, even, one situated in 
the present time. The following quotation illustrates this point: “¿no es envoltura el dulce 
engaño que nos contaban cuando fuimos niños? Los Reyes Magos, el Niño Jesús, Ratoncito 
Pérez fueron, a su manera, papeles, lazos que, para acercarla [la ilusión] en seguida, 
distanciaba nuestra avidez de cualquier cumplimiento” (Aguirre, 1989a: 82). Here, Aguirre 
draws on a bank of shared memories with the reader to make a connection with him at the 
same time he makes his point. Aguirre uses the first-person plural to bring the reader into 
this reflection, which, by means of the rhetorical question, almost seems like a conversation 
in which the reader is invited to agree with the writer.  
An intriguing lack of dates can soon be observed – also a feature of Zambrano’s 
work. As Duque suggests, “Jesús Aguirre se limitaría a borrar las fechas de acontecimientos 
tan memorables, insinuando que todo pudo haber sido ‘casi ayer noche’” (2002: xii). These 
characteristics, the result of his subjectivistic approach, mirror the behaviour of human 
memory; they alter the chronological order of events letting the individual’s prioritization 
emerge; they emphasize experiences rather than facts, creating a certain haziness familiar to 
the readers, who regardless of the nature of the information contained in the text may feel 
initially drawn to it because the text is experienced as a reflection of the readers, a reflection 
of what Spain has been through the eyes and experiences of one man, but also a 
reverberation of the personal memories of its readers. Aguirre stirs the memory of what 
was, encouraging a debate of what could be.  
This style also includes a strong element of tension; tension between a personal, 
specific – though hazy – past and an intellectual, abstract content which would be 
problematic to situate in a finished, closed past, which is also expressed in his reluctance to 
provide dates. This tension is intensified by the problematic relationship he develops 
between the private and public spheres; he chooses to share intimate details which the 
reader need not know and which are not particularly relevant to the point being made, for 
example: “en la Casa de Goya, exponía cuadros Cristina Duclos, entre ellos un retrato de mi 
mujer que es de mi propiedad y que Cayetana había prestado sin mi permiso” (Aguirre, 
1992: 77). Another example of this practice can be found in Crónica de una Dirección 
 260 
General, where he explains that “[Pío Cabanillas] recibiría a la de Alba, sin rencor porque 
ésta y sus hijos habían perdido un Baedeker, que les prestó para un viaje memorable por 
países sometidos a los soviéticos” (1988c: 49). Other comments include observations 
regarding Cayetana’s hairdo (1988c: 82-84). He often dwells in minutiae, for example, his 
housekeeper’s choice of furniture for his office or her dislike of his socks (1992: 22). 
Circuitous routes, routes filled up with banalities, need not be pointless; these routes are the 
reflection of an ideological statement. They declare that their point is not to achieve a 
resolution or conclusion, but rather the pursuit itself (see Chambers, 1999: 284). Thus, he 
makes his intimacy partly public. In addition to this, minutiae are discussed in conjunction 
with other issues of more intellectual weight and public interest, with the result of not only 
blurring the boundaries between private and public, but also relativizing both in the light of 
each other, thus questioning the value of what is considered important and on what grounds. 
Similarly, he turns the public sphere into a private one. This is particularly true of his 
Memorias de un cumplimiento, where he recalls his experiences as Director General de 
Música (1988) and as Comisario de la Ciudad de Sevilla para la Exposición Universal de 
Sevilla (1992). Both books discuss the situations he encounters himself in when holding 
these public positions, including his decisions and actions. Given the public nature of the 
position, these can be considered to be of public interest – and he seems to have judged it 
so, since he decided to publish them; however, he chooses to be vague to the point of being 
uninformative. In these memoirs he often mentions friendship, anecdotes, fond memories, 
but also to intrigues, vendettas, and power-struggles. These are generally just alluded to or 
only briefly discussed, as a result – and given the lack of familiarity of the reader with these 
events and these people – the text becomes largely inaccessible, sometimes to the point of 
being incomprehensible to those who did not share these moments and experiences with the 
author. That is how the public becomes private. The rest of his writings – again with the 
exception of his translations – also share a certain private style and sometimes an 
uninformative air. In fact, he openly admits – in reference to Las horas situadas – that “no 
es mi intención convertir este texto en una erudición acumulada” (1989a: 24).  
The private and public spheres are interspersed at the level of Aguirre’s expression, 
but also at the level of reception, where an amount of input from the reader’s own 
experiences is expected to reconstruct the text. This is best illustrated with an example. 
Aguirre, in reference to the overstated expression of friendship, which he ventures is the 
result of the troubled consciousness that Spaniards share since the Civil War, states that  
algo queda hoy de aquello, sobre todo entre políticos, que propinan sin ton ni son espaldarazos, 
abrazos y tuteos, a la postre aspavientos que impregnan a nuestras liturgias democráticas de tintes 
amarillentos o azulados. Por suerte, los comunistas españoles nos han ahorrado, al menos por ahora, 
el triple ósculo del Pacto de Varsovia. Y, entre tanto, la comedida reverencia monárquica ofrece, sin 
prisas ni presiones, su fórmula general para la cortesía de la libertad (1985: 35).  
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Not only should the Spanish reader have the required general knowledge to understand the 
allusions made, as in the case of the Warsaw Pact (1955), but he should also read between 
the lines, to grasp what is meant by heavily charged expressions, such as “liturgias 
democráticas”. Because of the density of the discourse, the reader is expected to have a 
deep understanding of the society he lives in and its mechanisms. If he does not, the 
complex thread of cultural references and associations will make no sense, thus ultimately 
missing Aguirre’s argument or grasping it only partially. An example of these associations 
can be found above in the case of “de tintes amarillentos o azulados”. By making colour 
references, Aguirre enters the terrain of associations; these colours may have different 
meanings to different people depending to the association/s that each individual makes, 
obscuring the meaning of the sentence. Does amarillento, a pale tone of yellow, refer to the 
old, stale state of what is being described? Does it refer to its unhealthy state? Is blue a 
direct reference to fascist camisas azules? Or, is it azulado because of the lack of new 
oxygen, that is, because of the lack of genuine renovation? Or, are these private 
connotations that the reader cannot hope to understand?  
Aguirre often seeks to engage the reader with the text by creating a sense of 
complicity by means of a number of strategies: volunteering some – unimportant – private 
details, the use of familiar tone, using nicknames, and recalling anecdotes of himself and 
others147. However, although he often adopts a very familiar tone, this – at times – 
paradoxically excludes potential readers who lack the circumstantial knowledge, thus, 
effectively becoming a very private discourse. Gullón describes his style as follows:  
lo traslucen el humor intermitente, las alusiones a figuras familiares –que no siempre lo serán para el 
receptor del texto– y un modo de verbalización inclinada a decir de otro modo lo que pudiera decirse 
sin recalar en lo semicríptico (1989: 15-16). 
The frequent allusions to acquaintances, anecdotes, and an array of personal experiences 
which the reader cannot possibly share force the reader to do some guesswork based on an 
informed psychological profile of the author. As mentioned above, Aguirre often uses 
                                                
147 Anecdotes are interspersed throughout Aguirre’s works. The following are just two example of 
these: 
el director del teatro de San Carlos (¡viva Carlos III!), en Nápoles, me recomendó sobremanera su producción de El duque de 
Alba, de Donizetti. Le dije, con gran calma, que era esa la única ópera italiana que yo no podía importar a Madrid. ¿No le gusta 
Donizetti? Claro que sí, pero es que el duque de Alba soy yo. Atravesó, la criatura, varios rangos protocolarios y gritó a don 
Dionisio que el español estaba loco de remate. Rougemont le aseguró mi cordura. Ya no le vi en toda la cena (1988c: 78-79). 
  As mentioned above, these anecdotes – possibly more often than not – involve others, as is the case 
here: 
[A Eduardo Ballester, director general de difusión cultural] le había pasado su gabinete una antología del 27, que dejó preparada 
su antecesor en el cargo. Su reacción fue, por desgracia, típica. Hojeó, sin ojearlo apenas, el original, y, no sabiendo qué otra 
pega ponerle, dijo despectivamente: yo esto no lo publico; la selección es incompleta; los he contado y no están los veintisiete. 
Rafael Pérez Sierra, director general de teatro, comentó al enterarse aquella misma mañana: ¡menos mal que no se trata de una 
antología del 98! (Lector benigno: no te escandalices; a un director general del libro del primer gobierno socialista, yo le he oído 
confundir, sin parpadeos, a Sinclair Lewis, el de Babitt, con el otro Lewis, mucho menos pesado por cierto) (1988c: 86-87; for 
more examples of other anecdotes see 1987a: 48; 1988c: 44; 1989a: 65, 86-87, 92, 116, 151, 57). 
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nicknames, which are not always introduced, let alone explained to the reader, such as 
“pintor de brocha gorda” in reference to Hitler, or the allusion to “el señor que supervisó la 
censura”, whose identity he never specifically reveals, although the reader might be able to 
gather it (see respectively 1985: 79, 101; 1988c: 48)148. In this respect, there is a parallel 
with Heidegger, who can be accessed only by those who have deciphered the references 
made in his particular use of language. So in this respect, he can almost be considered an 
elitist writer, for the content of his work is clearly not accessible to everyone. This is in 
contradiction, however, with his editorial commitment, which presumably aims at the 
divulgence of knowledge. In fact, it would also be in contradiction with one of his preferred 
mediums of expression, the newspaper article, which is directed to the wider public. These 
two aspects can, however, be reconciled when the text is understood as a multilayered 
discourse, as in the case of Zambrano. Aguirre does, indeed, reach for the wider public in 
an effort to provoke, first, their engagement with the text, and, then, their reaction and 
personal evolution. Aguirre explicitly affirms his belief in the powerful effect which books 
may have on the individual: “cualquier libro en el que nos adentremos atentamente, alterará 
nuestra manera de mirar, de andar, de soportar la despedida de la tarde” (1989a: 108). 
This appeal to the wider public, however, does not imply that Aguirre feels the need 
to compromise in terms of language, quality, or content, since – from his point of view – 
tailoring his writings for the public will be a self-defeating exercise. By doing so, the 
subversive element of his writings would disappear, becoming, instead, an instrument for 
the perpetuation of the existing socio-cultural and political situation. For him, the effective 
subversion of instrumental reason must be a holistic exercise in order to be effective. That 
is why, instead of adopting the practice so widely used by the mass media in the hope of 
creating interest, Aguirre challenges the reader and demands a certain effort from him. 
These strategies serve the purpose of driving the reader away from his passive acceptance, 
forcing him to reconstruct the text in order to decode it, hence actively participating in the 
process of creation of meaning from a critical standpoint. In so doing, it is possible to 
observe how Aguirre, like Aranguren and Zambrano, always addresses individual people, 
while avoiding any patterns that would address people as a mass, therefore perpetuating 
such a status. 
All of these factors have contributed to Aguirre’s writings being branded as obscure. 
At the end of Casi ayer noche Aguirre explains that “voluntariamente sigo un proceso de 
pensamiento, y en consecuencia de lenguaje, del cual no está excluido el hermetismo” 
                                                
148 As mentioned above, Aguirre’s written style largely reproduces the way he speaks. An instance of 
this can be found in his predilection for the use of nicknames, which – as Javier Pradera indicates – he 
also frequently uses in his oral style: “Jesús Aguirre, siempre [es] aficionado a utilizar motes para 
referirse a los ausentes” (2004: 291).  
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(1985: 239). Although there is no evidence to suggest that Aguirre is ever aware of 
Jameson, they share a similar position on this issue. Jameson poses the question: 
what if […] they [the ideals of clarity and simplicity] are intended to speed the reader across a 
sentence in such a way that he can salute a readymade idea effortlessly in passing, without suspecting 
that real thought demands a descent into the materiality of language and a consent to time itself in the 
form of the sentence? (1974: xiii).  
Jameson suggests that the current demands for simplicity and clarity are the result of an 
ideological standpoint which fosters absorption and repetition while it hinders independent 
thought. Aguirre, well aware of this mechanism, is critical of its practice and refuses to 
partake in it. This position can be explicitly observed in Aguirre’s criticism of writers who, 
as in the case of Marshall McLuhan, turn their reader into spectators (1988c: 13). In 
contrast with this practice, what Aguirre is suggesting is that readers should engage with the 
text, rather than read passively. Consequently, he opts for a more labyrinthine and 
unfinished form of expression which is aimed to express and encourage critical thinking. 
 
5.4.5 Erratic purposefulness  
Aguirre’s work can be qualified as disconcerting or as disorienting at the very least. This 
disorientation is produced by the lack of indicators of time as well as by the unexpected 
personal nature of his writings. Moreover, his style also shares and increases this feeling of 
disorientation. Despite the obviously knowledgeable character of the author, his language 
seems to project an impression of randomness. In fact, he suggests that obscurity and 
contradiction should be visibly present in writing. By exercising such traits, presumptions 
of absolute truth disappear, thus mirroring more accurately the human nature of the writer: 
también es transacción la palabra escrita. [...] Porque en ella conviven la verdad y los espejos, esto es 
que desde ella es inviable cualquier destello que no haya sido encandilado por la previa tiniebla. 
Suele escribirse con la mano derecha; entre tanto, ¿qué humor mantiene a la izquierda? La naturaleza 
no coincide con el hombre sino para acunarle antes o después de presentar batalla (Aguirre, 1989a: 
41). 
This is particularly so in relation to a number of unexpected associations evoked by Aguirre 
in terms of the topics chosen for discussion, but also in relation to his use of language, 
which is abundant with unlikely matches (see above for the role of minutiae). This is very 
revealing, because as Skinner explains, “we should study not the meaning of words, but 
their use” (1988b: 55). In order to throw some light onto the connotations and implications 
of Aguirre’s use of language, we shall now focus on his idiosyncratic use of language.  
One of the features of Aguirre’s style is to use religious references to qualify political 
categories, such as “catecismos marxistas” or “liturgias democráticas” (1985: 47, 35 
respectively). By so doing, Aguirre links political concepts, which in the minds of most 
Spaniards of that time are filled with great expectations as well as with prejudices, with 
complex religious memories which have far more concrete implications for this population, 
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providing them with a more attainable reality, hence achieving a more effective, efficient 
and complex level of communication than if longer sentences with more conventionally 
matched adjectives had been used instead. Catecismos evokes a long formulaic, dogmatic 
style, largely unrelated to the problem at hand, and liturgias emphasizes both the quasi-
sacred nature of democracy, as well as its ritualistic format, a format that involves a 
communion, a communion of the people who participate in the process of government and 
become equal by doing so. In contrast, we can discern his wager for ironic freedom; the 
importance that he awards to irony is patent in this statement: “la prueba de la ironía sobre 
cualquier fenómeno de envergadura histórica equivale, sobre todo si se ejerce desde dentro, 
a un certificado de vitalidad” (1987a: 39; see also Aguirre, 1989a: 78; see also 5.3.3). The 
often erratic and obscure style that Aguirre develops is, therefore, the realization of a 
purposeful goal.  
Another feature of Aguirre’s style is that it often appears casual, largely improvised; 
a perception which he encourages, as he admits at the end of Crónica de una Dirección 
General, “he escrito este libro de un tirón, sin fallos de memoria, en justo quince días, 
algunos asfixiantes, y otros tibios” (1988c: 91). The reader will find that this statement is 
quickly confirmed upon reading the book in question. A short passage is reproduced here to 
illustrate this:  
Entretanto [mientras que Aguirre y otros esperaban a Fernando Arias Salgado] yo animaba, en voz 
baja, a García Margallo, director general de la juventud, para que nos regalase con no sé qué líos 
horrorosos del barrio de la Uva. Margallo era especialista en interrumpir al ministro, cuando éste 
dejaba de hablar en puntos suspensivos y se disponía a impartir directrices inteligibles. Luego fue 
“joven turco”, facción de UCD, apelativo que le sentaba casi tan bien como a Vicki, esposa de 
Joaquín Rodrigo; Vicki, en una clínica de urgencia, tras un leñazo de automóvil. La cabeza vendada y 
sin papeles de identidad encima, confundió al galeno de guardia, que inquiría quién era y respondía 
ella: soy turca. Y lo es. El médico pensaba que el tortazo le había hecho perder la cabeza; pues no 
señor (1988c: 39). 
This paragraph exhibits a convoluted discourse which is not only erratic, but also 
particularly difficult to follow on account of the unusual metaphors used, such as “barrio de 
la Uva” meaning wine-related, the mention of numerous people who the reader is unlikely 
to be familiar with, and the mixture of formal and informal registers. 
By means of these devices – his hermetism, his erratic discourse, and the tension 
between the personal and the public spheres –, Aguirre is pushing forward the established 
linguistic paradigm, opening up our linguistic possibilities and as a result also opening up 
our conceptualization of reality. His erratic and imaginative language which shares some of 
the frequent features of oral expression is by no means random. On the contrary, it could be 
argued that this errancy seems deliberate, and it is. With this language, Aguirre – in a 
similar way to what Zambrano achieves with her poetic reason – suggests the 
interconnection of otherwise distinctly separate realms of reality, inviting the reader to 
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establish supradisciplinary connections, altering the traditional perceptions of boundaries 
and of hierarchy: “the supposedly secondary comes to occupy the foreground of attention, 
and the hierarchizing distinction between the relevant and the pointless, on which story 
depends, begins to lose its own cogency” (Chambers, 1999: 117). Thus, the erratic 
discourse favours an egalitarian understanding of any given reality, for all aspects of it are 
deemed appropriate for inclusion, having abandoned the traditional patterns that establish 
relevance (see Grohmann, 2005: 141-42). What is more, digressive writing destabilizes pre-
existing structures. Thus, an alternative to instrumental reason is offered and exercised with 
the adoption of the erratic discourse, for it represents, responds to, and encourages 
experiential rationality, while simultaneously undermining the premises and structures of 
instrumental reason. 
Despite the purposefulness of his erratic writing, his frequent disregard for the reader 
or, alternatively, the excessive familiarity with him – which equally leads to a clueless 
reader149 – suggests that his motivations for writing maybe multiple and overlap. There is an 
overt socio-political agenda as discussed above. However, his style also suggests that his 
writing may have been an exercise of confession – this need for confession can be seen as 
an almost side-effect of his previous priesthood –, and, as such, an exercise of redemption 
or catharsis for his trapicheos políticos, in the sense that public disclosure may provide a 
sense of purification or relief. As Aguirre indicates, “la intimidad se cultiva en el género 
literario correspondiente: los diarios, muy teñidos de confesión religiosa” (1985: 173). 
Another factor which may have compelled him to write down some of his autobiographical 
experiences is his status as Duque de Alba, because as such he might have felt the 
obligation to record his life – and to research the previous holders of this title – for the sake 
of historical interest150. He seems to make an allusion to this in his speech of entry into the 
Real Académia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, later compiled in Altas oportunidades:  
                                                
149 This can be observed in his essay entitled “Decía Don Pedro”, in which he discusses the life of the, 
at the time, recently deceased Don Pedro as if he were a mutual acquaintance of his and the reader’s 
(1989a: 65-68). Although various anecdotes and reflections on Don Pedro’s life are made, his surname 
is never disclosed, so the reader is none the wiser. Similarly, in Crónica de una Dirección General, he 
initially refers to Pío Cabanillas, Minister of Culture, as simply Pío, and it is not until the next page that 
he reveals his surname (1988a: 15-16). 
150 This urge to record his life is further confirmed by Aguirre’s claim that he is writing his diary, 
which is supposed to be a very candid account of his own life which includes details of those 
surrounding him: 
U: -¿Qué escribes? 
A: -Mi Diario. 
[…] 
U 
A: -[…] Recreo las gentes que pasan por esta casa, qué, como te he dicho, ya sólo son amigos. La cosa no es publicable hasta 
dentro de años. Hay mucha gente viva implicada (1984b: 12). 
The existence of this diary is also alluded to by García Hortelano and Jorge Herralde (1985: 15; 2006: 
14-15 respectively). Its contents, however, remain unpublished to this day: “me dijo [Jesús Aguirre], 
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no es añoranza, sino el pulso que debo tomarle responsablemente a mi presente, lo que me exhorta a 
reparar, sin aspereza alguna en las yemas de la memoria, las cuantas del “collar” académico que, en 
repetidas oportunidades, ha ennoblecido el pecho de los Duques de Alba (1987a: 19).  
Incidentally, it should be noted that this diversity of motivations for his writings provides 
another explanation for the tension between the personal and private with the abstract and 
public discussed above.  
 
5.5 The dynamics of the written word 
In Aguirre’s varied and multifaceted existence there is one role, that of the transmitter, 
which he plays time and again under different guises; the priest, the editor, the translator, 
the writer, and the cultural ambassador. This endeavour is underlined by the thought that a 
process of enlightenment or awareness will result in the empowerment of those who 
become committed to genuine communication, which will in turn have an objective social 
impact. It can be said that he has made communication the endeavour of his life, from a 
very active perspective, a perspective which has always, to some degree, been influenced by 
his rapprochement to the FS, to such an extent that this influence, as Aguirre himself 
acknowledges, can be felt in the later part of his career when he opts to distance himself 
from some of his earlier positions, as we shall see below (1985: 237). 
5.5.1 Translation 
In order to understand Aguirre’s thought, the role of his written word, even if scarce when 
compared to Aranguren’s or Zambrano’s, must be addressed151. The overarching 
assumption underpinning Aguirre’s work is that texts may contain a powerful element of 
self-liberation. This possibility is determined by the nature of the text, but also by the 
involvement of the reader – as agent – with the text. Bearing this in mind, the implications 
of the process of translation will now be addressed. 
Looking back at Aguirre’s overall intellectual and cultural behaviour, the coherent − 
although erratic − development of an initial yearning can be observed152. A creative and, 
                                                                                                                                       
entre otras cosas, que desde hacía muchos años llevaba un diario, redactado, al parecer, con 
espectacular sinceridad. En alguna ocasión intenté publicarlo, naturalmente expurgado, casi sin 
esperanzas y desde luego sin éxito” (Herralde, 2006: 14). 
151 When used in reference to Aguirre, the expression “written word” will include the totality of his 
written production, including prologues, translations, articles, conferences, and essays. Aguirre himself 
uses a similar expression in this sense as can be observed from the following quotation, where he says 
that before this publication, Crónica de una Dirección General, “durante más de diez años me había 
ocupado de la letra impresa” (1988a: 13). 
152 Although the enumeration of Aguirre’s different professional roles may give the appearance of 
linearity, this is not the case. His role as a translator illustrates his progression, for the evolution of his 
thought can be perceived in the choice of the titles he translates; at the same time, his activities as 
translator co-exist with his roles as a priest, editor, writer, and, even, duke, for his involvement in 
translation expands from 1959 until 1980. Aguirre’s trajectory, far from linear, is best described as 
 267 
above all, a communicative streak have always been present in Aguirre’s public persona. 
These two elements are first expressed in the form of sermons; however, it is not 
unreasonable to surmise that the socio-political atmosphere of that time, along with his own 
dissent must have made it difficult for Aguirre to find his own voice. In this context, 
translation provides a safer outlet for expression, which might come under the heading of 
what Gracia refers to as “resistencia silenciosa” (see Gracia, 2004).  
Aguirre becomes first published as a translator with Taurus in 1959 with Söhngen’s 
El cristianismo de Goethe. His second translation, also a book by Söhngen, is El camino de 
la teología occidental (1961) and constitutes one of Aguirre's few translations for a 
publishing house other than Taurus, in this case, Castilla. From this point onwards, as 
religious editor, Aguirre continues to translate and revise publications until 1969, when he 
becomes editor-in-chief and, as a result, he translates only occasionally, presumably only 
works which he feels particularly close to, as is the case with Benjamin’s. 
It is crucial to emphasize that the exercise of translation is more than the mere 
transportation of meaning from one language to another; it is also a form of expression for 
the translator, even if only indirectly. This is even more so in an oppressive regime, where 
alternative – safer – forms of self-expression must be found153. This conclusion has 
important consequences for the methodology of this research, which once again, follows 
Skinner’s footsteps. Skinner succinctly says: “the essence of my method consists in trying 
to place such texts within such contexts as enable us in turn to identify what their authors 
were doing in writing them” (1996: 7). Following his methodology, therefore, not only 
allows analysing an author’s translations in terms of what they “were doing in writing 
them”, but it also suggests that ignoring the role that these translations perform in an 
author’s œuvre would constitute a gross oversight in any attempt for a comprehensive 
analysis. 
Bearing this in mind, Aguirre’s choice of authors and texts reveals his preferences, as 
well as his assessment of the situation and needs of the country. There is a certain 
paternalism guiding Aguirre’s translation, as according to his own testimony, he translates 
to a large extent for pedagogical motives (see Aguirre, 1968: 13; see also 1985: 47; 1971d: 
14). The significance of his role as a translator rests, therefore, on the socio-political impact 
of his translations, but also on their informative value in relation to Aguirre’s character. 
                                                                                                                                       
spiral – as in the cases of Aranguren and Zambrano –, because although he moves on from his past, this 
past is not left behind, but integrated in some form into each new present.  
153 It should be noted that, as Gracia indicates, “el incorformismo se ha diversificado y la única manera 
de oponerse al franquismo no es ya la militancia política o la pedagogía social porque puede serlo 
también la edición literaria, la poesía, la traducción, las artes plásticas o la crítica literaria” (2004: 370). 
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Contrary to popular belief, which often defines translation in terms of transfer or 
transposition, translation requires a degree of involvement on the part of the translator that 
results in a necessary interpretation of the text to be translated (see Benjamin, 2001: 17). 
Aguirre is aware of this interpretation and mediation, which leads him to affirm that 
translation is in itself a prologue:  
¿los traductores son también prologuistas? Desde luego sí que son, cuando no merecen acabar en 
sujetos de juzgado de guardia, lo que los rapsodas, según el Platón que prefería Heidegger, respecto 
de los poetas: llevan a conocimiento las palabras de los autores que traducen. Resultan, pues, si atinan 
en su libro, discretísimos prologuistas no antes, sino dentro del texto (Aguirre, 1989a: 109).  
The culmination of the processes of reading and writing materializes in his role as a 
translator, for the first action required to translate a text is to read it, while necessarily 
interpreting the given content, which is then rendered into the target language (for the 
hermeneutic aspect of translation see Simon, 1996: 44). The translated text is no longer 
identical to the original (see Simon, 1996: 154; see also Flotow, 1997: 39); the difference 
stems not only from the language it is expressed in, but more importantly from the fact that 
the resulting text is an interpretation of its original, hence it is no longer, not even as text 
itself, the fruit of its author, but the fruit of the author tainted with the fruit of the translator. 
Aguirre is aware of the deception that translations may imply; temporal, but also of 
authorship, and the pretensions of its content, which is often viewed as the original 
disregarding the mediation process (Aguirre, 1985: 47; see also 1989a: 23). As with other 
types of writings, Aguirre advocates transparency, for the packaging of a unitarian finished 
product – be this a translation, a review, an essay or any other text – is no more than an 
illusion obscuring the complexity, fragmentation, and multiplicity which conform any text 
and reality itself. Aguirre becomes increasingly concerned with the visibility of the 
translator – making frequent references to and comments about the process of translations 
and its results – possibly as one more step to unmasking the deliberate objective appearance 
portrayed in the discourse of instrumental rationality (see Aguirre, 1969c: 23-24; see also 
1985: 22-23, 87, 97; 1988c: 14, 119; 1989a: 23; Venuti, 1998: 31; Gentzler, 2001: 37-38). 
This visibility is enhanced by the inclusion of prologues, which become more extensive in 
his later work (on the role and relevance of prologues see Aguirre, 1989a: 107-09). 
The process of translation requires an intense level of engagement of the translator 
with the text, often resulting in the transformation of the translator as a result of the 
influence of and interaction with such text. It has been argued that during this process of 
translation, a journey through one’s own mind takes place, for the translator’s views are 
challenged and stretched to meet with those of the source text (see Caballero Rodríguez, 
2002). A series of psychoanalytical processes takes place: a process of idealization, 
transference, analysis, and, finally, verbalisation (see Caballero Rodríguez, 2002). 
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Psychoanalytical processes are, in fact, an integral part of the process of translation, just as 
translation is inherent in the process of psychoanalysis (see Derrida, 1979: 3-12; see also 
Berman, 2001: 286-87; for the relationship between translation, puns, pain, and psychology 
see Levine, 1991: 13-14, 17-18, 20). These processes may have a cathartic effect in the 
author. In fact, in the case of Aguirre, it is possible to see how, influenced through the 
exercise of translation, he finally rebels against his source texts which are of religious and 
political nature, and although incorporating these influences, moves away from these 
sources to explore his own creativity. 
All in all, translation itself is an activity which is in harmony with the principles of 
CT: “one needs to return to the present and try to create new relations, derived from the old, 
which reveal the logic of the other” (Gentzler, 2001: 20). Translation, in this sense, can be 
described as the crystallization of overcoming perceived duality: theory and practice, 
translator and author, writer and reader, the solitary and the social, the self and the other, 
source language and target language, source text and target text, old and new. Therefore, 
engagement with the process of translation, insofar as it means integration, can be exercised 
as an element of experiential rationality. 
 
5.5.2 The writer and reader – a successful partnership 
“Si está loco de atar quien declare haber 
amado durante una hora, nadie que escriba 
asiduamente podrá sacudirse los síntomas 
de una especial demencia. El entusiasmo 
verdadero nos posee; jamás lo poseemos” 
(Aguirre, 1989a: 41). 
 
The aim of this section is to explore Aguirre’s views on writing and reading, arguing that 
they are two ends of the same process of communication.  
Aguirre’s modest and later contribution as a writer is often overshadowed by his role 
as translator and editor (see above). Nonetheless, after his period as editor (1969-1977), 
Aguirre becomes a writer in his own right. As discussed above, elusiveness and obscurity 
are key features of his writings. Self-awareness is another defining aspect of his writings, 
which is expressed in the semi-autobiographical character of his work as well as in the 
elements of meta-analysis it incorporates. 
This self-awareness is of particular significance in that it highlights the element of 
intentionality (see Skinner, 1988c: 77; see also 1.4). In fact, he affirms that “sólo soy capaz 
de escribir sobre aquello que amo” (1985: 168). This statement confirms the intellectual 
affinity that is discussed in relation to Benjamin, which, in fact, extends − in varying 
degrees − to all the authors and themes he portrays and discusses.  
Self-awareness, however, is not solely directed to the act of writing, but because it 
involves intentionality, the intended effect of the written product must also be considered. 
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In this context, Aguirre draws attention to the contradictory position of the book in 
consumerist society (1985: 105). On the one hand, books are products, commodities, like 
any other; they have an exchange value, they are bought and sold, and abide by the general 
laws of the market. On the other hand, some books are subversive in nature. Their contents 
may be subversive. An even more effective subversive and destabilizing strategy consist of 
demanding readers’s engagement to the point when the reader becomes a subversive agent 
of his own. This is Aguirre’s strategy. He is not so concerned with what could be called the 
element of reception – which may carry misleading passive implications – as with the act of 
reading itself. The reader plays a decisively active role by, first, interpreting the text and 
conferring meaning to it and, second, by the process of self-actualization that he undertakes 
when actively involved with the process of the creation of meaning in reference to a text 
(see Aguirre, 1985: 24). 
Aguirre analyses the nature and consequences of the reading process. In Casi ayer 
noche, he reflects on the loneliness that comes as a consequence not of the act of writing, as 
is the case with Zambrano, but of reading. Aguirre explains how “estas lecturas [novelas 
francesas e inglesas] sí que distanciaban de la casa, de sus ruidos y olores, de la familia y 
hasta de buena parte de los amigos” (1985: 19). In his view, the reader becomes isolated 
from his surroundings precisely because of being a reader – and as a result of his choice of 
text; the reader may become engrossed in the story, being transported to the world that is 
depicted and consequently being separated from the world where he is physically located. 
More importantly, because reading is a process in which the reader must become 
unavoidably involved to different degrees, the reader undergoes a process of transformation 
as a result of his contact with the text which is proportionate to the degree of his 
involvement. It is this change that comes as a result of whichever knowledge or experience 
is acquired through a particular reading that also separates the reader from the world that 
surrounds him insofar as this reading experience is not shared by the surrounding 
individuals. In addition, reading is, in many cases, an activity which has to be carried out 
alone. Alone, not only in the sense of reading individually, or not sharing the experience, 
but also, depending on what is being read, reading in hiding, reading in the occultation that 
solitude provides.  
This multiple isolation of the reader is not expressed negatively by Aguirre. Well 
aware of this mechanism, he uses it to consciously distance himself from the outside world. 
During his early years, he reads, at least partly, as a rebellious act; an act which allows him 
to break with the patterns established by his family, as can be observed from the 
information he volunteers on reading Goethe: “mi encuentro con Goethe pasó, pues, por las 
estaciones, sin parada ni fonda, de una modesta heterodoxia. Aquellos libros eran de un 
‘descarriado’ entre los otros miembros de la familia que habían seguido senderos trillados” 
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(1985: 20). This heterodoxy plays a very similar function in Aguirre to that which he 
describes in the man who marries a foreigner, expressing with this act his defiance (see 
Aguirre, 1995: 37). By the stealthy subversion of reading, he feels connected to the one 
man who breaks patterns dictated by habit and family expectation, at the same time as he is 
influenced by the contents of what he reads, opening his horizons and preparing him to also 
break the patterns of his family. In Aguirre’s case, the rebellious union is not carnal, but 
intellectual. A union which, like in the case of the young man, takes him away from the 
path set out for him. 
Aguirre suggests that it is possible to explore different egos through the act of 
reading. He points out that “hay lecturas que nos permiten vivir por poder, el del autor, 
otros personajes, implicarnos por procuración en acciones ajenas a nuestras propias 
capacidades” (1985: 24). Hence Aguirre, although probably unaware, explores the practical 
side of the horizon of possibility opened up by literature as proposed by Zambrano. Unlike 
Zambrano, however, Aguirre once again focuses on how this may affect the reader rather 
than the writer. This is even more so in the act of re-reading:  
la lectura de novelas me empuja siempre a la soledad, no así en cambio volver a leerlas, releerlas. 
Experiencia ésta quizá puramente personal a la que pudiera aplicarse alguna justificación teórica no 
descabellada, pero sí quebradiza por sutil. El punto de diferencia entre la lectura y una relectura sería 
en principio el siguiente: entrar en un mundo nuevo, irlo descubriendo requiere un aligeramiento del 
propio equipaje (Aguirre, 1985: 95).  
As can be observed from these statements, Aguirre resists developing a unilineal argument. 
Instead, he often highlights the complexity and richness contained in any given issue. In 
this case, he contrasts the experience of the reading of novels with their re-reading. He 
insists on the personal nature of these reflections and, in an almost dialectic fashion, he 
links reading to solitude, and re-reading to its opposite, without revealing what that is: 
company? A sense of belonging? Of complicity? Aguirre suggests that re-reading is a social 
act in as much as it requires entering the story temporarily leaving behind one’s own 
identity; that is, to become the other. As he explains, “releer no es sólo volver a ocuparse, 
por azar o por moda, de un libro, sino leer en él” (1985: 59). He concludes this brief 
reflection by linking both experiences to the concept of adventure and exploration, 
reminding the reader that embarking on such adventure requires leaving some one’s own 
baggage behind; thus, effectively linking the process of reading and re-reading to personal 
development. As Derek Attridge argues, “creatively responding to the other [...] involves 
the shifting of ingrained modes of understanding in order to take account of that which was 
systematically excluded by them” (2004: 123). Hence, after developing the solitary aspect 
brought about by reading, he is compelled to explore the different possibilities opened up 
by a re-reading.  
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This leaving behind one’s own identity has important socio-political consequences, 
for, as Adorno points out, “identidad es la forma originaria de ideología. Su sabor consiste 
en su adecuación a la realidad que oprime. [...] Ciertamente, suponer la identidad es, incluso 
en la lógica formal, lo que hay de ideológico en el puro pensamiento” (1986: 151-53). 
Hence, freeing oneself from one’s own identity, possibly by adopting that of another, is a 
step towards understanding other socio-political perspectives (see Attridege, 2004: 123-26). 
Thus, it may open the door to the development of a political standpoint which may consider 
not only the interests of the self, but his own interests as part of a group. As Attridge puts it, 
“the other – whether the other I struggle to create or the other I encounter in the shape of a 
person or a work – arouses in me a sense of responsibility” (2004: 123). Two pages later, 
Attridge elaborates on the relationship between responsiveness to the other – which is even 
more present in the act of re-reading – and responsibility: “responsiveness to the other must 
involve something like responsibility because the other cannot come into existence unless it 
is affirmed, welcome, trusted, nurtured” (2004: 125). Thus, is precisely this empathetic 
exercise which enables the individual to develop a true political proposal which reflects his 
awareness of being-in-the-world. 
 
5.6 The Transition 
Díaz explains how “viewed with hindsight, the close links between opposition culture under 
Franco and the progressive culture of the democratic transition are evident” (1995: 283). 
This is particularly so in the case of Aguirre. Aguirre is of interest to this research, not only 
because of his ties with the FS, but also because of the extent of his impact on the process 
of Transition. He largely succeeds in blurring the boundaries between the personal and the 
political, continuously moving back and forth between the theoretical and the practical, so 
much so, that his personal and intellectual evolution can be considered as an accurate 
reflection of the changes that Spain underwent during his lifespan. We will now focus on 
Aguirre’s positions and role within the process of the Transition, which will be analysed in 
the context of the rest of his thought as discussed above. 
 
5.6.1 Cultural Activist 
As Gutiérrez Girardot explains, “el padre Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate reanudó la 
apertura a la cultura europea moderna” (2004: 282; see also 283). He has been described by 
José Villa Rodríguez as an “activista cultural” (2002: 286). This can be said of him on 
several levels. He takes upon himself the task of disseminating culture, which is expressed 
in his work as translator, editor, and later writer. But he goes beyond the limitations of 
paper, and becomes an intellectual and influential public figure with a cultural mission. As 
Lago Carballo remembers, 
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el palacete de la plaza del Marqués de Salamanca, […] cobró con Jesús Aguirre nueva y más brillante 
vida como escenario de reuniones intelectuales y acontecimientos sociales. Igual sucedió cuando años 
más tarde se trasladaron las instalaciones de Taurus a un amplio piso de la calle Velázquez 76 (2004: 
28).  
As this quotation reveals, there is an important awareness of his belonging to a place in 
time, a place and time with which he engages with on a multitude of levels. As Herralde 
explains, Aguirre − along with other editors such as Javier Pradera, Pedro Altares, Faustino 
Lastra, Nacho Quintana, and Javier Abásolo − becomes un poder fáctico, a powerful agent 
in the cultural opposition against Francoism and in the socio-cultural scene thereafter 
(2006: 12). He sees himself as part of a group of intellectuals who have the opportunity and 
the duty of promoting deep changes in the Spanish panorama. These are far-reaching 
changes which range from the moral, religious, and social, to the political realms. This can, 
in fact, be observed in the equally wide range of contacts that he cultivates, which go from a 
powerful and diverse network which includes intellectuals, religious representatives, and 
political figures, to a more direct interaction with the wider public, la España de a pie, 
through a series of newspaper articles in El País (see Gullón, 1989: 13). 
In practical terms, this means also that he plays a very active role in the political 
process of the Transition. This role includes supporting key figures. An example of this is 
best expressed in Aguirre’s own words: “Felipe González proclamó por primera vez, ante 
un público literalmente apiñado en mi despacho de Taurus, que era secretario general de su 
partido” (1985: 46; see also Lago Carballo, 2004: 29; Herralde, 2006: 12-13). Gullón, in his 
prologue to Las horas situadas recreates the atmosphere in which this event took place:  
un político joven, todavía con motas de clandestinidad, accedió a presentar el libro de Fermín Solana 
sobre Besteiro y el socialismo. La preparación del acto había sido meticulosa, y el ambiente, 
favorecido por la naturaleza: aquella última luz de la Sierra filtrada por nubes ligeras que corrían de 
Este a Oeste, como impulsando la ceremonia cercana. Jesús se acercaba al mirador, escrutaba la caída 
de la tarde y traslucía su impaciencia en la sucesión del cigarrillo. Una hora más y el éxito se 
resolvería en canapés y cócteles. Llenaban los invitados las habitaciones cuando llegó el esperado, 
Felipe González, nervioso acaso, confortado por la seguridad de su huésped. El futuro presidente se 
convirtió en el representante y la representación y las expectativas se cumplieron (1989: 12).  
Aguirre contributes greatly to establishing channels of communication between 
intellectuals, politicians, and even the Monarchy, as Gullón explains;  
el espíritu de mediación y la confianza en las reacciones del Príncipe, con quien se mantenía en 
excelentes términos, le permitió a Jesús llevar a La Zarzuela a intelectuales de izquierda como José 
Luis Aranguren y José María Castellet. Serviría el diálogo de puente para el acercamiento, diluyendo 
en el espíritu de concordia la amenaza de una repetición de los conflictos entre la Corona y los 
intelectuales de los años de dictadura y de la dictablanda (1989: 12-13). 
This exceptional position also gave him the opportunity to make his own political project 
heard and known, an intention which he openly voices (see Gullón, 1989: 12). In this 
respect, the words that he uses regarding Benjamin may well apply to himself: “¿trató 
entonces de hacer méritos políticos? Quizá, pero en tal caso ante un único tribunal, el suyo 
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propio” (Aguirre, 1975b: 10). His project, in consonance with Aguirre’s style, is not 
elaborated explicitly in any of his writings. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe how he 
played an important role in the peaceful Transition, bringing closer together the then Prince 
Juan Carlos – nominated Franco’s heir and future king, in 1969 (Balfour, 2000: 288) –, the 
politicians of the opposition, and intellectuals:  
al día siguiente, o al otro, sentados en su despacho [...] habló Aguirre de su proyecto político, de su 
modo de participar en la conciliación que llegaba, que inexorablemente llegaría. [...] la conciliación 
pasaba por el acercamiento del Príncipe a intelectuales y políticos de la oposición (see Gullón, 1989: 
12). 
The king to be, the opposition politicians, and intellectuals seem to be, for Aguirre, the 
three key forces whose co-operation is required for the advent of a peaceful Transition. The 
figure of the king is viewed as indispensable in this process since he appears to be the one 
candidate whose embodiment of power can be widely accepted as legitimate and 
conciliatory by most Spaniards.  
Politicians are, of course, another indispensable element in any aspiring democracy 
(see Aguirre, 1985: 61, 153 on the role of intellectuals and politicians). Aguirre, however, is 
sceptical about a democracy led by politicians: 
escasean los políticos capaces de continuar la historia de los pueblos; abundan, eso sí, los que por 
ignorarla la deforman, y son manada quienes se apresuran a cambiarla para que no se sepa qué papel 
desempeñaron precisamente ayer. ¡Infeliz sociedad aquella en la que los actores políticos sean 
protagonistas! (1985: 43).  
That is why the democratic solution appears to him as doubtful: “no es honesta una 
democracia reducida a las formas, pero que la democracia funcione sólo materialmente 
implica una deshonestidad suicida” (Aguirre, 1985: 31). He is not only concerned with what 
has been termed by Benjamin Barber as “thin democracy”154. He also questions the reach 
and validity of a system which might surpass the limitations associated with representative 
democracy, because, to him, democracy is only possible where true choice exists. Aguirre, 
like Aranguren, and, in line with the FS, criticizes the extent to which a democracy – as 
exercised in modern democratic nations – can be considered genuine democracy. At the 
same time, he questions the desirability of the latter based on false consciousness or, at the 
very least, the limited scope of the horizon of possibility of the voters (see 3.2.2.4). Only 
freedom and information can make choice possible.  
The availability of these two elements, freedom and information, however, largely 
depends on the organization of the government. Despite his doubts, Aguirre remains 
hopeful: 
                                                
154 Barber describes thin democracy as a democracy “whose democratic values are prudential and thus 
provisional, optional, and conditional – means to exclusively individualistic ends. [...] From this 
precarious foundation, no firm theory of citizenship, participation, public goods, or civic virtue can be 
expected to rise” (1984: 4). 
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esperemos que, a la larga, aunque aparentemente contra toda esperanza, los españoles, tanto los que 
mandan como los que se figuran que no obedecen, consigan distinguir entre la igualdad democrática 
y el igualitarismo que aburre y agosta así la historia como la cultura, enfocadas desde una perspectiva 
totalitaria (1985: 37).  
By referring to those who imagine themselves as not following orders, Aguirre is making a 
reference to the existence of false consciousness, while, at the same time, expressing his 
hope for people to overcome it. The implication is that only a process of spiral evolution 
can lead to a truly democratic system; by emphasizing the importance of exercising a 
political engagement, it suggests that personal change in a sufficient number of individuals 
should propel a change in the government in the same direction. The change in the 
individuals, however, cannot be complete because their vision and options are restricted by 
that government. The change in the government, in turn, may open up the vision and 
possibilities of the individuals again, so that in time, another change in the government will 
be demanded, leading to a spiral process which would ideally be repeated until the 
liberation of the individual and true democracy have been reached. 
Given the insufficiency of monarchic, institutional, and political measures, the role of 
intellectuals in democracy is to provide a critical perspective, and to promote the critical 
change described above. In order for intellectuals to be able to perform these roles, Aguirre 
is keen to establish a distinct division between the political and cultural spheres. He affirms 
that “la política implica una gestión afirmativa, mientras que la cultura es una instancia 
crítica” (1985: 61). Unlike Aranguren, Aguirre does not insist on the separation of these 
roles into different people. He is content with a clear separation of tasks, which he initially 
does not perceive to be conflicting. What is more, the fact that Aguirre himself has 
performed both tasks simultaneously at numerous points throughout his life suggests that he 
sees both positions as complementary to each other. In conclusion, for Aguirre, there is no 
change without a critical exercise, but with criticism alone there is no progress; a positive 
political act is required. A well-developed balance between the two in all individuals would 
make the journey towards genuine democracy possible and desirable, and art holds the key 
to striking that balance. 
 
5.7 The interrelation between the realm of politics and art  
5.7.1 Aguirre the Duke 
A more mature and down-to-earth Aguirre, one that now believes more in action than in 
utopia, is offered the post of Director General de Música (1977). At the insistence of Pío 
Cabanillas Gallas – the then Minister of Culture – and the Duquesa de Alba, he accepts the 
position which he would use as an opportunity to revive and promote the Spanish Art scene 
(see Lago Carballo, 2004: 30; see also Aguirre, 1988c: 13). By doing so, he resigns as 
editor-in-chief of Taurus in the autumn of 1977, thus closing an important chapter in his 
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life. It should be noted that although he does not go back to Taurus, he maintains links with 
it, publishing Altas oportunidades in 1987 (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 30).  
It is after this period in the Ministerio de Cultura when, having renounced his priestly 
vows, he joins Cayetana Fitz-James Stuart, Duquesa de Alba, in matrimony thus becoming 
Duque de Alba on 16 January 1978 (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 30). At this point, Aguirre 
carries out the role of modern-day patron of the arts “por sentirse en cierto modo 
continuador de esa tradición de mecenazgo cultural de una estirpe nobiliaria”, as Reyes 
highlights (2002: 289). Being aware of the long-established tradition of art-patronage 
established by the house of Alba, Aguirre decides to continue with that role. This legacy 
can be observed in numerous instances throughout Spanish history. Álvaro Pablo Ortiz 
Rodríguez makes reference to the duke of Alba when discussing a number of proposals and 
changes in Spanish economy and culture that take place under the rule of Carlos III, 
between the years 1750-1816 and which he describes as part of a trend of Enlightenment, 
given their modernizing spirit (2003: 7, 11). Later, in 1824, the then duke of Alba, Carlos 
Miguel, forms a society of patronage with the purpose of opening a number of exhibitions, 
having opened a public gallery and imported several crates with works of art. Although this 
enterprise soon proves to be unsuccessful, it is evidence of his interest in the arts (see 
Vázquez, 2001: 50). The association of the duke of Alba with patronage and the arts in 
general is such that even in Goethe’s play, Egmont, the character of the Duke of Alba is 
used to represent culture (see Pugh, 2002: 74). In the twentieth century, the duke of Alba is 
credited with having supported the developments and reforms needed by the Prado Museum 
between the years 1931-1936 (see Sánchez Cantón, 1962: 67, 70). In 1962 an Institution 
named Gran Duque de Alba is inaugurated in Ávila with the purpose of the encouragement 
and support of art and research. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to conclude, like 
Reyes, that the dynasty of the duke of Alba is linked to progressive thinking; they can be 
considered enlightened nobility (see above). Aguirre himself takes an active interest in 
patronage, even from a historical point of view, as he explains in the speech he delivers on 
the occasion of becoming part of the Real Academia Española (1986: 19). It is, thus, 
reasonable to surmise that he may have taken this active role in the promotion of culture as 
a way of fulfilling what he is through his role as a nobleman (see Reyes, 2002: 290-91); that 
is a champion of culture and a promoter of the arts. Although I am not suggesting that he 
sought each and everyone of these positions as part of a grand narrative, it is also quite 
possible, that – in addition to the above – this embrace of the arts represents the 
continuation of a reform project which he first attempts in the moral sphere as a priest, then, 
as a translator and editor – becoming more involved in socio-political issues –, finally, as a 
duke, concentrating on the liberating possibilities of art. In any case, this task is observed in 
his frequent appearances in public performances, his joining the Reales Academias (Reales 
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Academias de Bellas Artes 1984, Sevillana de Buenas Letras 1985 y Española 1986), and 
in the creation or support of foundations to preserve different aspects of the Spanish cultural 
heritage, such as Fundación Casa de Alba. He also becomes a member of the Patronato de 
la Fundación El Monte (1992), in addition to his active participation as an influential 
intellectual figure, who on occasion holds political positions as when he becomes Director 
General de Música (1977), or Comisario del Pabellón de Sevilla (1991) (Villa Rodríguez, 
2002: 285). 
The end of the regime seems to have stimulated his own creativity because his 
writing activity increases substantially. Several publications in the form of compilations of 
short autobiographical essays see the light at this time; Casi ayer noche (1985), Las horas 
situadas (1989a), and several volumes of Memorias de un cumplimiento (1988c, 1992), the 
latter relating his autobiographical experiences in public office155. This is by no means an 
isolated occurrence. After Franco’s death, biography, or rather, autobiography, as a genre, 
blooms; the end of the dictatorship permits a reinterpretation of the past, at the same time as 
the rapid political changes which are turning Spain into a democratic country create the 
need for self-justification (see Villanueva, 1979: 31)156. Some of the essays collected in 
these books are first published as newspaper articles, thus being testimony to the public 
participation of the author in addition to his commitment to cultural transmission and 
dissemination. A collection of Aguirre’s speeches of admission to the Reales Academias is 
published under the name of Altas oportunidades (1987a). A collection of poems entitled 
Secreto a voces is also published during this same year, bearing testimony to the modest – 
in terms of number of publications – but also versatile and wide-ranging scope of Aguirre’s 
interests and writings. All in all, it can be said that towards the end of the regime and during 
the Transition, Aguirre performs two of the most important functions of the intellectual as 
described by Aranguren (see Chapter Three). Aguirre spreads culture by bringing awareness 
                                                
155 Although I have only been able to find two published volumes of his Memorias de un cumplimiento 
– Crónica de una Dirección General (1988a) and Crónica en la Comisaría (1992) – the fact that they 
correspond to the volumes four and six respectively suggests that there are others – perhaps only 
planned or simply unpublished – (see Aguirre, 1992: 131). It is also possible, however, that Aguirre is 
being playful and may be trying – and succeeding – to deliberately confuse the reader, because in the 
course of the Crónica de una Dirección General, he refers to it as the third volumen of his memoirs. Of 
course, if he has been truthful about having written that book without revising it and in only fifteen 
days, it might just be an honest mistake. In contrast, Crónica en la Comisaría is catalogued as volume 
six, whereas he starts the first chapter by referring to it as the second volume of his Memorias de un 
cumplimiento”, which suggests that if there are others, they are unpublished (1992: 11). This is 
confirmed when, towards the end of the book, he says “hasta ahora no he publicado de mis Memorias 
de un cumplimiento sino dos volúmenes” (1992: 131). 
156 Far from being coincidental, it seems more likely that it is as a result of the socio-political 
circumstances indicated above, that the aforementioned books very much resemble the format of those 
published by Aranguren in the 1970s, such as La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975), 
Entre España y América (1974), La democracia establecida. Una crítica intelectual (1979b), El oficio 
de intelectual y la crítica de la crítica (1979a), all collected in Aranguren’s complete works (1994). 
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towards the work of others and by means of his direct implication in a number of cultural 
institutions as outlined above. Moreover, he becomes a critic of a more social nature as 
explained at the beginning of this chapter, a feature which is constantly present at different 
levels during his Memorias de un cumplimiento (1988c; 1992).  
 
5.7.2 Reconsidering Aguirre’s relationship to the School 
In spite of the strong influence that the FS has on Aguirre’s intellectual path, and despite the 
fact that his name will remain linked to theirs, Aguirre − once again − breaks with his past. 
In line with his pattern of reinvention, after his editorial period, he decides to separate his 
image from the School − perhaps with the sole exception of Benjamin − by pursuing 
different interests (see Duque, 2004: n.p.). It is not clear when this decision is taken. In fact, 
it is rather likely that more than a decision, this distance from the School responds more to 
his own process of personal development than to a specific purposeful decision to change 
course and leave the FS behind. In any case, it is reasonable to assume that this process of 
separation from the School begins with his leaving Taurus. By leaving Taurus, Aguirre not 
only severs his editorial link to the School, but embarks upon a radically new life, not only 
accepting the position of Director General de Música but, more crucially, becoming Duque 
de Alba. 
Thus, his thought seems to have moved on in a different direction. It is certainly 
difficult to reconcile his Marxist and neo-Marxist sympathies with his newly acquired title 
of duke. Furthermore, far from being a figure of resistance and subversion, Aguirre 
becomes a well-integrated part of the Establishment, contributing to its operation and its 
development. Moreover, breaking with his past, in this case with his relationship to the FS, 
does seem to fit a long-running pattern of borrón y cuenta nueva. However, although this 
may remain true, a closer look will reveal that Aguirre’s evolution, like that of Aranguren 
and Zambrano, follows a spiral pattern, in which the past is re-evaluated and re-integrated 
into a richer present, informing future developments. This is also true in relation to the FS 
(see Aguirre, 1984b: 11). Although he no longer maintains such a direct relationship with 
their thought after the translation and edition of their works at Taurus, there is ample 
evidence to support that, after that period, far from rejecting their work, he undergoes a 
process of internalization of their CT through its praxis. As argued in previous sections, 
Aguirre integrates the guiding principles of CT into his own thought and uses them as a 
framework of sociological meta-analysis (see Aguirre, 1984b: 11). His continuing close 
links with the School after his editorial role are readily observable not only in the style of 
CT that he cultivates in his own writings, but also in a number of essays and allusions that 
he includes in his post-1985 work, as has been pointed out throughout this chapter. Even the 
nature of his work as a cultural ambassador can also be considered as part of a project of 
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empowerment and liberation of the individual, very much in line with the role of art as seen 
by the FS. Thus, his readers cannot help but wonder what his motivations to distance 
himself from the School are. Is it a part of the array of contradictions he purposefully 
cultivates? Possibly. More likely still is the possibility that − based on the evidence of the 
pattern of regular reinvention developed by Aguirre − after having internalized and 
integrated some of the key features and methods developed by the Institut, namely, its CT, 
Aguirre decides to move on, distancing himself from the most theoretical aspects of the 
School and of the School as an entity. On the other hand, given his continued fidelity to the 
spirit of the School, to its aims and methodology, there is no reason to conclude that this 
distance from the School is the consequence of an intentional choice; it may simply be the 
result of the development of professional and personal events in Aguirre’s career and life. 
In other words, this may just correspond to a change of focus and not necessarily to a 
change of attitude or purpose, as argued above. 
 
5.7.3 Art and aesthetics 
Art, from the perspective of CT, plays a crucial role in encouraging the empowerment and 
emancipation of the individual. Given his relationship to the FS, it is likely that Aguirre 
shares their views regarding the liberation potential for art and that this is precisely one of 
the reasons why he becomes heavily involved in the arts community, tirelessly promoting it. 
The influence of Benjamin’s view can be observed in Aguirre’s attitudes toward art. 
Benjamin stands in a position contrary to the Kantian conception of art. He rejects the 
doctrine of l’art pour l’art, which he refers to as a theology of art, because it excludes the 
possibility of a social function of art (see Benjamin, 1992: 218). In Benjamin’s view, art 
does serve a purpose, although its purpose is not in art as product, but in art as process. Art 
opens up the possibilities for liberation and self-development, both for the artist, insofar as 
its very creation constitutes an expansion of his horizon of possibility, and also for the 
receiver, in as much as art is considered as an unfinished product which becomes singularly 
complete with every individual’s reception, and reaction to the work of art, because their 
combination will engage the receiver in the process of the creation of meaning. It is this 
unfinished nature and the individually participative mechanism of the work of art which 
makes it a vehicle for personal and social change, as we shall discuss below. 
Some initial discrepancies can be observed in Aguirre; he does not theorize 
extensively about art, because in his opinion “la mejor lección de arte es siempre el arte 
mismo, cuyas explicaciones no pasan de ser añadiduras más o menos acertadas” (1989a: 
86). This is the reason why, from a theoretical standpoint, he seems more interested in 
aesthetics, particularly in the concept of beauty, than in art per se. He is concerned with the 
nature of beauty and concludes that “la belleza, Señores Académicos, es, desde Kant, una 
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finalidad sin fin” (1987a: 53). Having established the purposelessness of beauty, his interest 
shifts to its perception and its implications. It is at this stage where the Benjaminian 
resonances can be found;  
ya he dicho, en oportunidad también académica, que abrigo la convicción estética, en la cual la razón 
se pone en vilo, de que nuestros ojos ven las cosas, los valores bellos, los siente nuestro corazón y les 
procura nuestra cabeza activa residencia, porque hemos sido, primero, cercados por sus argucias y 
sorprendidos, luego, por su presencia deslumbradora. Un poeta ciego puede, por tanto, cantar ese 
acoso, expresar su intensidad innumerable y única. No nos transmite lo que ve, sino que es visto 
(Aguirre, 1987a: 58-59).  
Here Aguirre seems to imply that his criterion for identifying what art is based on the 
concept of beauty. He makes this move by displacing the emphasis from the object to the 
subject, which is consistent with the experiential rationality which he exercises in other 
areas of thought. Beauty is for Aguirre, first and foremost, the result of perception. 
However, he intends to escape the pitfall of relativism that awaits judgement based solely 
on a subjective account, because this would reduce beauty to a matter of taste. With this in 
mind, Aguirre refines his assertion and adds that beauty is not solely an emotional reaction 
to an object; rather, the emotional reaction is the first stage of a more complex process. This 
initial emotional reaction enables the eventual intellectual appreciation of the beautiful. By 
virtue of this process, Aguirre concludes that art would be, in the first instance, expression, 
and, then, representation, of the beautiful, because in the artist, as in the receiver, the 
emphasis is on the subject. The art object is looked at, at the same time as it returns that 
gaze, becoming, at once, subject and object. Contemplating a work of art establishes a 
connection with the artist; it is his perception and subsequent expression of the beautiful 
that the receiver contemplates and reacts to, hence establishing a link between artist and 
public, between the self and the other. Ultimately, this is a reference to Benjamin’s concept 
of aura, in which the singularity of the work of art is palpable in the “mirar y ser visto”, by 
which not only the work of art, but also the experience it arouses, are unique. 
Aguirre, very much in the same vein as Benjamin, establishes a link between 
aesthetics and society. As Benjamin does in El origen del drama barroco (1990), Aguirre 
interprets art as a reconciliatory element, for it may transform chaos into order, extolling the 
value of singularity; Aguirre explains that “en el bosque, por demás enmarañado, de la 
sociedad en la cual nos desvivimos, los ojos puros, limpios, que miran la belleza porque por 
ella son mirados, buscan una frente habitable” (1987a: 53). This is reminiscent again of 
Benjamin’s aura. This connection becomes yet more evident by looking at an explicit 
reference to this concept. In an introduction to his translation of the second volume of 
Iluminaciones Aguirre explains that  
las cosas tienen un ‘aura’ cuando son capaces de levantar la vista y devolverle la mirada a quien las 
mira. La fantasmagoría busca objetividad. La idea de ‘aura’ no distrae hacia terrenos baldíos, sino 
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que ordena el análisis de la mecanización, del automatismo en los procesos de producción del 
capitalismo industrial (1972: 14).  
Those objects which possess an aura, art, have been awarded characteristics generally 
reserved for the agent; looking back, beside the subjectivity involved in the act of looking 
also confers the object/subject a sense of uniqueness. 
On the other hand, the connection between art and mechanization is finally made 
explicit. Hence, we are now in a position to derive several implications from the former 
extract. It communicates Aguirre’s view of society as complicated and knotty, having used 
the adjective “enmarañado”, tangled. Furthermore, he enhances the impact of this 
description by inverting the expected content. Where the reader would have every reason to 
read “the society in which we live”, he is surprised to find a play on words which equally 
suggests “the society which we barely live in/ we are devoted to”. This is no coincidence. 
With this masterful use of language, Aguirre condenses and criticizes the mechanisms and 
implication of instrumental reason. Most people live in the expectation, in the hope, in the 
quest of fulfilling whichever need has been awoken, instead of making life its own finality 
– possibly suggesting a parallel with art, the art of living; life itself escapes us. In contrast 
with an ontology where existence has priority over essence, where following Heidegger, 
Sartre, and Ortega the human being is only as he makes himself, this is a society which has 
awarded essence pre-eminence over existence. This is a society where pre-eminence is 
given to the essence of the object, not the subject. Thus, Aguirre argues that the unravelling 
of the subject, its existence, is mistaken with the attainment of the object, that is, the 
absorption of other into the self. This presents several problems. First, this act of absorption 
constitutes an ontological violence which prevents the possibility of the development of a 
satisfactory ethical apparatus on this basis. Second, the absorption of the other into the self 
leads to an ever incomplete and unsatisfied self, which cannot gain either self-recognition 
or fulfilment. The other, once subsumed into a self which is only aware of a lack which 
cannot be identified or resolved, cannot provide knowledge or fulfilment precisely because 
of having been subsumed and having lost its own individuality. “Desvivir” is, thus, this 
destructive process living-for, in the instrumental sense, which ultimately means “un-live” 
(see Aguirre, 1987a: 53). It is also significant that he would choose to use the metaphor of 
the forest, echoing Heidegger’s Lichtung, claro del bosque. Lichtung constitutes another 
reference to the transcendental yearning of the self, a self understood primarily as the 
process of existence, as expressed in Zambrano’s Claros del bosque (1977a). Instead, the 
genuine acknowledgement of our living in-the-world-with-others would require the 
consideration of objects not as objects, but as others. It is in this context that Aguirre locates 
the experience of beauty. Beauty is understood by Aguirre as an ultimately rational 
category as discussed above. Despite this, it is not accessible to everyone. Aguirre makes a 
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number of romantic assumptions which link beauty to purity, which possibly establishes a 
relationship of identity between the beautiful and the good. What is interesting about this 
qualification is that he suggests that beauty – the good – has to be present in some degree in 
the subject so that it can be perceived in the object. What is more, he points to a relationship 
of reciprocity, which suggests that rather than a finished process, the perception of beauty is 
like a circular current whose flux increases proportionally to the regularity of its circulation. 
Three key elements are then present in this statement: the unsatisfactory dynamics of 
society, the equation of beauty to good, and the reciprocity in the perception of beauty – 
therefore, also good. This argument places some degree of hope in the benevolent, even 
redeeming effects of beauty. Because the capacity of perception of beauty – and good – 
increases with its praxis, this would, once again, encourage, first, individual and, then, 
social change.  
In conclusion, I hope to have provided evidence of Aguirre’s engagement in a 
multileveled project of transformation; transformation of the self, of his socio-cultural and 
political reality, and most importantly and more radically, a transformation of the very 
framework of thought, by providing an alternative to instrumental reason. His proactive 
attitude towards dialogue, cultural transmission, critical evolution, the use of a complex and 
rich language, as well as the contents he chooses to develop remain a testimony to his 
efforts and achievements as a Critical Theorist. 
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There is, I think, no more pressing task for progressive people in 
the First World than tirelessly to analyse and diagnose the fear 
and anxiety before Utopia itself: this relatively introspective and 
self-critical process need not wait on the emergence of new 
visions of the future, such as are bound to appear when the 
outlines of the new global order and its postnational class system 
have become stabilized. There is a collective therapy to be 
performed on the victims of depoliticization themselves, a 
rigorous look at everything we fantasize as mutilation, as 
privative, as oppressive, as mournful and depressing, about all the 
available visions of a radical transformation in the social order 
(Jameson, 2000: 388). 
 
6 Is it Critical Theory after all? 
Although, as argued throughout the thesis, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre certainly 
share a number of key elements with CT, it would not be fair to say that their thought 
conforms exactly to CT as developed by the FS. In the course of this chapter, we shall 
compare and analyse the characteristics and approaches adopted by Aranguren, Zambrano, 
and Aguirre in contrast with the members of the School in order to provide cohesion to the 
thesis and determine, by way of conclusion, whether their work may still be considered CT. 
 
6.1 Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre; their specificity  
The specificity of their thought in relation to Frankfurtian CT will now be discussed 
adopting a global perspective towards their work based on the arguments made in previous 
chapters. The analysis will focus on pivotal aspects of CT, as argued throughout this thesis: 
the role of biography, fragmentation, exile, Marxism, art, the subject, psychoanalysis, and 
spirituality. 
 
6.1.1 The vital role of biography 
Although the genre of the writings of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre cannot be 
considered entirely biographical, their writings have in common a strong, recurring, and 
deliberate biographical component, whose presence and relevance has been highlighted 
throughout this thesis. This section will explore, however, the subversive significance of 
biography in the context of CT. 
Within CT, the genre of biography is subversive. It is subversive because it reclaims 
the importance of the personal and the individual, both as important for its own sake, but 
also insofar as it contributes to shaping the public and collective. First, a biography is built 
from the perception of the self and from the relation between the self and the other. This 
shows an initial complexity which is resistant to the one-dimensional reductions 
characteristic of instrumental rationality. In fact, many of the key characteristics of the 
discourse of CT can be observed in biographic discourse itself, such as its concern for 
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human relationships, an experiential epistemology, fragmentation, errancy, 
interconnectedness, multilayered motivations and interests, and, of course, contradiction.  
The biographic content is universal and unique at the same time, in as much as our 
humanity relates the individual to everyone else, sharing a common nature, sometimes a 
common historical context, and, often, also a number of common challenges, whose 
specificities may or may not be shared by others, but which make possible relating to each 
other. Simultaneously, a biography also stresses what is original and unrepeatable in the 
individual, conferring upon the person − the person whose biography is being told and also, 
by extension, those who read it − the sense of dignity that is robbed from him when he 
becomes part of the instrumental chain of reason and action. 
According to Susana Narotzky, “there is a dialectical tension between doing and 
being that relates to the tension between structure and agency, [sic] in history” (2002: 45). 
This tension can be perhaps described as internalized and perceived, but not necessary. 
Such tension functions, in fact, as a mechanism of social control by means of the feeling of 
powerlessness that derives from it. Only by dissolving this distancing tension can 
individuals be empowered to become a proactive link between freedom and responsibility. 
By shifting the emphasis back on to the individual, this sense of powerlessness can be 
replaced by one of possibility and responsibility, by an awareness that the existing 
structures have been created and are, in fact, being perpetuated by either the will or the 
inaction of the agents of a given society. Only by re-evaluating the role, power, and impact 
of the individual, of each life history, of biography, can this tension be overcome and 
freedom exercised, not only as the reclamation of the positive freedom that governments 
often use as propaganda, but as the complex exercise of each individual taking charge of his 
own actions and their implications. 
Biography, therefore, becomes the basic genre of anti-instrumental discourse, as it 
contains a richness and complexity that resists the processes of oversimplification typical of 
instrumental reason, and reclaims the epistemological value of experience, as opposed to 
the illusory impersonality and objectivity of factual data. For this reason, the discourse of 
experiential rationality is necessarily grounded in biographic expression. 
 
6.1.2 Fragmentation 
As argued throughout this thesis, fragmentation is a key aspect of CT. Fragmentation may 
be considered to be, to a certain extent, one of the characteristics of the FS in terms of their 
displacement, but also in terms of their membership, and even content (see Thiebaut, 2003: 
441-43). As Kellner explains, “biographical material shows that Horkheimer, Marcuse, 
Pollock, Fromm, Lowenthal, and others […] were all drawn to Marxian ideas, which 
explained the war in terms of the dynamics of capitalism and imperialism and produced a 
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thoroughgoing critique of capitalist society, as well as an alternative to it” (1989: 9; see also 
Thiebaut, 2003: 447). Thus, Fromm, Pollock, Lowenthal, Neumann, and others, although 
initially attuned to the thought of the School develop in a divergent direction so that, in 
time, they distance themselves from the School, partly due in some cases to financial 
pressures, and partly because of the direction that their own interests take (for examples of 
such pressure see Wiggershaus, 1994: 229, 261-65, 295-96). The most dramatic case is, 
perhaps, that of Benjamin, whose acceptance by the School is never complete, mainly due 
to the existence of a number of ideological and personal tensions with its members (see 
Adorno and Benjamin’s correspondence edited by Lonitz, 1999). In some cases, the 
association to the Institut is more ideological than bureaucratic due to financial limitations. 
That is the case of Marcuse, who does not enjoy a steady income from the School, which is 
reflected in his trajectory, as can be observed in his acceptance of a number of positions 
which provide him with an income, ensuring his continuing intellectual involvement with 
the School. This is what happens when he becomes senior analyst at the Bureau of 
Intelligence of the Office of War Information (see Wiggershaus, 1994: 295-96, 301). 
Despite this fragmentation, a clear consciousness of group exists both in terms of 
institutional association and in terms of a common purpose and project, however 
problematic these may be.  
In contrast with this, and despite their connections of a personal and intellectual 
nature pointed out in the previous chapters, it cannot be said that Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre form a group or a school of thought. In fact, they work independently of each other 
and, not only are they not organized as a group, but there is no conciencia de grupo, that is, 
no awareness of sharing a common project. This is hardly surprising considering their 
distance, both geographic − in the case of Zambrano in relation to Aranguren and Aguirre − 
and of focus, for they have engaged in different enterprises, having concerned themselves 
with different aspects of thought. Furthermore, their political and historical context, far 
from fostering the development of such associations, has oppressed and hindered free 
expression, free association, and critical thinking. Partly as a result of this policy, Zambrano 
chooses exile, while Aranguren and Aguirre spend part of their lives and careers abroad. It 
is precisely away from Spain where Zambrano develops much of their thought and 
Aranguren and Aguirre start adopting their most critical positions.  
The fact that a formal association does not exist between these thinkers and that, 
notwithstanding, the thought they produce shares a common intellectual background, as 
well as similar aims and strategies, opens up the possibility that perhaps their biographical 
circumstances, in addition to their socio-historical context, may have been conducive to the 




 6.1.3 Inspirational exile 
The existing relationship between exile and intellectual production is highlighted by Faber 
when he starts his book Exile and Cultural Hegemony by asking: “what is it about exile that 
makes it such a catalyst for cultural production?” (2002: 3). Faber ventures that the fruitful 
production of the exiles, despite their frequent lack of material, institutional, and, even, 
personal support is the expression of the fact that they feel wronged, for they have “a cause 
to defend, an enemy to denounce, or a lost land nostalgically to evoke” (2002: 3). It would 
be, of course, naïve to defend exile or, more precisely, injustice as the ultimate recipe for 
literary inspiration. It is in exile, nonetheless, where the link between biography and 
intellectual production becomes not only relevant but also evident. This is also the case in 
relation to the exiles of the Spanish Civil War − some 160,000 Spanish men and women 
from different walks of life (see Faber, 2002: 5) – who all share socio-political inclinations 
and convictions which, although they may differ on the specific formulation of their 
content, involve the need to seek refuge in a country other than their own. What these 
circumstances prompt is an intensity of emotion and an array of experiences that in most 
cases may not have taken place otherwise. It is only natural to assume that, in many of these 
cases, these emotions and experiences would seek expression; an expression which would 
take different forms for different people and which would often translate into the 
proliferation of their written production in the case of intellectuals and of those so inclined 
(see Kellner, 1989: 81). Faber suggests that, devoid of the fatherland, cultural production 
becomes the refuge of the intellectuals who find themselves in this situation. That is why, as 
Faber puts it, “denied the right to participate further in the history of his or her community, 
the exile starts living in and off memory” (2002: 6).  
This is true not only of the Spanish exiles, but also of the members of the FS (see 
Faber, 2002: 6-7; Eagleton, 1997: 127; Kellner, 1989: 66). It is the triumph of Nazism that 
forces the members of the FS into exile. Equally, it is the triumph of the Nationalists which 
makes Zambrano opt for exile, as many other Spanish Republican intellectuals do, such as 
Joaquín Xirau, Eduardo Nicol, José Ferrater Mora, José Gaos, Manuel Granell, Francisco 
Ayala, Juan Larrea, José Bergamín, Eugenio Ímaz, Juan David García Bacca, Medina 
Echevarría, and Gallegos Rocafull y García to name but a few (see Abellán, 1998). This is 
also true of Aranguren, who, despite his initial compliance with the regime, chooses to 
emigrate to the United States when deprived of his chair157. The relevance of this is that 
                                                
157 “Debido a que los Estados Unidos no reconoció nunca la existencia de un exilio republicano 
español, los que entraron en el país lo hicieron como emigrantes. Una emigración escasa debido a las 
restricciones impuestas por la Ley de Inmigración americana que permitía una cuota de admisión 
anual de doscientos cincuenta y dos (252) españoles. […] No obstante, el apoyo de la [sic] élites 
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those in exile tend to view the conditions in their home and host countries from an 
outsider’s perspective; Aranguren is no exception. Having first-hand experience of a system 
they have not been socialized in, does put them in an extraordinary position to perceive the 
internal contradictions and needs of the underlying social system. Equally, it also provides 
them with a new frame of reference and a certain critical distance to analyse their 
homeland. Furthermore, the familiarity of Aranguren and of the members of the Institut 
with authoritarian regimes, in addition to the stark initial contrast they find in the United 
States, seems to have contributed significantly to their analysis: “testimony by members of 
the Institut themselves indicates the extent to which their experience of exile influenced 
their choice of language, modes of expression, and development of their social theory” 
(Kellner, 1989: 81; see also 66; Lonitz, 1999: 57, 200). Far from fully integrating in 
American society and its socio-economic and political dynamics, they − both the members 
of the School and also Aranguren − retain an outsider’s view as is reflected in much of their 
critique. The experience of exile influences their views on the evolution from classical 
capitalism to neo-capitalism; neo-capitalism is novel to them, in contrast to those who 
perceive it as a natural socio-economic evolution (see Kellner, 1989: 82).  
This can be observed in their fierce critique of consumerism, as well as in the 
comparison between authoritarian and liberal neo-capitalist societies, particularly in relation 
to the methods of control developed by both societies, and especially in relation to the use 
and impact of the mass media, as the Institut’s conception of mass culture and 
communications was first shaped by Hitler’s use of them (see Kellner, 1989: 66-67, 82, 
130, 133-34). This kind of analysis, however, is not exempt from criticism. Eagleton argues 
that “the Frankfurt School of Marxism, several of whose members were refugees from 
Nazism, simply projects the ‘extreme’ ideological universe of fascism onto the quite 
different structures of liberal capitalist regimes” (1991: 127). Hence, their position as 
outsiders is a double-edged one. Being outsiders, which as we have seen above may 
become an advantageous intellectual position, may also lead to distortions or 
oversimplifications. Kellner points out how “they may have missed some of the ideological 
contradictions within mass culture and the socially critical and potentially progressive 
possibilities of the new media such as film, radio, and television” (1989: 83). In fact, there 
are few suggestions of satisfactory alternatives in the Frankfurtian CT, which is why – as 
indicated in previous chapters – it has often been described as pessimistic (see Bottomore, 
2002: 17, 37-38; see also Bronner, 2002: 219, 225). As Marcuse concludes in relation to the 
                                                                                                                                       
intelectuales fue esencial para abrir una vía de penetración en el rígido sistema emigratorio de USA al 
conseguir que el profesorado universitario y los artistas quedasen exentos de la ley de cuotas de 
inmigración, siempre que estuviesen avalados por un ciudadano norteamericano o fueran requeridos 
por alguna universidad del país” (Soldevilla Oria, 2001: 77-78). 
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latent potential for liberation, “‘liberation of inherent possibilities’ no longer adequately 
expresses the historical alternative” (1964: 255). In contrast, Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre do not place their hopes in technology, or political, or even institutional change, but 
on the individual, perhaps also missing the opportunities these elements may offer. In any 
case, the influence of the experience of emigration or exile – even long stays abroad in the 
case of Aguirre –, although underestimated, is central to their thought, to the point that 
“Critical Theory, like much modern philosophy and contemporary social theory, is exile 
theory, the product of thinkers forced by adverse circumstances into emigration” (Kellner, 
1989: 81; see also 80). 
  
6.1.4 Critical Theorists do not always wear red 
As is widely known, the FS does have a strong Marxist grounding; in fact, their thought has 
often been described as neo-Marxist insofar as it re-addresses Marxism and elaborates new 
patterns of thought and criticism which aim to overcome the inadequacies and insufficiency 
of classical Marxism in relation to a neo-capitalist society. In contrast with this, none of the 
three key authors studied can be said to be either Marxist or neo-Marxist. Aranguren, 
Zambrano, and Aguirre do not expressly attempt to recuperate or update Marxist principles. 
Their relationship with Marxism is one of dialogue and their interest in it is more of a social 
than a political nature. 
Nevertheless, the importance of Marxism in their historical moment and in their work 
must not be underestimated. Although none of them are Marxists, they do engage with 
Marxism. It can be said that Aranguren and Aguirre do so extensively – as we have seen in 
the corresponding chapters – so that Marxism becomes their main interlocutor, especially 
between the years 1963-1969, after which point the neo-Marxist discourse occupies an 
important part of their work. Even Zambrano engages with Marxism to some extent in her 
early work, mostly from a critical perspective (see 4.3). This engagement, however small, 
provides evidence of their questioning existing socio-economic models and of their interest 
or quest into finding alternative ones. In the course of this thesis, I hope to have provided 
sufficient evidence of their knowledge of, and interest in Marxism, and how instead of 
adopting its ideology, it has provided them with an awareness of a number of key issues 
that they later engage with and develop in their own idiosyncratic ways. 
Thus, whereas the FS adopts Marxism as their framework, Aranguren, Zambrano, 
and Aguirre, by liberating themselves from such an intellectual constraint, take CT a step 
forward. Although adopting the critical stance promoted by neo-Marxism, by refusing to be 
shaped by Marxist ideology, they succeed in effectively freeing themselves from the 
limitations of a constraining rationality and open up their horizon of possibility. For this 
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reason, their work becomes more eclectic, also engaging with Heideggerian thought and 
French existentialism amongst other influences.  
 
6.1.5 Art as authentic experience? 
The position of the FS in relation to art has been the object of frequent criticism − even by 
left-wing authors − on the basis of its elitism. As Jameson explains, 
what is unsatisfactory about the Frankfurt School’s position is not its negative and critical apparatus, 
but rather the positive value on which the latter depends, namely the valorization of traditional 
modernist high art as the locus of some genuinely critical and subversive, ‘autonomous’ aesthetic 
production (2000: 127).  
Jameson objects to its elitism, but also to the reproduction of previous patterns of capitalist 
society through the acceptance of given cultural forms. These objections are applicable to 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre only partially. These thinkers are heirs of the 
Heideggerian tradition and, thus, they argue for the truth and authenticity of art in reference 
to high-culture manifestations of the work of art. However, they partly overcome some of 
the objections attached to this position by their encouragement of the individual’s artistic 
potential. In this way, art becomes a cathartic process of self-discovery − thus retaining its 
content of truth and authenticity −, expression, and eventually subversion by a process of 
spiral (r)evolution. 
Jameson, who advocates more radical subversive forms, would still regard this as 
insufficient and ambiguous:  
the ambiguity, in other words, is as much in the revolutionary’s own position as it is in the art object: 
insofar as he is himself a product of the society he condemns, his revolutionary attitude is bound to 
presuppose a negation of himself, an initial subjective dissociation that has to precede the objective, 
political one (2000: 68). 
The attempt to negate the self, however, seems to suggest a deconstructionist position, a 
deconstructionist effort that is doomed from the start given the impossibility of entirely 
freeing oneself from the given cultural heritage (see Wight, 2004: 213). The position of 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, instead, is, as we have observed, a conciliatory attempt 
to integrate and overcome this heritage. 
 
6.1.6 Is there such a thing as the subject? 
One of the distinctive characteristics of the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is 
a strong reliance on the existence of the subject, as opposed to the increasing perception of 
its fragmentation and fragility.  
The changing conceptualizing of human identity, with increasing emphasis on a divided subjectivity 
in a process of continual formation, has its roots in early modernity and continues to develop 
throughout Romanticism and the period of classic realism, in contrast with the stable subject 
interpellated by realist texts (Bretz, 2001: 441).  
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Different factors have contributed to this, most notoriously Nietzschean theories and 
psychoanalysis, which forces us to rethink the concept of the self, not only in terms of 
identity but also of control over the self and access to the inner self. Historical events such 
as the First and Second World Wars, with the destruction, displacement, exile, and death on 
a large scale, along with the subsequent climate of threat and tension contribute to 
emphasizing this atmosphere of fragmentation which culminates in Foucault’s claim of the 
death of the subject (see Bruns, 2005: 364-65).  
Far from this, influenced by Unamuno and Ortega, Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre regard the subject as the keystone which supports their moral and even political 
positions. From their perspective, although changes in the structures of society and its 
supporting institutions are considered necessary, the focus of their hopes for qualitative 
change lies in the individual as we have seen in previous chapters. So, in contrast to the 
heirs of the Marxist tradition, who envisage the self as a socio-economic product, these 
Spanish thinkers understand the self as a reflexive consciousness which enjoys a degree of 
cohesion. Theirs is not an atomistic and autonomous individual; it is a cohesive, although 
incomplete subject – still liable for ethical responsibility as a result of his freedom – who 
leads an existence which is intersubjective and interdependent on reality (for a quick 
overview of the process of deconstruction of the illusion of the Unitarian Cartesian subject 
see Bordwell, 1996a: 14-15). 
According to the Marxist interpretation of the dynamics of socio-economic change, 
base-structure and superstructure constantly influence each other, so that a change in one 
would lead to a change in the other. Although Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre take a 
substantially different position, they share with Marxism the assumption that a change at 
any one level of the structure will destabilize that structure in such a way that another 
change is required. These changes may either be interpreted as anomalies which are 
absorbed in the process of adaptation and survival of the system, or they may spiral into a 
transformative process of grand-scale change. What is specific about the proposal made by 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is that the change should come from the individual. 
This is radically different from Marxist projects for liberation. According to Marxism, the 
development of class-consciousness would lead the proletariat to join forces in order to 
overthrow the capitalist system, eventually replacing it with a communist one. Neo-
Marxists, on the other hand, consider that a more efficient use of the available technology, 
that is, a socially oriented use, would lead to increased production. In turn, the 
superstructure could evolve into a more distributive society in terms of production, but also 
leisure, which would eventually allow for the liberation of the individual. Neither of these 
paths, however, has rendered satisfying changes, which poses some questions. Is it still 
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possible to defend the interaction of structure and superstructure? If it is, why have these 
paths proven insufficient?  
Marxist analyses of culture largely rest on constructivist premises. Bordwell explains 
how from the perspective of the FS “culture is a social construction by its agents; at the 
same time, social processes construct culture; and social subjects are themselves constructs 
of culture” (1996a: 13). Although it is true that the pessimistic conclusions of Frankfurtian 
CT can be largely traced to the circularity of this argument, CT itself need not be caught up 
in this circle. In fact, by interpreting this process as a descriptive analysis rather than as a 
causative one, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre manage to offer a hopeful outlook that 
takes a spiral shape, instead of a circular one. Rather than changing the structures of socio-
economic and political organisation, or the behaviour of the individual, what Aranguren, 
Zambrano, and Aguirre suggest is that a more profound change at the level of the individual 
has to take place. Although these authors do not express themselves in this terminology, the 
idea remains that only a change in habitus can lead to long-lasting and effective change, the 
kind of qualitative change that would trigger a spiral process. The agent, although 
undoubtedly influenced by the process of socialization and culture itself, is not entirely 
determined by it; there exists some scope for dissent and innovation – without which 
history would be firmly anchored in a timeless period of stagnation and repetition. Still, the 
acknowledgement of the role and impact of social processes and culture, and, particularly, 
the fact that each individual is undeniably embedded in these makes it impossible for social 
change to follow a linear trajectory. Only a spiral trajectory may account for the complexity 
and slow progression of a multilayered process that is characterized by periods of apparent 
forward and backward movement. Thus, the possibilities of qualitative change lie in the 
uniqueness and unpredictability of the individual, or rather the person, as argued in the 
chapter on Zambrano. The difficulty, of course, remains how to make such a state of 
awareness and self-development widespread. The answer for Aranguren, Zambrano, and 
Aguirre is spirituality, art, and an engagement with experiential rationality as described 
throughout the thesis. 
 
6.1.7 Studying the soul 
A similar approach can be found in relation to psychoanalysis. As Ricoeur explains, “the 
Frankfurt School claims that the project of liberation which its sociological critique offers 
for society parallels what psychoanalysis achieves for the individual” (1986: 7). Moreover, 
Marcuse and Fromm integrate psychoanalysis into the discourse and methodology of their 
social research, because in Marcuse’s words “psychological problems therefore turn into 
political problems” (1955: 21; see also Marcuse 1970b: 44; Roazen, 2003: 401-02; 
Thiebaut, 2003: 455; 1.3). Such an approach not only constitutes an innovation in relation 
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with established patterns of research, the links it suggests, and the directions it opens, but 
also puts into practice the supradisciplinarity that the School strives to achieve (see Kellner, 
1989: 7-8, 36).  
None of the Spanish authors studied, however, embrace psychoanalytic theory. Far 
from it, Freudian psychoanalysis is rejected – by Zambrano, who is more Jungian − or 
acknowledged, although played down − by Aranguren and Aguirre − (see respectively, 
Zambrano, 2004c: 135; Maillard, 1990: 35; Aranguren, 1994, 1: 640; 1994, 2: 34-5, 55, 
128; 1994, 4: 487; Aguirre, 1969c: 16). Despite this lack of enthusiasm, some typically 
psychoanalytic elements, such as the existence of the unconscious, are incorporated into 
their thought, even if often not explicitly; without the presupposition of the different layers 
of the self and different levels of self-access, and, indeed, consciousness, the argument of 
false consciousness would be difficult to support and the power of symbolism as evoked by 
Zambrano would be seriously reduced. Furthermore, in their analysis of society and the 
individual, Aranguren and Zambrano identify the individual’s inner dissatisfaction as a 
symptom of the shortcomings of the process of and the result of their socialization (see 
Aranguren, 1994, 5: 168, 587; Zambrano, 2004c: 100-01, 105-06). The subversive nature of 
Freud’s findings lies in its value as a Copernican turn of the psyche, in as much as Freud 
distrusts conscious psychical manifestations, trusting instead in sources traditionally outcast 
from rationalist epistemology such as dreams and unintentional actions. The FS, and also 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, identify this blow to Cartesian rationality and invert the 
long-established parameters of truth by defending an experiential epistemology, as 
discussed in previous chapters. Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre differ from the FS, 
however, in that instead of applying the principles of psychoanalysis to their work, they rely 
on a return to transcendence to bridge the gap between the individual and society, and 
between the individual and himself. This is how Zambrano explains it:  
la existencia se había hecho una pesadilla. Una pesadilla de la que remedios como el freudismo, 
revelación psicológica, nada podían aliviar. Porque el psicoanálisis válido para el hombre europeo 
hubiera sido mostrarle aquel que quería ser, el que necesitaba ser, que su personaje en sombra 
rencoroso perseguía (1988a: 56). 
As discussed above in relation to Marxism, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre resist 
fully committing themselves to a systematized ideology, in this case, psychoanalysis. They 
do, however, revert to psychoanalysis in an etymological sense; insofar as psychoanalysis is 
the study of the soul, the introduction or recognition of the element of faith and 
transcendence are crucial to the development and cohesion of their project.  
 
6.1.8 Transcendence, faith, and spirituality 
As highlighted above, psychoanalysis exposes the discomfort and affliction which affect the 
individual in our society. These are interpreted by Critical Theorists as symptomatic of the 
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irrational and counter-productive structures which our culture and society are governed by. 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre − who share a common religious background − see the 
rejection of transcendence at the root of such symptoms. In contrast with the German 
tradition, Zambrano more directly, but also Aranguren and Aguirre, turn spirituality into the 
cornerstone of their thought (see Marí, 1983: 126). As Danièle Hervieu-Léger observes: 
empirical investigations dealing with beliefs within these very societies [Western European and 
North American societies] attest with the same consistency that individual interest in the spiritual and 
the religious has not undergone any decline, despite a disenchantment introduced by the pervasive 
expansion of instrumental reason in all regions of life (2001: 161). 
As Hervieu-Léger continues to argue, through faith, individuals construct or affiliate to 
systems of signification in order to give meaning to their own experience (2001: 161). 
Thus, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre integrate the element of faith into their thought. 
Paradoxically and perhaps contrary to the nature of faith itself, faith is not presented as a 
leap beyond what can be rationally explained; instead, faith is incorporated as a rational 
choice, not because of the rationality of its content, but because it is perceived as the best 
possible choice (see Aranguren’s discussion of Pascal’s wager in 3.2.1.1). By choosing 
faith, they avoid the traps of foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions, as discussed 
in Chapters Four and Five. Thus, it is important to distinguish between ritualized religion 
and interior religion, although in the case of the latter, it would be more accurate to say 
spirituality rather than religion (see Hervieu-Léger, 2001: 162; see also Wuthnow, 2001: 
306). The former does not require faith, whereas the latter refers to the spiritual or ethical 
engagement of the individual through the continuous appropriation of his transcendental 
reality and its implications (see Wuthnow, 2001: 306). It is in this latter sense that 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre propose faith and transcendence as an antidote to the 
loss of meaning which may result from the instrumental rationality our socio-cultural and 
political reality. Their defence of transcendentality and faith must be understood as a 
response to the unsatisfactory socio-political situation of Spain, as well as to the religious 
and moral challenges that came about as a result of the latter. 
The question of religion and, more particularly, faith has traditionally been central to 
the evolution of Spanish thought, as expressed by the Unamunian dilemma, as shown in 
Chapters One and Three. Crucial as it may be for Spanish thought, it is not exclusive to it. 
Their thought links in with the work of other authors, such as Ricoeur and Lévinas, who 
have also developed a deeply rooted spiritual philosophy (see Stiver, 2001: 161). In the case 
of Lévinas, his strong rejection of Heideggerian thought from a spiritual perspective 
informs much of his writings, as observed in Autrement qu'être, ou, Au-delà de l'essence 
(1974) and Totalité et infini, essai sur l'extériorité (1961). Their interest may be interpreted 
as the attempt to construct or find a system of signification which may give meaning to our 
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own existence as discussed above, or as an insightful attempt to resolve or shed light onto 
the tension that exists between the self and the other, so that an ethical proposal coherent 
with those findings may be put forward. Furthermore, the influence of religious and 
spiritual issues on socio-political events should not be underestimated (see Hinnells, 2005: 
7-20). Much has been written about the role of religion and spirituality in the outbreak of 
the Spanish Civil War and the events that would later unfold. Many of the exiles and the 
victors claim to have spiritual motives; religion is used as a legitimating tool by the regime, 
but also as a point of support by the opposition (see Faber: 20002; see also Piñol: 1999; 
Callahan, 2000; Lannon, 1987; Lannon, 1995). This is, in fact, a very complex issue which 
− for reasons of space − cannot be discussed here in the length it deserves. I hope, however, 
to have drawn sufficient attention to its role and relevance; particularly, I hope a firm 
connection between the spiritual positions of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, and their 
socio-political critique has been established.  
 
6.2 A question of words 
Based on the evidence shown in this chapter, and, indeed, throughout the thesis, it has been 
argued that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre are original thinkers who have made a 
unique contribution to the history of ideas with their work. Having established their 
idiosyncrasies, another question must be asked: is there still enough common ground for 
them to be called Critical Theorists? This is the question which shall be addressed in the 
following section. 
 
6.2.1 What is Critical Theory anyway? 
This section shall not delve into a discussion of the meaning of CT in relation to the FS, for 
this issue has already been covered in Chapter One. What this section will do, however, is 
to discuss the implications of the term “Critical Theory” and assess whether or not it may 
be relevant to use it in relation to Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre. 
It should be noted that term CT is made up of two complex concepts. What are their 
implications? CT is problematic in its inclusion of the word Theory when one of its 
objectives is precisely to challenge the traditional supremacy reserved for the concept of 
Theory and the kind of rationality and associations it generally implies158. According to 
Jean-Michel Rabaté’s analysis of Theory, Theory can only be made from a specific 
historical position; hence it harbours in its very conception a certain agenda (2002: 2; see 
also Butler, 2004: 121-22). Theory, almost by definition, is also intrinsically lacking in 
praxis, Theory is understood as the opposite of practice, experience, life (see Rabaté, 2002: 
                                                
158 Theory per se is capitalized as opposed to theory when in reference to particular theories. 
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3). Rabaté points to two central functions: witnessing and questioning an existing situation, 
discourse, or practice (2002: 8-9). These features also imply that there is certain 
incompleteness about Theory and it is only because of this that it can exercise the above-
mentioned functions. Despite the contemporary nature of this analysis − Rabaté’s book was 
only published in 2002 and its analysis focuses on the period from 1975 onwards − its 
conclusions about Theory are still useful and certainly applicable to the theory the present 
analysis is engaged with.  
These features of Theory, not coincidentally, are very close to what Aranguren 
defended as the task of the critic. Is that because critics ought to be theorists? Are critics, as 
portrayed by Aranguren, already, and perhaps unknowingly, theorists? Perhaps so. In any 
event, this brings us to a more fundamental issue, although by no means new: the question 
of language. It is a matter of terminology, but undoubtedly, it is also a matter of 
perspective, for whereas Theory is associated with abstract, even impersonal concepts, the 
term “critical” refers to the individual. It requires an engagement with a specific perspective 
on socio-political, economic, moral, and possibly also other issues. In contrast with the 
abstraction of Theory, this critical engagement can only take place from a given background 
and history; one which corresponds to the values and interests defended in its attack. 
Although CT does share the key points of Rabaté’s analysis insofar as it is Theory, it 
is also primarily critical. Describing Theory as “critical” confers it a distinctive edge that 
becomes crucial for its understanding; “critical” makes an unequivocal reference to the 
subversive nature of its methodology and aims. Rabaté, based on Benjamin’s use of the 
word, offers a succinct reflection on the meaning and implications of noun critique, whose 
adjective, “critical”, occupies our attention. 
The negative sense of either pointing to the limits of knowledge as with Kant, or of attacking 
deficiencies in taste or artistic production; the positive one being the wish to make this activity 
reflexive in a redoubling mirror-image of creation: without criticism understood positively, creation 
could not know itself as an agency linked to a general process disposing of specific laws (Rabaté, 
2002: 56). 
Critique, therefore, implies a sense of insufficiency, as well as a sense of infinity (see 
Rabaté, 2002: 57). CT is, thus, empowered with a practical and material dimension, 
practical because it is hoped to exercise an impact beyond books and scholarly discussion, 
and material in as much as it aspires to move from being a critique to achieving the 
emancipation of the individuals who would then become critics themselves, as the 
proponents of CT can be argued to have been.  
It is in this sense that Aranguren, Aguirre, and, even, Zambrano − despite her 
distance from the FS − can all be considered Critical Theorists. Despite their divergences, 
they all have in common the critique of instrumental reason, and share a number of basic 
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methodological features as shown in previous chapters, most notably the marriage between 
theory and praxis.  
This quest to establish a solid connection between theory and practice is by no means 
specific to these authors. Moreover, as Kyung-Man says in relation to Pierre Bourdieu, 
Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Taylor, and Jonathan Turner, “the 
relationship of theory to practice occupies the central place in the recent scholarship of 
social theory” (2004: 362). These approaches have in common the fact that they go beyond 
the theoretical models and accounts of agents and an examination of how they relate to each 
other and the institutions, by paying close attention to their practices, whose critical 
interpretation will in turn inform their theoretical analysis, becoming a meta-analysis and a 
meta-theory. Two key differences, the scope and the nature of the relationship between 
theory and practice, distance these approaches from the one adopted by the authors studied. 
What is specific about them is that this connection is not limited to social science, but is 
part of a wider research exercise that strives for supradisciplinarity. Moreover, their work 
must be understood in the context of the effort to rethink and redefine rationality in wider 
terms, and the re-association of theory and practice must be understood as part of such an 
effort.  
 
6.2.2 Post-modern thinkers? 
This section will address the position of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in relation to 
the debate about modernity and post-modernity. There is little agreement over the exact 
meaning and content of these terms, which increases the complexity of the debate. Bearing 
this in mind, and for the purpose of clarity, the present discussion will follow Jordan’s 
clarifying distinction, which states that postmodernity can be described: 
first, as a philosophical approach in which postmodernism questions modernity, understood in terms 
of rationality, progress, freedom and human emancipation. [...] Second, a cultural approach, by which 
postmodernism is seen as a form of cultural sensibility or condition, characteristic of late capitalist, 
consumer society. [...] Third, as an aesthetic or stylistic approach, where postmodernism dissolves the 
binary division between high and low cultural forms and opens up a whole series of otherwise 
marginalized, forgotten or discarded cultural resources, thus endorsing a plurality, hybridity and 
promiscuity of styles (2002: 173). 
Bearing these distinctions in mind, it could be said that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre 
are post-modern in their philosophical approach, given their questioning of modernity. One 
of the key elements which runs through their work is a critical standpoint towards 
foundationalist positions; they challenge the dominating role allocated to rationality; they 
question the role and reach of scientific knowledge; they reject the socio-economic and 
mechanical interpretation of progress as the increased capacity of production and 
consumption; and, they reclaim a space for transcendence. However, although they fit post-
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modernist criteria in their critique of modernism, they are also critical of some key features 
of post-modernism. 
As regards post-modernity from a cultural approach, one constitutive feature is “a 
new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary ‘theory’ and in a 
whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum” (Jameson, 2000: 193). It is precisely 
such depthlessness, such sense of loss and unfulfilment characteristics of consumerist 
societies, which these authors identify as symptoms of the insufficiency of such socio-
economic organization and of the instrumental reason it stems from. In this sense, far from 
being post-modern, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre perceive post-modernity as a crisis, 
whose manifestations are but symptoms. 
Their aesthetic or stylistic approach can hardly be considered post-modern either. 
Although far from adopting an elitist position regarding art, the reader is encouraged to 
engage with the artwork − particularly poetry or narration − the value of high art is still very 
much exalted. Moreover, whereas postmodernism empties art of political content, the value 
of reading and writing is so underscored that readers are encouraged to become writers, 
artists, as part of their process of empowerment and self-development, hence attributing art 
a crucial role in the process of liberation (see Eagleton, 1985; see also 4.4.5.4 and 5.7.3). 
Hence, given the wider extent of their critique and the holistic approach of their 
work, modern and post-modern descriptors are insufficient to define it. In consonance with 
CT’s resistance to the division of knowledge, they can only be understood beyond the 
modern and post-modern division. 
 
6.2.3 Post-theory 
It is, then, problematic to comfortably locate CT, both in the Frankfurtian sense and the CT 
developed by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, in one of the much-debated drawers of 
modernism or post-modernism, for it does not clearly belong to either. In order to fully 
understand its specificity, attention must be drawn to the change of paradigm this radically 
different rationality propounds, that is, the re-evaluation of the value of theory itself and the 
re-introduction of the value of practice – not experimentation, but experience – as a key 
element to epistemology and heuristics. What is the position of CT, then, in relation to Post-
Theory?  
CT cannot be regarded as post-Theory, if post-theory is understood to be an attempt 
to obliterate any references to Theory, for the ubiquity of intertextuality means that we are 
unavoidably building on the texts and theories proposed in the past. What is more, even 
attempting to leave behind such a legacy would be against the spirit of integration of CT, 
which rather than a reinvention of our cultural heritage, propounds dismantling the existing 
hegemonic rationality by means of an alternative rationality that would promote a culture 
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primarily based on the values of eros rather than on thanatos (see Marcuse, 1970a: 50, 56, 
78-79, 180). Unlike Derrida’s deconstructionism, CT is firmly based on the socio-historical 
and material conditions that propitiate its existence in the first place. Instead of struggling 
against the presence of this heritage, it strives to understand its causes, sources, interests, 
agents, reach, and tendencies, so that from an integrating – not totalizing – perspective, it 
can raise awareness of its dynamics and offer a plausible alternative. 
CT is, however, post-Theory insofar as “post” emphasizes what comes after Theory 
as a reaction against what Bordwell refers to as Grand Theory, that is, Theory understood as 
a necessary framework of reference derived from “Lacanian psychoanalysis, Structuralist 
semiotics, Post-Structuralist literary theory, and variants of Althusserian Marxism” 
(Bordwell, 1996b: xiii). The approach of the FS is described as culturalism by Bordwell as 
a result of the ambitious reach of its scope; the overarching nature of its project would 
initially indicate that it qualifies as Grand Theory (see Bordwell, 1996a: 9). However, CT 
points in the direction of post-Theory in as much as it integrates, but does not limit itself to 
theory; it acknowledges and explores the routes offered by psychoanalysis and spirituality 
without them becoming overpowering frames of action and research. So, whereas Bordwell 
explains that “what is coming after Theory is not another Theory but theories and the 
activity of theorizing”, CT constitutes a bolder proposition in that, despite its name, it does 
not constitute so much a theory properly speaking, as a methodological path to developing, 
not yet other theories, but an alternative rationality that would open up new personal and 
socio-political possibilities (see Bordwell, 1996b: xiv).  
 
6.3 A hopeful Critical Theory 
If there are such key points of contact between some Spanish thinkers − this research only 
focuses on three, but there may well be more − and CT, to the extent that they can be called 
Critical Theorists themselves, why has the existence of CT in Spain gone previously 
unnoticed? There are a number of reasons for this. 
It is tempting to point to the relatively late reception of some key Critical Theorists in 
Spain as one of the causes. However, the late nature of this reception can be called into 
question. As Savater explains, thanks to Aguirre’s editions and translations, Spanish readers 
gain access to key works of the FS at a time when Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, or 
Benjamin are hardly known in other European countries such as France and Italy; 
Jesús fue un poco la figura de proa de la Escuela de Frankfurt aquí, y el causante de que en España 
fuera conocida mucho antes que en Italia y otros países europeos, y yo creo que también mejor. 
(Savater, 2006; see also Gullón, 1989: 11; Aranguren’s arguments 1994, 4: 542; 5.3.1 and 5.3.2).  
Another explanation may be found in the clear association between neo-Marxism and 
CT, which makes it a very problematic designation to adopt in the context of Francoist 
 299 
Spain given the rich and often negative connotations associated with Marxism. However, as 
discussed in Chapters Three and Five, the adoption or at least tolerance of Marxist views 
become very popular amongst members of the opposition to the regime, particularly during 
the 1960s. 
Thus, the key factor may be found in the specificity of Spanish discourse, that is, that 
although many of the problems raised, such as the new forms of alienation brought about by 
the consumer society, mass culture, manipulation of the mass media, false consciousness, 
and mass art are discussed at length and tackled by Spanish authors − as is the case in 
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre themselves − their essentially different discourse in 
terms of methodology, style, vocabulary, and form may have obscured their relationship 
and inherent similarities to CT as developed by the FS.  
In any case, the problems posed, the most notable example being that of instrumental 
reasoning, are addressed in line with CT, that is, in a manner which is thought to destabilize 
instrumental reason. In addition, specific elements not present in the Frankfurtian CT are 
introduced. The FS, but also the legacy of existentialism, and a deep-rooted spiritual 
tradition, lead to a brand of CT that is concerned with the mechanisms of neo-capitalism 
and the consequences of instrumental reason, but which, contrary to the pessimistic tone of 
the School, finds hope in the self rather than in institutional, social, or political changes; a 
“bottom-up” approach is developed. From this perspective, the latter changes, although 
necessary, will only be gradually possible insofar as they are the result of a qualitative and 
widespread change of the self. Aguirre, Zambrano, and also, to a lesser extent, Aranguren 
conceive of this change as based on the conceptualisation of a transcendental self. The 
insufficiency of instrumental reason is diagnosed as an inherent yearning for transcendence, 
which may be conscious or unconscious, which, in fact, often masquerades as the 
continuous quest for the unattainable, often directed at material consumption. As a result of 
this transcendentality, the self and the other regain a fundamental equality that makes 
qualitative change possible. Art and (political) education are identified as desirable and 
effective routes towards personal self-development. As a result, a more hopeful critique is 
provided, in contrast with the FS who were uncertain as to where the agents for change may 
lie, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre find the agent for change in the self who has been 
equipped with a vital element of transcendentality. 
In conclusion, I hope to have provided enough evidence throughout this thesis to 
support the argument that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre can all be considered Critical 
Theorists based on their theoretical work, their praxis, and, more importantly, their efforts 
at unveiling the shortcomings and unsatisfactory outcomes of instrumental reason. Their 
project can be considered as part of an integral and coherent effort to destabilize 
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instrumental reason, as well as to create, provide, and exercise an alternative, subversive, 
and, ultimately, liberating rationality.  
There is much, however, which has not been covered in this thesis. I would 
particularly like to draw attention to the actuality of the debate of the problem of reason. 
This can be observed in Bourdieu’s Acts of Resistance. Against the Tyranny of the Market 
(1998), where he includes an intervention, which coincidentally took place in Frankfurt, 
entitled “Abuse of Power by advocates of Reason” (1995). From this short intervention, it 
quickly becomes evident that, although the term “instrumental reason” may be in disuse, the 
issues and concerns it raises are far from obsolete or exhausted. Bourdieu criticizes the 
attempt of the West to impose a whole range of values, structures, and behaviours which 
have lead some cultures to “a very profound revolt against the reason which cannot be 
separated from the abuses of power which are armed or justified by reason (economic, 
scientific or any other)” (1998: 20). It is therefore visible how now, as before, the issue of 
reason remains a very problematic one, one that in the form of continuing crises, tensions, 
and dissatisfactions urgently demands our attention. 
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Appendix 1 
A list of the first editions of the translations into Spanish and in Spain of books written by 
members of the FS – including Benjamin – has been compiled below. The period covered 
expands since the first appearance of any such books in 1962 until what is often considered 
the end of the Transition in 1981, although no books of this nature were actually published 
in 1981, making 1980 the de facto cut off date. It should be noted that other translations of 
these and other works into Spanish may have taken place earlier in Latin America. 
However, such texts have not been included here, for they are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
Adorno, T.W. 1962a. Notas de literatura, M. Sacristán (tr.), Ariel, Barcelona. 
______ 1962b. Prismas; La crítica de la cultura y la sociedad, M. Sacristán (tr.), Ariel, 
Barcelona. 
______ 1964a. Filosofía y superstición, J. Aguirre y V. Sánchez de Zavala (trs.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
______ 1964b. Justificación de la filosofía, P. J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
______ 1966a. Disonancias: Música en el mundo dirigido, Rafael de la Vega (tr.), Rialp, 
Madrid. 
______ & M. Horkheimer. 1966b. Sociológica, V. Sánchez de Zavale (tr.), J. Aguirre (rev.), 
Taurus, Madrid. 
 ______ 1969a. Crítica cultural y sociedad, M. Sacristán (tr.), Barcelona, Ariel.  
 ______ 1969b. Tres estudios sobre Hegel, Víctor Sánchez de Zavala (tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
______ 1970. Reacción y progreso y otros ensayos musicales, J. Casanovas (tr.), Tusquets, 
Barcelona. 
______, et al. 1971a. Freud en la actualidad: Ciclo de conferencias de las Universidades de 
Frankfurt y Heidelberg, T.W. Adorno y W. Dirks (eds), J.M. Pomares Olivares (tr.), 
Seix Barral, Barcelona. 
______ 1971b. La ideología como lenguaje, J. Pérez Corral (tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
______, et al. 1973. La disputa del positivismo en la sociología alemana, J. Muñoz (tr.), 
Grijalbo, Barcelona. 
______ 1975. Dialéctica negativa, J.M. Ripalda (tr.), J. Aguirre (rev.), Taurus, Madrid. 
 _____ & H. Eisler. 1976a. El cine y la música, F. Montes (tr.), Fundamentos, Madrid. 
 _____ 1976b. Terminología filosófica, vol.1, R. Sánchez Ortiz (tr.) and J. Aguirre (rev.), 
Taurus, Madrid. 
 _____ 1977. Terminología filosófica, vol.2, R. Sánchez Ortiz (tr.) and J. Aguirre (rev.), 
Taurus, Madrid. 
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_____ 1980. Teoría estética, F. Riaza (tr.), F. Pérez Gutierrez (rev.), Taurus, Madrid. 
 
Benjamin, W. 1971a. Angelus novus, H.A. Murena (tr.), Edhasa, Barcelona. 
_____ 1971b. Iluminaciones, vol. 1, J. Aguirre (pról. y tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1971c. Imaginación y sociedad: Iluminaciones I, J. Aguirre (pról. y tr.), Taurus, 
Madrid.  
_____ 1972a. Baudelaire: Un poeta en el esplendor del capitalismo, vol.2, J. Aguirre (pról. 
y tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1972b. Poesía y capitalismo: Iluminaciones II, J. Aguirre (pról. y tr.), Taurus, 
Madrid.  
_____ 1973. Discursos interrumpidos: Filosofía del arte y de la historia, J. Aguirre (pról. y 
tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1974. Haschisch, J. Aguirre (pról. y tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1975. Tentativas sobre Brecht, J. Aguirre (pról. y tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
 
Horkheimer, M., et al. 1966. La función de las ideologías, V. Sánchez de Zavala (tr.), 
Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1973. Teoría crítica, J.J. del Solar B. (tr.), Barral, Barcelona. 
_____ 1975. El cuerpo y la salvación, Diorki y P. Parrado (trs.), Sígueme, Salamanca. 
_____ 1976. Sociedad de transición: Estudios de filosofía social, J. Godo Costa (tr.), 
Península, Barcelona. 
 
Marcuse, H. 1967. El marxismo soviético: Un análisis crítico, J.M. de la Vega (tr.), Revista 
de Occidente, Madrid. 
_____ 1968a. Eros y civilización, J. Garía Ponce (tr.), Seix Barral, Barcelona. 
_____ 1968b. El final de la utopía, M. Sacristán (tr.), Ariel, Barcelona. 
_____ 1968c. El hombre unidimensional: Ensayo sobre la ideología de la sociedad 
industrial avanzada, A. Elorza (tr.), Seix Barral, Barcelona. 
_____ 1969a. Ética de la revolución, A. Álvarez Remón, Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1969b. Psicoanálisis y política, U. Moulines (tr.), Península, Barcelona. 
_____ 1970a. Ensayos sobre política y cultura, J.R. Capella (tr.), Ariel, Barcelona. 
_____ 1970b. Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad, M. Sacristán (tr.), Martínez 
Roca, Barcelona. 
_____ 1971a. La agresividad en la sociedad industrial avanzada y otros ensayos, J.I. Saenz-
Díez (tr.), Alianza, Madrid. 
_____ 1971b. Razón y Revolución: Hegel y el surgimiento de la teoría social. J. Fombona 
de Sucre y F. Rubio Llorente (trs.), Alianza, Madrid. 
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_____ et al. 1975. Marcuse ante sus críticos, Grijalbo, Barcelona. 
_____, K. Popper, & M. Horkheimer. 1976a. A la búsqueda del sentido, Sígueme, 
Salamanca. 
_____ 1976b. Calas en nuestro tiempo: Marxismo y feminismo: Teoría y praxis; La nueva 
izquierda, P. Madrigal (tr.), Icaria, Barcelona.  
_____ 1978. La dimensión estética, J.F. Ivars (tr.), Materiales, Barcelona. 
 _____ & J. Habermas. 1980a. Conversaciones con Herbert Marcuse, G. Muñoz (tr.), 
Gedisa, Barcelona. 
 _____ 1980b. Teoría y política, M. Jiménez Redondo (tr.), Teorema, Valencia. 
 304 
Appendix 2 
Please find below a list of the contents of Aranguren’s complete works as edited by F. 
Blázquez, which has been reproduced from Blázquez’s edition (see 1994, 1: 831-35; 1994, 
2: 753-57; 1994, 3: 711-18; 1994, 4: 599-603; 1994, 5: 657-61; 1994, 6: 7-12). The details 
of the original publication of each text have been provided when available, as well as the 
pages and chapter that it corresponds to within the Obras Completas. 
Aranguren, J. L. 1994. Obras Completas, Blázquez, F. (ed.), Trotta, Madrid. 
   
Volúmen 1. Filosofía y religión  
Blázquez, F. “Introducción,” pp. 9-16. 
Aranguren, J.L.L. “Prólogo,” pp. 21-22, (firmado en el 1993). 
 _____ 1945. Filosofía de Eugenio D’ors, Ediciones y publicaciones españolas, Madrid, 
pp.23-207. 
 _____ 1952. Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia, Revista de 
Occidente, Madrid, pp.209-411.  
_____ 1955. Catolicismo, día tras día, Moguer, Barcelona, pp.413-533.  
_____ 1978. Contralectura del catolicismo, Planeta, Barcelona, pp.535-682.  
_____ 1969a. La crisis del catolicismo, Alianza, Madrid, pp.683-787.  
_____ 1970. El cristianismo de Dostoievski, Taurus, Madrid, pp.790-830.  
 
Volúmen 2. Ética  
 Blázquez, F. “Introducción,” pp. 9-16 
 Aranguren, J.L.L. 1954. El protestantismo y la moral, Sapientia, Madrid, pp.23-157.  
 _____ 1958a. Ética, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, pp.159-502.  
 _____ 1958b. La ética de Ortega, Taurus, Madrid, pp.503-39. 
 _____ 1963c. Implicaciones de la filosofía en la vida contemporánea, Taurus, Madrid, 
pp.541-60. 
 _____ 1983a. Propuestas morales, Tecnos, Madrid, pp.561-616.  
 _____ 1985. El buen talante, Tecnos, Madrid, pp.617-71.  
 _____ 1987. Moral de la vida cotidiana, personal y religiosa, Tecnos, Madrid, pp.673-752. 
 
Volúmen 3. Ética y sociedad  
_____ 1963a. Ética y política, Guadarrama, Madrid, pp.25-165. 
_____ 1968. El marxismo como moral, Alianza, Madrid, pp.167-224. 
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_____ 1973. Moralidades de hoy y de mañana, Taurus, Madrid, pp. 225-321. 
_____ 1982a Sobre imagen, identidad y heterodoxia, Taurus, Madrid, pp.323-452. 
_____ 1989. Ética de la felicidad y otros lenguajes, Tecnos, Madrid, pp.453-580.  
_____ 1972. Erotismo y liberación de la mujer, Ariel, Barcelona, pp.581-647.  
_____ 1983b. España, una meditación política, Ariel, Barcelona, pp.649-710. 
   
Volúmen 4. Moral, sociología y política I  
_____ “Prólogo,” pp.21-22. 
_____ 1966. Moral y sociedad. La moral social española en el siglo XIX, Edicusa, Madrid, 
pp.23-173. 
_____ 1961. La juventud europea y otros ensayos, Seix Barral, Barcelona, pp.175-250. 
_____ 1963b. El futuro de la Universidad y otras polémicas, Taurus, Madrid, pp.251-346. 
(Although Blázquez clarifies that it first appears in 1962, Cuadernos por la Libertad 
de la Cultura, París.)  
_____ 1974b. La cruz de la monarquía española actual, Taurus, Madrid, pp.347-89.  
_____ 1976b. Qué son los fascismos, La Gaya Ciencia, Barcelona, pp.391-418. 
_____ 1975. La cultura española y la cultura establecida, Taurus, Madrid, pp.419-597.  
 
Volúmen 5. Moral, sociología y política II  
_____ 1996. “Prólogo,” pp. 19-20. 
_____ 1965. La comunicación humana, Guadarrama, Madrid, pp.21-138. 
_____ 1974a. Entre España y América, Península, Barcelona, pp.139-296, (from the articles 
published in La Vanguardia, Barcelona). 
_____ 1979a. El oficio de intelectual y la crítica de la crítica, Vox, Madrid, pp.297-382. 
_____ 1979b. La democracia establecida. Una crítica intelectual, Taurus, Madrid, pp.383-
561, (from the articles published in El País, Madrid, and La Vanguardia, Barcelona). 
_____ 1982b. Bajo el signo de la juventud, Salvat, Barcelona, pp.563-610. 
_____ 1992. La vejez como autorrealización personal y social, Instituto Nacional de 
Servicios Sociales, Madrid, pp.611-56. 
  
Volúmen 6. Estudios literarios y autobiográficos.  
_____ 1957. Crítica y meditación, Taurus, Madrid, pp.21-145. 
_____ 1967. Remanso de navidad y examen de fin de año, Plaza Mayor, Madrid, pp.147-70. 
_____ 1969b. Memorias y esperanzas españolas, Taurus, Madrid, pp.171-252. 
_____ 1976a. Estudios literarios, pp.253-581. 
_____ 1981. Prólogo a las Obras de Pascal, Alfaguara, Madrid, pp.583-613.                   
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Works authored by J. Aguirre, including prologues and introductions 
Aguirre, J.P. 1956. Subsoladores para labores profundas sin volteo de tierra, Artes Gráficas 
Faure, Madrid.   
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1959. “Nota preliminar,” en G. Söhngen El cristianismo de Goethe, Taurus, 
Madrid, pp.7-9. 
_____ (tr.) 1961. “Prólogo,” en G. Söhngen El camino de la teología occidental, Castilla, 
Madrid, pp.13-17. 
_____ & V. Sánchez de Zavala (trs.). 1964. “Nota de los Editores,” en W. Adorno, Filosofía y 
superstición, Taurus, Madrid, p.7. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1966. “Justificación de la edición española,” en J. Pascher Evolución de las 
formas sacramentales, Taurus, Madrid, pp.7-9. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1967. “Prólogo,” en K. Rahner Teología y ciencias naturales, Madrid, Taurus, 
pp.9-18. 
Aguirre, J. (tr. & ed.) 1968. “Autor y su libro,” en G. Girardi Marxismo y cristianismo, Madrid, 
Taurus, pp.9-14. 
_____ (ed.) 1969a. Cristianos y marxistas: Los problemas de un diálogo, Alianza, Madrid. 
_____ 1969b. “Justificación de este volumen,” en J. Aguirre (ed.) Cristianos y marxistas: Los 
problemas de un diálogo, Alianza, Madrid, pp.7-11. 
_____ 1969c. “La historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos,” en J. Aguirre (ed.) Cristianos y 
marxistas: Los problemas de un diálogo, Alianza, Madrid, pp.13-34. 
_____ 1969d. “Presentación española. La libertad religiosa y su figura en la vida española 
actual,” en Vaticano II. La libertad religiosa, Taurus, Madrid, pp.13-19159. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1971a. “Advertencia editorial,” en J. Green Suite Inglesa, Taurus, Madrid, p.9. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1971b. “Prólogo,” en W. Benjamin Iluminaciones I, Taurus, Madrid, pp.7-14. 
_____ 1971c. Sermones en España, Edicusa, Madrid. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1971d. “Walter Benjamin. Estética y revolución,” en W. Benjamin 
Imaginación y sociedad, Taurus, Madrid, pp.5-14. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1972. “Prólogo,” en W. Benjamin Iluminaciones II: Baudelaire; Un poeta en 
el esplendor del capitalismo, Taurus, Madrid, p.11-19. 
_____ 1973. “Interrupciones sobre Walter Benjamin,” en W. Benjamin Discursos 
interrumpidos: Filosofía del arte y de la historia, Taurus, Madrid, pp.7-13. 
_____ 1974. “Nota editorial,” en W. Benjamin, Haschisch, Taurus, Madrid, pp.9-20.  
_____ (ed.) 1975a. “Prólogo” in T.W. Adorno Dialéctica negativa, Taurus, Madrid, pp.7-9. 
                                                
159 This is the edition used and referred to throughout the thesis, however, the first edition is published in 
1967, as indicated below in the list of works translated by Aguirre. 
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_____ (tr. & ed.) 1975b. “Prólogo,” en W. Benjamin Tentativas sobre Brecht, Taurus, Madrid, 
p.152. 
_____ (tr. & ed.) 1982. “Prólogo,” en K. Kraus Los periodistas y otros contras, Taurus, Madrid, 
pp.10-18. 
_____, Duque de Alba. 1983. “Algo más que Flandes,” El gran duque de Alba: Un siglo de 
España y de Europa, 1507-1582, Turner, Madrid, pp.7-10. 
_____, Duque de Alba. 1984a. Discurso leído ante la Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San 
Fernando en la recepción pública del excelentísimo señor don Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de 
Zárate, Duque de Alba, Artes Graf., Madrid, pp.9-16. 
_____ & F. Umbral. 1984b. “Mis queridos monstruos. El Duque de Alba,” en El País, 2 de 
julio, pp.11-12, <http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/AGUIRRE/_JESuS_/DUQUE_ 
DE_ALBA/Duque/Alba/elpepiopi/19840702elpepiopi_14/Tes/> [consultado 17/01/08]. 
_____, Duque de Alba. 1985. Casi ayer noche, Madrid, Turner. 
_____, Duque de Alba. 1986. Discurso leído por el Excmo. Sr. Don Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de 
Zárate, Duque de Alba, ante la Real Academia Española, el día 11 de diciembre y 
contestación del Excmo. Sr. Don Fernando Lázaro Carreter, Imp. Aguirre, Madrid. 
_____, Duque de Alba. 1987a. Altas oportunidades, Taurus, Madrid. 
_____, Duque de Alba. 1987b. Discurso leído ante la Real Academia de Buenas Letras, el día 
31 de mayo, en la recepción pública del Excelentísimo Señor Don Alberto Díaz Tejera y 
contestación del Excmo. Sr. Duque de Alba, Real Academia de Buenas Letras, Sevilla. 
Duque de Alba. 1987c. Secreto a voces: Treinta poemas menos uno, Renacimiento, Sevilla. 
_____, Duque de Alba, 1988a. El arpa en España de los siglos XVI al XVIII. Discurso del 
académico electo Nicanor Zabaleta Zala, leído en el acto de su recepción pública el día 
24 de enero de 1988 y contestación del Duque de Alba, Real Academia de Bellas Artes de 
San Fernando, Madrid. 
_____, Duque de Alba, 1988b. “Hawthorne o el prisionero de su libertad,” en N. Hawthorne La 
letra roja, A. Ruste (tr.), Madrid, Espasa Calpe, pp.9-23. 
  
Aguirre, J. 1988c. Memorias del cumplimiento. Crónica de una Dirección General, vol.4, 
Alianza, Madrid. 
_____, Duque de Alba, 1989a. Las horas situadas, Turner, Madrid. 
_____ 1989b. “Moscú, capital del dolor,” en El país, 14 de febrero, 
<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/BENJAMIN/_WALTER/UNIoN_SOVIeTICA/
Moscu/capital/dolor/elpepiopi/19890214elpepiopi_10/Tes/> [consultado 02/02/08]. 
_____, Duque de Alba, 1989c. “Prólogo,” en E. Tierno Galván Los toros, acontecimiento 
nacional, Turner, Madrid, pp. 7-10.  
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_____ 1990a. “Músicas para Walter Benjamin,” en El País, 24 de mayo, 
<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/BENJAMIN/_WALTER/Musicas/Walter/Benja
min/elpepiopi/19900524elpepiopi_10/Tes/> [consultado 31/01/08]. 
_____, Duque de Alba, 1990b. “Prólogo,” en Smith, W. Eugenia de Montijo: ¡Qué pena, pena! 
Anne-Marie Ledoux (tr.), Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, pp.7-10. 
_____, Duque de Alba & G. Prieto. 1990c. Reflexiones y recuerdos Texto impreso discurso del 
académico electo Gregorio Prieto; y contestación del Sr. D. Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de 
Zarate, Fundación Gregorio Prieto, Madrid, pp.31-42. 
_____ 1992. Memorias del cumplimiento. Crónica en la comisaría, vol.6, Plaza & Janés, 
Barcelona. 
_____, Duque de Alba, & F. Pérez. 1995. La religión como sistema establecido, Movimiento 
Cultural Cristiano, Madrid. 
_____, Duque de Alba, 2002. Antología literaria, A. Duque (ed.), El Monte, Sevilla. 
 
 
Works translated, edited, or revised by J. Aguirre 
Adorno, W. 1964a. Filosofía y superstición, P. J. Aguirre & V. Sánchez de Zavala (trs.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
______ 1964b. Justificación de la filosofía, P. J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
______ & M. Horkheimer. 1966b. Sociológica, V. Sánchez de Zavale (tr.), P.J. Aguirre (rev.) 
Taurus, Madrid. 
______ 1971b. La ideología como lenguaje, J. Pérez Corral (tr.) Taurus, Madrid. 
______ 1972. Filosofía y superstición, J. Aguirre y V. Sánchez de Zavala (trs.), Taurus, Madrid. 
______ 1975. Dialéctica negativa, J.M. Ripalda (tr.), J. Aguirre (rev.), Taurus Madrid. 
 _____ 1976. Terminología filosófica, vol.1, R. Sánchez Ortiz (tr.), J. Aguirre (rev.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
 _____ 1977. Terminología filosófica, vol.2, R. Sánchez Ortiz (tr.), J. Aguirre (rev.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
Benjamin, W. 1971a. Angelus novus, H.A. Murena (tr.), Edhasa, Barcelona. 
_____ 1971b. Iluminaciones, vol. 1, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1971c. Imaginación y sociedad: Iluminaciones I, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1972a. Baudelaire: Un poeta en el esplendor del capitalismo, vol.2, J. Aguirre (tr.), 
Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1972b. Poesía y capitalismo: Iluminaciones II, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1973. Discursos interrumpidos: Filosofía del arte y de la historia, J. Aguirre (tr.), 
Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1974. Haschisch, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1975. Tentativas sobre Brecht, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
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Concilio Vaticano II (1962-1965). 1967. La libertad religiosa. Declaración “Dignitatis 
humanae personae”, J. Hamer e Y. Congar (Comentarios), B. de Pablos (tr.), P.J. Aguirre 
(ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Concilio Vaticano II (1962-1965). 1969. La liturgia despues del Vaticano II: Balances, 
estudios, prospecciones. Constitución “Sacrosantum Concilium”, J.P. Jossua e Y.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Congar (Comentarios), C. Sánchez Gil (tr.), P.J. Aguirre (ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Cook, R. 1994. Tratamiento letal, J. Aguirre (tr.), Plaza & Janés, Barcelona.  
Dilthey, W. 1963. La gran música de Bach, P. J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.  
Girardi, G. 1968. Marxismo y cristianismo, J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Green, 1971. Suite Inglesa, J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Kraus, K. 1982. Los periodistas y otros contras, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Marcuse, H. 1969a. Ética de la revolución, A. Álvarez Remón (tr.), J. Aguirre (ed.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
Mitscherlich, A. 1971. La idea de la paz y la agresividad humana, J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, 
Madrid.  
Pascher, J. 1966. Evolución de las formas sacramentales, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
Rahner, K. 1962a. Marginales sobre la pobreza y la obediencia, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
_____ 1962b. Para una teología del concilio, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, Madrid 160. 
_____ 1967. Teología y ciencias naturales, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Ratzinger, J. 1962. El Dios de la fe y el Dios de los filósofos, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
Schmaus, M. 1962. Permanencia y progreso en el cristianismo, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, 
Madrid. 
Söhngen, G. 1959. El cristianismo de Goethe, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1961. El camino de la teología occidental, P.J. Aguirre (tr.), Castilla, Madrid. 
Vorgrimler, H. 1963. Vida y obra de Karl Rahner, P.J. Aguirre (tr. & ed.), Taurus, Madrid. 
Welte, B. 1968. Esencia y recto uso del poder, P. J. Aguirre, (tr. & ed.), Talleres de Marible, 
Madrid. 
 
Works by J.L. Aranguren 
_____ 1945. Filosofía de Eugenio d’Ors, Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid. 
_____ 1952. Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia, Revista de Occidente, 
Madrid. 
                                                
160 The first page indicates that this book is published only after having been subjected to ecclesiastical 
censorship. 
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_____ 1953. “La evolución espiritual de los intelectuales españoles en la emigración,” 
Cuardernos Hispanoamericanos 38: 123-58.  
_____ 1954. El protestantismo y la moral, Sapientia, Madrid. 
_____ 1955. Catolicismo, día tras día, Moguer, Barcelona.  
_____ 1958a. Ética, Revista de Occidente, Madrid. 
_____ 1958b. La ética de Ortega, Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1963a. Ética y política, Guadarrama, Madrid. 
_____ 1963b. El futuro de la Universidad y otras polémicas, Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1965. La comunicación humana, Guadarrama, Madrid. 
_____ 1968. El marxismo como moral, Alianza, Madrid. 
_____ 1969. “El diálogo futuro entre marxistas y cristianos,” en J. Aguirre (ed.) Cristianos y 
marxistas; Los problemas de un diálogo, Alianza, Madrid, pp.203-14. 
_____ 1974a. Entre España y América, Península, Barcelona. 
_____ 1975. La cultura española y la cultura establecida, Taurus, Madrid.  
_____ 1979a. El oficio de intelectual y la crítica de la crítica, Vox, Madrid. 
_____ 1979b. La democracia establecida. Una crítica intelectual, Taurus, Madrid. 
_____ 1979c. “Sansueña juega, ojalá (a la cultura),” en El País, 15 de marzo, 
<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/FERNANDEZ-SANTOS/_FRANCISCO/ESPA 
 nA/UNIoN_DE_CENTRO_DEMOCRaTICO/Sansuena/juega/ojala/cultura/elpepiopi/1979
0315elpepiopi_7/Tes/> [consultado 14/05/08]. 
_____ 1982b. Bajo el signo de la juventud, Salvat, Barcelona. 
_____ 1983. El pensamiento de María Zambrano: Papeles de Almagro, Zero, Madrid. 
_____ 1984. “Utopía y libertad,” Revista de Occidente 33-34 (9): 27-35. 
_____ 1985. El buen talante, Tecnos, Madrid. 
_____ 1991. “Prólogo,” en Heidegger: La voz de tiempos sombríos, Serbal, Barcelona, pp.7-10. 
_____ 1994. Obras completas, F. Blázquez (ed.) vols1-6, Trotta, Madrid. 
 
Works by M. Zambrano 
Zambrano, M. 1928. “Preocupándose de lo social, la mujer,” El Liberal August: 3. 
_____ 1930. Nuevo liberalismo, Morata, Madrid. 
_____ 1934. “Hacia un saber sobre el alma,” Revista de Occidente 138 (46): 261-76. 
_____ 1937. Los intelectuales en el drama de España, Panorama, Santiago de Chile. 
_____ 1939. Pensamiento y poesía en la vida española, Casa de España en México, México. 
_____ 1948. “Delirio de Antígona,” Orígenes 18: 14-21.  
_____ 1955. El hombre y lo divino, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México. 
_____ 1967. La tumba de Antígona, Siglo Veintiuno, México. 
_____ 1971. Obras reunidas, vol.1, Aguilar, Madrid. 
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_____ 1977a. Claros del bosque, Seix Barral, Barcelona. 
_____ 1977b. Los intelectuales en el drama de España, Hispamerca, Madrid. 
_____ 1983. “San Juan de la Cruz. De la ‘noche oscura’ a la más clara mística,” en Litoral: 
Revista de poesía y pensamiento, 124-126 (2): 17-32. 
_____ 1986a. De la aurora, Turner, Madrid.   
_____ 1986b. El sueño creador, Turner, Madrid. 
_____ 1986c. Senderos, Anthropos, Barcelona. 
_____ 1987. “A modo de autobiografía,” Anthropos 70-71: 69-73. 
_____ 1988a. La agonía de Europa, Mondadori, Madrid. 
_____ 1988b. Persona y democracia: La historia sacrificial, Anthropos, Barcelona. 
_____ 1989a. Delirio y destino: Los veinte años de una española, Mondadori, Madrid. 
_____ 1989b. “He estado siempre en el límite,” entrevistada por J.C. Marset en ABC, 23 de 
abril, pp.70-71. 
_____ 1992a. El hombre y lo divino, Siruela, Madrid. 
_____ 1992b. Los sueños y el tiempo, Siruela, Madrid. 
_____ 1996a. Horizonte del liberalismo, Morata, Madrid. 
_____ 1996b. “Delirio, esperanza y razón,” en J.L. Arcos (ed.) La cuba secreta y otros ensayos, 
Endymión, Madrid, pp.164-71. 
_____ 2003. La razón en la sombra, J. Moreno Sanz (ed.) Siruela, Madrid. 
_____ 2004a. Bienaventurados, Siruela, Madrid.  
_____ 2004b. “Diótima de Mantinea” en E. Laurenzi (ed.) María Zambrano: Nacer por sí 
misma, horas y HORAS, Madrid, pp.125-33. 
_____ 2004c. Hacia un saber sobre el alma, Alianza, Madrid. 
_____ 2004d. La confesión: Género literario, Siruela, Madrid. 
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<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/ultima/AGUIRRE/_JESuS_/DUQUE_DE_ALB 
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so/Jesus/Aguirre/elpepiult/19780317elpepiult_3/Tes/> [consultado 09/03/08]. 
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